TELOS

Number 29 Fall 1976

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a quarterly journal of radical social theory

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TOUR OF THE CITY*

by Hans Magnus Enzensberger

Over there crouches the shoeshine man
who doesn't need shoes anymore:
His legs rotted away
a long time ago, in the Far East

That is the smoke from the shipyards

This café used to be jammed
with peddlers and starving poets
Informers sat there like flies
and sipped blood from little cups

Here you can have soft girls
for hard cash
The pavement is torn up
that's where the tanks were

This is where the Emperor
used to take rides on summer days
Stadtwäldchenallee — now Gorkij fasor
That's the Central Committee

That is the smoke from the stockyards

Here my friend Sandor was born
before the second World War
in the big apartment
where it was always dark

Do you see the smoke?

This bridge was completely destroyed
Here the rich poets have tea
and scoff quietly
And there the new Hilton is going up

On this wobbly park bench
there sometimes sits an old man
who sometimes speaks the truth
He is not there today

But the smoke . . .
Do you see the smoke?
The old smoke over Budapest

*Translated from the German by R.V. Heydebrand.

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STADTRUNDFAHRT

von Hans Magnus Enzensberger

Da drüben kauert der Schuhputzer
der keine Schuhe mehr braucht
denn seine Beine sind verfault
im Fernen Osten vor langer Zeit

Das ist der Rauch von den Werften

Dieses Café war früher ganz schwarz
von Hausierern und armen Dichtern
Spitzel wie Mücken sassen dort
und tranken aus kleinen Tassen Blut

Hier gibt es weiche Mädchen
gegen harte Devisen
Das Pflaster ist aufgerissen
Dort standen damals die Panzer

Da ist im Sommer immer
der Kaiser spazierengefahren
Stadtwäldchenallee, heute Gorkij fasor
Das ist das Zentralkomittee

Das ist der Rauch von den Schlachthöfen

Hier ist mein Freud Sandor geboren
vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg
in der Beletage
wo es Tag und Nacht dunkel war

Siehst du den Rauch?

Diese Brücke war ganz zerstört
Hier trinken die reichen Dichter Tee
und schimpfen leise
und dort wird das neue Hilton gebaut

Auf dieser wackligen Parkbank
sitzt manchmal ein alter Mann
der manchmal die Wahrheit sagt
Heute ist er nicht da

Aber der Rauch. Siehst du den Rauch

den alten Rauch über Budapest?

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THE HUNGARIAN SOURCE
by Cornelius Castoriadis

". . . Over the coming years, *all significant questions* will be condensed into one: Are you for or against the action and the program of the Hungarian workers?"[1] Perhaps I should apologize for quoting myself. But today, twenty years later, I stand by these lines more firmly and more savagely, if possible, than when I wrote them. Nothing—not even the silence surrounding the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in virtually all the Left, New Left and Far Left literature—has altered my attitude in the least. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that this silence is but one more sinister indication of the domination of reactionary ideas in the contemporary world. It means that the Stalinist bureaucracy continues, even if more indirectly, to dictate the parameters of permissible discussion.

Of course, the actual impact and influence of the Hungarian Revolution cannot be gauged by the silence that has followed. Despite ideological repression of the memory of the 1956 events, there has certainly been a continuous "working through" of their meaning. Moreover, in addition to the Revolution's probable subterranean effects in Eastern Europe and Russia, there is little doubt that the wide diffusion of the the idea of self-management during the last two decades is linked to the exemplary demands of the Hungarian Workers' Councils. Here again, however, it is no accident that most of the organizations advocating self-management (in particular, but by no means only, reformist parties and unions) keep silent about Hungary and instead refer to the more respectable (and empty) Yugoslav model. Divorced from the power of Worker's Councils and the destruction of the existing order, self-management is presented as something which could be added, without tears, to the present system. Nevertheless, propagation of the idea of self-management does serve to undermine the foundations of bureaucratic domination, and it is by no means certain that the reformist bureaucrats will succeed in reducing it to a mere embellishment of the established order.

I spoke about the silence that for years has surrounded the Hungarian Revolution. Although the literature pertaining to these events now amounts to several thousand volumes, most of it has been written by specialists for specialists and is, therefore, much more a manifestation of the tremendous expansion of academic writing and publishing business than it is a true recognition of the revolutionary significance of 1956. To be sure, the Hungarian Revolution was defeated. But so was the Paris Commune of 1871, yet this did not prevent revolutionaries from celebrating its example and

1. "La révolution prolétarienne contre la bureaucratie," *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, 20 (December, 1956); reprinted now in *La Société bureaucratique*, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1973), pp. 277-278. The present text presupposes some familiarity with the Hungarian events of 1956, especially concerning the constitution, activities and demands of the Workers' Councils. Numbers 20 and 21 (March, 1957) of *Socialisme ou Barbarie* were largely devoted to the 1956 events in Hungary and Poland, and included documents and texts by refugee participants in the Hungarian Revolution. For some bibliographical indications, see *La Société bureaucratique*, *ibid.*, p. 265.

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discussing its lessons. That the Hungarian Revolution was crushed by the Russian Army may explain its lesser resonance among the popular strata, but it does *not* account for the systematic silence among revolutionaries and left-wing intellectuals. Or is it that the ideas ceased to be valid once the Russian tanks rolled over them in the streets of Budapest?

But things become clearer as soon as the content, the meaning and the implications of the Hungarian Revolution are considered. Then this silence can be understood for what it is: the direct consequence of the radical character of this Revolution, and the attempt to repress its significance and its memory.

Modern society can be best characterized as *bureaucratic capitalism*. And its purest, most extreme form has been realized in Russia, China and the other countries presently masquerading as socialist. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was the first and, up to now, the *only total revolution against total bureaucratic capitalism*. As such, it foreshadows the content and orientation of future revolutions in Russia, China and the other bureaucratic capitalist societies. In taking up arms, the Hungarian workers and youth put a final, practical end to the absurd scholastic debates about the social character of the regimes in Russia and other Eastern European countries. Through their deeds, they demonstrated that the difference between workers and the workers' state is the difference between life and death; that they would rather die fighting against the workers' state than continue to live as workers under it.

Like the fragmented bureaucratic capitalism of the West, the total bureaucratic capitalism of the East is full of contradictions and torn by permanent social conflicts which recurrently reach acute levels and drive the system toward open crisis. Economics and Politics are, of course the areas where these contradictions and conflicts manifest themselves in the most pressing manner. The quasi-permanent economic chaos endemic to bureaucratic planning and rooted in fundamental conflicts in production,[2] and omnipresent political repression appear as the more intolerable aspects of total bureaucratic capitalism. Obviously, these two aspects are strongly interdependent and reciprocally conditioned—and both are necessary results of the logic of the system. Yet, fantastic as this may be, they are regarded as secondary blemishes or reformable defects by virtually the whole international Left. Thus, reforms which would preserve the substance of the system (a new case of squaring the circle) are welcomed by the candidate bureaucrats of the West and their open or disguised ideologues (socialists,

2. Cf. my article cited in note 1 above, especially pp. 278-307; also, "Sur le contenu du socialisme, III: La lutte des ouvriers contre l'organisation de l'entreprise capitaliste," *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, 23 (January, 1958); reprinted now in *L'Expérience du mouvement ouvrier*, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1974), pp. 9-88. The extraordinary book by the Hungarian Miklos Haraszti, *Salaire aux pièces: Ouvrier dans un pays socialiste* (Paris, 1976), a section of which has been translated into English as "I Heard the Iron Cry," in *New Left Review*, 91 (May-June, 1975), shows the identical nature of the relations of production and organization of the work process between "capitalist" factories in the West and "socialist" factories in the East.

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dissident and now even orthodox communists in Italy, France, etc., Trotskyists, progressive journalists, various types of intellectual fellow-travellers, from existentialist philosophers of yesterday like Sartre and the *Les Temps Modernes* team to radical economists of today like Nuti, etc.). It is no wonder that these strange bed-fellows could have been more or less unanimous in their support of Gomulka in 1956-57 and in their opposition to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, while in the case of the Hungarian Revolution they resorted to shameful slanders (the communists), approved the final Russian invasion (Sartre), frowned upon the spasmodic, elementary and spontaneous actions of the Hungarian workers (Mandel) or retreated into silence as quickly as they could. In 1956 Poland the people did not take up arms. Despite their development and their effervescence, the Workers' Councils never explicitly questioned the existing power structure. The Communist Party succeeded by means of minor internal purges and some shifts of personnel, in keeping the situation under control throughout the critical period and thus in stifling any initiative from below.[3] Things were even clearer in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Left protests even louder. In this case there was virtually no sign of autonomous activity on the part of the general population. Instead, the new leadership of the Communist Party was attempting to introduce some democratic reforms and a degree of decentralization in the economy. It goes without saying that the population could not but be in favor of these measures. A reform from above, with the support of the people—what a golden dream for today's revolutionaries! As Mandel would say, this would "have allowed millions of proletarians to once again identify with the workers' State." Of course, in these circumstances it is possible to blame the Russian tanks.

But in Hungary, the movement of the masses was so powerful and so radical that both the Communist party and the whole existing state apparatus were literally pulverized in a few days. There was never even a question of dual power. Whatever power there was rested with the armed youth and the

3. I discussed, at the time, developments in Poland in "La voie polonaise de la bureaucratisation," *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, 21(March, 1957), reprinted now in *La Société bureaucratique*, Vol. 2, *op.cit.*, pp. 339-371. Here it is worth quoting at length the inimitable E. Mandel, lest the reader think I am exaggerating for the sake of polemics: "...Socialist democracy will still have to engage in more battles in Poland. But the main battle which allowed millions of proletarians *to once again identify with the Worker's State*, is already won... The political revolution which, for a month now, shakes up Hungary, has shown a more spasmodic and unequal development than the political revolution in Poland. It did not, like the latter, fly from victory to victory [*sic*]... This is because, contrary to the situation in Poland, the Hungarian Revolution was an elementary and spontaneous explosion. The subtle interaction [!!!] between objective and subjective factors, between the initiative of the masses and *the building of a new leadership*, between pressure from below and *the crystallization of an opposition faction above, at the summit of the Communist Party, an interaction which made possible the Polish victory* [?!?], has been missing in Hungary." From *Quatrième Internationale* (December, 1956), pp. 22, 23; emphasis added. The bureacratic essence of Trotskyism, its nature as a faction of Stalinist bureaucracy in exile, its yearning to rejoin the Party apparatus at the slightest chance of internal struggle and some "pressure from below" has rarely been expressed with more clarity—and in more laughable style.

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Workers' Councils, whose Program[4] was totally incompatible with the preservation of the bureaucratic social structure. The demands were for self-management in the enterprises, abolition of work norms, a drastic reduction in income inequalities, control of general planning activities, control of the composition of the Government and a new orientation of the country's foreign policy. And all this was agreed upon and clearly formulated *in the span of a few days*. In this context to remark that certain aspects of these demands were unclear and inadequate would be ludicrously irrelevant. Had the Revolution not been crushed by the Kremlin murderers, its development would have forced the necessary clarifications and completions and would have shown whether or not the Councils and the people could find in themselves the capacity and strength to establish new power-structures and new social institutions.

What was the historical and sociological meaning of the extraordinary proliferation of parties, organizations, etc., in the span of a few days? Precisely this: that a genuine Revolution was taking place. This proliferation and the corresponding spectrum of ideas *is*, indeed, *the* distinctive mark of the Revolution. It is not despite, but because of this unlimited manifestation of political tendencies—this "chaotic" (for bureaucrats and philistines) character of the social explosion—that we recognize the Hungarian events of 1956 as a Revolution. It is—or rather, ought to be—a commonplace that a true Revolution is always national: all sections and strata of the nation abandon their passive conformity to the old order and strive to take an active part in its destruction and in the shaping of a new order. The whole of the heretofore oppressed society seizes the opportunity to express itself; the people stand up and speak loudly their ideas and their demands. This is what happened during the French Revolution after 1789, and in the Russian Revolution after February 1917. The highly suspect and intolerable mess created by both doubtlessly would have been condemned on grounds of impurity, confusion, etc., by the critics of the Hungarian Revolution. But Revolution is precisely this state of overheating and fusion of society, along with the general mobilization of all social categories and strata, and the destruction of all established barriers. It is this unrestrained character which accounts for the extraordinary liberation and expansion of society's creative potential during revolutionary periods, the interruption of the repetitious cycles of social life, the sudden *opening* of history.

Despite its short life-span, the Hungarian Revolution posited new organizational forms and social meanings which represent an original social-historical *creation*. The source of this creation was the activity of the

4. I am referring to the points I consider most important as they were already formulated by the 28th and 29th of October, 1956. Unbelievable as it may appear, the demands formulated by the Councils after November 11 (i.e., after the full occupation of the country by the Russian Army and the murder of thousands of people) were even more radical, comprising the constitution of an armed workers' militia and the establishment of Councils in all branches of activity, *including Government administrations*.

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Hungarian people—intellectuals, students, workers. Theoreticians and politicians as such contributed nothing to it; rather, they continued to offer only deceit and mystification. The intellectuals, however, had begun months before the outburst to play an important, positive role by demolishing the political, ideological and theoretical nonsense with which the Stalinist bureaucracy had presented its totalitarian dictatorship as peoples' democracy and socialism. They played this role not by bringing to the people a new, ready-made truth, but by courageously exposing the old lies for what they were. New, positive truths were created by the people themselves during and by means of their autonomous activity. I call them positive because they were *embodied* in actions and organizational forms designed not only for the struggle *against* exploitation and oppression by the bureaucracy, but also as new forms for the organization of collective life on the basis of new principles. These principles entailed a radical break with all established social structures (East or West) and, once made explicit, reduced to nonsense the inherited political philosophy and theory. This, in turn, overthrew the traditional relationship betwen theory and practice, as well as that between theoreticians and plain people. In the Hungarian Revolution we find a new point of departure—*a new source*—which both forces us to reflect anew on the problems of *politics* in the modern world, and provides us with some of the means for doing so.

Let us have a look at the contributions of distinguished theoreticians and politicians before or during the 1956 events. Consider, for instance, Georg Lukács. He certainly was one of the very few creative Marxist theoreticians to appear after Marx. What did *he* do? From about 1924 until 1956 he *covered*—ideologically—Stalin and Stalinism, the Moscow Trials, the Goulag, socialist realism and developments in Hungary since 1945; he implemented successively, the orders of Zinoviev, Bukharin, Zadanov, Révai, etc. And he did so *in full knowledge* of the facts, *and* of "the most revolutionary conception history has ever produced:" Marxism.[5] He spent his life swearing by *die List der Vernunft*—the Cunning of Reason; and made himself into an extreme instance of *die Unlist der blossen Vernunft*—the blindness of sheer reason.

Or consider Imre Nagy, the politician. Where did his political cunning come into play against the treacherous lies of the Russian bureaucracy? Did he for a single moment find in himself the clarity of mind and the resolve to speak out loudly against the Russian deception with which he was so well acquainted? No. He muddled through, and tried to seek help...from the United Nations! History in the making; the bloody drama of power; armored tanks and guns facing the naked hands and breasts of millions of people; and Nagy the statesman, the *Realpolitiker*, could only think of the

5. I am not talking about the persons as such, but about the significance of their behavior. The personal tragedy of Lukács (or of Nagy, etc.) is, in this context, irrelevant. For Lukács in particular, the Hegelian Marxist, to weep about his "subjective drama" would only add insult to injury.

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United Nations—that sinister *Guignol* theater where the bandits of Washington and Moscow, assisted by their respective second or third order ruffians, make speeches against each other in public and combine their dirty business in the corridors.

Such was the contribution of the non-spontaneous, the most conscious, well-learned and highly skilled professionals of theory and politics. But the contribution of the non-professionals was a radical revolution—not foreseen, not prepared, not organized by anybody, and so spontaneous, like all revolutions in history.

The Hungarian people did not act spontaneously in the sense that a baby cries spontaneously if hurt. Rather, they acted on the basis of their social and historical experience, and they fashioned something new out of it. Now, when the self-styled theoretician or revolutionary looks contemptuously upon what he calls spontaneity, the hidden postulate in the back of his mind is: It is impossible that this rabble could ever learn anything from their lives, draw any sensible conclusions, put two and two together—let alone bring forward new ideas and try to find *their own* solutions to *their own* problems. The essential identity of this postulate, over thousands of years, with the basic tenets of the ruling classes concerning society and man, hardly needs to be stressed.

A slight digression seems necessary here. Marxist and leftist intellectuals continue to spend their time and energy writing interminably about the relation between "Volume One" and "Volume Three" of *Das Kapital*, commenting on and interpreting this or that comment on Marx by this or that interpreter of Marx, and hardly ever considering actual *history*, the effective creation of forms and meanings in and through the activity of people. Thus, once again, history is reduced to the history of ideas, and a very narrow set of ideas at that. One of the consequences is that history tends to be understood less and less. For history is not just the array of objective facts; what matters, from a revolutionary point of view, is the *interpretation* of these facts, something which cannot be left to the historians of the university establishment. Certainly, this interpretation is a function of both the theoretical ideas and the political project of the interpreter. But it is the organic connection between these three elements: the project, the ideas and the full consideration of actual history as a *source* (and not as dead material), which is the distinctive trait of the revolutionary intellectual's work and which alone marks his radical departure from the traditional, dominant conception of "theoretical work." And it is this connection which is in fact broken in virtually all of today's left-wing literature.

But much more is involved here. For both the project and the ideas have their origin in actual history, that is, in the creative activity of people in modern society. The revolutionary project is not a logical inference derived from correct theory. Rather, the successive theories in this field are attempts at a universal formulation of that which masses of people, over the last two hundred years—workers at first, then women, students, national minorities,

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etc.—have expressed in their struggles against established social institutions. By forgetting this fact, the revolutionary intellectual falls into a ridiculous contradiction. He proclaims that his theory enables him to understand and even to judge history, yet he seems to ignore that the essential *source* of his theory is precisely the historical activity of the people. In this way, the revolutionary intellectual blinds himself to this activity as it manifests itself *in the present,* e.g., the Hungarian Revolution.

To drive home this point, consider Marx's work. Had this work been merely a synthesis of classical German philosophy, English political economy and French utopian socialism, it would have remained just another theory. The difference lies in the political ideas which animated Marx. But what was the source of these ideas? There is virtually *nothing* among them—or at any rate, nothing retaining any contemporary relevance and value—which can be attributed to Marx alone. Virtually all of Marxism has its source in the working class movement as it was forming itself between 1800 and 1840; virtually all of it is already there, black on white, in the English working class literature of this time.[6] And what "addition" was Marx able to make to his political ideas after the *Communist Manifesto*? Only the idea of the destruction of the existing state apparatus and the dictatorship of the proletariat which was, as he himself pointed out, the lesson of the Paris Commune; a lesson embodied in the activity of the Parisian workers and, first and foremost, in the new institutional form they created: the commune itself. This creation Marx had not foreseen—despite his theory, and despite his genius. But being Marx, and not a Marxist, he was able to recognize it after the event.[7]

Let us revert to our main argument. What would be "non-spontaneity?" To what is spontaneity opposed? To consciousness? But is anybody saying that the Hungarian workers, for instance, were *un*conscious? In what sense? Sleepwalkers? Under LSD? Zombies? Or is it that they were not conscious enough—or not in the proper way? But what is enough consciousness, or the proper way of being conscious? Mr. Mandel's, perhaps? Or Mr. Sartre's? Or would it be Absolute Knowledge? Whose? Is there anybody around representing it? And what is he *doing* with it? We do, at any rate, know what Kautsky and Lenin did with their knowledge.

Or is organization the opposite of spontaneity? But the question is precisely: *what* organization, and *whose* organization? The spontaneous action of the Hungarian people was action *toward organization; and even* more, their spontaneity was exactly that, *their self-organization.* And this is what the bureaucrat pseudo-theoretician hates the most: the workers

6. The material contained in E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Gollancz, 1963; revised Penguin edition, 1968) abundantly illustrates this point.

7. It is all the more striking to note that, despite this precedent, and Marx's recognition of the fundamental importance of the Commune's *form*, Lenin's initial reaction to the spontaneous emergence of the Soviets in Russia during the 1905 Revolution was negative and hostile. People were doing things contrary to what he, Lenin, had decided on the basis of his theory that they ought to be doing.

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organize themselves in Councils instead of waiting, with enthusiastic passivity, for him to come and organize them. And how does he organize them if given the chance? Like the dominant classes have always done, for centuries, in the factories and in the armies. Clearly, he does this if and when he takes power; but also before that—in large unions, for instance, or in a "Bolshevik party" —where structure, form and content of relations simply reproduce the relations of capitalist society: hierarchy, the division between a stratum of executive leaders and a mass of followers, the veil of pseudo-knowledge cast over the power of a self-coopting and self-perpetuating bureaucracy. If the opposite of spontaneity (that is, of self-activity and self-organization) is *hetero*-organization (that is, organization by politicians, theoreticians, professional revolutionaries, etc.), then, clearly, the opposite of spontaneity is *counter*-revolution, or the conservation of the existing order.

The revolution is exactly that: self-organization of the people. By the same token, it obviously presupposes having become conscious of the essential characteristics and mechanisms of the established system and of the desire and the will to invent a new solution to the problem posed by the institution of society.[8] Self-organization is here *self-organizing* and consciousness is *becoming-conscious*; both are *processes*, not *states*. It is not that people have finally found *the* appropriate form of social organization, but that they realize that this form *is* their activity of organizing themselves in accordance with their understanding of the situation and the ends they set for themselves. In this sense, the revolution cannot but be spontaneous, both in its inception and its unfolding. For the revolution *is* the explicit self-institution of society. "Spontaneity" here means nothing else than the creative socio-historical activity in its highest expression; that which has as its object the transformation of society itself.

No historical action is spontaneous in the sense of surging in a vacuum, of being totally unrelated to its conditions, its environment and its past. And every important historical action is spontaneous precisely in the pristine sense of the word: *spons*, source. History is creation, i.e., the emergence of that which is not already contained in its causes, conditions, etc.; that which is not repetition, neither *stricto sensu* nor in the sense of a variant of the already given, but the position of new forms and figures, and new meanings—that is, *self-institution*. To put it in a more narrow, more pragmatic, more operational way: spontaneity is the excess of the result over the causes.[9]

8. It is clear, for instance, that the understanding possessed by the Hungarian workers in their activity of the social character of the bureaucracy as an exploitative and oppressive class, *and* of the conditions for its existence, was *from a theoretical viewpoint* infinitely superior to all the pseudo-theoretical analyses contained in thirty years of Trotskyist literature and in most of the other left Marxist writings.

9. The postulate of "identity" underlying all inherited philosophical and scientific thought is equivalent to the assertion that such an excess, if and when it exists, is always only "a measure of our ignorance." The presumption which goes with it is that this measure can, *de jure*, be reduced to zero. The shortest answer to this is: *Hic Rhodus, hic salta*. We can confidently sit back and relax waiting for the day when the difference between *Tristan und Isolde* and the sum total of its causes and conditions (the bourgeois society of the 1850s, the evolution of instruments and

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The Hungarian workers acted out of their experience, and their action was an *elaboration*, in a non-trivial sense, of this experience. But this action was neither a necessary, causally determined reaction or response to the given situation; nor was this elaboration the result of a logical process of deduction, inference, etc. In half a dozen East European countries, the general conditions to which one might try to impute the 1956 explosion were present, in essentially similar form, for quite a few years—and, for that matter, in Russia for much longer. That they were similar is, after all, proved by the events in East Germany in 1953, in Poland in 1956 (and 1970 and 1976), in Czechoslovakia in 1968—as well as by the more limited and less well known revolts in Russia (e.g., Novocherkassk). However, it is only in Hungary that the activity of the people reached an intensity leading to a revolution. Moreover, the particularities of Hungarian history, etc., are of no help in exhaustively trying to explain why this particular form of revolution took place in this particular country at this particular moment.[10] A concrete historical investigation can, of course, help in making intelligible *ex post facto*, but it is *never* possible to jump from this description and partial understanding of conditions, motivations, actions, etc., to the explanation of the result.

Thus, for example, a revolution is caused by exploitation and oppression. But exploitation and oppression have been there all the time, for centuries. Perhaps exploitation and oppression have reached an extreme point. But what is this extreme point? And has it not been reached recurrently, without a revolution ensuing? Then again, it has to coincide with an internal crisis of the ruling class, the crumbling of the regime. But what more crumbling can one expect than that which obtained throughout most of Europe after 1918—or after 1945? In the end, the revolution has not taken place because the conditions for a revolution were not mature. The most important of these conditions is a sufficient level of consciousness and combativity in the masses. Sufficient for what? Well, sufficient for making a revolution. In short, a revolution has not taken place because a revolution has not taken place. This is the gist of "Marxist" (and any other deterministic or scientific) wisdom in the matter.[11]

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orchestra, Wagner's unconscious, etc.) will be reduced to zero.

10. Though one can, of course, explain why this type of revolution did not take place in 1956 in Egypt, Iran, or Java.

11. Another illustration of this type of argument: It is correct that one of the main differences between Poland and Hungary in 1956 is that the Polish Communist Party was able to adapt itself to the events, while the Hungarian Communist Party was not. But *why* did the Polish Communist Party succeed where the Hungarian one failed? Precisely because in Poland the movement *did not go far enough*. This allowed the Polish Communist Party to continue to exist, and to play its role, while in Hungary the violence and the radical character of the movement rapidly reduced its Communist Party to nothing. And this also explains, up to a point, the different attitude of the Kremlin in the two cases. As long as a bureaucratic party remained alive and more or less in command in Poland, the Moscow bureaucracy believed—and rightly so—that it could spare itself an armed intervention and maneuver instead toward a gradual restoration of the bureaucratic dictatorship of the sort which eventually took place. Such maneuvering seemed impossible in the case of Hungary, where the Communist Party had been destroyed and the Workers' Councils were showing their intention to demand and exercise power.

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Things are even clearer when one considers the revolution as self-organized activity aiming at the institution of a new order, rather than as an explosion and destruction of the old order. (The distinction is, of course, a separating abstraction.) In other words, it is helpful to consider the *positive content* of what I earlier called an elaboration of the experience. The intolerable old state of affairs could have been met with an additional dose of resignation. Or by a resurgence of religiosity. Or by demands for more or less moderate reforms. Instead, the movement short-circuited all other solutions, and people started fighting and dying for a wholesale reconstruction of society. It would be a difficult task for a theoretician to try to prove that this was the only logical and-or feasible alternative to the 1956 Hungarian state of affairs. The positive content of the response—the constitution of Workers' Councils, the demands for self-management and the abolition of work norms, etc.—was not a choice of the only other alternative, etc. Rather, it was an elaboration which *transcended the given* (and all that was implied by or contained in it), and posited the *new*.

That this transcendence stands in a deep, organic relation with previous creations of the working class movement and the content of other phases of revolutionary activity does not limit its importance—on the contrary. It emphasizes that the Hungarian Revolution belongs to a long series of struggles aiming at a radical reconstruction of society, struggles which have gone on now for almost two centuries. Thus, the activity of the Hungarian people constitutes a new moment in the unfolding of the revolutionary project and, at the same time, ensures that its creations possess a significance which is not limited to the particular moment and conditions of their birth. The forms of organization created by the Hungarian workers—the Councils—are not variations on the forms created previously and elsewhere by working class revolutions. The aims and the demands formulated by these Councils are in line with the aims and demands implied by the whole history of the working class movement, even if on certain basic points (e.g., self-management, abolition of work norms) they are more explicit and more radical. Thus, in the modern world, there is a *unity* of the revolutionary project. This unity can be rendered more intelligible by pointing to its historical inheritance and continuity; the similarity of the conditions in which the working class is placed by the social system, in particular of its conditions of life and work. But, even though these factors are relevant and important, they can never give us the sum of necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of the specific content of responses in 1871, 1905, 1917, 1919, 1936-37, 1956—or, indeed, for the failure to produce such responses in other instances. For what we have here is not an objective unity—not a unity as in the identity of a class of effects stemming from a class of identical causes—but a unity in the making, a unity *making itself* (and, of course, *not yet made*), a unity of socio-historical creation.

Without minimizing the importance of other aspects of the Hungarian Revolution, the following will focus on the significance of the Workers'

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Councils. Although the Hungarian Revolution lasted only a few weeks, it was a *limit situation* through which new potentialities were revealed, nay, *created*. Thus, like the few weeks of the Paris Commune, for us the Hungarian events are more important than three thousand years of Egyptian history because they constituted a radical break with the inherited philosophies of politics and work, while prefiguring a new society.

The exemplary character of the Workers' Councils—which sprang up almost everywhere in a matter of hours—does *not* stem from their proletarian composition, from their origin in productive enterprises, or even from the Council form as such. Rather, their importance lies in (a) the establishment of *direct democracy* (true *political equality*); (b) their rootedness in existing concrete collectivities (including, but not limited to, the factories); and (c) their demands concerning *self-management* and the abolition of work norms. What was implied was the abolition of established social *divisions* and of the *essential separation* between the main spheres of collective activity. What is involved here is not only the division between classes, but the division between rulers and ruled (including the division between representatives and represented); the separation of government or a narrowly defined political sphere from the rest of social life—particularly work or production; and the division between immediate, day-to-day activities and a political universal. This does *not*, of course, require an undifferentiated identity of each and all, i.e., the establishment of a homogeneous society.[12] Nor does it mean the occlusion of these differences by means of abstract universals like "citizen," "proletarian," "consumer," etc. Rather, the abolition of these social antagonisms requires that the differences between various segments of the community be recognized and that they be given another *articulation*.

According to the Council form of organization, all decisions have to be taken—in principle, and whenever possible—by the whole collective; that is, by the General Assembly of the Council's constituency (be it factory, administration, university or district). A body of delegates ensures the implementation of the decisions of the General Assembly and the continuity of its direction between meetings. These delegates are elected and are *permanently* revocable. But, neither this permanent revocability, nor even the election of the delegates are the decisive features. There could be other means (e.g., rotation) to achieve the same ends. The important point is that the power of decision rests with the General Assembly—which can reverse the decisions of the delegates—and that the power of the delegates is *residual*, i.e., it exists in principle and only in so far as the General Assembly cannot be in permanent session.

This power of the General Assemblies implies the abolition of the *instituted* division between rulers and ruled. In particular, it eliminates the prevalent,

12. This dichotomy—*either* society is antagonistically divided, *or* there is total homogeneity—is one of the hidden postulates of inherited political thought. Moreover, it is a postulate shared by Marx himself, for whom the elimination of the social divisions of society, state power, politics, etc., will result from the homogenization of society brought about by capitalism.

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typically modern (*not* ancient) political mystification that democracy is equivalent to representation, by which, of course, is meant *permanent representation*. Being irrevocable (even if formally limited in time), the permanent delegation of power to representatives is a form of political alienation. Political power is appropriated by the representatives. But to decide is to decide for onself. It is *not* a matter of deciding *who* is going to decide. Moreover, this appropriation is veiled by the juridical form of periodic elections. The well-known critique of elections under present social and political systems need not be repeated here. What is important is to stress the generally neglected point that political representation tends to "educate" people in the conviction that they are unable to manage the problems of society, that there exists a particular category of men endowed with the specific ability to govern. Permanent representation therefore goes with professionalized politics. It contributes to political apathy which in turn widens the gap between the extent and the complexity of social problems and their own ability to tackle them.

Needless to say, neither the power of General Assemblies, nor the revocability and accountability of delegates is a panacea capable of guaranteeing that a degeneration of the Revolution—bureaucratic or otherwise—is impossible. The ultimate fate of the Councils, or any other such organization, depends on the self-activity of the people; on what they will and will not do; on their involvement in the life of the collective; and on their readiness to bring their full weight to bear within the processes of discussion, elaboration, decision, implementation and control. It would be contradictory to seek an institutional form capable of *ensuring* such participation and coercing people to be autonomous. The Council form cannot *guarantee* the development of such autonomy, but merely *renders it possible*. In contrast, established political forms such as representative democracy, or the leadership of a party *guarantee* that such a development remains *impossible*. What is involved here is the de-professionalization of politics—i.e., the abolition of politics as a special and separate sphere of activity—and, conversely, the universal *politicization* of society, which means just that: the business of society becomes, quite literally, everybody's business.

A revolutionary phase necessarily starts with an outburst of autonomous activity and, if it proceeds beyond the stage of revolt or revolutionary episode, it establishes autonomous mass organization. It displays a tremendous amount of activity, abnegation and self-sacrifice, an extraordinary expenditure of energy. Individuals become actively interested in public affairs, as if they were their own—which *is indeed what they are*. Thus, the Revolution manifests itself to society as the *unveiling* of its own repressed truth. This goes together with almost unbelievable social, political, practical and technical inspiration and invention of the sort abundantly illustrated during the Hungarian Revolution by the audacity and skill with which the Workers' Councils continued fighting Kadar more than a month after the second Russian invasion.

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The continuation and further development of the autonomous activity of the people depends upon the character of their power in mass organizations and the relevance of their decisions for their concrete, daily existence. In this sense, the main problem of post-revolutionary society is the creation of institutions which allow the continuation of this autonomous activity, but without requiring heroic feats twenty-four hours a day. The more people can see that their day-to-day existence crucially depends on their active participation in the exercise of power, the more they will tend to participate. In this way, the development of self-activity feeds upon itself. Conversely, any limitation on the power of autonomous mass organizations, or any attempt to transfer a "part" of its power to other institutions (e.g., Parliament, "party," etc.) can only favor the opposite movement toward less participation, declining interest, and finally, apathy. Bureaucratization starts when certain decisions pertaining to common affairs are removed from the competence of mass organizations and, under various rationalizations, are entrusted to such "representative" bodies. When this is allowed to happen, the participation of people and the activity of the mass organizations inevitably declines, and the ensuing vacuum is filled increasingly by bureaucracy. Eventually, people abandon the mass organizations, where substantial decisions are no longer being made, and revert to the state of cynical indifference toward politics which is not only characteristic of present bureaucratic societies, *but the very condition of their existence.* This state of affairs will then appear, to sociologists and philosophers, to both explain and justify the bureaucracy (after all, *somebody* has to take care of public affairs).[13]

Now the people's day-to-day existence depends on what is going on at the general social and political level *as well as* on what is happening in the particular collectivity to which they belong and the specific activities in which they are engaged. The separation of these two spheres is an essential expression of alienation in present society. It is in this that the importance of the Hungarian demands for self-management and for the constitution of Councils in all sectors of the national life is to be found. Participation in general political structures which leaves people powerless over their immediate environment and separated from the management of their concrete activities is, of course, a mystification. And so is participation or self-management when confined, for example, to the enterprise, thus leaving general political power in the hands of a separate social stratum. What is entailed by the demands of the Hungarian Workers' Councils is precisely the overcoming of this separation. It is the demand that people be allowed to manage the concrete collectivities to which they belong—not only in factories, but in all sectors of national life; *and* that they be able to participate in the exercise of political power—not abstractly, as voting citizens, etc., but directly, through the very organs of their self-activity, i.e., the Councils.[14]

13. On a reduced scale, this spiral of bureaucratic degeneration and apathy is visible in the life of contemporary political organizations and trade unions.

14. It is true that in Hungary there were demands for free elections to designate a new

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Thus, the abstract formulation of the problem in terms of social divisions and the homogenization of society is eliminated; what we are led to is a mode of articulation capable of mediating between society and the particular segments which compose it.

By now, the mystification of the Yugoslav Workers' Councils and self-management of enterprises should be clearly visible. There can be no "self-management" as long as a separate State apparatus is maintained; even in the narrow field of the management of the enterprise, people's activities are stunted and finally destroyed. For example, of what value is self-management when it is confined to the functioning of the factory and especially when the League of Yugoslav Communists retains total power over all other important matters including, in the final analysis, *what is happening in the factories themselves*. Conversely, one can also see why the power of Councils or other such organizations (e.g., Soviets in Russia after October 1917) rapidly becomes devoid of content if confined to the realm of the political in the narrow and current sense of the word.[15] For then the division between a political sphere in the traditional sense, and people's concrete existence is reintroduced. If the Councils—or Soviets—are called upon only to write laws, sanction decrees and nominate Commissars, then all they really possess is the abstract shadow of power. Thus, once they were separated from the interests and preoccupations of concrete collectivities, the Soviets were bound to appear empty. Even if they had not been dominated and manipulated by the Bolshevik Party, the people could not have helped but view the Soviets as just another official institution not belonging to them, not caring about their cares.[16]

When I speak about the autonomy of the organizations of the masses, I do so only because and in so far as *they do not accept the established institution of society*. This means in the first place, that they do not accept any other source of legitimate power outside themselves; and in the second place, that they abolish, within themselves, the division between those who direct and those who execute. The first point implies not merely that they create a

Parliament, and it seems that they had the support of the Councils. But this was an understandable reaction to the previous state of affairs and the bureaucratic dictatorship. Had the Revolution been allowed to develop, the question of the respective roles of Parliament and the Councils would, of course, have remained open. In my view, the uninterrupted development of the power and activities of the Councils would have brought about either a gradual atrophy of the Parliament, or a clash between the two.

15. This was the line Lenin was advocating, *on paper*, when speaking about Soviet power. In actuality, of course, he was striving to centralize all power in the hands of the Bolshevik party.

16. Cf. my article "Socialisme ou barbarie," in *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, No. 1 (March, 1949); reprinted now in *La Société bureaucratique*, Vol. 1, in particular pp. 164-173. Also, "Le rôle de l'idéologie bolchévique dans la naissance de la bureaucratie," in *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, No. 35, (January 1964); reprinted in *L'Expérience du mouvement ouvrier*, Vol. 2, pp. 384-416. Unbelievable as it may sound, Lenin and Trotsky considered the organization of work, the management of production, etc., as purely *technical* questions, having nothing to do with the "nature of the political power" which remained "proletarian," since it was exercised by "the Party of the proletariat." This absurd position corresponded to their equally rediculous enthusiasm for the capitalist "rationalization" of production, Taylorism, piece work, etc. In the second of the articles mentioned above, and in many other texts, I have tried to show that this attitude corresponds to one of the deepest layers of Marx's own thought.

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situation of dual power, or even that they tend to assume for themselves all power; but rather that the autonomous organizations posit themselves as the *only* legitimate source of decisions, rules, norms and laws—that is, as organs *and* embodiments of a new institution of society. The second point means that, through their activity, they abolish the antagonistic division between a sphere of politics, or government, and a sphere of everyday life. The second point is, in fact, the concrete implementation of the first. For the political organization of historical societies, as well as the nuclear organization of all other social relations, has for thousands of years been the institution of a social *hierarchy*. This has involved both the institution of a real-material sub-stratum embodied in social networks and individual positions, and objectified in possessions, privileges, rights, spheres of competence, tools and weapons; and an imaginary social signification whereby people are defined as superior and inferior along one or various socially instituted lines of order. The internalization of this hierarchical ordering by each and every individual has been, and remains, a cornerstone of class society. Contemporary bureaucratic capitalism tends to push the hierarchical organization of society to its limits and posit it as the rational organization *par excellence*.[17] The hierarchical, pyramid-like structure of organization—omnipresent in contemporary society—is rapidly replacing the traditional bifurcation of capitalist society. In Russia, the latter has been completely replaced for more than fifty years and in Eastern Europe and China for the last quarter of a century. This hierarchical structure is the dominant form of oppressive relations in the present world.[18]

But the Council organization destroys the structure of hierarchy. By vesting power in all concerned, the hierarchical structure, and the division between those who direct and those who execute, are overcome. Decisions are made by

17. Elsewhere, I have tried to show that this "rational" organization is, in fact, inherently *irrational* and full of contradictions. Cf. "Sur le contenu du socialisme, II" *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, No. 22, (July 1957); "Sur le contenu du socialisme, III" quoted in Footnote 2 above; and "Le mouvement révolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne, II" *Socialisme ou Barbarie* No. 32, (April 1961). In modern conditions (as opposed, e.g. to "Chinese mandarin" conditions) there *can* be no rational basis for organization along hierarchical-bureaucratic lines. Knowledge, skill and expertise *should* , but *cannot* be the criteria for appointment. For solutions to the problems facing the organization are determined by the constant power struggle between rival bureaucratic groups, or rather *clans*. This is not an accidental or anecdotal phenomena, but is, instead, central to the workings of the bureaucratic mechanism. The idea of a technostructure as such is a mystification: it is what the bureaucracy would like people to believe. The tops are tops not as experts in a technical field, but as experts in the art of climbing the bureaucratic ladder. As it expands the bureaucratic apparatus is forced to reproduce within itself the division of labor which it imposes increasingly on the whole of society; thus, it becomes estranged from itself, *and* from the factual substance of the problems. Thus, any "rational" synthesis becomes impossible. But some synthesis must take place. In the end, decisions must be made. And they are—in the Oval Office (or the corresponding Kremlin Bulb), between Nixons, Ehrlichmans, Haldemans, and other petty delinquents of sub-normal intelligence. This *is* the apotheosis of technostructure, scientific management, etc., just as the Lockheed bribes are the apotheosis of perfect competition, optimization through free market mechnaisms, etc.

18. This is a fact which today's "Marxists" are unable to see, as they go on talking about "commodity production" in the West and "socialism"—however "degenerate," "deformed" etc.—in the East.

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the people who will have to implement them, and who are, therefore, in the best position to judge not only abstract options but also the concrete conditions of this implementation including, above all, its real costs: their own effort and work. Similarly, the relevance of the decisions can thus best be judged by those most interested in minimizing the time and cost involved. In this manner, experience in both technical matters and the exercise of direct democracy can begin building up. This is another illustration of what I have called *articulation*.

Of course, the abolition of the antagonistic *division* between specialists and non-specialists does not mean the suppression of their difference. Self-management does not require that competence and specialized knowledge be ignored—quite the contrary. In fact, it is under today's bureaucratic capitalist social structure that they most often *are* ignored and that decisions largely depend on the outcome of strife between bureacratic cliques, each of which uses its specialists for purposes of public justification and mystification. Under the Council organization, specialists are not eliminated as such, but instead belong to the collective and are listened to in their specific capacity as specialists, like everyone else. But in the last instance, it is the General Assembly, not the engineer, that must decide. Certainly their decisions may prove to be mistaken. But it is unlikely that their record could be any worse than that of bureaucratic capitalism.[19]

What is involved here is much more than the traditional separation between means and ends. This separation is an abstraction with limited validity only in fragmented and trivial domains. The point is not that people have to decide *what* to do, and then technicians will tell them *how* to do it. Rather, after listening to the technicians, the people must decide *both* what to do and how to do it. For the *how* is not neutral, and the *what* is not disembodied; neither are they *identical* or *external* to each other. The notion of "neutral" technique is, of course, an illusion; a conveyor belt is linked to both a type of product *and* a type of producer.[20]

The demand of the Hungarian Workers' Councils for the abolition of work norms addresses this problem in a concrete way while, at the same time, suggesting new conceptions of work, man and their relation to each other. If the tasks already have been decided, and if the various technical means are simply taken as given, then it is inevitable that work itself appears as just another means to be used in the most rational and efficient way possible. The *how* of its usage appears to fall into the province of the corresponding technicians, whose job it is to determine the best way of doing the work, the time allowed, etc. The absurdity of the ensuing results, and the permanent

19. Consider the recent example of *Pan American Airways*, where management, with the expert advice of hundreds of technicians, statisticians, computer experts, econometricians, transport economists, etc., extrapolated the demand curve for air transport in the 1960s into the future (something a moderately intelligent first-year undergraduate would not have done) and almost went into bankruptcy, from which they had to be rescued by the American government.

20. The idea that technique is neutral, as well as the idea that capitalist rationalization is rational, is central, even if more or less hidden, in Marx's thought.

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strife thereby introduced within the labor process, are well-known. But we are not concerned here with the critique of Taylorism or the capitalist (and socialist) rationalization of the work process. The crucial point is that the demand for the abolition of work norms is not simply a means by which workers defend themselves against exploitation, speed-up, etc. Instead, this demand contains certain *positive* elements of paramount importance; it suggests that the people charged with the implementation of a task are the ones entitled to make decisions concerning work rhythm, etc. Contrary to their conception within the rationalistic framework of capitalism, such decisions affect an essential dimension of the worker's life. Moreover, workers cannot really defend themselves against exploitation without doing something positive relative to production itself. Of course, if externally imposed work norms are abolished, the rhythm of work will still have to be regulated owing to the collective and cooperative character of modern production. But under these circumstances, the only conceivable source of such regulation is the collectivity of the workers themselves; groups of workers—whether in the shop, the department or the factory—will have to establish their own discipline and ensure its observance (as, indeed, they presently do, albeit informally and illegally). Implied here is a categorical rejection of the idea that "man endeavors to avoid work. . . Man is a lazy animal" (Trotsky), and that, therefore, work discipline can only be achieved through external coercion or financial reward. The coercive organization of work is not, in fact, a response to the "laziness of man;" rather, it is laziness that is a natural and understandable response to alienated work.

The germinal character of these demands can also be seen in terms of another series of implications. Once the principle of effective self-determination has been accepted, and once the separation between means and ends has been repudiated, then it follows that the tools and machines, etc., cannot be taken as a given. Nor can they be imposed by engineers, technicians, etc., who would design them with an interest in increasing productive efficiency, thereby further promoting the domination of the mechanical universe over human beings. A radical change in the relations between workers and their work implies a radical change in the nature of the instruments of production, which in turn requires, first and foremost, that the perspective of the *users* of those instruments becomes the dominant one in the process of their conception and design. A conveyor belt socialism is a contradiction in terms; machines must be adapted to people, not people to machines. Obviously, this leads to a repudiation of the basic character of present-day technology. Today's machines imply today's junk and *vice versa*. And both presuppose and tend to reproduce a certain type of human being.

Clearly, numerous and by no means trivial problems would emerge along this road. But nothing would appear to render them insuperable—certainly no more insuperable than the ones created daily by the present antagonistic organization of society. For example, if groups of workers set their own work rhythms, there may be problems concerning both the equality of rhythms

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between different groups—in other words, concerning justice—and the integration of these various rhythms into the whole production process. But both of these problems exist today and have not yet been solved. Considerable progress will be made, however, once these problems are explicitly formulated and discussed. In an analogous vein, the production of machines in the interests of those who use them will require constant and close cooperation between machine-makers and machine-users. And more generally, a collectivistic organization of production—and of all other social activities—will, of course, require a large measure of social responsibility and reciprocal control; the various segments of the community will have to behave in a responsible manner and accept their role in the exercise of mutual control. Obviously, such social coordination will best be carried out through the networks of delegates linked to the basic organizations and the permanent, public discussion of common affairs.

This is not the place to discuss the more important and complex questions that will confront a collectivist society relative, for instance, to the orientation of the "total economy" or other social activities, to their mutual interdependence, to the general orientation of society, and so on. In fact, as has already been stressed, the crucial problem for a post-revolutionary society concerns neither the management of production, nor the organization of the economy. Rather, it concerns the *political* problem proper or what might be called *the other side of the problem of state power*; namely, the capacity of the society to establish and maintain its concrete *unity* without establishing relatively autonomous institutions charged with this "task," i.e, the State apparatus. Despite appearances, this problem was ignored by classical Marxism and, indeed, by Marx himself. The notion that the State—as a separate, quasi-autonomous apparatus—has to be destroyed, was *not* accompanied by a positive consideration of the political problem. Instead, this problem was dissolved (mythically) in the conception of an explicit, material unification and homogenization of society supposedly brought about by the development of capitalism. Politics, for Marx, Lenin, *et al.*, involved the struggle against the bourgeoisie, the alliance with other classes, etc.; in brief, the elimination of the "remnants of the ancient world." But in their view, it did *not* concern the positive institution of the new world. *According to Marx, in a 100% proletarian society there would not and could not be a political problem.* Furthermore, this neglect is deeply rooted in Marx's determinist philosophy of history: *either* socialism *or* barbarism, but, if *not* barbarism, then socialism. The wicked irony of history, however, has been that the first victorious revolution took place in a country where the population was anything but "united and disciplined by the very process of capitalist production itself." And the task of unifying and homogenizing Russian society had to be accomplished by the Bolshevik party and by Stalin's totalitarian terror. Fortunately, they met with less than total success.

Unfortunately, we can no longer look forward to the unity of

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post-revolutionary society being brought about through a process of homogenization, even if such a process exists, which it manifestly does not. The political problem as such can never be eliminated. The unity of post-revolutionary society can only be brought about—that is, constantly recreated—through the permanent, *unifying activity* of the collective organizations. This, of course, entails the destruction of any separate State apparatus. But it also entails the existence and continuous remodelling of *political institutions* (e.g., the councils and their networks), which are neither *antagonistic* to the real society, nor directly and immediately *identical* to it. And there is no magical guarantee that all possible frictions between segments of the community will disappear; that a stratum will not emerge that will attempt to occupy permanently positions of power, thereby reinstating the division between rulers and ruled, and a separate State apparatus. In conclusion, we can pose the following problem: *either*, the autonomous and collective organizations of the people will invent a solution—or rather a *process* of solutions—to the problem of maintaining society as a differentiated unity *or*, if they fail, substitute solutions—such as the power of a revolutionary party and the reconstitution of a permanent bureaucracy—will necessarily be imposed. In this latter instance, the old mess will *ipso facto* be re-established.

It is not that we are ignorant of which route to follow. Such a route simply does not yet exist, either in reality or in theory. If and when this route is opened to us, it will be through the autonomous and collective activity of the people. In the mean time, however, we *do* know which route *not* to follow: namely, the route leading to totalitarian bureaucratic capitalist society.

The Hungarian Revolution never had the opportunity to face these problems. Nevertheless, in the short span of its development, it not only destroyed the ignoble mystification of Stalinist "socialism," but also posed—and provided certain germinal answers to—some of the most important questions confronting the revolutionary reconstruction of society. Thus, we are obliged not only to honor the heroic struggle of the Hungarian people but also recognize that, in the resolve to manage collective life, the Hungarian Revolution truly does constitute one of the creative sources of contemporary history.

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THE AGE OF NOVELTY*

by Claude Lefort

Undoubtedly, the Hungarian Revolution is one of those events carved forever on historical memory. It marks the first great fissure in the totalitarian structure, far different from that created by the East Berlin uprising of June 1953 or, three years later, by the Poznan disturbances and the great Polish rebellion whose outcome was dramatically affected by the defeat of the Budapest rebels. Historians of the future will continue to ponder those days of October and November 1956 which, despite their ill-fated end, "shook the world." And all those who cherish freedom, whose convictions are nourished by the memory of great revolutionary episodes, will do likewise—provided that the desire to know and the desire for freedom are not silenced in future societies.

But historical memory is one thing and collective memory another. The latter is elaborated at the interface of the many groups which retain from the past only that which accommodates their representations of the present. And in our era, collective memory is molded with ever-increasing insistence by small numbers who have at their disposal the means for publicizing these representations: the political leaders whose declarations overflow with reminiscences made to credit a tradition, the intellectuals who recreate the instructive past, and the media manipulators, both large and small, who are skilled in the art of filtering out whatever does not appeal to the current masters. From the perspective of this collective memory, the fate of the Hungarian revolt has been striking. Collective memory has shrouded it. Doubtlessly, the occasion to exhume it does arise this year. The media need and enjoy necrology and anniversaries. Thus a few notices can be expected, but this fact which cannot be erased remains: that the Hungary of 1956 has been the object of oblivion, either deliberately or otherwise. There remains the silence that has fallen upon it.

I am thinking particularly of the Western left. What good is it to deal with the Right? Either it humors the weaknesses of the opposing great power when interest thus commands, or it exploits those weaknesses and contradictions to justify the politics of the current Western administration. How can it be reproached for having crossed out the Hungarian Revolution or for using it every now and then as a pretext to condemn Soviet imperialism? But what about the Left, especially in France, where it is influential, where radio and television air its voices, and where its press reaches a large audience? Why the silence about Hungary, yet so many references to the Chinese Cultural Revolution or the Prague Spring? Is it a matter of these events being more

*Translated from the French by Dorothy Gehrke.

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recent? But there is an abundance of commentaries provoked by Stalinist terrorism, for example. It could be maintained that this has only lately been discovered, thanks to the reports of prison camp escapees and, especially, to Solzhenitsyn. And it is true; the *Gulag Archipelago* exposed in broad daylight, through a collection of confessions and irrefutable information, the character, dimensions and duration of this terror. However, the disclosures made in 1949 to the Social and Economic Council concerning the number of those in prison camps have become common knowledge, stupefying as they did the non-communist intellectual Left in France, and wrenching from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty the condemnation of a regime which, they went so far as to say, was perhaps socialist in name only. Why then are people discovering now what they had learned over twenty-five years ago? The truth is that what previously appeared novel, unheard of, unthinkable, was then hidden away in the shadows of collective memory. The truth is that the information received was well preserved, but excluded from representation. If it is now emerging from oblivion, the reason is that only now is it possible for it to be assimilated. And what is the reason for this change? Is it not that only yesterday this information endangered the Left's faith in socialism, while now it contributes instead to restoring that faith? This danger is conjured up by investing the image of Stalin with all the features of evil, for fear of having to recognize the totalitarianism under the mask of socialism and of having to agree that it subsists in different guises after the death of the supreme master. It is not necessary to examine here how such a change is tied to various historical circumstances. The phenomenon is interesting only because it yields insight into the fate of the memory of the Hungarian Revolution.

Novel, unheard of, unthinkable is how this event also appeared to the majority of the Left in the West. Initially, it was in everyone's vision. Yet the tumult it created in hearts and minds was brief. Afterward people preferred not to think any longer about the events. Of course, traces of it remained, and for some, painful wounds; but most often these traces were conveniently forgotten. The example provided by some of the best known Communist Party intellectuals at that time illustrates this point. In November, 1956, a meeting of the Association of Intellectuals Against the Algerian War was held in Paris. It included Communists, Trotskyites, progressive Christians, Sartreans, and others, many of whom were not affiliated with any organization. During this meeting, which had an exceptionally large attendance of several hundred persons, a motion was made to condemn simultaneously, in the name of peoples' right to self-government, France's intervention in Algeria and that of the USSR in Hungary. A small group of communists began to yell, calling those who supported the motion "scum" and "dirty rats." I recall the image of Edgar Morin, sitting on the platform, trying to make himself heard, and squirming under the taunts. In the weeks and months which followed, these raging defenders of the USSR (whose names and faces I have not forgotten) left the Party in spite of a long history of activism. It is true that the disclosures of Krushchev's report had dealt a heavy

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blow; and the opportunism of the French Communist Party in the face of the Algerian War put their discipline to a difficult test. But what was their real motive? The Hungarian affair had broken them. To my knowledge, they have never uttered a word about Hungary since then. The subject is taboo. Of course, their confidence vanished and they lost the urge to treat their former adversaries as so much scum. But better yet, they lost faith in the USSR. Nonetheless, the absurd conviction that Hungary had foundered in counter-revolution persisted—absurd, I say, because how can one believe in a counter-revolution when one no longer believes in the revolutionary character of the Hungarian or Soviet regime? Only they know this secret. We'll let them keep it.

Let us rather compare their conduct with that of a Garaudy in the face of the events of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The man who had been for so long the acknowledged theoretician of the French Communist Party announced his solidarity with the Czechs. He publicized their demands, and was indignant at the Russians' pretension to impose their law on Eastern Europe, denouncing their military intervention in violent terms. Nor did his break with the French CP silence him. The Czech brand of socialism became for him the symbol of socialism "with a human face" when confronted by the Russian version of authoritarian socialism. And he is still welcomed by the press or by television to this day—an astounding contrast between Garaudy and his predecessors, which is even more significant if one notes that this champion of liberal and democratic socialism consistently fails to awaken any memories of 1956. He who participated in all of the slander which his dear Party heaped on the Hungarian rebels has no words remaining that would disavow his earlier position. Now he denounces sectarianism, dogmatism, and unconditional support of the USSR, but the memory of Budapest reveals again his Stalinist skin. If one were to believe him, the sun rose in the Prague Spring. As for the Hungarian Revolution, it is thrust into the era of the Shadows.

The experience of the Communists who one by one rejected the mother country over the past twenty years is not of interest only to themselves. The vast majority of the non-Communist Left also forgot Hungary. The socialist leaders—both the so-called right-wing and the so-called left-wing—are careful not to remember Budapest, yet they never miss a chance to recall the Prague Spring. Their political designs matter little. Sometimes they seek to embarrass their Communist allies, to put them in a position to draw out the consequences of their "astonishment" at Soviet interference in the affairs of socialist nations. Sometimes they endeavor to credit the *Union de la gauche*, in partially drawing upon the French CP's reservations concerning the USSR, in the hope that general opinion will finally be convinced of the existence of a national communism. Whatever the case, for the Left, history's great turning point occurred in 1968. Dubček provided an outline of modern communist leadership: that of an independent and reasonable man whose character must be popularized.

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The meaning of my comparison, let me hasten to add, is not to belittle the Czechoslovak reform movement. In a totalitarian society, even limited liberal or democratic reforms are not only beneficial in themselves but eventually make possible transformations whose integrity is above suspicion. Where the authority of State and Party merge and civil society is engulfed by this State which, by means of Party spokesmen, plunges its tentacles into all domains, we cannot underestimate the effects of a process leading to a split between Party and State, thereby creating differentiations within that Party while beginning to break down the combined political, judicial, economic and cultural imperative. That this process was set in motion in Czechoslovakia and that the need for it was publicly recognized, thus resulting in the mobilization of the collective energies of all sectors of society, suffice to justify the hopes attached to the events of Spring '68. Furthermore, the interconnections of the Eastern regimes are so strong that the success of Czech reform would have profoundly affected its neighbors.

It is, however, impossible to overlook the difference between the Hungarian and Czech movements. They resemble each other only in their outcome. Only the former had the character of a revolution; the latter, in spite of the mobilization of the masses that it attained, was essentially a reform movement. Only the former was an uprising from below; the latter was motivated by an enlightened elite. These differences, then, can explain why one was forgotten and repressed, while the memory of the other was so actively cultivated. And on further reflection, it appears that in spite of all the unexpected changes, the mechanisms of the dominant interpretation in progressive leftist circles continue to prevail, with the aid of new devices.

How did these mechanisms function in the past, as early as the decade preceding the Second World War, but especially in that which followed? A major cleavage developed between the socialist and the capitalist worlds. In the latter, exploitation and oppression constituted the structural characteristics so that there remained no alternative but revolution or an accumulation of reforms resulting in a radical transformation of the mode of production—in short, the destruction of the State's power and the abolition of private property. On the other hand, the USSR (and later the countries of Eastern Europe) presented the image of a post-revolutionary society in which agrarian collectivization and state control of the means of production had created the basis for socialism. And many people besides the Trotskyists have talked and talked about this basis. Thus, even to those who were distant from the Soviet model, concerned by what they termed the privileges of the ruling stratum, the variation in income, the stifling of political opposition—in other words, by the use of terrorism as a means of governing—even to them, these vices appeared accidental. Either they were attributable to the fact that Russia had bypassed the bourgeois revolution, that it lacked a democratic tradition, and that it took time to overcome the heritage of semi-asiatic despotism, or else they were seen as a consequence of international power relations. Because it was encircled by capitalist countries, the USSR was

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forced to take extraordinary measures in the economic as well as the political arena, in order to defend the October victory and guarantee its safety. Although the characteristics of oppression and exploitation in the USSR or the East in general were recognized, there was no challenge to the claims of socialism, whose progress was deemed to have been impeded by historical circumstances.

Such a line of argument has yet to be exhausted. In fact, it has just recently been resumed by French CP theoreticians who, after eliminating all criticism of the Soviet regime and the policies of its great helmsman—e.g., after denying, pure and simple, the existence of concentration camps—do not hesitate (e.g., the historian Elleinstein) to speak from a Trotskyite perspective of a "Stalinist phenomenon," or (e.g., the philosopher Althusser) to denounce a "Stalinist deviation" (social-democratic economism's posthumous revenge on Leninism). Nevertheless, outside Party circles, an entire series of events has little by little undermined the idealization of Soviet socialism: the diffusion of Krushchev's report, the widely known fraud of the political trials, the testimony of those deported long ago, the conflicts which overturned many popular democracies, the large schism of the communist world causing the rise of the new pole of Chinese orthodoxy, and finally, on another level, the emergence since 1968 in countries such as Franch and Italy, of new methods and objectives of struggle which elude the initiative and control of union bureaucracies and traditional politics. Yet, the idea of a division between the socialist and capitalist worlds continues to be maintained, at least on the level of the leftist elites who have a monopoly on speech. As for the Maoists, their positions are well known. The Soviet leaders are, in their eyes, revisionists; a new bourgeoisie is establishing itself in the USSR. Socialism is embodied in China. Of course, the new Trotskyist generation seems less rigid than the old: it is amenable to pushing further its criticism of Soviet imperialism, even if this is owing more to a lack of theoretical consistency rather than analytical developments. Neither Maoists nor Trotskyists can conceive of a new system of domination, possessing its own logic, wherein the bureaucratic class is welded to the apparatus of the State and the Party, and is guided only by the imperative of self-preservation. All they can imagine is that the Russian regime, rather than defending the celebrated socialist basis, is compromising with the capitalist camp and restoring bourgeois ideology.

How would they decipher, in light of events, the characteristics of a new social formation and the rise of the bureaucracy as a class, and how would they understand the meaning of an anti-totalitarian revolution? Some would be forced to carry over their interrogations to China; others to examine the role of Trotsky and Lenin in the constitution of a bureaucratic party. Certainly, their cases must not be confused with regard to the Hungarian uprising. The Trotskyists, at least, can be credited with defending its cause. They did so in the conviction that the creation of workers' councils evinced a return to the initial conditions of proletarian struggle, and without assessing what was at stake in this revolution. But the fact remains that they are the

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only organized group who cannot be reproached for silence and amnesia, even though they remain prisoners of the idea of a division of the world into potentially good societies and potentially perverse societies. Moreover, since this idea is self-evident, as far as they are concerned, we do not need to refer to the Hungarian Revolution to know their system of thought.

On the other hand, the Hungarian Revolution does shed light on the Maoist mentality. These implacable critics of the Soviet regime (some of whom go so far as to denounce the "red bourgeoisie") do not fail to justify, when provoked, the crushing of the Budapest revolution. Moreover, in this matter they merely present themselves as faithful to the politics of the great helmsman who came down with all his weight in favor of the repression of the insurrection in 1956. Thus, instead of speaking of inconsistencies in the position of unattached communist intellectuals, we have to admit the coherence of their views. After all, as a revolution which mobilized all the popular forces against the State apparatus and the governing party, and which realized democracy in action, the Hungarian Revolution risked ruining the foundations of bureaucratic order (and on this point, Mao was not mistaken), no matter what the location of its implantation and the face that it presents.

But let us now turn away from consideration of small groups, taking note, however, that their beliefs, despite having suffered a resounding ideological defeat, continue to be propagated (notably the myth of the good China) far beyond their narrow frontiers. Let us now focus attention on the official (non-communist) Left, because it is precisely to this case that our thesis applies.

As things stand now, the majority of the representatives of this position are careful not to praise the Soviet model uncritically, as they previously did, but only by accompanying such praise with a critique of its "faults." They can be heard affirming that socialism is inseparable from respect for human rights, that planning cannot be just and effective if it remains authoritarian, that it is advisable to decentralize, and recently they have even discovered the virtues of the word "self-government." Briefly, everything happens as if there were no reference at all to an historically instituted positive pole: as though socialism remains to be constructed with nothing to start from except the historically instituted negative pole of capitalism and allied bourgeois regimes. However, their silence on Hungary is one of the most prominent signs of the survival of their way of thinking. In the face of revolutionary events which shook or could shake the world *here* and *there*, the traditional dichotomy between East and West is restored, with these events implicitly categorized according to whether they occur or are likely to occur in the West or the East (concepts which are not, it should be pointed out, geographic but symbolic: Japan is in the West, China in the East). In the West, the revolution is necessary, legitimate, and desirable. In the second case, however, one could not even say that the revolution is unnecessary, illegitimate, or undesirable: it has no status whatsoever. It cannot be arbitrarily summoned, nor can one even be delighted that it breaks out. It is *undesirable* in the sense that it is

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incongruous, that this is not its proper place. Thus, the official Left's erasure of the positive pole (socialism in the USSR) must not deceive us. It is in appearance only that the official Left claims to reinvent socialism. The official Left remains tied to the Soviet regime, even when it has become powerless to mention the regime by name or to justify it.

The Prague Spring arouses official Left enthusiasm because it has seen only the blossoming of a desire for change, for reforms. In the East, only *reforms* are good, while the *revolution* is consigned to the West. It is useless to state that this distinction is highly instructive, because what our Left dreams about, under the name of revolution, is only the establishment of a *good* bureaucracy, effective, flexible, which would yield a little room for self-management supervised by the experts and the police. In this sense, the Hungarian Revolution constitutes a touchstone for contemporary political thought.

The objection may be raised that twenty years ago, in a period when the Soviet Union was still idealized, the Hungarian rebels' cause nonetheless aroused feelings of solidarity among important factions of the non-communist Left, while the USSR's military intervention was the object of widespread reprobation. This is true. Still, it must be remembered that this resulted from a misunderstanding—a misunderstanding which prepared the way for oblivion. In the first place, the first Russian intervention was much more overtly condemned than the second. The latter was often deemed necessary, though deplorable. But after the emotion of the first days had abated, the well-intentioned souls regained their self-control. The news that presented the rebirth of right-wing forces was blown out of all proportion; anxiety was built up concerning the possible restoration of capitalism; the news bulletins were skillfully manipulated to create the impression of a drift toward chaos. Of course, no proof of the real significance of any drift toward the right was offered. There probably were a few individuals who hoped for a return to the Horthy regime and who exploited the disorder, or who simply desired the establishment of a Western-type democracy. Any revolution allows for even the most retrograde sort of demands to come to light. And for centuries reactions following revolutions find a pretext for their existence in such demands, which are not unlike mercenaries and looters who manage to discredit all that has been done.

In Hungary, right-wing individuals or small groups did not have an audience and had no means at their disposal to bring anything to bear upon the course of events. None of the reconstituted parties' programs advocated measures aiming to return landed property to the large landowners or to put the factories back into the hands of private capital. The mobilization of the workers, the rise of factory and regional councils, rendered impossible not only the realization but even the formulation of such a program.

As for the imminence of chaos, what could have indicated this? The hasty executions of political policemen which received ample publicity were localized and rare. In a period when government is powerless to demand

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obedience, when there are general strikes and confrontations, what should have struck public opinion was the workers' promptness and effectiveness in taking responsibility for the needs of the population as well as for armed resistance on the local level. The country's large factories had elected councils and, at the time of the cease fire, October 29 and 30, numerous central councils were already representing workers of an entire city or region. They became prominent, notably at Miskolc, Győr, Magyarovár, Pécs, and in certain outlying areas of Budapest. These bodies, thanks to the provincial radio stations, publicized their demands, attesting to their socialist aspirations and to an astonishing convergence of perspectives. Finally, the Nagy government's public declarations and even those of Kádár after the second Soviet intervention left no doubt as to the scope and significance of the workers' uprising.

Thus, in France the journal *Socialisme ou barbarie* was able to gather immediately enough information (drawn exclusively from press and radio sources) to publish a brochure on the Hungarian insurrection which conveyed an image of the workers' organization and its objectives. It matters little that this image calls for a number of additions and slight alterations with the passage of time. It has been confirmed and in certain respects considerably enriched by the work of historians, notably by those who are Hungarian exiles. Yet the Left, although it was in a position to fully appreciate the role of the councils, preferred to let itself be confused by the reconstitution or creation of many political parties and by the resurrection of the ghost of reaction. Its audacity culminated in its refutation of the French CP's version of the facts—i.e., in drawing attention to workers' participation in the insurrection and their desire to demolish the Stalinists' power or to prevent its return. At first, the Left heroically denied that what had occurred in Hungary was a counter-revolution, but it was still unable to conceive of the phenomenon as revolutionary. And even when the idea was mentioned, it remained empty, since it was impossible for the Left to name the regime that the revolution was to destroy. From this it followed that, without ever having recognized the revolution, in the final analysis people came to speak of the development of a counter-revolutionary current that menaced it (according to some) or that submerged it (according to others). Thus, in the end, the second Soviet intervention was deemed necessary, because it had not been understood that the defense of the bureaucracy was the sole motive of the first intervention.

In effect, the Left's ambivalence was in evidence from the very start of the insurrection. The October 23 uprising failed to arouse any enthusiasm. The indignation provoked by the news of repression was accompanied by a feeling of consternation over what appeared to be a tragedy. True, the aspirations of the demonstrators could seem legitimate, and the violence which oppressed them condemnable. But why? Because the revolt seemed a product of errors, of blunders, even of crimes of bad leaders, that is, of a team who undeservedly continued in their posts after the death of Stalin, even though they were

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compromised by his politics; or else because the revolt seemed a product of an economic crisis ascribable to the errors, blunders, indeed, inequities of Soviet leaders who subordinated the interests of Eastern countries to those of the pioneering State, alone capable in their eyes of guaranteeing the cohesion of the socialist bloc. In short, the event was attributed to peculiar, contingent, avoidable causes, according to an interpretive scheme which left the traditional representation of the nature of the USSR intact.

A *tragedy*, I say; this is how the Hungarian Revolution presented itself, a modern tragedy, in the ancient sense of the term, in which the law of socialism in human hearts confronted the law of socialism in institutions. Thus, our leftist thinkers, with Sartre in the lead, hoped to beg the people to put down their arms, the Russians to return to their borders, and Nagy to simultaneously save the Party, respect the Warsaw Pact and initiate reforms. But the truth is that they suddenly saw the myth of the proletarian State explode, with, on the one hand, the Hungarian State in pieces, its power reduced to that of Soviet armoured cars, and on the other, the people armed. The tragedy was played out only on the stage of their fantasies. The event as such could not touch them because they were incapable of reflecting upon this fact which they themselves rendered unthinkable: an anti-bureaucratic revolution.

I have just referred to Sartre. Few men have, as he has, embodied the spirit of a certain Western Left during this last quarter of a century. At the beginning of the fifties he was the intransigent theoretician of Stalinism, while taking care not to declare his membership in the Communist Party. Then he was the censor of USSR politics in popular democracies, soon becoming an advocate of Krushchev's reformism, a partisan of Fanon and a spokesman for Third World revolutions. After all this, he became the protector of young Maoists, and now defies all categorization (and with each change, he finds a platform in the progressive press). Sartre has glided from one position to another without ever disavowing any of the theses he was abandoning. Legend has it that he sided with the Budapest rebels. But in reality, he only acquiesced to their demands in order to guide them back within the limits of a will for reform, and he presented the revolution as merely an unfortunate consequence of Gerö's obstinacy in barring Nagy's return (to whom historical reason prescribed the role of Gomulka). A derailing of history—such was his vision of the facts at the time. And if, according to him, the fault lay with the train's conductor or the railway linesmen, necessity dictated that socialism be set back on its tracks, even at the painful price of crushing the workers' councils.

Whether the course of history is attributed to Stalin, Krushchev or Brezhnev, to Mao, Liu Shao-chi, or Lin Piao, to Dubček or Husak, to Gerö, Rákosi, Nagy, or Kádár, it is always the seat of power that fascinates so-called Marxists. It is from this seat that they see the fate of socialism decided.

Stalinism, revisionism, deviationism, liberalization, democratization, socialism with a human face—these are the categories of the Left's discourse.

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However, should a revolution arise unexpectedly, the discourse risks collapse.

To return to the Hungarian Revolution, though, it is primarily its *novelty* that must be praised and examined—a novelty which did not fade with its failure, with the reconstitution in Hungary of the bureaucratic regime aided by unprecedented artifices; a novelty whose meaning is not behind us, but still before us.

Of course, the Hungarians do not alone possess the privilege of revolting. The uprising of East Berlin had already brought to light the existence of mass opposition in a popular democracy, an opposition ordinarily masked by ideology and in fact paralyzed by the police apparatus. It had also revealed the weakness of the leadership cadres, from which a faction of political and union officials had suddenly broken away to join the side of the insurgents. The power of a collective movement mobilized around national and democratic protest was manifested to different degrees in Poland as well as Czechoslovakia twelve years later. Furthermore, as Solzhenitsyn recently informed us in the last section of his *Gulag Archipelago*, in 1962, the entire population of Novotcherkaask, an industrial village in the USSR (situated in the basin of the Don) began a riot which lasted three days. One finds at the source of the workers' protest incidents analogous to those which provoked workers' unrest in East Berlin. And, following the same scenario as in Hungary, the unrest was precipitated by army intervention, thereby creating near unanimity among the population and the upsetting of the local Party apparatus, and forcing the Soviet leaders to make apparent concessions before they mounted a second offensive of repression with the aid of new troops. All this is one more sign of the profound kinship among the East European revolts.

The case of Hungary is different, however, on account of the broad scope of the uprising, its duration, the radicalism of the demands, the sense of organization which the revolutionaries demonstrated, and parallel with this, the collapse of the State and Party apparatus. Here the contradiction of totalitarianism appears fully for the first time. Here the State tends to engulf civil society, to impose the same norms, the same rules, the same representations on the population, no matter what the sector of activity, and to render its operation visible in some sense. At the same time, owing to the denial of internal division within classes and the reabsorption of differences in the unity of the popular democracy or of the proletarian State, power becomes detached and the means of domination are concentrated in the hands of a small number of leaders. In such a way, with the aid of historically determined conditions and a weakening of authority, seeds of conflict are paradoxically sewn through the entire spectrum of society. The vast majority of the population similarly experiences the oppression, though to different degrees, and is united in opposition to this power.

This was the first consequence of the Hungarian crisis: all the hierarchies which seemed firmly established on the eve of the revolution, all the divisions issuing from the new system of domination, were suddenly secondary to the

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cleavage between the State-Party apparatus and the society as a whole. The power which was previously omnipresent and invisible suddenly re-emerged as the foreign organ of coercion and of lies. The game of identification, whereby each petty bureaucrat was invested with the power of the rulers, was broken up. In large part, the bureaucratic stratum dissolved and a faction of it, liberated from the phantasm of its function, sided with the population in revolt.

To reiterate: the failure of the revolution could not efface the truth—a truth that some theoreticians could well have conceived but which has become concrete and visible for millions, inscribed upon them through experience—that totalitarianism constitutes the most efficient system of domination, but also the most vulnerable. After such an event, it is conceivable that if a crisis were to reach the heart of the totalitarian structure, the Soviet Union, a generalized, uncontrollable revolt would break out which would strip it of power as never before elsewhere.

However, we could not limit *novelty* only to the Eastern regimes, since the rise of totalitarianism is not foreign to the history of the Western world. In part, totalitarianism emerged from the West, having been established in the wake of a proletarian revolution in the USSR (whose conditions resulted from the westernization of the country) and under the sign of a socialist ideology, born of the critique of the capitalist mode of production and of bourgeois democracies. In fact, the Hungarian Revolution acquires universal significance because it tried to assume the task of destroying totalitarianism and State ownership of the means of production, without wishing to restore bourgeois democracy and private property. All the propositions formulated by the workers' councils, and the embryonic programs elaborated during the course of the revolution which obtained the support of numerous organizations, students, intellectuals, writers, and journalists (principally the program of Bibo, who was one of the Petöfi Party officials, and a minister under Nagy as a populist socialist peasant) attest to an historically unprecedented project: an anticapitalist and antibureaucratic project. This project, although the product of specific conditions different from those obtaining in the West, is nonetheless not, in its final inspiration, *Hungarian* (nor even a revolutionary project peculiar to the East). It condenses the lessons of an historical experience which is also ours; it thereby challenges a particular mode of domination, the basis of all modern systems of domination.

What now demands our utmost attention, and what I did not sufficiently appreciate twenty years ago, is the originality of the *research* that mobilized the Hungarian revolutionaries. It is not enough, in effect, to emphasize that in the face of the bureaucracy, the proletariat spontaneously rediscovered methods of struggle (the general strike) and forms of organization (the councils) created in past revolutionary struggles against capital and the bourgeois State. Nor is it enough to affirm the legitimacy of national and liberal-democratic demands in a country which, economically and culturally, suffers from imperialist oppression and where the suppression of freedom of

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organization, of expression, of information, and of the circulation of ideas and people serves the all-powerful State. In adopting this language, one could still allow part of the novelty to escape. The Hungarian revolutionaries and above all the workers organized in councils not only had the notion, as did a small number of the predecessors in 1917 or in the following years, but also the *representation* of the danger that was posed by a power (even if it be in "good hands," i.e., those of the Nagy government), that concentrated all the decisions affecting the fate of society. What is more, in the period of their most intense creativity—i.e., after the second Soviet intervention—they showed new insight into the danger which issued from the development of their own power.

The history of the formation of the Budapest Central Council as Balázs Nagy has described it is, in this respect, exemplary.[1] The first sign of a common will not to permit an executive organ to splinter the working class can be seen in the way delegates were assigned to the first coordinating meeting called at the behest of the Council of Ujpest (one of the most important workers' areas of Budapest). These delegates, according to the available information, were elected by all the workers in the factories involved, not just by their respective councils. This phenomenon indicates the resolve to maintain revolutionary leadership within the framework of a participatory democracy. As a general rule, "the Hungarian workers and their delegates from the working class saw democratism as the greatest value of the Councils. They saw it in the relation that closely linked the delegates to the entire working class and in which these delegates were only the envoys and executors of the workers' will. It should be noted that in this Council movement, the workers often removed those delegates from office who deviated from their mandates."[2] A second sign should be pointed out: during the meeting at the Egyesült Izzo factory, November 14, from which the Central Council would emerge, the participants seem haunted by the problem of their representativity and, according to Balázs Nagy's remark, were solidly attached to a "democratic protocol" as rigorous as that of court ceremonies at Versailles. This problem acquired such a significance that they renounced the creation of a National Workers' Council. Although such a body might have been useful, the majority of the delegates decided that their mandate had been limited to the establishment of the Budapest Council and that they could not adopt decisions involving the provincial councils, whose representatives were absent. It is noteworthy that in the discussion which opposed the criterion of efficacy to that of democracy the latter prevailed—a fortunate choice, moreover, because it would later influence a number of provincial councils to join ranks with the new central body in the days that were to follow. Once again, this is but one episode in the fundamental debate which questioned the function of councils in a new regime.

1. Balázs Nagy, "La formation du Conseil central ouvrier de Budapest," in *Etudes sur la révolution hongroise*, Institut Imre Nagy des Sciences politiques (Brussels, 1961).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

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At the same time, the desire to create a workers' power is affirmed and partly as a result of Kadar's intransigence (with whom the workers negotiated but whose legitimacy they denied), this desire becomes real: the Central Council defined itself as the authentic political power. Still, the idea of a new revolutionary power totally in the workers' hands was condemned because it would have had a totalitarian bent. Clearly, this was a contradiction, but nonetheless a fruitful one which, as Balázs Nagy suggests, cannot be described in terms of an opposition between practical and theoretical imperatives. In demanding that the councils direct the future economy, the delegates claimed political power. The ability not only to determine production norms, distribution of salaries, local working conditions, but also to decide investment on a national level and to direct the country's economic affairs implied a governmental responsibility. It was thus not in the present or in self-defense that the delegates accepted political responsibility. They were already confronting a future contradiction in desiring to obtain this responsibility and at the same time desiring that it be limited. What they were outlining was the model for a new division of power—unknown in the bourgeois democratic system and what alone would make socialism possible—between, if one can say it, the politico-governmental and the politico-economic bodies: a division instituted according to law.

Granted, this model was not sufficiently elaborated for us to judge it viable or not. But it is impossible to misconstrue its impulse. The idea is to combine authorities whose sources are openly recognized as dissimilar. This may be seen emerging in the association of three demands put forward by the Central Council and noticeable in the programs of many provincial councils: the organization of workers' councils; a multi-party system, assuring through the mechanism of elections to a Parliament, the representativity of governmental proceedings; and the reconstruction from the bottom up of unions defending workers' interests and their right to strike. In one sense, the last demand increases the contradiction because it implies that the councils themselves do not constitute the entire working class. But the contradiction still remains fruitful. The desire for true unions presupposes that there cannot exist a society in accord with itself, delivered once and for all from internal antagonisms, and that precisely where democracy functions best, in the framework of production, there may occur a split, for example between the councils and the ensemble of workers who are only represented there, or for example between certain disadvantaged workers and the majority, or even conflicts arising from unequal development among certain sectors of production or certain regions. Implicitly, the model recognizes that the worker is caught in at least three different webs of socialization and that the fiction of unity must be realized and the social differences that the worker harbors be conceded: that of worker-citizen, of worker-producer, and of worker-unionist-potential striker. Thus there is a difference at the heart of the same individual between the movement which implicates him in a general collective decision and the movement that cuts him off from it by associating

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him with a particular collective act.

Let us repeat: this representation emerged from the critique of totalitarianism, which does not appear simply as a regime to be destroyed, like the external adversary whose face is visible under the traits of an existing State and Party, but as the internal *possibility* of socialism. Nothing is more instructive in this sense than the remarks of Sandor Bali in the November 14 debates, who seems to have expressed faithfully the sentiments of the assembly. After affirming that the workers' councils exercise a political and economic function while waiting for the creation of new parties and new unions, he stated: "We know that the workers' councils will become the managing organs of the country's economy and this is exactly what we wish them to be. We don't want to commit the same error as the Party did, in that it was at the same time master of the country and factories and also the only organization representing the workers' interests. If we commit this error, we will always be at a standstill. We want the councils to direct the country's economic affairs and the unions to have the right to strike and to direct all matters related to the protection of workers' interests."[3]

This is not merely a collection of small facts illuminating only a part of the Hungarian Revolution. In my eyes, this shows quite well what was at stake. Certainly, this revolution cannot by any means be reduced to an uprising of the working class. The role the students and intellectuals played at its outset is well known. The former were mobilized first in Szeged, then in Budapest, and their action precipitated and radicalized the process of confrontation begun by the intellectuals of the Petöfi circle. Enthused by the events in Poland, determined to demand a review of all political trials after the rehabilitation of Rajk as well as an investigation of those responsible for the terror, and attracted by Titoism, which seemed to them to couple the merits of a national socialism with those of a socialism founded on industrial self-management, it was to the intellectuals that the initiative returned for the great assembly of October 22 (a sort of pre-revolutionary parliament, as Miklos Molnar described it),[4] and for the demonstration of the 23rd which was transformed into an insurrection. It is already remarkable that the demands raised during this assembly—even prior to the workers' intervention—evidenced the desire for democracy which was subsequently realized. In the "Fourteen Points of Poly," not only is the immediate convocation of the Party demanded with the return of Imre Nagy to the government, but also notably: "new general elections founded in equality, secret ballot, the participation of several parties and of new candidates for the national assembly; the revision in industry of the norms imposed upon workers and the creation of workers' autonomy in the factories; total freedom of opinion and freedom of the press guaranteed by the founding of several newspapers."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 73. (Citation taken from F. Bondy, *La Révolution hongroises: Histoire du soulèvement d'Octobre d'après les documents, les dépêches, les rapports oculaires et les réactions mondiales* [Paris, 1957], p. 335.)

4. Miklos Molnar, *Victoire d'une défaite: Budapest 1956* (Paris, 1968).

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In the course of the revolutionary period, an extraordinary effervescence seized the population outside the working class and was translated into the creation of many committees. The demand for autonomy grew, activated by the example of the councils. The University, the communication organs, the large public services, and the associations of intellectuals and writers are the theatre for continuous discussion concerning the institution of socialism, which meant in the spirit of the protagonists, cutting the roots of totalitarianism. While the Western observer's vision is clouded by the problem of property, the Hungarian revolutionaries manifestly did not think in terms of property, but in terms of rights. Certainly, they explicitly rejected the idea of a restoration of private property in the means of production. But what they sought to establish were the rights that would guarantee freedom and security, i.e., the right to the truth: rights which need not be formal, but which presuppose that collectives and individuals are no longer in the grip of State-Party power, a power which has made itself the sole possessor of all knowledge and law.

Liberty and truth: this means concretely the establishment in each domain—education, information, intellectual and artistic creation—new institutions, in which there is collective self-organization and simultaneously a recognized plurality of representations, legitimacy of differences and conflicts. Security: that means concretely the abolition of police arbitrariness and legal guarantees according to which judges must publicly give reasons for their sentences and by which the accused may be defended. Thus, one sees a democratic will affirmed very deliberately according to two poles which could not, in effect, be disassociated without being annihilated; the pole of collective organization, which presupposes the implication of agents in the institution (by which must be understood not only a system of delegation of authority from bottom to top, but the obligation of those who are delegated with such authority to be held accountable for their actions, and of opponents to assert themselves, and the free circulation of information) and the pole of social differentiation which presupposes the recognition of the specificity of the domain of politics, economics, law, pedagogy, science, esthetics, etc.

What a mistake it is to find here a conflict between the model of socialism and that of bourgeois democracy or, in the best of cases, to believe that the rights feverishly affirmed by the Hungarian revolutionaries only had a provisional meaning, at the end of a totalitarian experience. This was not the announcement of a transition toward the good society, communism. Socialism simply began to live at the moment when it became recognized that socialism alone could offer the maximum life to civil society while it could prevent power from being solidified, law from decaying to the ground of the dominant interest, and knowledge from dissolving into ideology.

Marx said of the Commune that it was the form of socialism discovered at long last. We won't fall into the error of pretending that the Hungarian Revolution yielded us a *solution*: it rather gave meaning to the question of socialism not only owing to the existence of the councils, but also owing to the

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discovery of the limits of power, especially of their own power; not only owing to the mobilization and the near-fusion of collective energies, but also owing to a new experience and an authentic desire for difference.

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PRESENTING MERLEAU-PONTY[1]

by Claude Lefort

Maurice Merleau-Ponty was Professor of Philosophy at the Collège de France from 1952 to 1961. During this period, he wrote summaries of his courses for the Collège de France annual bulletin. They were later collected together in a little volume entitled *Themes from the Lectures.*[2] The lectures for 1961, which were interrupted by the philosopher's sudden death early in May, did not leave the usual traces. They were divided into two series: 1) "Cartesian Ontology and Contemporary Ontology" and 2) "Philosophy and Non-philosophy since Hegel." In reading and rereading the notes for the second series, which are rather well developed and do not involve major problems in deciphering, I was persuaded that it would be worthwhile to fill in, at least partially, the lacunae in the *Themes.*

The text presented here was not designed for eventual publication. In the first place, stylistic discontinuities, eliptical expressions, single sentence summaries of whole arguments, and the plethora of German terms borrowed from Hegel's and Heidegger's vocabulary would be perplexing to a large public. However, these considerations are perhaps not crucial. Of even greater importance, to my mind, is the status of the text. It is sufficiently equivocal to falsify the natural relationship that the reader establishes with the printed material.

These course notes are in fact different from the working notes which accompany the edition of *The Visible and the Invisible.* Although the writings collected in this latter case are often abrupt and allusive, they were designed to serve as the basis for a thought which would attain its full expression shortly thereafter. Undoubtedly, Merleau-Ponty did not even imagine that they would be published one day; but at least he dated, classified, and (in most cases) provided titles for them. They constituted a kind of philosophical journal. By contrast, the course notes were simply meant to support an expression realized in another context at another time, for oral presentation before his listeners at the Collège de France.

Here, the written medium is insufficient. In this instance, thought is not limited when it doubles back on itself and detaches itself as it must when it becomes visible in print. The reader, for his part, is deprived of this detachment which would reassure him of what he reads, since all the risks normally taken in creating a written text were channelled into speech. This speech is absent to us now; but while being made, it was articulated and returned back upon itself by another circuit.

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1. English translation by Hugh J. Silverman. All footnotes to Lefort's prefatory remarks are those of the translator.

2. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Resumés de cours,* ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1968). English translation by John O'Neill as *Themes from the Lectures* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

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Furthermore, let us not be mistaken: the most effectively composed sentences in these notes may never have been spoken. As those who heard Merleau-Ponty's courses remember, he did not read. He looked at his notes only in order to speak. He did not deliver a text. He did not possess those qualities which one would ordinarily attribute to a lecturer and which demonstrate the actor in him. His thought carried him away into speech just as it did elsewhere in writing. Speaking was an event for him—which made it as much of an event for those who listened to him.

The course notes do not really constitute a type of writing. Just as they go outside speech, they also go outside writing. But if we are willing to accept their uncertain status, if we can abstain from demanding of them what they cannot give, if we approach them keeping the rest of Merleau-Ponty's work in the background,—and if we recall our own experience of writing which is not yet writing, of movement which promptly achieves a different expression, of white spaces on the page where one expects words to spring forth, of little abysses where one seeks one's breath,—then no doubt we will sense the workings of thought in the gaps, the retreats, the lacunae, the startling effect of the sentences and the words. No doubt these questions, stirred up at the time of his last year of teaching, will regain their full impact and attraction beyond any delay that may have been necessary.

The course is entitled "Philosophy and Non-philosophy since Hegel." As we will see, his goal is far from attained. In fact, he reduces his discussion to lectures on Hegel and Marx. Merleau-Ponty says "since Hegel" but it is impossible to leave Hegel behind when one wishes to start from there. Thus, the first part[3] is concerned mostly with the last pages of a fragment from the *Phenomenology of Mind*, a fragment which we know as the "Introduction," but which was originally left untitled.

This text is marked by an ambiguity, which is also present in phenomenology *per se*. *Philosophy and Non-philosophy since Hegel* should not be of an introductory sort and yet it should serve as an introduction. It should not announce a separation between knowledge opening onto phenomenology and phenomenology itself, and yet it should permit such a separation. In one sense, phenomenology is self-sufficient; in another sense, it circumscribes itself apart from true science, when conceived as Logic. At the same time, it both challenges and requires a division in knowledge.

We must note that Heidegger had already offered a long commentary on the "Introduction," which he included in *Holzwege* under the title *Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung*.[4] Of even greater significance, we remark that

3. Lefort refers here to the first half of the course notes which appeared in *Textures*, 1974, No. 8-9. The second half, appearing in the subsequent number (*Textures*, 1975, No. 10-11) deals with Marx.

4. Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Klostermann, 1950), pp. 105-192. A French translation is entitled *Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part* (Paris: Gallimard, 1962). The particular essay in question here was translated into English and published separately as *Hegel's Concept of Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) with the Hegel text in Kenly Royce Dove's translation.

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Merleau-Ponty worked from Hegel's text as it was reproduced along with Heidegger's essay (at the time not translated into French). If he proceeded in this way, it was not in order to spare himself the trouble of consulting an edition of the *Phenomenology*. He shows us that in order for a philosopher to think "philosophy and non-philosophy since Hegel," he must move toward both Hegel and the great philosopher who reads Hegel in our own day. Thus, although this course, reduced in fact to lectures on Hegel and Marx, does not offer us the dialogue with Heidegger that we awaited, it does engage Heidegger tacitly and offers signs of proximity and distance which are worthy of investigation.

Merleau-Ponty says "philosophy and non-philosophy." He doesn't waste any time on artificial expressions by referring to "modern thought" or "thought after Hegel." He is not worried about establishing landmarks in the history of ideas. The question of philosophy's achievement and its negation is, for him, the question which brings about philosophical thought. The point is supported by the impossibility of philosophy taking its own place and returning to it. The question opened the pathway for Merleau-Ponty's work. It made him recognize that the question was always mostly *his* question, particularly since he approached it "from the point of view of consciousness," a position which he had held in the *Phenomenology of Perception*. In this sense, the interpretation of Hegel is incorporated into a work of self-interpretation.

But we cannot deny that the procedure implies a return to Hegel,—not to the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*, liberated from the Hegel of the *Logic*, but to the break from Hegelian thought—a break in which an eclipsing occurs under the label of Experience, as it does under Science.

"Philosophy and Non-philosophy since Hegel:" Hegel makes us want to explore the illusion of philosophy and non-philosophy—the illusion of philosophy in non-philosophy and that of non-philosophy in philosophy. But if he makes us explore them, he also inaugurates an interrogation. We could not recreate such an interrogation except by returning to his side. Such an interrogation would permit us to explore, not only his illusions, but also those of his successors, blinded in turn when they saw their own illusions.

The course notes are presented in their original form. I have modified or added only punctuation marks where it appeared indispensible. From time to time, I have inserted a word, in brackets, to facilitate the intelligibility of the text.[5] I have maintained the references in the German edition of *Holzwege*, for Hegel's text is brief and it will be rather easy to find the passages in any edition of the *Phenomenology of Mind*.

5. In this translation of *Philosophie et non-philosophie depuis Hegel*, it has been necessary, for the sense of a passage, to fill out a sentence here or there—particularly in places where a direct translation of a phrase would be practically meaningless in English. Thus if some sentences of this version give the impression of a full thought—which, under scrutiny, lack the requisite elaboration—the reader whould remember the abbreviated state of the French text as Claude Lefort presents it here. The reader should therefore be prepared to search between the lines or acept the presence of many absent sentences and lines of argument.

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Sometimes marginal notes constituted additions in the manuscript. They therefore are incorporated into the text. If not, they are given in the footnotes followed by (M-P). [6]

An illegible word is indicated by the sign: [?]; a questionable word by the sign: [knowledge?].[7]

6. Lefort has footnoted the many passages, sentences, and terms which Merleau-Ponty left in German with translations borrowed from the current French version of Heidegger's *Holzwege* by Wolfgang Brokmeier, and of Marx's writings in the Costes edition. By contrast, for purposes of clarity and brevity, my translations of the German are integrated into the body of the work. They are based on the English version in *Hegel's Concept of Experience* and in *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (New York: Vintage, 1975) by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton. In consulting both the German text and the French translation, I have sometimes modified the rendering of passages in the aforementioned English translations. Also, when Merleau-Ponty gives his own translation of Neitzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, and Marx, I have found it necessary to provide the English reader with a formulation which comes closer to Merleau-Ponty's version than to the direct English rendering from the German. When a particularly significant French or German expression occurs, I have placed it in brackets after its English equivalent. Any footnotes for which this translator is responsible are followed by (HJS). Claude Lefort's footnotes are followed by (CL). Merleau-Ponty's own footnotes and marginal notes are followed by (M-P). Annotations by the translator have been restricted to those which will be useful for an adequate appreciation of the status and context of the text.

7. Any major interpolated additions to the text are indicated by an asterisk*.



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PHILOSOPHY AND NON-PHILOSOPHY SINCE HEGEL[1]

by Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Part One: Hegel

No battles occur between philosophy and its adversaries. Rather what happens is that philosophy seeks to be philosophy while remaining non-philosophy, i.e. a "negative philosophy" (in the sense of "negative theology"[2]). "Negative philosophy" has access to the absolute, not as "beyond," as a positive second order, but a another order which must be on this side, the double, inaccessible without being passed through. True philosophy scoffs at philosophy; true philosophy is a-philosophical.

According to Hegel, one attains the absolute by way of a phenomenology (the appearance of mind; mind in the phenomenon).[3] This is not because the phenomenal mind is on one level of a scale, after which one moves on to the absolute, but because the absolute would not be absolute if it did not appear as absolute. Phenomenology is the whole truth from a certain point of view.

Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind

For Marx, the realization of philosophy is its destruction as an independent philosophy (Hegel is to be understood here).

Kierkegaard advances further, for philosophy is sacrificed. Philosophy masks the existence in its entirety [*l'existence intégrale*] which "includes" other existences and surpasses[4] them from within, that is, it transforms them

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1. Text of the 1961 course notes established by Claude Lefort. English translation and annotations by Hugh J. Silverman.

2. As we know from the Pseudo-Dionysius, negative theology is the view that God *is* only in terms of his absence. This is not the seventeenth century French "hidden god," studied by Lucien Goldmann in terms of Pascal and Racine. Rather it is the positing of God in terms of all that He is not. God is not His creatures; therefore, He must be other than what is created, etc. To follow this negative theology around to negative philosophy, recall a phrase used by Sartre in reference to the self: I am what I am not, and I am not what I am. In negative theology, God is what He is not, and He is not what He is. It has been argued by some, e.g. Mikel Dufrenne, that Jacques Derrida's philosophy is a negative theology. Derrida's conception of the "trace" that appears in writing (*l'écriture*) but which is the manifestation of decentered subject that can only be a differencing at the textual level did not receive public expression until the late 1960s—after Merleau-Ponty's death. But the notion of difference does send us back to a Heideggerian ontological difference (*ontologische Differenz*), which is, in a sense, where Merleau-Ponty begins his elaboration of negative philosophy. The return to a Hegelian philosophy of negation must therefore pass through its Heideggerian "double," where nothingness becomes active—*das Nichts nichtet*. (HJS)

3. The Greek etymology for "phenomenology" as *logos* of the *phainomenon* is taken here to mean the "structure or logic of appearance." In 1926, Heidegger developed a similar interpretation of "phenomenology" in section 7 of the "Introduction" to *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquairie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 49-63. (HJS)

4. *Dépasser* and *dépassement*, the French equivalents for the celebrated Hegelian *Aufheben* and *Aufhebung*, will be translated as "to surpass" and "surpassing" respectively.

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into one [chapter]. A relationship with the absolute cannot be realized except in an existence which is partial (*non intégrage*) but which is narrow and [therefore] profound.

But this anti-philosophy is above all anti-system—against Hegel the scholar—not against the Hegel of 1807 and earlier.

Nietzsche's "Preface" to the second edition of *The Gay Science* (1886).[5]

Every philosophy is life and the life of the body "ends up fulfilling the need to write ideas across the sky in cosmic capital letters." (*FW* p. 8, trans. pp. 33-34) "After such self-interrogation, such self-temptation, one learns to take a more subtle view toward what has been philosophy up to the present. We can guess better than before which are the involuntary detours, the circumvented routes, the side lanes, the resting places, and the places of thought where the happy sufferers are driven and transported precisely because they suffer... All philosophers until now have never concerned themselves with 'truth' but with something else—let us say, health, the future, growth, power, life..." (*FW* pp. 9-20, trans. pp. 34-35)

A philosopher "...simply cannot keep from transposing his states every time into the most distant form of the spiritual—this art of transfiguration is precisely philosophy. We others are not free to separate the body from the soul, as the people are wont to do; we are even less free to divide soul from spirit. We are not thinking frogs, nor are we objective and registering mechanisms with their innards in refrigeration. We constantly give birth to our thoughts out of pain, and, like mothers, endow them with all we have of blood, heart, ardor, joy, passion, agony, conscience, fatality. For us, life consists in continually transforming all that we are into clarity and flame, just as it transforms everything that we touch.

...Only great pain is the ultimate liberator of the spirit, being the teacher of *the great suspicion*...[which] compels us, we other philosophers, to descend into our ultimate depths and to put aside everything good-natured, everything that would impose a veil, that is mild, that is medium,—things in which we may have formerly placed our humanity. I strongly doubt that such pain makes us "better;" but I know that it makes us more profound...One emerges as a different person out of these dangerous exercises in self-domination, and with a few more question marks in addition. Above all, one emerges with the *will* hence forth to question further, more deeply, severely, harshly, evilly and quietly than one had questioned heretofore. The trust in life is gone; life itself has become a *problem*." (*FW* pp. 11-12, trans. pp. 3`36)

"But one should not imagine that all this should necessarily make us misanthropic! Even love of life is still possible, only one loves differently. Our love is like the love for a woman whom we suspect...However, the attraction of everything problematic, the joy caused by the x, is so great in such more

5. Merleau-Ponty translates, into French, passages from the second German edition of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1887). This work is abbreviated as *FW* and its page references are followed by those in Walter Kaufmann's English translation as *The Gay Science* (New York: Vintage, 1974). In order to more closely approximate the French translation which Merleau-Ponty offers, I have at times altered Kaufmann's rendering. (HJS)

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spiritualized and more intellectual men that this pleasure flares up again and again like a bright blaze over all the distress of what is problematic, over all the danger of undertainty, and even over the jealousy of the lover. We know a new happiness..." (*FW* pp. 12-13, trans. pp. 36-37)

"...One returns *newborn* from such abysses, from such severe sickness, also from the sickness of severe suspicion. One returns as if one had shed one's skin, more ticklish and malicious, with a more subtile taste for joy, with a tenderer tongue for all good things, with a merrier spirit, with a second dangerous innocence in joy. One returns more childlike and yet, at the same time, a hundred times more subtle than one has ever been before...No, we no longer find pleasure in things of bad taste, this will to truth, to "truth at any price," this youthful madness in the love of truth: we have too much experience for that, we are too serious, too merry, too burned by fire, too *profound*. We no longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn; we have lived too much to write this. Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand everything and to "know" everything...One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddles and multiple uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons?...Ho, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for living is to stop courageously at the surface, to hold on to the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, sounds, words, in the whole Olympus of appearance! These Greeks were superficial,—*out of profundity*!" (*FW* pp. 1à-15, trans. pp. 37-38)

Commentary: When detached from life, philosophy is a panacea: a search for "sunny places of thought." Philosophy is a "transfiguration" of what we live, a "transfiguration" of sadness and of suspicion, for life is a "problem."—At the end of this awareness [*clair voyance*] there is no misanthropy and hatred for life, but rather *another* love, "a new happiness."—"Abyss" and "regeneration."—Second innocence.—Truth is only a hidden truth.—Do not seek to "see" everything "in its nakedness," to "know" all—to be superficial through profundity (Apollo and Dionysus).[6]

6. In his first work, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), Nietzsche centered upon these two Greek gods (Apollo and Dionysus) as representatives of two psychological tendencies. The Apollonian was associated with illusion, dream, a rational reserve—i.e. profundity. The Dionysian was appropriately wild, drunken, frenzied passion. Thus the god of Bacchinales, of wine and festival, represented superficiality. But according to Nietzsche, an unprecedented tendency arose in Greek thought about the time of Aeschylus: a new Dionysian, evidencing the harnessing of passion, the fusion of the two forces,—superificality along with profundity. But the Apollonian Socrates came along and destroyed all that. Rational discourse prevailed over the union of profundity and superficiality. Appearing profound became simply a form of superficiality in the Socratic outlook. Although the philosopher, according to Merleau-Ponty, must avoid such appearances (false-seeming), appearance is not necessarily in opposition to profundity. A place for the co-givenness of appearance and profundity (without being purely superficial) is possible. As Merleau-Ponty explains in the next paragraph, with Hegel the absolute can be achieved through the unification of appearance and profundity. Appearance is associated with (Dionysian) superficiality, but the superficial is the profound. Similarly, in Nietzsche's greatest wish, profundity should not be opposed to appearance in order for appearance (*phainomenon*) to be absolute,—in order for phenomenological intuition (as in the Husserlian *Anschauung* and the

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We find here the idea that there is a philosophy that does not question enough, which flees from questioning into "sunny places"—all philosophy is a "transfiguration" (cf. Marx). We discover that true philosophy is beyond: great suspicion, abyss, a-philosophy through infidelity to what we live. We realize that this does not end with "full knowledge" (a new positivism), nor with despair, but with the will to appearance.—For Hegel, appearance and profundity are not contraries.—Nietzsche maintains the quality of the "philosopher" [in] the absolute of appearance.

If we have time, we will examine: a) The connection that Heidegger thinks he brings with his thinking [*Denken*] to this movement towards a surpassing of metaphysics, towards philosophy a-philosophy. b) A text from Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, to see if Marx is the unsurpassed philosophy, as Sartre claims, or if Marx is a moment in the history of a-philosophy.

Problems linked to what is within [the world of experience], what is beyond, and their relationship:

1. The Problem of Christianity.—Philosophy as the negation of a detached philosophy; religion as the death of God.—Death of God: Hegel's word, Marx's theory of ideologies, Kierkegaard's Pharisean Christianity, Nietzsche's word.—This does not mean (according to Heidegger): *es gibt keinen Gott*.[7] —It does mean: the absolute must be thought by a mortal (capable of dying). This is not death in the sense of beings which are merely alive and which are uprooted from existence by an external cause. Rather it is death in the sense of human death, prefigured in man because conscience (*Er-innerung*)[8] is negativity offered as proof of itself.—The absolute requires all that in order to avoid being "solitary" and "lifeless" (Hegel).[9]

The question of Christianity in the second sense.

2. The Problem of humanism:

Humanism must also involve a kind of anti-humanism. Are the Dostoevskian superman and the Nietzschean overman[10] to be understood as man replacing God (mystique of the Superman),—or do Being and man belong to one another without the possibility of thinking their relationship only from man's point of view? The relationship is the appropriate domain of philosophy—beyond all anthropology.

Our procedure will be to explain the last four paragraphs of Hegel's "Introduction" to the *Phenomenology of Mind*. But first we will analyze what precedes with reference to some passages.

Nietzschean Apollonian tendency) to reveal appearances. In Nietzsche's new Dionysian, appearance becomes autonomous in the work of philosophy. (HJS)

7. [marginal note:] *Gott ist tot: das sagt alles andere, nur nicht: es gibt keinen Gott*. God is dead, which means everything, except: there is no god. (M-P)

8. In French, conscience can be either "conscience" or "consciousness." The ambiguity is relevant here since *Er-innerung* (re-collection, re-membrance, re-minder) can be both a conscious activity and an aspect of moral awareness. (HJS)

9. Whenever words, sentences, or passages, which Merleau-Ponty left in the German, are included here in English, quotation marks are used to identify them as such. (HJS)

10. Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov (in *Crime and Punishment*) and Nietzsche's Zarathustra (in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*) both propose a "superman" theory as a hypothetical ideal human type. (HJS)

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I

Philosophy has no understanding [*connaissance*][11] by which it can gain the absolute. Philosophy is (irreducibly) the revealing[12] of phenomena, the presence of the absolute.

Philosophy goes "to the thing itself"—but if this movement is established by "understanding" [*Erkennen*], it is conceived either as an instrument or as a medium through which the thing itself is visible to us.—Whence the question of the critique of "understanding:" can consciousness acquire "*what is in itself*" by this instrument, through this milieu?—With the question posed in this way, the response is necessarily that "there is a strict line of demarcation separating *understanding* and the absolute."[13]

The instrument modified the thing. The milieu alters its image. The means run counter to the end. There would have to be no means: "what is non-sensical lies in our making use of any means at all" (Holz pp. 106, trans. p. 8).

Would we say that the action of the instrument cuts off the result?—But then we find ourselves back again before the initial problem: how does one grasp the absolute? If the instrument is only a trap like flypaper for insects which brings the absolute closer to us without forcing us to approach it, then the instrument becomes a kind of mockery. The absolute defies all activities of "understanding." It serves only "to bring forth a relationship which is immediate and thus effortless" and would be powerless "if it (the absolute) were not, in and for itself, already close to us of its own accord." (Holz p. 106, trans. p.9)

Would we say that "understanding" corrected through a medium by taking into account the refraction of light rays? But "understanding" is not a certain refraction of light. It is light itself, "the ray of light itself through which the truth touches us" (*Holz* p. 106, trans. p. 9) and if we subtract this light, "understanding" indicates nothing more to us than an empty spot or a pure directionality. . . (*Ibid.*)

A philosophy of "understanding" (whether instrument or medium) destroys itself by placing philosophy and the absolute side by side. The relation to the absolute must be preliminary to "understanding." Such a relation must pass

11. The reader would be thoroughly confused if both *connaissance*, which Bertrand Russell has called "knowledge by acquaintance," and *savoir*, which Russell terms "knowledge by description," were both rendered as "knowledge." Although "knowledge" is doubtless the best translation in each case, for purposes of clarity connaissance has been translated as "understanding." *Erkennen* is the German equivalent of *connaissance*, so it too appears as "understanding." *Savoir*, and the corresponding German *Wissen* are given as "knowledge." (HJS)

12. *Dévoilement* (the revealing) is the French expression which parallels Heidegger's *Unverborgenheit*, i.e. bringing out of concealment. Heidegger relates it to a conception of truth as *aletheia*—the revealing or appearing of what is. (HJS)

13. This passage from Hegel's "Introduction" to *The Phenomenology of Mind* and those that follow are cited from Heidegger, "*Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung*" in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950). In English, the essay *Hegel's Concept of Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) is published separately and includes Kenley Royce Dove's translation of Hegel's "Introduction," occuring on pages 7-26. Merleau-Ponty cites the Hegel "Introduction" as it occurs in *Holzwege* (abbreviated as *Holz*) on pp. 105-117, and he sometimes refers to Heidegger's paragraph by paragraph commentary on the Hegelian source. (HJS)

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by another route whether the absolute be "already in our midst," or whether it be the light itself which reveals it.

The critical attitude of "understanding" involves a distrust of knowledge which "takes up its work and actually understands without any such hesitations." (*Holz* p. 106, trans. p. 9) But this distrust is presupposed and is not true radicalism. It presupposes a "representation" of "understanding" as a medium and instrument and "a difference between ourselves and this understanding." (*Holz* p. 107, trans. p. 10) It also presupposes the disjunction between "understanding" and the absolute, and therefore immanence to "understanding" a truth at the moment when it is spoken outside of the absolute. All this is not a "fear of error," but a "fear of truth"..., resistance to the truth.[14] —True radicalism will not be just this distrust, but also a "distrust of distrust."

A "difference" between ourselves and "understanding" must not be presupposed.[15] We must seek an "understanding" which is [identical with] ourselves (our being)...

In reality, we must begin with the fact that "the absolute alone is true" or "the true alone is absolute." (*Holz* p. 107, trans. p. 10)

This appears to be a dogmatic leap into the absolute; a proposition not proven. That is:

1. The leap is implicated into our existence as a distrust of distrust, as a knowledge which becomes, in fact, a universal postulate [*Weltthesis*], the identity of our being and our ability to understand [*connaitre*].

2. The proof will be given by whatever follows, that is, by our history, by revealing a mind-phenomenon, a life which makes itself knowledge, and therefore a knowledge which gives itself life.

In a sense, it is a circle—the beginning is the end—but it is a conscious circle.[16]

"The 'absolute,' 'understanding' etc. are words which presuppose a signification, which has yet to be acquired." (*Holz*, p. 107, trans. p. 11)

We must understand the relation between "understanding" and the absolute as given in our life (hence an absolute which will also be "understanding"). We must truly recast the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity, absolute and understanding according to their contact with our life. We must take science within us in its nascent state "science, in that it

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14. This fear of being wrong is the error itself. (M-P)

15. [marginal note:] "This distrust presupposes that there is a difference between ourselves and this knowledge." (M-P) [below:] This attitude presupposes "that understanding, which, while remaining outside the absolute and thus certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true..." (*Holz*, p. 107, trans. p. 10). (M-P)

16. [marginal note:] To give priority to certainty, as Descartes does, it to give priority to a truth outside truth; —an "other" truth: a confusing distinction, —we have an "interpretation" [*Bedeutung*] of the absolute, and an "interpretation" of "understanding," which must be rendered equal. (M-P) [below:] The "understanding" is not to be placed outside the absolute because the absolute is not to be placed outside the "understanding:" "all these representations of an understanding separated from the absolute and of an absolute separated from the understanding." (*Holz* p. 107, trans. p. 11) (M-P)

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appears, *is* an appearance itself." (*Holz*, p. 108, trans. p. 12)

The fact of knowledge is not like a simple fact (as in Descartes) which can be placed alongside any sort of false knowledge, and which has certainty in that it is a simple thought. However the fact of knowledge delimits an appearance of knowledge "as it is in and for itself" and takes recourse in the "presentation of knowledge as a phenomenon (of appearing knowledge); experience of its own self." (*Holz*, p. 109, trans. p. 13)

Phenomenology is this self-presentation of mind, an appearance which is not an effect of the absolute, but the absolute itself.—In that respect, philosophy is experience.

II

1. Philosophy is not "understanding" but [it wishes] to redefine everything with our being as its point of departure. Our life of understanding opens onto "the thing itself."

The distinction between the understanding and the absolute (the critical attitude) is a false radicalism. Its presuppositions are: [a.] the instrument of understanding: either that this instrument alters the absolute (and on that basis, how do we even have a notion of an absolute?) or, if it is only a trap like flypaper for insects, it presupposes "a relation which is immediate and thus effortless" and which is and wants to be the absolute already "in and for itself close to us of its own accord." [b.] the medium of understanding: this "milieu" is truth coming in contact with us, "the ray of light itself through which the truth touches us."

Therefore, this fear of error invokes a critical examination of "understanding" against these *Vor-stellungen* (external representations of the understanding). —"This...is the error itself." —In other words, we are within truth; —or, to put it another way: the understanding is not distinct from us, and we are not distinct from understanding. There is no "difference between ourselves and this understanding."

And this understanding, which we are, is also understanding of the absolute, since, if one denies it (Descartes),[17] it must be affirmed that the understanding is true at the moment when one says that this is outside the absolute and hence outside the true. (*Holz*, p. 107, trans. p. 10) And what does this "other truth" mean? Absolute, understanding: "words which presuppose a signification which has yet to be acquired." There is knowledge, a science "which takes up its work and actually understands without any such hesitations."

Thus, there is the fact of understanding which we are, and which is in contact with the absolute.—

17. Descartes' universal doubt, formulated in the *Meditations*, is suggested here as the paradigm for affirmation of truth by negation of itself. The dualism created by distinguishing the denial from that which is denied does not place understanding outside truth. On the contrary, understanding is thereby included in truth because the denial is a form of understanding. To claim that one does not understand is already to make an assertion of truth. Merleau-Ponty interprets Descartes as necessarily implicated in the texture of truth despite his sceptical leanings. (HJS)

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Only the absolute is true, "the absolute alone is true" only the true is absolute, "the true alone is absolute." This implies that the absolute within us is internal to the truth, that there is an absolute which is nothing other than our truth, and which is not separated from "understanding."

The attitude here is not dogmatic. On the contrary, it is the true radical, critical attitude. By it, we commit ourselves to "giving" the concept of the absolute, "understanding," the objective, the subjective "to give this concept" (*Holz*, p. 108, trans. p. 11) rather than presupposing what everyone understands or assuming the concept that we already have of it.

We begin with the true as absolute and with the absolute as true. We start from an understanding, which can only form a unity with our being as a knowing being. This knowledge cannot correspond to "science making its appearance" (*Holz*, p. 108, trans. p. 12) nexus of understanding and absolute, of our Being and the Being.—We must grasp this nexus fully and not in the emptiness of "representations."

2. Revealing the phenomenon is presence of the absolute.

The phenomenon ("science making its appearance") "Appearance" (a manifestation).—The science is that which "comes forth" "which is not yet rendered explicit and developed in its truth." It is not yet freed from "semblance" [*Schein*]. (*Holz*, p. 108, trans. p. 12)[18]—It cannot simply free itself as "assurance" (*Holz*, p. 108, trans. p. 12) certainty of thought (in the Cartesian sense), certainty "dried of its Being"—for another Being, that of false knowledge, is worth precisely as much. Similarly it is undesirable to make reference in false knowledge to any misgivings (or presentiment) that it might have about itself. This would still be to refer oneself to a Being (the presentiment). It is false knowledge to refer to oneself as "science making its appearance," to refer to a "bad" mode of its Being, to refer to its manifestation ("Appearance") and not to itself, a science, "as it is in and for itself." (*Holz*, p. 109, trans. p. 13)

Science must be shown to manifest itself with reference to *science in and for itself*. —This occurs through the presentation (*Darstellung*) of science while it is appearing, that is, while it proves itself to be a science, the "presentation of appearing knowledge" presenting itself, exposing itself in the name of science. (That is, not only the Cogito, but a Cogito which includes both itself and the false.)

This "presentation" is no longer science "in its free form," but the pathway (*Weg*) of "natural consciousness" which strives toward true knowledge,—or the soul's road towards the explicit *Geist* through stations which are prescribed for it by its nature. —This pathway is experience (*Erfahrung*), complete within itself, realizing the understanding (*Kenntnis*) of "that which it is in-itself." (*Holz*, p. 109, trans. p. 13)[19]

18. "Semblance" is Dove's rendering, but *Schein* is also a "shining forth." (HJS)

19. [We include and translate the text from which this quotation is taken:] This presentation can be regarded as the pathway of natural consciousness striving towards true knowledge, or as the path of the soul making its way through the sequence of its own transformations as through

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Science here is in the process of manifesting itself. That is, it proves itself to be a science by taking up what goes before it, conserving it and surpassing it. Now there is a question of its identity in this becoming, because it develops itself, and because this departure is a return to that which it is in its pure state, as pure "knowledge."

Life makes itself into knowledge, —and perceives itself in such a way that knowledge gives itself life.

The juncture of the two, the overthrowing of one in favor of the other is a manifestation of knowledge. —When there is an identity of the phenomenon and of the absolute, the phenomenon, i.e., the way, is precisely the absolute (in and for itself) or its presence. And reciprocally the absolute is the phenomenon since it is that which "is in and for itself."

Presence of the absolute and revealing the phenomenon are synonymous because the absolute is the subject, self-consciousness, and the phenomenon represents the becoming of this self-consciousness. The phenomenon and the absolute are linked, because every phenomenon represents the relation to itself, and because the absolute is itself, that is, relation to itself.

Every phenomenon [is] a "presentation of appearing knowledge:" an exposition of knowledge in the process of manifesting itself. —Here exposition means exteriorization, revelation, and what is not secondary in relation to knowledge. What is appropriate to knowledge is to manifest itself as knowledge. —

Whence:

a. The phenomenon is a "figure" (*Gestalt*) and not "free" knodledge. —It is "figurative" knowledge. —Thus the relation to a "figure" [is] knowledge of something. —But this knowledge of something is self-knowledge: what I see, in these phenomena, are figures of a relation to myself. —Consciousness of something is self-consciousness (once it is decoded).

b. Inversely, self-knowledge (either in equilibrium with itself, or as absolute) does not truly rejoin itself except in departing from itself. To attain the absolute is nothing other than to completely decode the "appearance." —An absolute knowledge does not prove itself to be absolute except in manifesting itself, in being born into phenomena.

The relation between phenomenology and absolute knowledge (metaphysics) is the relation between perception and the thing: partial perception is not simply reconciled with the thing. In order to be total, it must be partial. This is at least the case if one considers the "vertical," present world—and an "understanding" which is not distinct from our being. Phenomenology uncovers this order where to be with the thing and to be with oneself are synonymous, —where the linking of "figures" leads to the Self. This order is the same thing as the Self, and is not a prolegomenon to metaphysics. Inversely methphysics here is nothing other than a taking

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waystations prescribed to it by its very nature. By purifying itself it may lift itself to the level of the mind and attain cognizance of what it is in itself through the completed experience of its own self. (*Holz*, p. 109, trans. p. 13). (CL)

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possession of what appears.

Phenomenology is the total part: the whole system under a certain relation. —What is restrictive in the "appearance" (which is *only* a manifestation) is in reality not a hindrance, but the accomplishment of an absolute which is entirely a manifestation of the self, subjectivity.

We must now specify the nexus, the "chiasm:"[20] relation to the self-relation to the external.

3. The structure of consciousness as a fundamental law of the phenomenon and of self-presentation: (*Holz*, p. 109, trans. p. 13ff) the movement from "appearing knowledge" to "knowledge."

"Natural consciousness" (*natürliches Bewusstsein*) is not real accomplished knowledge (for example, when living in a society, a religion is not knowledge in its truth). —However, taking itself for real knowledge, "natural consciousness" is the concept of knowledge, a non-realized concept, and one which will be realized only by sacrificing this deceitful positivity, "loss of itself" (*Holz*, p. 109, trans. p. 13), recognition of its non-truth.

There is a natural consciousness which is naturally unconsciousness (cf. Marx; and Freud), naturally mystified. This "consciousness:" consciousness of the external. It appeals to the truth, but can only happen unexpectedly by negating and tearing it apart. The immediate is deceitful.

The movement from there to truth. We note the difference between this movement and that of Descartes. —The pathway is that of doubt or even despair. Cartesian doubt, however, leads to a restoration of truth in the initial sense (by God), whereas here, doubt —the whole history of consciousness —inserts itself into truth ([since] the object and work of consciousness reflect each other exactly). An intuition of the non-truth of the immediate and an intuition of a higher truth than what follows is the carrying out (*Ausführung*) of knowledge, —consciousness at work on the self (*Bildung*).[21] The school of truth is not the place for doubt, which converts everything into *my thoughts*. Skepticism, which is no more careful with my opinion than that of others, does not give precedence to my principles over those of others. It does not take refuge in my thoughts, but attaches itself neither to me (thought of understanding), nor to authority, but to the content, to its "necessities" (*Notwendigkeit*), and to its cohesion (*Zusammenhang*).

This conscousness, which forms itself, cultivates itself, or works itself, is a negation (since the immediate is recognized as untrue). It is a negation which does not reach the "pure nothingness" (*Holz*, p. 110, trans. p. 16) but which attains the "nothingness of that from which it results" (*Holz*, p. 111, trans. 16)

20. The central notion of the penultimate completed chapter in *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1968), which Merleau-Ponty was writing at the time of his death and hence while he was offering this course at the Collège de France. The chiasm is an intertwining of visible and invisible, seen and seeing, touched and touching. It is associated with an inside becoming outside, outside becoming inside, in short, a reversibility. The last working note (dated March, 1961) in *The Visible and the Invisible* (p. 275) reads: "worked-over-matter-men equals chiasm." (HJS)

21. *Bildung* is both formation and education. Where consciousness works on the self, a process of learning occurs. Self-knowledge arises along with the realization of knowledge. (HJS)

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and which is, therefore, in the end, "the actual result." (*Ibid.*) Once nothingness has been determined and that which has a content has been determined, the previous truth is therefore not a "void" (*Abgrund*) (*Ibid.*) but a movement (*Uebergang*) to a new form, its true surpassing. Question: but then could anything ever be achieved from this movement? Would it not be necessary for the negation to be absolute, a negation without context which disclaims itself (a negation of the negation)? Therefore it would no longer be necessary "to go out beyond itself." (*Ibid.*) "Knowledge" would find itself. The concept would correspond to the object, [and back again] to the concept. Sartre's solution would be to sacrifice the for-itself so that the in-itself might be: the nothingness is not anyting.'[22] For Hegel, this would be an impossible solution, since "consciousness" (thrust into the apparently solid reality of the immediate, into its flesh), which, we would say, *is only* its own concept, a projection of itself, a being in the distance, is not its own self-realization. We must also say that if "consciousness" is its own concept, the concept is intentional with all its force. "Consciousness" projects itself into that of which it is conscious and, therefore, "out beyond itself." Once it is beyond, spatial perception, for example, is "of the beyond;" it forces itself beyond the limited segment. "Consciousness" is violence done against itself, passion by itself, self-destruction ("consciousness therefore suffers violence at its own hands, a violence through which it destroys for itself any limited satisfaction") (*Holz*, p. 111, trans. p. 17) Hegel condemns the nihilist solution that would conclude on this account that the self and others are guilty of vanity. This solution which depends on vanity detaches itself from all content and "bereft of all contact, finding instead no more than the barren 'I',"(*Holz*, p. 112, trans. p. 18) remains in "being-for-itself." (*Ibid.*) Judgment, skepticism, pure nothingness or always I.

But then, if "consciousness" is, by definition, outside of itself, a hole, (and it does not feel that it can even find repose in nothingness), why isn't all consciousness unhappy?[23] How can there be access to the absolute?

4. The problem of the standard of measurement and what is measured.[24] —The exchange between the standard of measurement and the

22. Merleau-Ponty's orientation is to avoid the Sartrian negation of the for-itself. For Merleau-Ponty, the for-itself is not nothingness, but intimate inter-relation with the in-itself through the body (in *Phenomenology of Perception*) and through "visibility" (in *The Visible and the Invisible*). In chapter two of "Interrogation and Dialectic," Merleau-Ponty takes up his critique of Sartre, indicating that perceptual faith cuts across the separation between the for-itself and the in-itself. (HJS)

23. This interpretation of Sartre's for-itself suggests that all consciousness must become eternally caught up in a Hegelian "unhappy consciousness." For Hegel, the unhappy consciousness is only a stage on the way to the absolute. The "unhappiness" is due to an unsatisfied desire for complete consciousness of self. In Sartre, consciousness is continually being frustrated by being thrown outside of itself, for consciousness can never achieve happiness or repose in itself. Thus, a Sartrian consciousness is denied the absolute. (HJS)

24. *Mesurant* here stands in opposition to *mésuré*. Literally, these would be measurer, or measuring, (*mesurant*) and measured (*mésuré*). The participle used as a substantive (here *sesurant*) is equivocal. I translate it as "standard of measurement" (or just "standard") to mean "measurer," but it could also be rendered as "the act of measuring," both of which are distinct from what is measured (*mésuré*): the measured. The opposition is parallel to de Saussure's

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measured or "experience." (*Holz*, p. 112ff, trans. p. 18ff)

"Presentation" is science entering into knowledge in the process of appearing. "Presentation" tests (*Prüfung*) this knowledge which supposes a "standard of measurement" (*Holz*, p. 112, trans. p. 18) that is applied to it. This "standard of measurement" is taken as "essence" or "in-itself." Now, since science only appears, where will we take the "essence" (the essential as opposed to the inessential)? (How can consciousness learn? Either it knows or it does not know.)

"Consciousness" distinguishes from itself something to which it relates—this "something" is "something for consciousness." This being of something for a consciousness ("for an other") is what we call "knowledge." But what is known is also presented as being outside this relation. And that is what is called "Truth" or "being-in-itself." All this is taken as a phenomenon, an "appearing." Here, we philosophers interrogate ourselves about "the truth of knowledge." We are therefore questioning what "knowledge" is in itself. But in this inquiry, this "in itself" of "truth" is the "for us" which we attain. Its supposed "in itself" is not the truth, but our knowledge of this truth. We therefore do not have any standard of measurement which we could introduce here; and when we apply such a standard to nascent knowledge, it will perhaps be refused.

Nevertheless, consciousness is what we study, and we are the standard of measurement, which is consciousness. Philosophy is already in life. "Since consciousness provides itself with its own standard, the investigation will be a comparison of consciousness with itself." (*Holz*, p. 113, trans. p. 20) The standard of measurement-measured distinction is internal to consciousness. Being for the other is its own, and this other for consciousness is not only other in consciousness, but other in itself. Consciousness is knowledge, *Wissen*; it is truth. In that consciousness declares itself "in itself" or "true" we have the standard of measurement which it brings along to measure its own knowledge.

The "concept" [*Begriff*] can be called "knowledge;" "truth" or "knowledge" can be called the object)—the examination (*Prüfung*) of the correspondence between the concept and the object occurs in consciousness. Inversely, the concept can be called the essence or the in-itself of the object (the consciousness-object) and the object can be called the examining, philosophical, consciousness, since that is what we examine. When examining "philosophical consciousness,"[25] we make it appear before "natural

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conception of signifier (*signifiant*) and signified (*signifié*) in his *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). In his semiology, however, the nature of the opposition (as de Saussure calls it) or relation, is precisely the "sign." Merleau-Ponty, who taught a course on de Saussure at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1948-49, would certainly be aware of this implication. See Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, trans. Hugh J. Silverman (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973) for a further discussion of the linguistic model. If the *mesurant* is the standard of measurement and the *mésuré* is what is being measured, then the relation may well be the measurement itself as a form of sign. (HJS)

25. The French text reads "natural consciousness." However, from the sense of the passage, Merleau-Ponty must have meant "philosophical consciousness." (HJS)

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consciousness" and we seek its being for natural consciousness.

The two presentations are "the same,"—exchanging their roles; natural consciousness and philosophical consciousness are object and subject for each other. We philosophers do not bring our standards of measurement, our "thought" and our inventions. We seize the thing (*die Sache*) "as it is in and for itself" (*Holz*, p. 114, trans. p. 12) that is, absolutely.

III

1. para. 13[26] Knowledge is experience. The absolute is the reversal of roles between the measured and the standard of measurement.

2. para. 14 Experience; Ambiguity; Dialectic. para. 15 and para. 16: However philosophy is not "pure act of vision" [*reine Zusehen*]. (*Holz*, p. 114, trans. p. 21)

1. paras. 13 and 14:[27]

"But if a contribution (addition, or *Zutat*) by us becomes superfluous, it is not simply in connection with the concept and the object that the standard of measurement and what is to be examined are already present in consciousness. We are also spared the effort of comparison and preparation for examination (*Prüfung*). And therefore, since consciousness examines itself, what remains for us, on this side of the investigation too, is simply the pure act of vision (*reine Zusehen*). For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and, on the other, consciousness of itself; it is consciousness of what is true to it, and consciousness of its knowledge of this truth. Since both are before the same witness (for consciousness, *für dasselbe*) consciousness itself is a comparison; whether its knowledge of the object corresponds or fails to correspond with this object will be a matter *for consciousness* itself.

To be sure, the object seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousness seems, as it were, unable to get behind the object (*dahinter*) in order to see it, *not as* it is *for consciousness*, but as it is *in itself*. Therefore consciousness also seems unable to examine its own knowledge by comparing it with the object. But the difference between the in-itself and the for-itself is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. With respect to consciousness, something is the *in-itself*, but the knowledge or the being of the object *for* consciousness is still another moment. It is upon this differentiation, which exists and is present, that the examination (*Prüfung*) is grounded. And if, in this comparison, the two terms do not correspond, then it seems that consciousness will have to change its knowledge in order to conform with the object. In the transformation of knowledge, however, with respect to consciousness the object itself becomes

26. Merleau-Ponty follows the same paragraph divisions Heidegger indicates. (CL) Hegel's "introduction" is divided by Heidegger into sixteen paragraphs. Merleau-Ponty commented upon the first twelve. At this point, he translated the last four paragraphs into French and comments on them in pairs. (HJS)

27. The German phraseology included in these passages is found parenthetically in Merleau-Ponty's French version and not in the Dove rendering. Additional variations from Dove's translation are made only where Merleau-Ponty offers a different interpretive direction.

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something which has in fact been transformed as well. For the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object: with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes an other, since it was an essential part of this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what had been *in-itself* is not in-itself, or, in other words, what was *in itself* was so only *for consciousness* (*für es an sich was*). When therefore consciousness discovers that its knowledge does not correspond with its object, the object itself will also give way. In other words, the standard of the examination is changed if that whose standard it was supposed to be fails to endure the course of the examination (*Prüfung*). Thus the examination is not only an examination of knowledge, but also of the standard used in the examination itself." (*Holz*, pp. 114-115, trans. pp. 21-23)

"This *dialectical* movement, which consciousness exercises (*ausübt*) on its self—on its knowledge as well as its object—is, *in so far as the new, true object emerges to consciousness* as the result of it, precisely that which is called *experience*. In this connection, there is a moment in the just mentioned process which must be articulated further so that new light may be cast on the scientific aspect (*die wissenschaftliche Seite*) of the following presentation (*Darstellung*). Consciousness knows *something*, and this object is the essence or the *in-itself*. But this object is also the in-itself for consciousness; and hence the ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*) of this truth comes into play. We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first *in-itself* (*Ansich*), the other is the *being-for-consciousness* of this *in-itself*. The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into its self, a representation (*vorstellen*) not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. But, as already indicated, the first object is transformed for consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the *in-itself* and becomes with respect to consciousness an object which is the *in-itself* only *for it*. And therefore it follows that this, the *being-for-consciousness of this in-itself* (*das Für-es-sein dieses Ansich*), is the true, which is to say that this true is the *essence* or consciousness' new *object*. This new object contains the annihilation (*Nichtigkeit*) of the first; it is the experience constituted through that first object." (*Holz*, p. 115, trans. pp. 23-34)

Literal commentary on paragraphs 13 and 14:

The development from "consciousness" to knowledge occurs without our adding anything (*Zutat von uns*). This is true not only because the standard of measurement and the measured are both present in consciousness,[28] but also because there is no basis for comparison; when the self is examined by itself, there is only pure intuition (*reine Zusehen*), pure insight (*spectacle*). In effect, consciousness is itself the comparison to be made, on the one hand, with the object, on the other hand, with the knowledge consciousness, has of it. Since these two moments are for consciousness, for the same consciousness, they are therefore grasped at once as to whether they coincide or not. One could say

28. "Since consciousness provides itself with its own standard, the investigation will be a comparison of consciousness with itself." (*Holz*. p. 113, trans. p. 20). (M-P)

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that consciousness, on the contrary, cannot pass behind itself in order to rejoin the in-itself and confront the in-itself with the knowledge that it has of it. However, from the very fact that consciousness is consciousness of an object, consciousness does have a dual reference. Its double reference is (1) to that which is in-itself for consciousness and (2) to that which for consciousness is the knowledge or the being of the object for consciousness. Because there are two references, there is an examination (*Prüfung*). Thus there is a duality in the undivided nature of the process (intentionality).

If consciousness cannot determine any correspondence between the in-itself and the knowledge of the in-itself, one could be led to believe that knowledge must model itself after the object. (Here the problem is how consciousness can learn anything.) But this change in "knowledge" (toward the true) also entails a change in the object, for the initial "knowledge" was essentially linked to the object. If "knowledge" changes, the object changes. The initial object which could pass for the "in-itself" becomes "an in-itself for consciousness." The object, the in-itself that was a standard of measurement is modified by the fact that the measured does not remain stable. The proof is therefore equivocal [*à double sens*]: the measured according to the standard of measurement and vice versa (cf. Lévi-Strauss).[29]

1. This exchange is dialectical. An action of A on B is also an action of B on A. Furthermore, the action is a movement of the self [*automovement*].[30] Consciousness as a relation to its object is its own modification of itself.

2. This dialectic is "experience" (pure "vision", concrete without discourse) because it creates for itself the new truth (by its content), without our bringing anything to it. Only experience, that is, the productive incorporation of a being, can make way for a dialectic, because it alone is an openness onto something that can reveal itself, something that is profound and latent, and something that can therefore give way to the *ek-stasis* out of which a truly *new* [form] will arise.

3. The consciousness in question here, i.e. experience, is "ambiguous:" a reference to an "in-itself" and a reference to the "being for consciousness of this in itself."

The introduction of this second element (self-consciousness) modified the object itself. It becomes the second object, an object established by evidence.

29. We might hypothesize that Merleau-Ponty is suggesting the relationship between nature and culture in Lévi-Strauss' work. Nature achieves its form through social and cultural structures (kinship, myth, prohibitions) and the latter have their basis in nature. The point becomes particularly evident in the relationship between exchange and symbolic function within kinship systems, as Merleau-Ponty points out in "From Mauss to Lévi-Strauss," *Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 114-125. (HJS)

30. Merleau-Ponty's term is "*automovement*." Although he is referring to Hegel's *Selbstbewegung*, "self-movement" does not make much sense in English. Merleau-Ponty's long-standing debates with Piaget suggest that another possible formulation might be a variation on the genetic epistemologist's notion of "self-regulation" (*auto-régtage*). In his *Structuralism* trans. Chaninah Maschler (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), Piaget cites the "self-regulative" element along with "wholeness" and "transformation" as key notions in structural understanding. Thus "*automovement*" oscillates between "self-movement" and "self-regulated-movement" with "movement of the self" performing a mediating function. (HJS)

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This second object, which annuls the first *is* the experience of the one on the other. (The second is nothing other than the first which has become its truth, and which is other in becoming the second. Thus the exchange of the In-itself-in-itself with the In-itself-for-us is an exchange which supposes that consciousness or "experience" is at the same time the relation to the self and the relation to a transcendent, and that it is both—not alternatively—but simultaneously. This is to say that latent intentionality calls for reversals and not dependence in the unitary sense direction[31] of a noema in relation to noesis.

Thus it seems that dialectic (if it is defined entirely in this way) could be, essentially, phenomenology (in the Hegelian sense), that is, the relation to the self in relation to a transcendent [object] and vice-verse. This dialectic is an intertwining[32] of subject and object, because they are abstract moments of an "experience."—Since the dialectical movement is a movement of content, it is not "given by consciousness; it exists only as content in relation to someone who experiences and lives it. No dialectical movement is possible without the duality: relation to the thing and relation to the Self.—To put dialectic back on its feet again would be to destroy it. We forget that it is Hegel who said deliberately that dialectic is the world stood on its head. Philosophy—that is, access to the absolute—appears to be essentially experience. Philosophy is an entering into phenomena in order to take part in their maturation and in experience. This is its character because in the relation of *experiri* with existing things, we can participate in the advent[33] of knowledge.

31. *Sens* can be both sense (or meaning) and direction. Merleau-Ponty is concerned here that Husserl's notions of *noema* (*Sinn* or meaning (*sens*)-given in an intentional act) and *noesis* (*Sinngebung* or meaning (*sens*)-giving act) not be taken as undirectional. It might be argued that Brentano understood intentionality, the structure of consciousness with its necessary relation between act and object, as unidirectional. The act always precedes what is to be know. In Husserl, the noetic-noematic correlates form a structure in which neither has precedence. The difficulty, however, arises in that Husserl conceives of intentionality as starting from a transcendental ego going out toward the thing in question (*die Sache*). Merleau-Ponty wants us to realize that experience, or even consciousness, also comes from the subject matter (the thing) as well as from the self. (HJS)

32. Intertwining is the translation for *l'entrelaes* employed by Alphonso Lingis in chapter four of *The Visible and the Invisible* "The Intertwining—The Chiasm," pp. 130-155. (HJS)

33. *Avènement* is associated with the coming of Christ, with Heidegger's notion of *das Ereignis*, and with Merleau-Ponty's distinction between "*avènement*" and "*évinement*" in previous writings. *Er-eignis* is that which comes to be one's own (*eigen*) property. *Das Ereignis* is sometimes rendered as "appropriation." Thus, here with Merleau-Ponty, we have not only the advent of knowledge, but even more so, the appropriation of knowledge. Otto Pöggeler (in 1959) gave an extended study of Heidegger's *das Ereignis* in "Being as Appropriation," trans. R.H. Grimm, *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 19 No. 2 (Summer 1975), pp. 152-178. In a 1968 *Festschrift* article for Jean Beaufret, entitled "Time and Being," Heidegger expands his earlier discussions of appropriation (or advent—as I translate *avènement* here) by developing the manner in which time is given and appropriated along with Being. Most importantly, however, Merleau-Ponty himself in *Signs* ("The Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence") and in *The Adventures of the Dialectic* cites the term *avènement*. In "The Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," (1952), he attributes his debt to Paul Ricoeur for the expression when announcing, "We propose. . . to consider the order of culture or meaning an original order of *advent*, which should not be derived from that of mere events, if they exist, or treated as simply the effect of extraordinary conjunctions," [*Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary, (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), p. 68]. And again in 1955, he writes, "But history does not work according to

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Correlatively, surpassing is conceived above all as conservation. The true (the standard of measurement) is already there, before the beginning. The beginning is the end or the result. The creation of the new, the *Bildung*, is the rendering explicit of what was already there.[34] Nevertheless the movement, as we have described it, includes a meta-empirical aspect.

2. paragraphs 15 and 16 (*Holz*, pp. 115-117, trans. 24-26).

"In this presentation of the course of experience, there is a moment in virtue of which it does not seem to be in agreement with the ordinary use of the term "experience." This moment is the transition from the first object and the knowledge of that object to the other object. Although it is said that the experience occurs in this other object, here the transition has been presented in such a way that the knowledge of the first object, or the being-for-consciousness of the first in-itself becomes the second object itself. By contrast, it usually appears that we experience the non-truth of our first concept in another object, such that we discover, in an accidental and extraneous manner, that what rises from us (i.e. lands on our side) is the pure *apprehension* of what exists in and for itself.[35] From the viewpoint of the present investigation, however, the new object shows itself as having come into being through a reversal (Hyppolite calls it "conversion")[36] of consciousness itself. This way of considering the content (*der Sache*) is our contribution. When viewed in this way the sequence of experience constituted by consciousness is raised to the level of a scientific progression and only what the philosopher is in the process of considering is for consciousness (*Bewusstsein*).

As a matter of fact, the circumstance which guides this way of obseving is the same as the one discussed with regard to the relationship between the present inquiry and skepticism. In every case, the result which emerges from an untrue mode of knowledge must not be allowed to dissolve into an empty nothingness (*leeres Nichts*) but must of necessity be grasped as the nothingness of that whose result it is, a result which contains what is true in the previous knowledge. Within the present context, this circumstance occurs as follows: when that which first appears to consciousness as the object sinks to the level of knowledge of the object, and when the in-itself becomes the being-for-consciousness of the in-itself, then the new object *is*. And with this new object a new form of consciousness also makes its appearance, a form whose essence is constituted by something else. This circumstance guides the entire succession of forms of consciousness in its necessity. But it is this

a model; it is, in fact, the advent of meaning," ["The Crisis of Understanding," *Adventures of the Dialectic*, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), p. 17.] The "advent of knowledge" is therefore the appropriation of a meaning realm in which knowledge has significance in our own experience. (HJS)

34. As early as *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), Merleau-Ponty had developed his notion of the *déjà là*. For him intentionality is precisely the experience of what is already there. (HJS)

35. Merleau-Ponty's version of this sentence diverges significantly from Dove's translation. (HJS)

36. Jean Hippolyte is the French translator of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, and author of *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (1947), trans. S. Cherniak and J. Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1974). (HJS)

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necessity alone—or the *birth* of the new object, presenting itself (*darbietet*) to consciousness without the latter's knowing how this happens to it—which occurs for the philosopher, as it were, behind the back of consciousness. A moment which is both in-itself and for-us is thereby introduced into the movement of consciousness, a moment which does not present itself (*darstellt*) for the consciousness which is engaged (*begriffen*) in the experience of itself. But the *content* of what is born before the eyes of the philosopher exists for consciousness, but the philosopher comprehends only the formal aspect (*das Formelle*). That is, for consciousness, what is born in a pure state is nothing but an object. For the philosopher it exists at once as movement and as becoming.

This, then, is the necessity in virtue of which the present road toward science is already a *science*. And, at the same time, in accordance with its content, it may be called the science of the *experience of consciousness*.

[para 16] According to the concept of experience, consciousness creates an experience of itself which in itself grasps (*begreifen*) nothing less than the whole system of consciousness or the whole realm of the truth of mind. The concept of experience thus entails the moments of truth presenting themselves, not as abstract, pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as this consciousness itself appears in its relationship to them. Presenting themselves in this way, the moments of the whole are *forms of consciousness*. And in driving itself toward its true existence, consciousness will reach a point at which it casts off the semblance of being burdened by something alien to it, something which is only for it and which exists as an other. In other words, at that point where its appearance becomes equal to its essence, consciousness' external presentation of itself will therefore coincide with this very same point in the authentic science of mind. And, finally, when consciousness itself grasps this, its essence, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowledge itself."

Literal commentary on paragraphs 15 and 16:

"Experience" has just been described as the revealing of knowledge. Philosophy, however, is not experience in the ordinary sense. Experience in the ordinary sense uncovers the non-truth of its point of departure by the truth of another object which substitutes for it.

Here, on the contrary, the experience, which was described, makes the new object emerge from the negation of the previous one by the work accomplished on the previous object. Experience produces its appearance as a result and surpasses the previous object by conserving it in its truth.[37] What the philosopher adds is this necessity apperceived in the unravelling of experience. The philosopher sees a "reversal [*Umkehrung*] of consciousness"[38]

37. The colloquial translation of *Aufhebung* as "canning" would emphasize Merleau-Ponty's stress upon *dépassement* as a process of conserving. Surpassing as conserving occurs when fruit, for example, is taken out of its fresh state, preserved, and hence given a new form. See also footnote 4. (HJS)

38. *Umkehrung* is literally a "turning around" or "over-turning" ("reversal," "inversion," or "conversion") of consciousness. (HJS)

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while in common experience one sees an object emerge without knowing how it comes to him. The philosopher goes behind the back of consciousness. Unlike the view of the man who simply lives, the philosopher's view of experience is not consciousness grasping successive objects (according to the irreversible neotic-noematic correlation). Rather he views experience as having been an object (in-itself) which can become consciousness (in-itself for consciousness), as having been consciousness which can become an object, and as a reversal of consciousness. Common consciousness is "engaged" in experience, and thought through experience "is caught up in the experience itself." (*Holz,* p. 116, trans. p. 25) The philosopher thinks the experience.[39] — The implication is that the content and the formal aspect are distinguished anew. The path, if it is going somewhere,[40] if it has a direction, is already science and the experience of consciousness is not the content of this science.

Thus, experience contains everything, the entire realm of mind, determined in a particular fashion, i.e. by "figures of consciousness." A moment comes precisely within this experience when "consciousness" comprehends itself in its own truth, reintegrating the object into itself. Its own nature, which is to manifest, becomes equivalent to all that is essential and thus leads to absolute knowledge, that is, knowledge which is absolute and the absolute which is knowledge.

IV

1. *The absolute and us: its parousia*[41] — *an und für sich bei uns* — the chiasm.

From the beginning, the absolute "was already in and for itself close to us on its own accord." From the absolute to us, the whole intermediary is "the ray of light itself through which the truth touches us" — the intermediary is not the "difference between our selves and this understanding." — Consequently, only the absolute is true, and only the true is absolute. — This does not signify a dogmatism (an external link: absolute-knowledge), but on the contrary an internal and reversible relation (without hierarchy)

39. For this special sense in which the philosopher has the capacity of "thinking" experience, see Heidegger's *What is Called Thinking?* trans. F.D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). (HJS)

40. The expression "*le chemin, s'il mène quelque part*" alludes to the French title of Heidegger's *Holzwege*, i.e. *Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part*, trans. W. Brokmeier (Paris; Gallimard, 1962). Literally, it means "Paths which Lead Nowhere," or, in the German, logging roads which circle around in forests without having any particular direction. The phrase "the path, if it is going somewhere..." is presented with *Holzwege* in the background. The philosopher's path is stated either as a counterfactual conditional (philosophy goes nowhere and is therefore not science) or as a rhetorical conditional (philosophy goes somewhere and therefore is already science). The prevalence of the latter indicates that if philosophy is already science, it cannot be the content of science. Rather science participates in the experience of consciousness, — which is the philosopher's domain. The establishment of the philosopher's path as between "nowhere" and "everywhere," between the counterfactual and the rhetorical, is also suggested in Merleau-Ponty's introduction to an anthology of major philosophers, *Les Philosophes célèbres*, which he entitled "*Partout et nulle part*" and included in *Signs* (translated as "Everywhere and Nowhere."), pp. 126-158). (HJS)

41. *Parousia,* being present, presence. It is related to *ousia*, being, essence. Heidegger defines them as *parousia, Präsenz*, presence; and as *ousia, Seienheit*, mode of being, or state of being, something that is. They are the ontic analogies of the ontological *Anwesenheit* (Presence) and *Sein* (Being). See, for example, *Holz*, p. 122, trans. p. 34. (HJS)

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between true knowledge and absolute knowledge. The absolute is in the nature of the knowledge, and knowledge is in the nature of the absolute. —What is given is their relationship, from which "Subject-Object" must be clarified.

2. The absolute:

The absolute is in the nature of the knowledge. The absolute is subject, not "Object" (not "in itself," that is, not "for-us"). The absolute is "for-itself." If it is in itself, it is in and for itself; that is, its repose in itself depends upon what it is for-itself. The only true "in itself" is "for itself;" but that means non-coincidence. That which the subject knows is nothing other than itself— "self-knowing Mind" [*Sich selbst wissends, Geist,*] but it objectivates itself [in the process].

The phenomenon. Here we are not told what this absolute is, since that would run counter to the starting point. As to the notion of phenomenon, in considering human history and our own, we see "knowledge" "appearing." —And the absolute would be this "knowledge" for itself. Everything that is produced is never anything but a "Figure" (a form, which is related to something else, hence, not "free;" which has not yet overcome itself; and which does not quite know itself fully yet). This follows from the unique nature of "knowledge," for example, as in the Greek city-state, or in Christianity.[42]

Why is the form related to something else? Because it is engulfed, non-transparent to itself, but, according to its very nature, it is in the process of "appearing."

However this whole variety is nothing but a series of variants on the relation to Self. But the relation to Self is unachieved. It "appears," that is, before us. The knower is not that which he knows and vice versa. One can "present" it, and recount it like an external event.

Yet, as the form unravels itself, its relatedness allows one to say that what follows is the truth of what precedes. Thus it is both accumulation and elucidation, not a blind process. So it "returns into itself," becomes itself. Its "appearance" [*Erscheinung*] undoes itself from the "*Schein.*"[43] At the same time as the "I" which contemplates it, I perceive that I am not other than it. The form becomes the Self that knows itself and becomes me while I become it. There is an appearance (that is, an external manifestation) of a knowledge which is absolutely knowledge. Every phase of this absolute knowledge passes

42. In the Greek polis a certain form of self-understanding is established from tyranny through the court of the Areopagus and then in democratic government until ultimately it becomes part of the Macedonian and subsequently Roman empires. At each stage, a Gestalt arises, but it does not have full independent knowledge of itself. On the one hand, it is related to a previous form, on the other it moves toward a new *Gestalt*. Similarly, in Christianity, the form established in Christ's own lifetime could not have had the knowledge within it of what it would be under the Apostles, Paul, Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas and so on. The appearing of the phenomenon in human history is an indication in human history of each stage in its development. Hence, at no moment is a particular *Gestalt* "free." (HJS)

43. *Erscheinung* is the appearance, whose root word is *Schein*, a shining forth. Hence the appearance makes itself separate from what appears. See footnote 18. (HJS)

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from one into the other (its beginning into its end, its end into its beginning), and what passes into me is like my passing into it. At this decisive moment where the knowledge making its appearance comprehends itself (*begreift*) "as it is in and for itself" we have arrived at the absolute.

The Hegelian notion of phenomenon [incorporates] the mind as phenomenon. The for-itself is viewed from the outside, appearing, and, to that extent, not fully for-itself. Yet the for-itself is already the for-itself, since otherwise, while on the way toward the self and toward the other, it would never become for itself. —Identity both departs from the self (*erscheinen*) and returns into the self.[44]

The phenomenon is not the object, nor is it the subject. It is not the object in that it concerns me: in presenting it, I understand myself. It is not the subject in that it still has to become for itself. The phenomenon is the hidden frame of "subject" and "object"—object returning to itself, subject outside of itself.

The only justification for the absolute is the conquest of this order of the phenomenon, the presentation of its relatedness. This justification is not a demonstration but rather an "auto-monstration"[45] of the becoming-absolute of the phenomenon (the becoming-phenomenon of the absolute) by its own movement.

3. Phenomenon and structure of consciousness. —The movement from the phenomenon to knowledge.

The starting-point: "natural consciousness"—knowledge of the external—believes that it comprehends the external and truly believes that it possesses the external. But how would the "natural consciousness" possess it if it is already the external? Perhaps it is only my dream—total skepticism: I know my thoughts as little as I know things (Montaigne?)[46] What there is, is *work*, not according to my rules, but according to the context, knowledge at work according to its necessities and its "cohesion." Thus negation, which is "actual result," is negativity that is not "pure nothingness" and not "void," but movement to the truth of. . .(cf. Husserl: all blocked perception is replaced by a true one).

This movement is set in motion by a consciousness of the external *per se*.

Consciousness of the external is its own concept, that is, "beyond itself;" it is above itself, "goes out beyond itself"—the Hegelian equivalent to intentionality. —In this sense, consciousness destroys itself in order to realize itself: "consciousness therefore suffers violence at its own hands, a violence

44. [marginal note:] cf. Goethe: "one never goes further than when he no longer knows where he is going." —In being a full phenomenon, the absolute is fully absolute. (M-P)

45. Merleau-Ponty is proposing that from "demonstration" (someone showing something) follows the neologism "auto-monstration" (someone showing oneself or something showing itself).

46. The reference is to Montaigne's pyrrhonist question: *que sais-je?* (what do I know?). With Montaigne, particularly in his skeptical period (as distinct from his enthusiasm for epicureanism and stoicism—even though the *Essays* constitute a network of all three orientations), little, if any, knowledge of the various levels of the great chain of being could be acquired. Conviction could be based only in skepticism and in fideism. See Merleau-Ponty's essay "Reading Montaigne" in *Signs*, pp. 198-210. (HJS)

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through which it destroys any limited satisfaction for itself."

But this must be clarified further, for one could object that consciousness is impossible, a failure in principle, being both a crack and an overhang.[47] One could offer the objection that one is tempted to direct at Husserl: consciousness is consciousness of something, always noetic-noematic correlation—but how can consciousness have its noema if it does not possess itself as noesis? Now if it possesses itself as noesis, consciousness can therefore take itself as an object (reflection) and, to the extent that there is not always a correlation in one noetic-noematic direction, reversibility is possible. This is precisely what Hegel will say: consciousness is this reversibility, this exchange. (In Husserl, intentionality also has this meaning).[48]

The Measured and the Standard of Measurement.

A knowledge, which turns out, in fact, to be knowledge, is put to the test (*Prüfung*) that is, a standard of measurement which is essential or "in itself," is applied to it. From where can the standard be taken? Answer: it is already in consciousness.

The relation to "something" is for "consciousness." The being of "something" for consciousness (*für ein anderes*) [is] "knowledge." But this something is also thought as outside of this relationship to consciousness, i.e., as "truth" or "being-in-itself." When the philosopher questions himself about the truth of the "knowledge," about the "in-itself" of the "knowledge," we will obtain nothing but its "being for us." The enterprise appears absurd. These are our measures which we apply to our "knowledge;" and perhaps our "knowledge" declines to judge them. But philosophy is possible becasue the object to which we are applying ourselves here is consciousness, and becasue this object is identical with our measures. The consciousness which we take from "knowledge" and from its truth cannot deform it because, in this case, consciousness is acquainted with consciousness. "Since consciousness provides itself with its own standard, the investigation will be a comparison of consciousness with its own self." The standard of measurement is not external to what is measured. Consciousness comprehends the being-for-another of knowledge as consciousness itself. The fact that, by reflecting on "knowledge," consciousness makes it a being-for-another does not diminish its value, since this being-for-another is consciousness.

47. The crack (*fissure*) causes failure because it allows a support system to crumble, while the overhang (*porte à faux*) is where the support system has overextended itself causing the whole structure to fall. Merleau-Ponty's metaphors are designed to indicate two opposing cases in which consciousness could be viewed as inadequate. Since these two alternatives (consciousness as a hole in being and consciousness as overhanging outside itself) may be construed as consistent with Sartre's position, this may be a further critique of Sartre. (HJS)

48. The meaning of intentionality as bi-directionality, as an intentional arc which is reversible, is Merleau-Ponty's particular contribution. Of course, he is assisted by his understanding of the Hegelian dialectic as this bi-directionality. From the time of *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty has emphasized the reversibility of conscious experience. In his view (a position that would be difficult to ascribe to Husserl), intentionality is both sparks flying up at us and our grasping of them. (HJS)

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Here the dichotomy "knowledge-in-itself" is dissolved and the "knowledge" of philosophy rejoins the "in-itself," because it is the "in-itself" of "knowledge." Reflection is a return to the unreflected.[49] In Hegel, if one calls "concept" the "knowledge" and "truth" or "essence" the object, then the object is the proof of the concept. Consciousness is not detached from its object by this structure since the object is restricted to presenting itself as having a view "for consciousness," but one which the object could dispute. For consciousness is its relation to the object—and the proof of their correspondence is part of the definition of consciousness. In other words, one could just as well reverse the situation by calling "concept" the essence or the in-itself under consideration (the "knowledge" which I strive to evaluate), and by calling the object this "knowledge" in that I examine it and in that it becomes in that way "for an other." Thus the concept is the proof of the object.

"We see clearly that both are the same; but what is essential is to retain for the whole investigation the fact that the two moments, *Concept and Object*, Being for another and Being for itself, themselves fall within the knowledge which we are studying. We therefore do not need to bring along standards or to apply our preconceived ideas and thoughts throughout the entire course of the investigation. On the contrary, in leaving them along the way, we come to examine them as the thing is in-itself and for-itself. (*Holz*, p. 114, trans. p. 21)[50]

The exchange between the standard of measurement and the measured, in reflection, creates a situation in which the object measures the subject as much as the subject measures the object, and one in which we are therefore at the absolute.

The narrow relationship between phenomenology and philosophy is self-confirming. Even the structure of consciousness is such that: 1. absolute knowledge is available to us (with respect to knowledge, there is not relativity in one's comprehension of oneself); and 2. absolute knowledge in a sense precedes itself, since the measured is also the standard of measurement.

Thus the notion of the phenomenon as neither object nor subject—as mind appearing, for-itself seen by another—turns out to be from the outside, and must be taken as it *presents* itself. [This notion] which is itself bound up with the true structure of consciousness,—a reversibility of measured-standard of measurement which makes the apprenticeship of consciousness and the appearance of knowledge possible—leads immediately to a relation with the absolute.

4. Subject-object relativization. —They are both "for the same."—Consciousness is *ek-stasis*.

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49. Merleau-Ponty's association of the unreflected with "perceptual faith" as against reflection is elaborated in the first chapter of *The Visible and the Invisible*, pp. 3-49, entitled "Reflection and Interrogation." (HJS)

50. [marginal note:] This is a knowledge in which subject and object, savage consciousness and reflected consciousness reciprocate each other. Both fall within knowledge, which is therefore not our meaning-giving act [*Sinngebung*], but a deployment of the "thing" as it is in and for itself. (M-P)

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Paragraphs 13 and 14:

para. 13: We cannot even say that a distinct act of comparison has been added to "consciousness," for it is consciousness of both the object and itself and the split between the two. Consciousness itself and the object are "for the same." Consciousness conceals any reference to the "back" of the object, and to the sides where the object escapes it. One doesn't even have to say that consciousness rectifies its "knowledge" according to the object. The object precisely as object was exactly correlative to "knowledge," and when "knowledge" changes, the object also becomes another. In truth, consciousness goes to test the object (the standard of measurement) by knowledge (what is measured), just as much as the measured is tested by the standard. Consciousness, the true progress of knowledge, does not consist in the external comparison of the two terms, but in the mutual coincidence [*Ineinander*] of object-knowledge, noeses-noemata, which give birth to each other. (Cf. Lévi-Strauss' double critique—and in general the relationship between objects and research.[51] Therefore, the idea of consciousness is not a meaning-giving act (*Sinngebung*), but an adequateness in the manifestation—philosophy [is] "pure vision."

para. 14: This movement (which is internal to consciousness) is "dialectical," in the sense of reciprocal action, transition of one into the other, "being-for-another," and therefore a movement which starts itself again. This dialectic is linked to the structure of consciousness. It is "experience" in the sense of someone's experience, for example, in the course of which the object and knowledge modify one another. The dialectic is a movement of content, its opening onto...its truth, is without any contribution from us. This is only possible when the dialectic has the phenomenon as its base. Because it is "experience," the contact with something which can reveal itself remains latent. Therefore it can give rise to *ek-stasis*.[52]

An ambiguity of the true: the in-itself becomes in-itself-for-us, that is, object-subject. The progress of "knowledge" is a surging of a new object. The ambiguity is essential to the dialectic and the "experience," for the object passes into the subject and conversely. There is no immanence; there is truly apprenticeship. —"Experience" is a solution to the dilemma: either one

51. Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology presupposes that criticism can be addressed both at the object of research and at study of the object. Attention given to only one or to the other: the collected facts or the research itself will not show that the true focus of interest should be the relation between the two. This relation is revealed in terms of structures: structures of kinship myth, and totem. The resolution of the double critique is the concept of structure. (HJS)

52. In a footnote to their translation of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 377, J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson write, "The root meaning of the word 'ectasis' (Greek *ekotasis*; German, *Ekstase*) is 'standing outside.' Used generally in Greek for the 'removal' or 'displacement' of something, it came to be applied to states-of-mind which we would now call 'ecstatic.' Heidegger usually keeps the basic root-meaning in mind, but he also is keenly aware of its close connection with the root-meaning of the word 'existence'." The relevant passage from *Being and Time* itself, p. 377, reads, "Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the present, the '*ecstases*' of temporality." (HJS)

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knows or one does not know.

The movement seems certainly not to be connected with consciousness in the sense of immanence, but rather with consciousness as this same consciousness *for which* the in-itself and the in-itself-for-itself exist simultaneously. It is certainly not connected with the "meaning-giving act" [by a subject], but with consciousness as the identity of savage consciousness and reflected consciousness. The movement comes from the content, but from the content inasmuch as there is "experience." To put dialectic back "on its feet" again would be to destroy it. Philosophy seems to have entered into the phenomena. But then there is para. 15.

V

February 20, 1961

Reread the translation of para. 13.

Commentary:

The development "consciousness"-knowledge, the "knowledge making an appearance" or the "knowledge" that "comes forward" operates without any contribution or addition from us (philosophers). This occurs not only because consciousness is a comparison of the self with the self (as stated on *Holz*, p. 113, trans. p. 20), and does not receive its standard of measurement from the outside ("provides itself with its own standard"). This could be the banal theme of immanence, where we ask only those questions which we can resolve. The interrogation is the contrary of an affirmation in the process of determining itself; the battle is victory; there is an underestimation of the investigation; dogmatism. But for a more profound reason, there is not even any comparison, since the self puts the self to the test, but as pure vision. It is truly a self-presentation of "knowledge," and not a "meaning-giving act" by us.

For it is not necessary to imagine consciousness either as a relation to the pure exterior, or as a pure relation to the self, or as the summation of the two (consciousness of the true plus consciousness of the knowledge of the true). Consciousness is the third and unique aspect for which the first two (the true and knowledge of the true) are distinguished by abstraction. This means that there is no true and no knowledge of the true. There is only one single term, and a second which is the same, and a third term, which is: openness onto . . ., examination of the self in the presence of . . . An openness before that which was knowledge can become an object, and that which was ture can be restored to the level of simple knowledge. Consciousness must not be thought alternatively as a relation to the self and a relation to another, but as the locus of a single explosion which produces selfness and consciousness of something. Consciousness serves neither as positive nor as negative, but as negativity at work—thus one cannot truly speak of consciousness as either an entity or as a *négatité*.[53]

53. *Négatité* corresponds to *entité*. *Negatité* is Sartre's term in *Being and Nothingness* for the implication of some element of negativity in human activity. This would include experiences such as the presence of absence. Merleau-Ponty considers *négatité* as a pole opposed to *entité* and essentially static, while negativity is the active component which mediates *qua* consciousness. (HJS)

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If that is achieved, we escape from the banality of immanence. The immanentist objection is that the reference to the true in-itself is illusory; consciousness can only aspire to that which *is* in-itself *to it*. consciousness cannot go behind the object that offers itself. It tries to catch a glimpse of the object itself. But since consciousness cannot comprehend my old sport jacket as it is in my absence, consciousness cannot go behind itself as an appearance of the "phenomenon making its appearance." [Thus], there is no knowledge where one could compare the self with the self, [since] all objects would be relativized into knowledge. This would be true of all knowledge, even knowledge of future objects. Hegel rejects this objection. If the immanentist were right, there would be no consciousness at all. Never would the words "in-itself" or being-in-itself, "knowledge" or being for consciousness have any meaning for us. From the moment that there is consciousness ("already in the fact that consciousness knows an object at all," *Holz*, p. 114, trans. 23) there is a meaning for the in-itself, or the true, and a meaning for being-for-consciousness, or knowledge. The truth is not that there is only knowledge or that there is only the in-itself or the object, but that there is the one and the other in a kind of precession, or gravitation, exchange or reversibility.

We could ask ourselves if we are not, in that way, both "consciousness" and "self-consciousness," two abstractions that designate the two sides of "the same." The Self (and philosophy) is neither receptivity, nor meaning-giving act "our contribution," but the spontaneous articulation of a "pure vision."

End of para 13: what has happened to the self's "putting istelf to the test" or the self's placing itself in question?

How does consciousness learn something? This seems to occur either in the reception of the object (but then how does it search [for the object]) or else by reminiscence and contribution of itself (but then how is it ignorant [of the object]?). It seems that the solution is either to deny knowledge or to deny non-knowledge.

A relation to an external transcendent [object] or, on the contrary, a relation to an immanence (philosophical dogmatism) are, in reality, equivalent. We must not say: I learn by changing my knowledge to conform with the object; nor must we say: I learn by elucidating a knowledge which corrects the object. The truth is that I form my knowledge according to the object, and I model the object according to knowledge, because there is no knowledge that is purely knowledge nor any object that is purely an object. [Consciousness is]* neither the subject nor the object, but the work of one against the other. For example, the minute that I "correct" my knowledge according to the object, the object is also changed. The change deposits a layer of disillusionment in the object, even if it is the object which teaches that suddenly it is not the same as it was a while ago. Compare this to when I learn the truth about someone after coming to know him. The change in my knowledge is also a change in the object, since this enemy today is no longer my friend of yesterday. It would be false to say that the friend of yesterday is the enemy today or that my friendship has given way to hatred. What is

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excluded is not annulled, not even in the object. There is no absolute error. Essence does not substitute for appearance. Appearance becomes essence and the true is what has occurred (*ist gewesen*). It is essential to "knowledge" to be "knowledge making its appearance."

Thus, the phenomenological theme (*erscheinende Wissen*, the blossoming of knowledge) seems to imply an overthrowing of philosophy. There is no absolute "in-itself," and no absolute "for us"—for the same reasons, i.e., their reciprocal relativization, their "mutual coincidence." This means that the very dimension of the absolute is to conceive in a fashion other than the way philosophy has done until now. The absolute is neither "free" knowledge (that is, without attachments, without an outside, without adherence to the in-itself), nor "free" object (that is, purely an object, without adherence to knowledge), but the "mutual coincidence" of the two. The (ultimate) formula: "the absolute is the subject" does not mean that there is only a subject. The "free" is freedom of the free and the related. The absolute is the "sameness" of the absolute and the relative. The true subject is the subjectivity of the subject and the object. There is an absolute "lifeless" and "alone" which is not the absolute. True philosophy does not go "behind:" behind the "appearance" and behind what is in the world. Philosophy cannot conceive the absolute except as the other side of the "appearance" or the phenomenon.

Whence para. 14.

Translate para. 14.—Of major importance [is]:

1. What we call dialectic. —Its activity is a movement which consciousness exercises on itself. The reaction of "knowledge" on the object and of the object on "knowledge" is the metamorphosis of one into the other. Thus we have self-movement which is consistent with the structure of *ek-stasis*. Its product is the movement which makes the new true object "surge forth." Surging forth implies discontinuity, "pure vision" and not "our contribution." The newness is created by a surpassing, but also a surging forth which con-firms [*a-vère*] what preceded, and which therefore has its cohesion and its "necessity," i.e., reason and knowledge. The subject has become object and vice versa or they have exchanged places.

2. Dialectic understood in this way is "experience," that is, a relation to the being which is pre-objective, a relation to a being in which we are *begriffen* (*Holz*, p. 116, trans. p. 25), i.e., taken or thought. To think the other is to be thought by him.

Why must dialectic be "experience"? Because it is not "our contribution," "meaning-giving act," only "for-us"; because it is the self-movement of the preobjective and presubjective content; because it is "pure vision," "knowledge making an appearance" inside an outside, a "related" inside; and because it would be nothing of the sort if it were immanence. Between immanence and the relation to an external transcendent, horizon and richness, the fruitfulness of a content is not a dried up *object*.

3. Dialectic, understood in this way, is "ambiguity" [*Zweideutigkeit*]. This

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must be underscored if the "scientific side" of the "presentation" which follows (from the phenomenon) is to be placed in a new "light." A new idea of light is at work here. The true is of itself "ambiguous," for it must be "essence" or "in-itself" and cannot be such while it is "for the consciousness of the in-itself," that is, not "in-itself." (Compare this with Kierkegaard's pharisaism: from the moment that I say that I am Christian, I am no longer what I say I am.)[54] The "polysemy" (*Vieldeutigkeit*)[55] is not a shadow to eliminate true light. The true cannot be defined by coincidence and outside of all difference (*écant*) in relation to the true. All relation to an "in-itself" (the first object) includes an inevitable relation in which this "in-itself" is for me and destroys the first object. This "in-itself" transforms the first object into a second one. But one would say that this is not a second object. Only the reflection of consciousness on itself adds to the object my knowledge of it. The limits of the subjective and the objective remain well defined. Yet this "reflection" becomes the "true," the truth of the first openness onto an object, and, in this respect, the essence as opposed to the appearance—the object. In determining the state of my knowledge, the state of the object (the state of the motives for my naive experience), I integrate these motives into the domain of the object. I annul the first object as something abstract, and I bring about a new object. Hegel says that this is "the experience constituted through that first object" (*Holz*, p. 115, trans. p. 24). An "experience" [signifies] this incorporation of an object. Because the experience incorporates the object most, the object works on the experience ("through it"—an understanding which is not distinct from our being). As such it is generative of truth, of an object to the second power, an object of the object, a truth of the truth.[56] Truth and knowledge are inseparable from a reciprocal "concept" where the object "comprehends"[57] me no less than I comprehend it. —Philosophy is inseparable from the phenomenon. (Compare this to modern phenomenology and the discovery of latent or operant intentionality, including the reversal of the relation to the self and the relation to the other. It is not only the uni-dimensionality of noesis-noema.)

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54. Kierkegaard's conception of the "becoming" of the human individual (in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*) is matched here with, for example, Abraham the Knight of Faith who must sacrifice his son Isaac at the request of God (in *Fear and Trembling*). Abraham must will the impossible. For him to simply affirm his faith to others would not be to establish it. Abraham must go beyond any objectification of his belief (the leap of faith). Since the Pharisees were the doctors of law, self-righteous in their strict observance of doctrine and ritual, Merleau-Ponty is suggesting, paradoxically, that Kierkegaard's affirmation that one cannot be a Christian when one claims to be a Christian is itself a Pharisaical law. For Kierkegaard to deny someone his Christianity on the basis of his assertion of faith is a kind of law which seems to be set down to hold in all cases. (HJS)

55. *Veildeutigkeit* emphasizes the multiplicity of meanings. *Zweideutigkeit* and *zweideutig* (cited above) are usually translated as ambiguity and ambiguous. As such, they indicate multiple meanings given at once. (HJS)

56. [marginal note:] what is essentially vision and not "meaning-giving act." (M-P)

57. The verb *begreifen*, which means "to grasp" or "to comprehend," is the term which Merleau-Ponty has translated as "*saisir*." He plays with the relationship between *begreifen* and *Begriff* (i.e. concept) in this sentence. (HJS)

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It seems that dialectic is certainly not a fact of consciousness in the sense of a spiritual motive, for then it would be "our contribution." But it is also not an objective movement (and for the same reason). Dialectic is a *movement of content*, that is, of our new ontological milieu, which is the "appearance" and which does not occur without a relationship to someone who experiences. [Dialectic] is not a property of consciousness, rather consciousness is the property of dialectic. Dialectic has consciousness. (It appears unthinkable without consciousness, for the production of the new object occurs through consciousness, but it is an opaque consciousness, i.e., experience).[58] To "put it back on its feet again" would be to destroy the "presentation" of science, of productivity. When Marx says this, does he misunderstand Hegel? No, Hegel himself also said that dialectic is the world stood on its head.

Literal commentary on paragraphs 15 and 16:

Para. 15: The experience which Hegel discusses here [is not] experience as it is commonly understood. As commonly understood, experience externally and accidentally finds the new object that devalues the old. In our sense, on the contrary, the knowledge of the old object becomes the new object. For example, what I projected about this friendship, once projected before me in the object, becomes the truth of this friendship. Now this presupposes a reversal and conversion of consciousness. The object becomes subject and vice versa. There was mystification; there is demystification. I was walking on my head; I now stand erect on my feet. How is this possible? The philosopher must be supplying something which guides the experience towards its truth.

If there is to be philosophy and not skepticism, past experience must not fall into the nothingness, the present must be a result and the truth of the past, what was in-itself and what has become being for consciousness, no matter what this thing may constitute, must be the new object, and necessity

58. [marginal note:] The experience as "pure" [purely] "vision." Reciprocally in Marx (1) The dialectic of consciousness is illusory only as long as the principle of alienation remains (Lukács: [what Merleau-Ponty cites here as "*Funktion-Wandel*" is probably "The Changing Function of Historical Materialism" included in *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 223-255. (HJS)]). Afterwards, dialectic is no longer a reflection of matter. —Capitalism is a phenomenology of concrete experience. —(2) Even before the revolution, no given force perfects Reason; human matter, the non-objective. Lenin: one needs an oblique consciousness, the party (without which there would be trade-unionism) —Dialectic-"Experience" is the philosophy of Marx just as it is that of Hegel. For both, there cannot be simple [assent?] to a mystique of experience. What is necessary is a "concept," by which the experience of capitalism will be understood—or even by which the externalization, to the extent that it is necessary, will be recognized. Without this "concept," consciousness (which is its own concept) might be misguided.

Certain Marxisms will give a major role to experience (i.e., the reabsorption of the State into society) or, conversely, they will make this *praxis* itself into the work of a dictatorship. Hegel keeps it on the border. Precisely if truth is experience, it must not be a shocking experience; there ought to be [a mystery?], a philosophy (a logic).

Cf. para. 15—Show that experience as progress towards truth requires "reversal" of "consciousness" (that the thing becomes consciousness). But this means that science is not life. —There are two orders: (1) the idea itself of experience, as truth, controlling from outside experience (the very idea of the proletariat becoming the control of the Party over the proletariat); and (2) the very idea of phenomena, as carriers of truth, becoming extreme dogmatism. —What is the solution? (M-P)

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must be the genesis of it. Whence, [we encounter]* the disjunction between consciousness "comprehended" in experience and philosophy which "comprehends" the becoming. Human experience is only the content; philosophy is only "the form." But then, from the philosophical point of view, the path towards science is alerady science, and the experience of consciousness is only the content of this science. Is this not a reversal of the *pro* to the *con* in relation to what precedes? —"Our contribution."— Why pass through phenomenology if the goal is a science which hangs over experience (as "the form" hangs over the "content"). [Whence] Logic. —For Heidegger the genetive "science of experience (*Wissenschaft der Erfahrung*) is neither objective nor subjective. It is speculative, dialectic, that is, the chiasm of the two movements.

The answer:[59] phenomenology contains all of mind, but under a particular determination. The moments [of each determination] are not "pure." Rather, they are as they are for consciousness or in that they are terms of reference from consciousness, such that they are "figures of consciousness" (*Gestalten des Bewusstseins*). The consciousness which considers them feels itself linked to another, an external world, in which "knowledge" is not quite what appears. Then comes a point where the "figure" is entirely included, where it comprehends itself, where what appears regains its center, where the phenomenon passes into the absolute and shows the nature of the absolute.

This means that there is something other than consciousness of the external world. However nothing is outside of "consciousness." This something other is attained when "consciousness" is equal to its outside, when it coincides with knowledge of itself. This self-knowledge is not the attribute or property of consciousness. No such property or attribute pertains to that which has self-knowledge and which turns out to start only from self-knowledge. For the same reason (necessity, continuity, conservation of the truth of the past), experience must be a "concept," but "concept" must be experience. —The equilibrium of 1807.[60]

General Commentary on Philosophy and Non-philosophy.

Phenomenology poses the problem of a consciousness that understands itself. [Such a consciousness has]* two sides: on the one hand, there is discontinuous, skeptical experience; and on the other hand, experience which is only for the form and in which the standard of measurement is never put to the test.

Philosophy was defined in 1807 as this double critique of experience by the

59. [marginal note:] Recall the problem at hand: (1) Nothing can enter into [phenomenology] from the outside; it is "open," experience, and, therefore, nothing can get behind its back. —(2) Experience can be discontinuous, "empirical," erroneous, and blind. Philosophy's "contribution" would therefore be necessary, something that goes behind the back of "consciousness." —(3) "consciousness is a surpassing of "consciousness," [whence] Logic (the solution given in the last paragraph). (M-P)

60. The date in which Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* was published. (HJS)

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concept and the concept by experience. We exclude impressionism and dogmatism. —But these dangers exist to the second power: (1) One has recourse to experience as dogmatism (a judgement of history—the facts show that . . . , I did not say it, the things did. Consider, for example, the 1937 trials.)[61] (2) One has recourse to the concept as skepticism (*I think that* this experience is absolute—*that* I have attained the essence there—that 1937 [is] history in its nakedness). But can any such experience coincide with the essence? A consciousness that is truly consciousness of itself is empty—"nothing." —All full consciousness is related.

Phenomenology and logic represent these two dangers. There is no solution as long as we remain at the antithesis: subject-object or consciousness of the external world-consciousness of the self. Hegel has surpassed this antithesis for a moment in his analysis of the Third Term. But he reestablishes philosophy's "contribution." Therefore his very recourse to the phenomenon is the most violent dogmatism. The others no longer know what they think. The philosopher understands them better than they understand themselves.

In that respect, he aggravates the situation. His successors will protest against his dogmatism (Kierkegaard and Marx), and against his skepticism or his coinciliation (Marx and Kierkegaard). He necessarily collapses the "alienation" [*Entäusserung*]. He takes the bourgeois state for the State. He takes established religion for the truth—*praxis* must be absolute. But these philosophers as well, in their opposition to Hegel, have the same oscillation between dogmatism and skepticism. The problem of a philosophy which *might be* non-philosophy remains *in toto* as long as one thinks *consciousness* or "object." [62]

VI

Lecture of March 6, 1961

We have shown that only the truth is absolute.

The true: only that which turns out to be (work, becoming, experience) is absolute. There is no external relationship with the absolute, no instrumental means of joining it. There is no introduction to the absolute: we are there.

There is only a manifestation (*Erscheinung, Offenbarung*) of the Free, of identity with the self, of "knowledge," of science in the Cartesian sense, of certitude. The manifestation is the externality of "knowledge making it appearance" and "knowledge." But this exteriority is not an accident for "knowledge." The "ambiguity" is not to be understood "as a lack of univocity, but as a characteristic of consciousness in its essential unity" (*Holz*, p. 155,

61. The Moscow Trials, which Koestler discussed in *Darkness at Noon*, and which serves as the focus for Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Bukharin's "defense" in *Humanism and Terror*, trans. John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon, 1969). (HJS)

62. On the one hand, the object (*Gegenstand*) stands agsinst or alongside what is there. Consciousness, on the other hand, opposes itself to the object. Consciousness, on the other hand, opposes itself to the object. Consciousness separates itself from what is there. Philosophy retains its integral and problematical state as long as it continues to orient itself in one direction or the other. (HJS)

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trans. p. 95).[63] Consciousness is equivocal, not in the skeptical sense, but because it is a reversal (*Umkehrung*) (derived from its "perversity" [*Verkehrtheit*]),[64] because in this movement, concept and in-itself exchange their roles and the truth manifests itself, because consciousness becomes what it is, i.e., its concept. The concept allows for the appearance of delivered *sense*, the "as," the being of what is.[65] As long as consciousness is "consciousness," it "does not accept the 'as' " (*Holz*, p. 160, trans. p. 104). It carries a horizon or a "background" which it has not explored. In order that it become itself, consciousness must tear itself away (*Zerrissenheit*): "a mended stocking is better than a torn one; not so with self-consciousness" (*Holz*, p. 160, trans. p. 104).

But this tearing is its realization—"the presentation of appearing knowledge is not a path travelled by natural consciousness. But it is also not a way which distances itself gradually from natural consciousness in order to close itself off, at a determined point along the way, somewhere in absolute knowledge. However, this presentation is nonetheless a path. However, it constantly moves 'in-between' here and there, opening itself up between natural unconsciousness and science" (*Holz*, p. 132, trans. p. 53). "If one were able to speak even here of a pathway, then the absolute only departs from the path to the extent that it *is* the way" (*Holz*, p. 151, trans. p. 85).

It is essential to the absolute that it include this self-presentation, for self-presentation is the living truth, experience which gives the absolute-subject life. "The representation of the object represents the object, although this fact is not grasped in thought" (*Holz*, p. 163, trans. p. 108). Since it is preontological, natural consciousness aims at going beyond the "object" (but for Hegel, it will not discover "what is distinguished in the distinguishing" (*Holz*, p. 153, trans. p. 90] except on the side of the "subject"). —"Experience [is] the word of Being" (*Holz*, p. 166, trans. pp. 113-114)—"the name of the Being of that which is" (*Holz*, p. 166, trans. p. 114); the new object is "the truth of the true being of what is, the appearing of appearing things (*Holz*, p. 170, trans. p. 120); it is experience itself. Here Hegel approaches the surpassing of the subject-object [dichotomy].* (The Third Term, "for the same," includes the "in-itself" and the "for us" and thus beyond.) —"Experience" is therefore "the existence of the absolute" (*Holz*, p. 171, trans. p. 122). "Experience is the Being of that which is" (*Holz*, p. 175, trans. p. 130). Phenomenology [?] in the kingdom of the mind. Phenomenology and

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63. [marginal note:] The ambiguity, a representational concept—"this ambiguity is the form of the representation" (*Holz*, p. 153, trans. p. 90), but the philosophy of "representation" tends to surpass itself as "consciousness" achieves its reversal. (M-P) Both the passage cited in this note and that to which this note corresponds are from Hiedegger's commentary on Hegel's text. At this point, Merleau-Ponty begins to quote from Heidegger's interpretation. (HJS)

64. The terms "perversity" [*Verkehrtheit*] and "reversal" [*Umkehrung*] indicate the idea of a "turning" in their root *Die Kehre*—a notion which Heidegger has explored at length. (HJS)

65. *on e on*,—"the other side" (*Holz*, p. 144, trans. p. 73). (M-P)

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science are "the same" (when taking their identical aspects) (*Holz*, p. 179, trans. p. 136). *Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins:*[66] the genitives are subjects as much as objects, the reversal indicates the dual relationship of "that which is" and "Being," a dual relationship which "opens" (*Holz*, p. 182, trans. p. 140) onto Being—dialectical-speculative genitives. "Phenomenology itself is Being, according to whose mode the Absolute is with us in and for itself" (*Holz*, p. 187, trans. p. 148). This mode of Being according to which the absolute is beside us in and for itself has a need to avoid being alone and "lifeless." "For man there is no introduction to the Being of that which is, because man's nature, his life, led in the accompaniment of Being, *is* itself that accompaniment" (*Holz*, p. 187, trans. p. 150). Natural consciousness was not introduced into the absolute, it is there. Its only obligation is to recognize the constitutive "perversity," which "we, in this experience, may also be what our Being *is*" (*Holz*, p. 190, trans. pp. 151-152).

All this is in the text. True philosophy is non-philosophy,—which is to enter into the profundity of "experience."

But the absolute is also true. The absolute alone is true. Nothing that is related is true. No consciousness of the external world is true. No "figure" is true.

Experience in the ordinary sense [is] an external encounter of a new object with a forgetting of the former—[whence] skepticism. The second object is not an interiorization of the first object; rather it is—a "pure comprehension" of what is in and for itself. For example, mastery (and its complications) disappear. [Whence] the truth of slaves, stoicism, Christianity. —To move from there to metaphysical experience, a conversion is necessary. This conversion is a reversal by which what was "for me" is objectivity. What was "in itself" is subjectivity. Otherwise consciousness makes itself into a"figure."[67]

Now, in the eyes of consciousness, this is not taken into experience. There is a disjunction between lived "content" and its "form" or "pure originating" or becoming. Slaves do not know that they make the future and surpass the master.

In short, experience [is] necessary, but not sufficient. Experience must be understood—which requires "conversion" or "reversal." —The ground of natural consciousness is in reality the "foreground of light" (*Holz*, p. 164, trans. p. 113). To convert this ground into a figure, to truly know what "appears," the "self-manifestation" of the 'appearance" or the "appearance" of the "appearing," is the contribution of the philosophical look that transforms into a "for us" (philosophers) what is in itself a consciousness in (*lieé*) relation.

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66. "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" [marginal note:] the announced title for *The Phenomenology of Mind* and for which had been substituted *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, then (1832), *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (M-P)

67. For example, the master's search for recognition is objectivized and, in that way, surpassed. (M-P)

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But there seems to be a dilemma here: either experience is truly assumed and is errant, skeptical; or it is understood, transformed into its truth, but then surpassed. The claim that experience introduces itself at this second order is the greatest dogmatism; for this is a dogmatism disguised in the movement of things.[68]

Read text para. 16.

Hegel's solution:

But where will the philosopher establish external standards of measurement for experience? He does not contribute anything; his contribution is precisely the renunciation of all contribution so that the "appearance" of the "appearing" will show itself (*Holz*, p. 174, trans. p. 127). We have said that no consciousness was cut off from this reverse side of things, which the philosopher sees. What is "behind the back" of consciousness is only that true characters in the drama are not the "figures" among which it itself plays, but the moments of a unique Self. Experience itself metamorphoses itself into absolute knowledge. Phenomenology eliminates itself and the "presentation" interiorizes itself. Simply from the fact that the *point* where experience attains this level is defined by coincidence, the philosopher reveals himself (1) as allowing an understanding of himself and all the rest, (2) as not a local event in the middle of everything, (3) as rather always having been in another mode of Being, and (4) as even giving reasons for his becoming. The relationship of envelopment, however, remains reciprocal. The "reversal" is in the nature of consciousness. The moments of the truth of Mind are in experience, not in a *pure* (*reine*) state, but as in a mirror: "as they are for consciousness (in the eyes of this consciousness of the external world, in the face of an external 'presentation') or as this consciousness arises in relation to them." With phenomenology, structures of consciousness of the external

68. We do not even allow men the consciousness of what they do, their experience—; we overburden them with the weight of history. (M-P) [At the bottom of the page underneath this footnote, separated by a dash, the following few lines summarize the subsequent development of thought. (CL)]

Hegel's solution circularity—Hegelian "equivocation" is more and more sceptic-dogmatic—the emptiness of absolute knowledge—reconciliation—what is the Hegelian absolute?)

The impossibility of this solution. Return to Hegelian dogmatism (The *Logic*-The *Encyclopedia*)—Phenomenology under a particular determination of consciousness leaves a place for metaphysics or logic which is the dialectic of Being—. As for his successors, Marx's critique must be placed aside, in that it does not see (1) that Hegel has seen the problem of the inverted world, and that his secret from experience *runs counter to* dogmatism; (2) that Marx himself with his philosophy of the object falls back into the dogmatism of absolute subjectivity.

The reason for this failure is that consciousness, subject-object, is a *philosophy of representation*, which necessarily ends up in ambiguity, that is, in skeptico-dogmatism, and hence the absence of philosophy-non-philosophy.

The solution will be that neither naked experience, nor recourse to another source (i.e. God before the creation as Hegel notes in the *Logic*) is decisive. Only representation is an alternative. *Unsere Zutat*, the contribution of philosophy, must be precisely the abstention of all contribution, "it is the mute experience which must be brought to pure expression in its own sense." We must understand that the Being of what is, the "appearance" of the "appearing," the "birth" of truth is not the movement to another "that which is." Certainly, phenomenology, affected by the mark of consciousness, does not sufice, but what is beyond does not lack subjectivity either. (M-P)

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world appear and create the dialectical movement in consciousness without knowing exactly why, without taking possession of its own reversal, of its own chiasm, of the movement of self-genesis that traverses it. But this movement (which is consciousness) *pushes* consciousness toward its true Existence (that is, toward its existence as revealed to itself). At a certain point, it knows that it is not consciousness of an *external world,* that it is conscious of itself, that the "presentation" is a presentation of self to itself, that "appearance" is equivalent to "essence," to the thing itself, and therefore that it coincides with the same point of knowledge appropriate to Mind. Thus consciousness "designates" absolute knowledge. The absolute is not therefore the object to be contemplated before itself or before the philosopher; when it was that, it was no more than the mind-phenomenon. This mind-phenomenon perceives that it is mind in and for itself. from the fact that the meaning of experience and its truth is, in the end, only the full identity of the Self, and from the fact that the secret of things is simply that Being is the Self (the "formal," i.e., structural, secret, which all experience confines in what is ontological), one could say that the philosopher does not reveal this secret to mankind, that it is also latent in humans, and that it receives its rigorous, naked, direct (*and ordinarily retrospective*) formulation from the philosopher. In the same way, we can say that all men, except the philosopher, are in error, and that they are all in the same truth as he is. The philosophical meaning-giving act does not go to any other source than the very form of experience, which emerges when consciousness puts down its presumed intentionality, in order to discover *itself* as that which it sought and at the same time, as absolute.

The Hegelian absolute (what the philosopher sees behind the back of consciousness taken in experience) is of such a nature (the pure core of the Self, which tears itself away, which does not have *its own* Concepts or Ideas, which however does have the Ideas and the Concepts that we all have, and which, once it is seen from the outside, in the ob-ject, is what we hold before our eyes as the "figures" of the mind-phenomenon), that one cannot understand it as *behind the back* of consciousness occupied with their own experience. The Hegelian absolute is in their hearts and in their reports. The "divine universal man" as an "element" (Hyppolite), in which self-consciousness of the absolute is possible, is not the external consciousness of the "divine universal man."

Without the rest, this Hegelian absolute, which is complete nothingness, would be "lifeless" and "alone." Therefore it is not to be thought separately. —"The mode of Hegelian thought itself. . . this circularity of thought or this finality of the self."[69] —"The true is the self's becoming, the circle which presupposes and which has, at the beginning, its own end as its goal and which is only effective by means of its developed actualization and by means of its end."[70] Thinking the absolute is not only thinking the absolute but also

69. Jean Hippolyte, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 588.

70. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke III* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 26. In the Walter Kaufmann translation of the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology of Mind* as *Hegel: Texts and Commentary* (New York: Anchor, 1965), p. 34. (M-P)

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everything else and again the absolute from everything else, and so forth. The circle is constituted by what there is. Furthermore, it is true at the same time that (1) phenomenology encompasses everything; and (2) everything is affected by an indication of externality, since consciousness is in the process of conquering it. Consequently, besides phenomenology, there will be a system of "science," specifically Logic. Logic is Hegel's metaphysics, where discontinuous experience is surpassed,[71] where truth develops in itself and for itself. —One could say that Logic is "the presentation of God as it is in its external essence before the creation of Nature and a finite mind."[72] But Hegel does not accept the creation; this is thus his way of saying that logic is abstract, a methodical abstraction. In fact, at first it is objective (Being, Essence) and then subjective (Concept); it encompasses therefore the Self-Being distinction. —"Self-certainty is *immanent* in truth."[73] Logic presumes the phenomenology which has shown that Self and Being are identical.[74] Inversely, it presumes the absolute-subject in order to place the genesis of experience in perspective. In 1807, while having phenomenology open onto "science," Hegel conceives their relationships as circular. In 1802, he had said, "the world of philosophy in itself and for itself is an inverted world"—"natural consciousness immediately entrusts itself to science. It is a new effort for natural consciousness to walk on its head, which it does without knowing what impels it to do so."[75] For science, ontic consciousness is the inverse of itself. —"Phenomenology" is created in order to transform one into the other. It is not, therefore, a simple reference to an external regulation of logic, by which consciousness will walk on its head. (Hegel 1807, no more than Marx, would not want to "walk on his head." He sees that better than Marx, for the head is the *Object* as well.)[76] One could say that this circular solution is ambiguous (*Vieldeutig*) with a conscious ambiguity which has no lack of univocity. In *Phenomenology*: "man kills his own death and is uprooted by the absolute—the absolute separates out death"—"God is dead. This means everything except 'there is no God' " (*Holz,* p. 186, trans. p. 147).[77]

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71. To be surpassed here are the sequential, successive impressions that the empiricist, such as Locke or Hume, regards as our only mode of Experience. For Hegel, sense-certainty is not yet the absolute. (HJS)

72. Hegel, *Logik*, IV, p. 31. (M-P)

73. Hippolyte, *Genesis and Structure*, p. 586. (M-P)

74. The movement of categories should include the Self, but it tacitly presupposes the concept. (M-P)

75. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*, p. 30. Kaufmann trans., pp. 40-42.

76. In the preface to the second edition of *Das Kapital* (1873), Marx claimed that Hegel's dialectic stands on its head. He supposed Hegel to be asserting a primacy of Mind (or Spirit) and invoked the need to place dialectic back on its feet again. In that way, dialectic would acquire material primacy. Merleau-Ponty is criticizing the misconception that Marx wanted to stand Hegel himself on his head. But Merleau-Ponty is also suggesting that, by the proper understanding of consciousness, the Object is equally well the head and the Subject the feet. The ambiguity leads to an understanding of dialectic which Marx, by his comment, did not comprehend. (HJS)

77. This statement by Heidegger comes near the end of *"Hegel's Concept of Experience,"* which is followed (in *Holzwege*) by his essay *"Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist Tot'," Holz*, pp. 193-247.

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Is the Hegelian solution stable? Or is there a good ambiguity? Doesn't the solution always move toward the equivocal? It was not so with Hegel. In the first edition, the fragment which is translated without a title is subsequently called the "Introduction." Hegel himself no longer holds the view that there is no "introduction" to the phenomenology of mind, which *is* the presence of the absolute. In 1817, at the time of the *Encyclopedia*, phenomenology again becomes a discipline, i.e., a part of science. It can no longer be "the whole of the system from a certain point of view" (Hyppolite). In 1807, a relationship of "mutual coincidence," a concentric condition, a reciprocal envelopment, then gives way to the enveloping thought of the "positively rational"—or of the speculative.

"Identity of identity and identity of non-identity" eventually subordinates *difference*. This is inevitable as soon as [the difference]* ceases being experience and becomes *signification,* something spoken (oldness),[78] that is, as soon as it ceases reconsidering itself, thinking itself as encompassed by an englobing: the present vertical world. At this point it is presumed to have totalized, included *everything*, surpassed *everything*.

The risk implies a return to skepticism, to dogmatism—or rather to the two.

The absolute [can be]* considered as expressing itself on the same account in everything that is, "the enduring" (because what is, is all that can be). Thus the bourgeois State and established religion are thought as an expression of the absolute, which they obviously are, but in [connection?] with another future. —Hegelian reconciliation: the worst stupidities are treated as historical barriers, because that is what they are. The absolute empties itself, becomes indifference and pure conservation, because its tie with the vertical world of experience is released. We repress this skeptico-dogmatism in the name of a nominal absolute. The absolute is practically the "nothing" empty of skeptics, and the world is practically the positivity of all that "endures," while in 1807 the negative was at work.

I have said that the movement of experience to things spoken is inevitable. But this means that in a sense philosophy negates itself in formulating itself (what Kierkegaard will call Pharisaism); at least this occurs when philosophy converts itself into contemplated significations. —The dissociation: "the enduring"—the empty absolute, the disjunction in the order of phenomena was inevitable with a philosophy which remained a philosophy of consciousness, of representation and of the "subject." —Hegel admirably deepened these notions, made them supple, showing the paradoxical relationships between consciousness and the object and its metamorphoses. But in conserving the relation to the Self and the relation to the external world, he could not avoid the fact that the double envelopment was equivocal, and that the fissure appears at the level which phenomena must

78. Signification arises out of experience as the act or process of giving meaning to experience. "Oldness" is associated here with that which is established, and with tradition, and with what is unself-consciousness. (HJS)

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seal. Perhaps it is here that Hegel has not succeeded in his desire to link philosophy and non-philosophy.

Will Marx succeed better? If one accepts this appreciation of Hegel, the perspective in which he is placed here, it is to be feared that Marx will not succeed any better. As Kierkegaard claims to have experienced with the present age against the established State and established religion, Marx reopens the vertical world onto the future, but he does not interrogate Hegel about what truly caused the ruin of the enterprise. What Marx questions was not necessarily responsible for the dislocation. In terms of this misunderstanding, he picks up certain mistakes that Hegel made, sometimes reproducing Hegel poorly.

VII

March 13

The alternative is that experience or enveloping thought does not exist in principle. Moreover clarity is not placed on experience. Experience itself demands the reversal which makes it true. Inversely, what does absolute knowledge know? That all "figures of consciousness" are "self-consciousness"? But it knows this only by experience and on the way. The truth is that which has become. The "end" and the "means" are interdependent—the end is the integral of the different experiences. The expression: "there is self-consciousness" has no meaning, if not as a totalization of this movement. And the totalization must also appear. Therefore the truth is not *only*: there is "self-consciousness,"[79] but also there is self-consciousness appearing in that which is other than itself and which *is* only in revealing itself there. —To submit experience to an external regulation (to a "meaning-giving act" by a "self-consciousness for us," for a philosopher who will identify with God, or—what turns out to be the same thing—with a process in itself behind experience, "in-itself") will be to walk on one's head. By definition, the Hegelian absolute is In and For-itself. It is neither on the side of the In-itself, nor on the side of the For-itself, as they present themselves on the level of "consciousness" (that is, at the same time correlative and destructive of one another). If it is truly In-itself-For-itself and not the pursuit of the In-itself by the For-itself, a movement from one to the other, it is such only in the context of experience. It is the limb and face of experience, the manifestation of the intimacy of the one and the other which "consciousness" never succeeds in attaining. In the movement of experience, which brings understanding, we reach the absolute which is not something behind it or under it, but which is a water-mark within it and which exists only as a water-mark.[80] The negativity of the *Phenomenology of Mind*, which does not reappear again in the same

79. [marginal note:] The Hegelian absolute is the decay of a separate absolute, the death of God; this does not mean "there is no God," the end of all fetishizing. (M-P)

80. In French paper currency, the water-mark of Voltaire, for example, appears to be neither on one side nor on the other. One must hold the bill up to the light in order to see the image. Hence, Merleau-Ponty claims that the absolute is "within" the movement of experience—like a water-mark. (HJS)

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role in subsequent writings, is a negativity which works, which is negativity only when it is in practice and which eliminates the immanence-transcendence alternative in philosophy. Philosophy is the recognition of this negativity which is only a negativity when at work, that is, when in contact with the Being which is sets to work.

The rigorous solution—should we even say solution, that is, the end of interrogation by a positive response?

The "ambiguity" of consciousness is not eliminated by the experience whcih reveals its "perversity" and which realizes the "reversal;" for the external cannot be eliminated. The absolute knowledge which I have become remains a "figure of consciousness" and does not reabsorb itself as such. Hence it never ceases to be "consciousness." —In this respect, there is no "definitive recovery."

Ambiguity is not a lack of univocity. Ambiguity is "good."[81] This poses no problems if "ambiguity" is present as such. Here the absolute appears as the light of truth which penetrates the thickness of experience, and which unites the relativised subject and object. But if it is formulated in terms of consciousness, it is equivocal.

In truth, we have experience of knowledge and knowledge of experience. These two faces of ambiguity are abstractions. The absolute is that which is between the two: the transformation of one into the other. But this cannot be maintained except in contact with experience, with the "vertical" world (of which the absolute is its "profundity").[82] The very formulation of this living "ambiguity" makes experience disappear. The formulation transforms it into

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81. On at least two occasions, Merleau-Ponty made reference to the "good ambiguity." At the time of his candidacy to the Collège de France, i.e. between 1951 and 1952, he sent a text to Martial Geuroult which has come to be known as "An Unpublished Text" trans. Arleen B. Dallery in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie, (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 3-11. In the final paragraph, he writes: "The study of perception could only teach us a "bad ambiguity," a mixture of finitude and universality, of interiority and exteriority. But there is a "good ambiguity" in the phenomenon of expression, a spontaneity which accomplishes what appeared to be impossible when we observed only the separate elements, a spontaneity which gathers together the plurality of monads, the past and the present, nature and culture into a single whole." (p. 11)

The second occasion is in his inaugural lecture to the Collège de France, given in 1952, entitled "In Praise of Philosophy:" *Eloge de la Philosophie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), p. 10-11. The passage begins: "The philosopher recognizes the *inseparability* of his taste for evidence and a sense of ambiguity. When he tries to keep himself out of ambiguity, it is called equivocation. With the greatest philosophers, it becomes a theme and contributes to the establishment of certainty instead of threatening it. We must therefore distinguish a bad ambiguity from a good one. Even those who have always wanted to create a fully positive philosophy have been philosophers only in that they have refused, in the same moment, the right to install themselves in absolute knowledge, and in that they have not taught this knowledge, but rather its becoming in us, not the absolute, but at the most, as Kierkegaard says, an *absolute relation* between it and us." (my trans.) Both the topic of an *absolute relation* between the absolute and us, and the polemic in favor of "bad ambiguity" are again the focus, a decade later. (HJS)

82. The "vertical" is the bi-directionality of the ambiguity: experience of knowledge and knowledge of experience. Experience is the vertical intentionality of the subject-object relation. Here it is given depth by the absolute. The absolute is the profundity (as Merleau-Ponty said of Nietzsche's Apollonian) and signification (also Dionysian appearance) arises out of experience. See footnote 6 (HJS)

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something said, into the positive, and makes the negative disappear in the 1807 sense—it restores the truth of identity. The Hegelian philosophy of 1807 (like Kierkegaard's Christianity)[83] excludes the utterance. Once uttered, it returns to identity.[84] Speculation separates itself from dialectic, that is, the absolute [is] conceived as absolute negation or as absolute affirmation (the "positively rational" in *The Eycyclopedia*). In any case, the absolute is taken as thinkable separately: whence, skepticism (the empty "nothing"), and dogmatism ("enduring" is entirely positive). Here we have a mixture of indifference and conservatism. The bourgeois State and established religion are thought to be the only expressions of the absolute. Experience is localized. The Hegelian reconciliation would then be that there is no more living communication between the absolute and history.

The conclusion: (1) Either, if consciousness protects its rights, if it falls back into abstract positivism or negativism, and if it creates a disjunction at the level of phenomena (the *Phenomenology* becoming a part of science again, and our text becoming an "Introduction"), then one no longer has "the whole system from a certain point of view" (Hyppolite); or (2) philosophy can be left unformulated; in any case philosophy is whatever succeeds in passing for a notion of consciousness.

Have others succeeded better than Hegel in maintaining the link between philosophy and experience?

Marx certainly had every intention of doing so (in the early manuscripts of 1843-44). He put the philosophy of right into action. But in the end did he do so? What he criticizes in Hegel includes: the theoretical attitude, the exhaustibility of philosophy, the return to phenomenology, *praxis* contra *theoria*, the search for a thought-action which does not have the positivity of all thought, the *profane* character of all action, and the exteriority of all action. (Marx therefore remains faithful to the negativity of 1807.) Fine, but then Nature (a dead end) also returns to the "reversal" of Hegel's dialectic. A return to the object. Now, to get there, he must make use of the Hegelian Concept, of Hegel's Logic. At the moment that he believes he has inverted Hegel, he takes up the Hegelian mode of thought (applied to the analysis in *Capital* where the self-destruction of all "enduring" is inscribed). What transpires then is a polemic against idealism, accompanied by a counter-idealism and a return to Hegel's logic.

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83. [marginal note:] cf. Marx's claim "I am not a Marxist." What is needed is a self-critique of absolute knowledge, which is the only absolute, the only "self-consciousness." An (external) knowledge of the absolute in the sense of "consciousness" is, by definition, false. Marxist *praxis* is something like Kierkegaard's *decision*. (M-P)

84. For Merleau-Ponty's stress upon utterance and the speaking subject in experience, see the 1949-50 *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*, and the posthumous *The Rose of the World*, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973). The utterance can deny in content, but affirm by its very expression and *praxis*. (HJS)

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Part Two: Marx [85]

March 20, 1961

The texts to be considered are the "Introduction" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (which was written in 1843 for the *Franco-German Yearbooks*) and the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.*[86]

Before translating the text, we must indicate: (1) why we are studying it; (2) what questions we must ask about it (particularly in relation to our problem of "Philosophy—Nonphilosophy"); and (3) how and in what terms can this Hegelian problem also be addressed to Marx.

The Hegelian Marx (the "Young Hegelian") was associated with the movement to *reform* Hegelian philosophy, which included principally Feuerbach.[87] In what sense do we mean *reform* here? We shall see.

Then Marx dissociated himself from Feuerbach in his *Theses on Feuerbach* of 1845, written six months after *The Holy Family* (1844). Perhaps he was dissociating himself from all philosophy. In the "Preface" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), Marx says that with *The German Ideology*, he wanted to "liquidate traditional philosophical consciousness."[88]

But when he writes the afterword to the second edition of *Capital* (1875), he once again praises Hegel against his critics. He even coquettishly restates the first book of *Capital* in Hegelian form. He writes that one day it must be explained that Hegel's *Logic* has given a true account, but in a mystifying form.

The usual interpretation delineates three stages: (1) the pre-marxist and "philosophical" period (Feuerbach); (2) the break with philosophy as a form of alienation (the critique of other types of alienation is extended to philosophy); (3) the transition to science and "scientific socialism" based on a scientific analysis in *Capital.*

Two problems arise from this classification: (1) At the time of the first period, views which are very different from those of Feuerbach are mixed with ideas characteristic of Feuerbach. For example, in our text, destruction must be the realization of philosophy and realization must be the destruction (of truth and falsehood in philosophy) and not simply a return to speculative philosophy. (2) If socialism is "scientific," how and why can Hegel's dialectic

85. The second part of "Philosophy and Non-philosophy since Hegel" was published in a subsequent issue of *Textures*. A short statement repeats the information which Claude Lefort had already offered in the preceding issue (1974, No. 8-9) as part of his introduction. (HJS)

86. "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," and "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" in Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, pp. 243-257, and pp. 280-400, respectively, trans. Rockney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage, 1975). Henceforth citations will be given in the text. (HJS)

87. Note of the 1839 Feuerbach article "Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy" in *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*, trans. Zawar Hanfi (New York: Anchor, 1972), pp. 53-96. (M-P)

88. Merleau-Ponty mistranslates Marx. The quote should read: "to settle accounts with our former philosophical conscience" as in the "Preface" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in *Early Writings*, p. 427. (HJS)

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in the *Logic* be valid? How and why can it become an empirical truth drawn from fact? (Engels) This removes the whole foundation of "comprehension"—or rather, on the contrary, it is recovered from Hegelian logic and placed in absolute objectivism.

Marx did not write his own *Logic*. Marxists claim that *Capital* serves this purpose. But *Capital* goes from essence to appearance, reconstructs experience out of essence, and implies a Hegelian logic.

In its totality, it is Hegelian from one end to the other.

But, first, consistent with the *Phenomenology*, in 1843-44 there are some humanist, Feuerbachian themes. In the end, they are more consistent with the *Logic*. (*Capital* follows an order which is the inverse of that in the *Phenomenology*, i.e., from essence to appearance).

This is not a movement from philosophy to science; rather it is a movement from "direct" philosophy (man, nature, Feuerbach) to another conception of philosophy (man, and nature which achieves itself through the experience of capitalism). Once this experience is understood, and leads to the concept, it reveals the proletarian class which is the historical formation in which the understanding of capitalism is realized. There is then an identification of the one who thinks the functioning of capital with this historical formation.[89] This historical formation therefore, which reveals *the point* corresponding to Absolute Knowledge, is knowledge making its appearance. *Capital* relates to the intuition of the proletariat as Hegel's logic relates to the *Phenomenology*.

Marx does not say this but it amounts to a *utilization* of Hegel's logic without specifying its relation to facts. We would like to ask him, as he asks Hegel: is the relation a "logic of the thing in question" (*Logik der Sache*) or a "question of logic" (*Sache der Logik*)? If it is a *Logik der Sache*, why is there a logic of content?

Furthermore, he reviews Feuerbachian critiques of Hegel in their most extreme form. These are not dialectical, but they include a reversal of speculative philosophy, and a replacement of idealism with materialism.

With Lukács, the "return" cannot consist simply of a reversal of signs.

Materialism, as opposed to idealism, does not account fully for what *Capital* introduces as essence-ideas. Furthermore, in a dialectical philosophy, what is surpassed is the very opposition between the thing and the idea. Hegel does not withdraw any of his spontaneous movement (*Eigenbewegung*)[90] from History to give it to the Absolute or to Self-Consciousness. (He has explicitly stated that the philosopher comes after history and the passions, and contemplates them.)

Being so disposed, we arrive at the question of the Absolute and the question of philosophy.

If, as has been stated above, philosophy is experience understood and

89. For Merleau-Ponty's employment of "thinking" what merits being thought (in this case, "the functioning of capital"), see the reference to Heidegger in footnote 39. (HJS)

90. Literally, his own (*eigen*) movement (*Bewegung*). *Bewegung* is the term that Merleau-Ponty has rendered as "*passage*" in French, and which is translated into English as "movement." See also footnote 30 (HJS)

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passed on to the concept, if the absolute is a form of self-presentation, an apperception that consciousness comprehends the self in an external form; or, at least, if the absolute is the movement of truth that carries this movement of consciousness along with it and makes it possible (Hegel), then when Marx wants to return to immediate philosophy (nature, man, 1844) with Feuerbach, he gets lost along his own way, and falls back outside the Hegel who had characterized sense-certainty as abstract. And when he believes that he has abandoned "philosophy" (with *Capital*) in reality he rediscovers it, since he sensed it in defending Hegel.

When he engages in a polemic with idealism, as a "war of the gods," and against the personal union of the philosopher with God, this must not be understood as a kind of positivism, in which "the idealist joke" is empty of meaning, but as the truth of this philosophy "in mystical form." This is not like the movement of philosophy to nonphilosophy," but like the negation of the philosophy which realizes "nonphilosophy." Of course, it is no longer necessary that "the world become philosophy" but rather "philosophy must become the world."[91]

Marxist *praxis* is the inheritor of "self-consciousness." The Marxist "sacred cow" is totality: the alienation of alienation, or the action of revolutionizing—an action which is never only mine, whence the return to transcendent problems.

Thus what remains to be done is a study of the philosophy in Marx's *Capital*. There we will find what Marx has been able to say about philosophy. We must also take into account what the human experience of capitalism and Marxism has revealed after Marx.

Our two texts are once again: (1) the very Feuerbachian manuscripts of 1844. Here we must ask to what extent the ideas of nature and history, which these manuscripts express, are pre-Marxist and pre-Hegelian. (2) The "Introduction" of 1843, which is remarkable for its precociousness and permanent value. This text contains: (a) A reference to man, not as directly received, but as "world of men." (b) A view of speculative philosophy as ambiguous: false and true, true and false precisely as an abstraction—and not only, as Feuerbach said, false in that it is abstract. (c) A derivation of *praxis* coming out of speculation—as speculation that is negated, but realized. (d) A positive evaluation of philosophy—as, in a certain respect, the germ of life and the point of departure for the Revolution—the head of the Revolution with the proletariat as its heart.

What is lacking is the idea of a concrete-economic analysis, showing that the proletariat is the philosophical god. But perhaps this intuition is the best document of Marxist philosophy. It would then be sufficient to reconnect this intuition concerning *praxis* and the proletariat to the objective structures of

91. Hegel's project was for "the world to become philosophy." The task for Marx—and for Merleau-Ponty, as evidenced also by *The Visible and the Invisible*,—is for "philosophy to become the world." This negation of philosophy as a realization of non-philosophy is more commonly characterized by Merleau-Ponty as "philosophy becoming life." (HJS)

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Capital and to the "comprehension" of *Capital* in order to obtain the philosophy of *Capital*.

April 10, 1961

The "Introduction" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*.

The following issue arises: Hegel envisaged (on the level of "phenomena") the identification of philosophy and non-philosophy, Absolute and "appearance" of the Absolute. Then he subordinated a dialectic of consciousness to a movement of truth.

Didn't Marx follow an analogous route? In that respect, he was a Hegelian from head to toe. Specifically, the movement from the young Marx to *Capital* is not so much a movement from philosophy to science as it is a movement from *Phenomenology* to *Logic*.

What confuses things is the approval at first given to Feuerbach. Feuerbachian themes arise in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. The role of the idea of nature appears, which is not Hegelian. And Marx engages in a polemic against Hegel in the name of embodied man [*l'homme sensible*] and "non-philosophy." But, from the beginning, Marx is profoundly Hegelian. And, later, it is not Hegel from whom he distances himself, but from direct philosophy.

Thus we must show that for Marx, as well as for Hegel, the failure to reunite philosophy and non-philosophy, which he wanted in the first place, is due to a domination of the philosophy of the concept over a philosophy of "experience" (*Capital*).

We must first show this in Marx: Hegel is imbued with it (similarly the efforts of direct philosophy describe the "here—there is"). The notion of *praxis* as inheritor of absolute knowledge is elaborated here. This is the unity with a form of existence (the proletariat) which is the presentation of a true society and the true man.

The "Introduction" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*.[92] The issue here is to "critique" Hegel, and to reform speculative philosophy (Feuerbach and the Hegelians). But in what sense is he to be criticized?

I. The Problem

(1) The historical situation of Hegel's philosophy is equivocal, i.e., both true and false (*MEGA*, pp. 612, 38-613; *Intro CHPR*, p. 249).

(2) We would be right to want to deny philosophy. But we do so only by surpassing it, or by surmounting it (*aufzuheben*) (*MEGA*, pp. 613, 21-613, 40; *Intro CHPR*, p. 250).

(3) We would be right to want to realize philosophy. But we do so only by surpassing it (*aufzuheben*) (*ibid.*).

92. The references given refer to the *MEGA* (*Marx Engels Gesamt-ausgabe*), I Vol. 1 (Frankfurt, 1927). (CL) The English version is "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction," in *Early Writings*, pp. 243-257. Henceforth abbreviated as *Intro CHPR*. (HJS)

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(4) The critique of the philosophy of Right is equivocal like the philosophy of Right itself. It is both *pro* and *con*. *Pro*, as a critical analysis of the modern State. *Con*, in the sense that this State is illusory [*un fantasme*]. —Germany, for example, is outside and above the modern State (*MEGA*, pp. 613, 40-614, 22; *Intro CHPR*, p. 250).

(5) The problem is to find a *praxis* (we cannot be speaking of theory here, for Germany itself is backward) which expresses the profundity of the philosophy of Right and thus the future of mankind. [The problem is]* to surpass the modern State and, at the same time, the defects [*l'echarde*] of the modern State, represented by a backward Germany. The two are related.

This *praxis* will be both the realization and the surpassing of the philosophy of Right. *Praxis* is the head and heart of the Revolution. (An unequal development arises here, particularly in connection with the idea of Revolution. In order to indicate the appearance of the revolutionary idea compare this with the text of the appendix to Marx's thesis on the Hegelians.)

[This question of *praxis* can be considered according to the same five levels:]*

(1) The philosophy of the historical situation in Germany, and the philosophy of Right (as a "history of dreams" of the Germans). Philosophy in Germany is a lived "natural history" just as mythology for primitive man is a lived "pre-history." The philosophy of Right is contemporaneous with the "official" Principles of the modern State. It is associated with a backward German historical reality, and is its "abstract continuation."

This ambiguous situation (a *de facto* backwardness with a boldness of thought) means that the future is neither in the immediate negation of historical reality, nor in the immediate realization of an already surpassed philosophy.

(2) Therefore we would be right to want to negate the philosophy. But by this negation we cannot overlook it, since philosophy is part of the German reality. It is even the only germ of life in Germany. It cannot be surpassed without being realized. Practice must realize philosophy.

(3) Inversely, we would be right to want to realize philosophy (the Hegelians, the partisans of "critique" who measure things against the idea). But we forget that philosophy belongs to this German world, and that it is its "imaginary complement" [*ideale Ergänzung*]. We will not realize it, except in denying it "as philosophy."

(4) Marx's enterprise is a critique of Hegel. This critique is "both:" destruction and realization. Here we find consciousness of the modern State and its infrastructure, and also a negation of this consciousness inasmuch as it is satisfied with itself and its "theoretical" status.

The picture of the modern State, its "truth," is possible in Germany, *because* Germany is backward (because the *ancien régime* is artificial and without conviction; and because the power of the industrial nations is not real the result but the condition of its development).

This "truth" is at the same time an illusion. The modern State, as Marx

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describes it, is a fiction.

The philosophy of Right—and its critique—is equivocal.

[It presents]* the idea that the truth, *qua* expressed, formulated, conceptualized truth, is associated on its own with falsehood. Truth is necessarily not a reflection of that which exists in the same place, but rather an illusion of it—and even an illusion in relation to England and France. Philosophy is (1) a part of a historical whole and (2) the content, the mask, "the abstract continuation"—and the truth as an illusion.[93]

(5) What can be done in the face of this ambiguity? A critique that will also be ambiguous implies a break. Change is necessary. *Praxis* (in contrast to philosophy as sleep) is necessary. But it must be a *praxis* that employs the highest of principles (which could not be any less true than philosophy, but which could be more true), a *praxis* that indicates the future and is thus above the illusion of the modern State.

II. The Solution

(1) The Proletariat *qua* "formation" of existence is the presentation of truth (*MEGA*, pp. 619, 37-620, 10; *Intro CHPR*, p. 256). This was the case before the period of economic and political analysis beginning in 1844.

(2) The thought which recognizes this is the realization, and not simply the elimination of the philosophy of Right (*MEGA*, pp. 620, 41-621, 10; *Intro CHPR*, p. 257). It is the Hegelian sense of "experience."

Next time, we will explore the following two questions: What does Marx have against Hegel? What philosophy does he put in the place of speculation?

April 17, 1961

We have examined the problem of the eminently dialectical relation between philosophy and historical reality ("non-philosophy"). This is not a simple parallelism in the form of either reflection or mystification.

(1) Hegel's philosophy is not a reflection of a backward Germany and it is not a simple falsehood or mask of this Germany. It is a theory of the modern State. In Germany, the germ of life is in one's head.

(2) Hegel's philosophy is not a simple reflection of modern States either. Nowhere does a State actually become what Hegel says it is. Nor is he presenting a falsehood; his philosophy is the spirit of a time without spirit.

Philosophy is a "history of dreams," imaginary history—like religion. But dreams have an historical function—like the "pre-history" characterizing the myths of primitive peoples—they constitute a "post-history."

Dream and reality are in a dialectical relationship with one another. The dream is part of human reality.[94] Philosophy *qua* philosophy is also part of human reality.

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93. Note, for example, the treatment of Religion in the beginning of the "Introduction." (M-P)

94. *La réalité humaine*, is the term that Henri Corbin used to translate Heidegger's *Dasein*. The expression recurs particularly in Sartre's writings. (HJS)

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What must be done to escape this equivocation?

If one wants to simply realize philosophy out of the modern State, Germany remains backward. For this philosophy is the "imaginary component" of this backwardness, and the radicalization of philosophers remains verbal. To realize philosophy directly is to annul it, and also to maintain everything at the *status quo*. Therefore, are we going to turn our backs on philosophy? Will we throw ourselves into pure action (*praktische Partei*)? But this still runs counter to what one would wish; it is to forget that philosophy is part of the German reality—that it is the living part. In its absence, there would be action without principles.

In place of this realization which destroys and this destruction which maintains, a realization-surpassing is necessary. In place of a dialectic that does the opposite of what it wants to do, a dialectic which obtains "both" (cf. Plato's "the two").[95] Note, for example, Péguy's *Clio*[96] in which the "scandal," the failure of all public life becomes a "mystery," i.e., a beneficent paradox: "a justified scandal."

This is precisely the problem that Marx poses for himself. The proof appears in the appendix to his doctoral thesis (written in 1839-41) on the Hegelians.[97]

Already, then, Marx takes a position against the reformers of Hegel. These are Hegelians who wish (1) to maintain Hegel's philosophy as such, and (2) to realize it. According to the second group, Hegel's only failing was to "accomodate" himself to his philosophy—all he would have to do is to apply it, to realize it—which is a "non-philosophical" way of criticizing Hegel. There is no "moral" fault here. The fault must be in the very principle of philosophy *qua* separate philosophy, *qua utterance*, comprehension. Their Hegel was "science in the making"—[for their Hegel "science was something"]* "to whose uttermost periphery his own intellectual heart's blood was pulsating" (*MEGA*, p. 63, *CW*, p. 84). Hegel (i.e., dialectic) must be criticized philosophically (1) more profoundly, more faithfully, and (2) by remaining faithful to him, by remaining a philosopher oneself. —Hegel is fulfilled when he is criticized (parricide). —These Hegelians [commit] the inevitable error of unsuccessful emancipations—emancipations that are a form of dependence. —The theoretical spirit becomes "practical energy, will," but this *praxis* itself is fully impregnated with theory: "the praxis of philosophy is itself theoretical." In what respect? In the respect that one wants to replace philosophy by "Critique," which "measures the individual existence by the essence, the particular reality by the Idea" (*CW*, p. 85). It is also true that immediate realization is a poor theoretical spirit. This is a theoretical

95. In Plato, there is no movement. The work of the demiurge leaves an intelligible world and a sensible world with no possibility of a surpassing. (HJS)

96. Charles Péguy (1873-1914), French poet and essayist, wrote *Clio, dialogue de l'histoire et de l'âme paienne* in 1909. Through Clio, the muse of history, he defends the mystical in his polemic against the modern spirit and the scientific view of history. (HJS)

97. "On the Difference between the Democratean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature," in *MEGA* I, 1, pp. 63ff and *Collected Works*, Vol. 1 (New York: International, 1973), pp. 84ff. [Hereafter cited as *CW* in the text.] (HJS)

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spirit since we make reference to concepts, but it is a perverted theory, since the concepts lose their value and their truth [when]* employed immediately.

When philosophy turns against the world which it criticizes (the backward German reality), it becomes "one side" of the world. Its relationship to the world is a "relation of reflection" of it, one tension against another. (Here Hegel is quite right to oppose himself to the Hegelians who want to "apply" him): "What was an inner light has become consuming flame turning outwards. The result is that the world becomes philosophical, philosophy also becomes worldly,"[98] "that its realization is also its loss, that what it struggles against on the outside is its own inner deficiency, that in the very struggle it falls precisely into those defects which it fights as defects in the opposite camp... That which opposes it and that which it fights is always the same as itself, only with factors inverted" (*MEGA*, pp. 64-65, *CW* p. 85). (Here, there is a will to realize ends and the ideas that destroy them.) —This is the immediate will. It is empty, hollow. It combats its own emptiness in the world. It combats itself. The immediate will's action is in disagreement with itself. As a lack of the world, it is in profound agreement with backwardness and can bring nothing to it. Under the flag of realization, this immediate will ruins philosophy without any gain for itself. There is a commitment which is profoundly theoretical, precisely because it is the immediate negation of the world. —Therefore, there is a low estimation of the relation between philosophy and the thing. It is "perverted in itself."[99]

On the philosophers' side of consciousness, this attitude of "Critique" is equivocal. There are two contrary unreasonable demands: "one turned against the world, the other against philosophy itself... Their liberation of the world from non-philosophy is at the same time their own liberation from...philosophy..." (*MEGA*, p. 65; *CW*, p. 86). Philosophy's weariness is still philosophy. The replacement of the philosophy-system by the "act" and by the "immediate energy of development" proves that "they have not yet theoretically emerged from that system" (*ibid.*). The Hegelians actively sense their opposition "with the plastic equality-with-self" of the system" (*ibid.*), and do not take into account that, in denouncing it purely and simply, they do not truly change anything. Philosophy is destroyed only if it is realized.

This equivocation of the young Hegelians ends finally in two opposing philosophical tendencies: (1) the liberal party that wants to apply philosophy ("Critique"), (2) the opposition party, Positivist Philosophy, which present the "non-concept" of philosophy, "the moment of reality," as essential. "Each of these parties does exactly what the other wants to do and what it itself does

98. We have here a formula which without any further information from Marx is not expressed according to his own goal. There is the world's becoming-philosophy which can be reduced to philosophy's becoming-world, that is, to its pure and simple destruction (and, without a doubt, also, philosophy's becoming-world which, in truth, is only the world's becoming-philosophy, i.e. conservation of the system) Marx's goal is not to realize these two slogans as such. This would be a simple addition of illusions, with practice disguised behind theory and theory disguised behind practice. His goal would be to realize the chiasm of the two movements, the *two in one*. (M-P)

99. Cf. Hegel's analysis of "the unhappy consciousness" in *Phenomenology of Mind*. (M-P)

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not want to do" (*ibid.*). "Critique" ruins philosophy, while it wants to "realize' it. —"Positive philosophy" (Schelling?, Feuerbach?, the "practical" political party?) conserves the ideology-masks, because it wants to destroy them physically, immediately.

What is the difference between this text and our own? The two unilateral, immediate, non-dialectical attitudes are brought back to a common principle in 1839-41. It is a false freedom with respect to Hegel, whether one wishes to apply it, or whether one wishes to replace the "concept" by an act. The immediate "energy" of development is not dialectical but a "reflexive" relationship.

The result is philosophy-world. —Hegel's true freedom is Hegelian, dialectical, and does not turn its back on philosophy, or criticize the world from the heights of philosophy, which returns to the same. —The Hegelian attitude applied to the history of Hegelianism consists in understanding it dialectically. (1) There is first of all a "perverted" relationship of philosophy-*world which "appears." A tension of abstract opposition [exists]* between* them. (2) This becomes an opposition of philosophical consciousness with itself. (3) Finally, there is a division and a doubling back of philosophy, which interiorizes its opposition to the world.

The conclusion of the 1839 dialectical analysis is that there are two tendencies (both false) to be placed in the same bag. The tactical rallying to the "liberal party," to the extent that it is "the party of the concept," conserves philosophy immediately, while the other side is "perversion" in its pure state: *Verrüchtheit* (breakdown, madness). This leads to the position of waiting for a realization which might not be the destruction [of philosophy].*

The diagnosis (that each one does the contrary of what he wishes) remains in 1843. But, instead of saying that they are both wrong (and for the same reason, which is false emancipation, and a poor critique of Hegel), Marx adds: they are both right. One must both destroy and realize. This is what he proposes to himself in making himself a critic of the philosophy of Right.

Why?

At the end of 1842, a violent reaction occurs. Frederick William IV announces the suppression of certain journals notably, beginning in January 1843, the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, edited by Arnold Ruge, and beginning in April 1843, the *Rheinische Zeitung*, edited by Marx. In September 1843, Marx writes to Ruge: "a general anarchy rages among the reformers. . .each is obliged to admit to himself that he no longer has a very clear notion as to what the future must be." The "liberalism" of the Hegelian State is a myth. It is illusory to want to put the State back on its path of freedom again. —Feuerbach recommends an alliance of German theory and French practice. —Marx senses the necessity of moving away from an attitude disposed toward waiting. What is needed is a revolutionary dialectic which puts the State back on its path, a driving force towards historical evolution, —since the State turns out to be revolutionary.

Whence, it is *no longer* the case that the philosophical party and the

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practical party are both wrong (above all the practical party). The attitude of non-engagement [can no longer continue]. They are both right. It is all the same, since Marx continues to say that each one, powerless to do what it wishes, does what the other wants. Thus they are right, but one cannot disengage their truth while surpassing them. Simply put, the positive formula indicates that one must take a position in the matter.

This position will be, at the same time, for philosophy and for practice, ceasing to be external to one another in a "relation of reflection." Practice will be that which implies the true realization of philosophy (a theory that is the true destruction of itself as a separate theory) where the light of philosophy is rediscovered. This practice therefore incorporates philosophy in its entirety, and, in this sense, destroys it, truly surpasses it, because it contains it.

Thus we can consider (1) *praxis* and (2) a *praxis* which holds the promises that philosophy can give:

(1) "By the single fact that it is the determined opponent of the previous form of German political consciousness, the critique of the speculative philosophy of Right does not become lost in itself, but in the tasks which can only be solved in one way: through *praxis* (*MEGA* p. 614; *Intro. CHPR*, p. 157).

We go against the German political consciousness as a "point of honor," and as an ideological justification of a backward reality. The task is to transform the German reality, to pass on to action, to an action that is not a hidden theory (as before), but which changes the world.

(2) But, the difference between it and the practical political party which has forgotten the philosophy in action (and in this respect it remains "theoretical" and was an intellectual's *praxis*, anti-philosophy and hence philosophy), —it that it must deal with an action that realizes philosophy. Is this therefore compelling the State to apply Hegel's principles? No, this is impossible in the backward State of Germany. And, moreover, Hegel's principles are not applied anywhere. —Hegel's realization will not consist in *reforming* the real according to its concepts, but in instigating the transformation of this reality by itself, in seeking the principle of surpassing and of negative work within itself, which Hegel's philosophy of Right seeks in the Spirit.

"The question is: can Germany attain a practice *according to its highest principles*, that is, a revolution that raises it not only to the official level of modern nations, but to the human level that will be their immediate future." (*MEGA* p. 614; *Intro. CHPR*. p. 251)

An action according to the highest principles, i.e., one which realizes not less, but more than the principles of the Hegelian State. —These principles always remain "official," i.e. masks, and in Germany, they cannot have this official existence. They cannot realize themselves there except by surpassing themselves as principles. They animate a historical movement which realizes them in concrete men and makes a society not less advanced, but more

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advanced than the English and French societies. Thus they become the model for the future of these actual societies.

How is such philosophical action possible—particularly in Germany? Practically speaking, Germany has not even attained the level that it surpasses theoretically. It must therefore cross not only the limits of its own reality, but also the limits of modern States. Since this is the case, Germany does not appear to offer the "radical" needs which would make this radical revolution possible.[100]

Where is the positive possibility of German emancipation? (Read *MEGA*, p. 619; *Intro. CHPR.* p. 156) The answer: it is precisely in the formation of an absolutely lost class, the proletariat. He also gives a definition of the proletariat.[101]

The work of the negative to an extreme in the proletariat will amount to the dialectical union of the proletariat and philosophy.[102] The proletariat is the *Weltgeist*, the historical figure of the *Weltgeist*. —The proletariat (as defined above) in its seizure of power is the advent [*l'auènement*] of negativity and of the universal, since it cannot save itself except by saving man, and by surpassing itself as a class, in creating a society without classes. But this imposes a condition on revolutionary *praxis*: even it if is a *praxis* animated by the negativity of the proletariat, and, in that respect, a philosophical *praxis*, it is not action, in the pragmatist sense of success, nor in the relative and "realist" sense of attaining certain particular ends, certain goals by any means, but a *praxis* which is not *poèsis*,[103] but which is the integration of all means—with means and ends in dialectical interdependence. —It is a refusal to opt for Being or Doing; one is not to be preferred over the other. They are indivisible in *praxis*. —It is a refusal to opt for moralism or cynicism. *Praxis* is not an empirical action in this respect. Properly speaking, it has no *goal*; rather it is a "manner." It is an action that is done for nothing (empirical or positive) and for everything (the universal and man). *Todo y nada*.[104] The proletarian "mystery of existence," *Geheimnis seines eigenen Daseins*.[105] (*MEGA*, p. 630; *Intro. CHPR.*, p. 256) —The philosophical function of the proletariat is to command its economic function.

Such is the philosophico-political attitude.

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100. Read *MEGA*, p. 616; *Intro CHPR* p. 252. (M-P) The passage indicated here states, "But Germany did not pass through the immediate stages of political emancipation at the same time as modern nations... A radical revolution can only be the revolution of radical needs, but the preconditions and seed beds for such needs appear to be lacking." (CL)

101. The definition in question goes as follows: "This is our answer... this dissolution of society as a particular class in the proletariat." *MEGA*, pp. 219-220; *Intro CHPR* p. 256.) (CL)

102. "Just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat... the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization (*Verwirklichung*) of philosophy." (*MEGA*, pp. 620,35-621,10; *Intro CHPR* p. 257). (CL)

103. Aristotle's distinction can be summarized with *praxis* as doing; *poèsis* as making. (HJS)

104. "All and nothing" translates the Spanish expression. (HJS)

105. Merleau-Ponty's translation of this expression as "mystery of existence," rather than "secret of its own existence," recalls Gabriel Marcel's use of the phrase. One of Merleau-Ponty's earliest publications was a review of Marcel's *Being and Having* in *la Vie Intellectuelle* (1936). (HJS)

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More specifically, what "philosophy," what conceived superstructures, what conceptual preparations will make this *praxis* possible? We will examine this in the *1844 Manuscripts*, where Marx offers his phenomenology. Here conceptual preparations go before the practical recognition of the proletariat as a carrier of the universal. What is in question here is a "philosophy" which is not a philosophy of consciousness, but a philosophy of man incarnate.

Just as Hegel makes phenomenology a part of knowledge as soon as he installs himself there, Marx will view these essays as preparatory once he has installed himself through them in the becoming of truth, i.e. in *Capital* and its self-surpassing.

Future lectures: April 24: *Manuscripts of 1844*; May 2: Afterword to *Capital*; May 8: a text by Kierkegaard and one by Nietzsche; April 24, 1961;[106] read *MEGA*, pp. 620-21; *Intro. CHPR*, p. 257.[107]

Praxis bears *its own* theory, —man is the supreme being for man. This is a theory that surpasses the modern as the modern surpasses the Middle Ages, a theory that is *fundamental* and universal—what philosophy is in words, the proletariat is in act. This theory expresses "the mystery of existence." (*MEGA*, p. 620; *Intro. CHPR.*, p. 256) The "secret" or speculative mystery (negativity) is passed on to the proletariat. Note that in *Capital,* there is the mystery of "reification" [*Verdinglichung*] where the proletariat and the *praxis* which it is (as negativity) and which it defines are the realization of philosophy. *Praxis* is not the fabrication of a certain result, for example, a technical tool of Power, but a practice, a mode of historical existence (universal and fundamental). *Praxis* is not defined by deliberate ends, but by a movement of history (the industry that creates the proletariat) extended into the re-creation of human society. —Evidently what is necessary is a political technique to illuminate the *de facto* proletariat. But the last measure will always be the mystery of negativity and the negation of the negation which is the idea of the proletariat. It is an action that is an action for all (the universal, mankind), because it is, in a sense, an action for nothing and for no *particular* interest.

Philosophy is the conceptual preparation for this historical adherence. Concepts such as positive and negative, universal, *Grund* (fundament), history, man, nature, mind, contribute to the science of historical experience. This is why Marx treats them in 1844.

We see that Marx's concept of the proletariat as self-surpassing [*Selbstaufhebung*] is prior to the experience of "advanced" countries and prior to an extensive reading of Hegel's sources. This is no argument against his position: It only shows that Marx is a philosopher. He will remain such since *Capital* was interrupted before he began treating classes and the proletariat. However an analysis of the structure of *Capital* reveals the same metaphysical mechanism: that of a reality which "surpasses" itself, and in which *Capital* contradicts itself. Here, we pass from reality (*Capital*) to

106. The notes which follow occur in the margin at the end of the manuscript for the preceding lecture. Then there are new notes which again bear the April 24 date. (CL)

107. This is the passage quoted above in footnote 102. (HJS)

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appearance (the proletariat). As in Hegel's *Logic* "becoming truth" is substituted for "becoming consciousness," but it is still philosophy and still Hegel. Under the guise of philosophy's abandonment, it is the most audacious philosophy: a philosophy which hides itself in "things" and which is masked by an apparent positivism. It is a philosophy to the very extent that it does not wish to be one. Inversely, the declared philosophy of 1844 is not far from the concrete.

Why then do we have this change, these declarations concerning the abandonment of philosophical consciousness? (1) Because what must be understood, particularly after 1848, is the weight of things in the sharpest sense and *their* movement. Thus *Capital* founds proletarian philosophy in the movement of things. (2) Because the sense of political practice leads to a consciousness of separation between the *de facto* proletariat and its philosophical and historical function. Action is the strategy and the technique of the reversal of capitalism. (Whence) the objective analysis. From this point of view, the sketches of 1844 apear too "immediate," schematic. One cannot "realize" only half. But what must be realized, by the analysis of *Capital* and through action, is always precisely the play of negative and positive.
April 24, 1961

The *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844.[108]

1. The critique of Hegel. —Let us leave aside for the moment the Feuerbachian critique (returning, subject-object), and the superficial critiques of "idealism" which "surpass" history and remove "spontaneous movement" from it. This leaves the following:

(a) The critique of philosophical exhaustiveness in the name of *Dasein*. (*MEGA*, I, 3, p. 165; *EPM*, p. 394) Here negation and confirmation in philosophy render real modes of existence equivocal in philosophical existence.

(b) The critique of "self-consciousness's" pretensions that it is other than itself. Here the pretentions of pure "knowledge" permit one to identify objectification and alienation. —This is related to the very essence of Hegel's philosophy (negativity) and not to "accomodation." (*MEGA*, p. 163-164; *EPM*, pp. 392-393)

(c) The critique of the negation of negation and of the equivocal "surpassing" which it realizes. (*MEGA*, p. 164; *EPM*, p. 393)[109]

However, the negation of negation is a good description of human Prehistory. (*MEGA*, p. 164; *EPM*, p. 393) Marx is a positivist for a far off future, beyond communism. Communism is a negation of the negation depending upon a future positivism. (*MEGA*, p. 125; *EPM*, p. 348)

(d) Similarly, Marx accepts the idea of the alienation of the subject in the object, but not as a definition of "objectivity." Rather as an episode of it,

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108. Merleau-Ponty translates and comments upon Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844). An English version is included in *Early Writings*, pp. 281-400. Henceforth passages are cited in the text as *EMP*. (HJS)

109. In this text Marx agrees with the views of Feuerbach. Cf. *MEGA*, p. 152; *EPM*, p. 382.

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since non-alienating objectification (the positivist perspective) will follow.

This is the critique of Hegelian alienation. We must add the alienation of alienation; in short, a negation which is carried away absolutely into the positive.

(e) The critique of nature according to Hegel.

This summarizes everything that precedes: the critique of "knowledge," speculation, negation of the negation, and alienation. (*MEGA*, p. 170-172; *EPM*, p. 395-396)

2. Efforts at a Marxist philosophy.

(a) "Surpassing" [*Aufheben*]. The negation of negation must be maintained. However, the surpassing must be a true one and not a conserving negation (i.e. in raising the object to the level of thought). It is an abstraction of an abstraction. In an *alienated language*, "thought" is this negation of a negation which is the being-object of man, of his "essence" and positive humanism. (*MEGA*, p. 166-167; *EPM*, pp. 395-396)

(b) Nature before and after pre-history.

Here we must study the relationship among the concepts: nature, man, history, *praxis*. (*MEGA*, p. 160; *EPM*, pp. 389-390)

Man is viewed as a sensuous-objective being. (*MEGA*, p. 160; *EPM*, pp. 389-390) Man is also viewed as a social, historical being inasmuch as he is non-alienated. —This is his *nature* and nature becomes man through him—the nature-history relation becomes dialectical. (*MEGA*, p. 115-116; *EPM*, p. 344-345 and *MEGA*, p. 160; *EPM*, pp. 389-390) Such is the critique of Hegelian negativity (Spirit). It involves reform (a final and primordial positivism) and, consequently, the elaboration of the concepts: man and nature.

What remains to be appreciated is the exact relationship between Marx and Hegel, and between Marx and Feuerbach. Is this the return of Hegel, as Feuerbach says. Or is Marx introducing something else? And, as a function of that, what is the relationship here with Marx's final thought?

May 2, 1961

The Marxist critique of Hegel.

(1) Philosophical "thought," as exhaustiveness, as unconditioned thought, as identical to the thing itself, is equivocally both destruction and conservation: "This unstable being, in the real existence of human attitudes, is hidden (their existence is blind). It is only visible and revealed (*Offenbarung*) in thought and in philosophy. Thus my true religious being-there (*Dasein*) is my being-there in the philosophy of religion. My true natural being-there is the being-there in the philosophy of nature. My true human being-there is my philosophical being-there. Similarly, the true existence of religion, the State, art, nature is the philosophy of religion, nature, the State, art... Thus, it is only as philosophy of religion that I am truly religious and thus I deny real religiosity and the really religious man. But, at the same time, I confirm them, partly in my own being-there, that is, in the alien being-there which I oppose them with for this is merely their

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philosophical expression, —and partly in their particular and original form, for apparently, there are also no others (than me). They are all allegories and hidden variants under sensuous mantles of their authentic and true being-there, i.e. my philosophical being there." (*MEGA*, p. 165; *EPM* pp. 393-394)[110]

For Marx, philosophy is equivocally both phenomenology and also speculation. "To understand" is taken as "seizing the truth of. . ." In other words: (a) this means denying art, nature, religion, the State in their immediate form, —destroying them—, transforming them into their truth, which is other than what they are. (b) It also means being what they are, since this form is only its philosophical expression and they are allegories, emblems of this truth, and hence true.

But didn't Marx say that there must be both destruction and realization? Yes, but in the end, philosophy does neither destruction nor conservation or maintenance. —It engages in pseudo-destruction and pseudo-conservation, with each serving as no more than an alibi to escape the other. —We do not reproach philosophy for ambiguity, but rather for bad ambiguity.[111]

How does philosophy develop a bad ambiguity? Like overview "thinking," exhaustive, possessing the thing "in thought," philosophy, wanting to be all, is nothing; it does not inhabit the things it discusses, —and, since it is not anything in particular, it is not even opposed to that which it criticizes. It is neither yes nor no; it is not no, because it is not yes. Philosophy has no enemies, nor does it have any friends. It has no friends because it has no enemies. It lacks everything, both the particular and the universal. By contrast, it must have both. This thought will not have the character of an overview, the pretense of living at a distance, of seeing, haunting, contemplating —which is a yes under the flag of a no, and a no under the flag of a yes. By contrast, what is needed is a manner of thinking which is at the same time concrete and universal, in which the yes will be a no, and the no an unequivocal yes. It is not a question of a returning behind Hegel, for example, towards a philosophy that renounces its comprehension of non-philosophy or towards a non-philosophy that will take non-philosophy (art, religion, nature, the State) without criticism. The problem is to succeed at that which it lacks, to create a concrete philosophy that is truly concrete.

(2) To be more precise, Marx criticizes the pretensions of philosophical "thought" for remaining at home in what is other than self, for being contained in itself and possessing its contrary, —surpassing its contrary from the inside or for understanding it from the outside, without experience. The problem is to rediscover philosophical proximity and distance: philosophy's state of being nowhere and everywhere.[112] There are two conditions to this:

110. Merleau-Ponty translates from the German; therefore I have attempted (here and in subsequent passages from the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*) to render an approximation to his French version in English. However, the reader will also note the similarity to the Benton translation cited in the text. (HJS)

111. See footnote 81 on "good" and "bad" ambiguity. (HJS)

112. See footnote 40 on philosophy as "nowhere and everywhere." (HJS)

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(1) Consciousness, —particularly "self-consciousness," —must not be given the power to carry its contrary in itself and to be at home with its inverse. (2) An illusory all-powerfulness—a negativity that is so total that it founds and digests everything and nothing, —must not be fabricated in the name of "knowledge."

"In this discussion, we find a compendium of all the illusions of speculation. First, self-consciousness is at home without its being-other than self as such. This is true—if we create an abstraction of Hegelian abstraction here and replace self-consciousness with *man's self-consciousness* (which is at home in its being-other than self). This implies, for one thing, that consciousness—knowledge *qua* knowledge, thinking *qua* thinking—presumes that it is immediately other than itself, sensuousness, reality, life, thought which, by thinking, overreaches itself (*sich überbietende*) (Feuerbach). This aspect (of the doctrine) is implied in that conscousness as the simple consciousness (of the external) (*Bewusstsein*) is not offended by alienated (*entfremdeten*) object-being (*Gegenständlichkeit*), but by the object-being as such.

"Secondly, this implies that to the extent to which man in his self-consciousness has recognized and surpassed (*aufgehoben*) the spiritual world or the general spiritual being-there of his world as self-exteriorization of himself (*Selbstentaüsserung*), he nevertheless reconfirms it in this externalized form. He passes it off as his true being-there. He restores it and presumes that he is at home in his being-other as such. Thus, for example, after having surpassed religion and recognized it as a product of self-externalization, he finds that he has nevertheless been confirmed in religion *qua* religion. Here is the root of Hegel's false positivism or of his merely apparent critique. It is what Feuerbach calls the positing, negating, and restoring of religion or theology, —but it needs to be understood in a more general fashion. This is to say that reason is at home in non-reason *qua* non-reason. The man, who has recognized that he leads an exteriorized life in law, politics, etc., in fact leads his true human life in this externalized life as such. Self-affirmation (*Selbstbejahung*), self-confirmation in contradiction with itself and with the knowledge and the essence of the object is therfore true knowledge and true life.

"Therefore there is no longer any question about a compromise on Hegel's part with religion, the State, etc., since the falsehood here is that of its very (philosophical) progress." (*MEGA*, pp. 162-164; *EPM*, pp. 392-393)

[We must] relate the critique of pure "knowledge" and pure "thought"—as they outdo themselves and realize their own surpassing—with the problem of what carries the dialectic, namely, sensuousness, reality, life, nature, man bringing "self-consciousness" but not created by "self-consciousness" as it "outdoes" itself.[113]

113. "It goes without saying that when the abstract thinker decides in favor of intuition, he sees nature abstractly. For the abstract thinker, nature lies enclosed in a hidden shape, and nature itself remains enigmatic, like the absolute Idea, and like a rational thing. When the

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This self-consciousness is in the midst of things and does not produce things. It is a negativity which permeates things that are already there and does not manipulate them from itself.

The problem of alienation appears as a movement from the self into the other who denies the selfness (*ipséité*) of the first. For Hegel, this movement is coextensive with objectivity, where "self-consciousness" is pure subject. The relationship "self-consciousness"-object must be thought, though it does not necessarily involve a contradiction, or the genesis of an antagonist.

The problem of "surpassing" has already been discussed. Hegel's progress (i.e. thinking negativity) is responsible for equivocation in "surpassing." For thinking, "surpassing" can only reinforce critique, criticize critique, that is, a "false positivism," which reestablishes that which had been criticized under the aegis of extracting the truth.

(3) Marx and Feuerbach as critics of Hegel.

In this text, the problem of negation appears as a central item in Hegel's Marxist critique. The questions of "materialism" or "idealism," of a "returned" or "rectified" dialectic are all subordinated to this problem of negation. One must achieve a conception of negation (and of the negative-positive relation, of alienation, of "surpassing" which is not the pseudo-destruction and pseudo-conservation that one obtains in replacing the thing by the thought of the thing.

In all this, there is not a word against the idea of negativity. The Feuerbachian critique of Hegel is very different from this. In his *Thesis*, Feuerbach says:

"The method of the reformative critique of speculative philosophy as such does not differ from the method already used in the *Philosophy of Religion*. It is sufficient to transform the predicate into the subject, and, once it is a

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abstract thinker gives birth to nature out of himself, it is, in truth, still only abstract nature. In adding to it the sense of a "being-other of thought," real, intuitive nature is distinguished from the abstract thinker. Only nature as a rational thing has been born from him. Or even, to speak in human language, the abstract thinker discovers, from his intuition of the experience of nature, that those beings which he thought he was creating out of nothing, out of pure abstraction, in a divine dialectic (as the pure products of the labor of thought weaving into thought itself, without ever looking at reality) are nothing other than abstractions drawn from nature's determinations. For the abstract thinker, the whole of nature amounts only to a repetition of logical abstractions in a sensuous and external form. He analyzes nature and the abstractions again. His intuition of nature therefore is only a renewal of the abstraction from the intuition of nature, a conscious reenactment of the process by which he produced his abstraction. For example, time becomes the image of negativity referred back to itself. The future surpassed as being-there (*Dasein*) corresponds to the natural form of movement, surpassed as matter. Light is the natural form of reflection-in-itself. Body, such as the moon and the comets, is the natural form of opposition, which, acording to the *Logic*, is the positive resting on itself, and the negative resting on itself. The earth is the natural form of the logical ground (*Grund*)—as the negative unity of the opposition, etc. Insofar as it is appreciably distinct from its secret sense hidden within itself, separate and different from these abstractions, nature *qua* nature is nothing, a nothing confirming itself as nothing. Nature has no sense, or has only the sense of an externality that has to be surpassed. . . Externality should not be understood here as self-externalizing sensuousness (*Sinnlichkeit*), accessible to light and to sensuous men. There is no externality except in the sense of alienation (*Entaüsserung*), in the sense of a flaw, a weakness which ought not to be. For that which is true is still the Idea. Nature is only the form of its Being-other." *MEGA*, pp. 170-171; *EPM*, pp. 398-200. (M-P)

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subject, it can be transformed into an object and a principle—thus it is sufficient to invert speculative philosophy. In this way we obtain the naked, pure and simple truth (*die blanke Wahrheit*)."[114] Although Marx has sometimes taken up these formulae, they do not express his thought or at least not for very long. "Direct thought (*die Direcktheit*)—the conscious elimination of all mediation—eliminates dialectic with Hegelian idealism."[115]

We can observe Feuerbach's temptation (the Feuerbachian return) and Marx's reaction in his assessment of Feuerbach: "When he opposes negation of the negation, which goes under the pretense of being the absolute positive, with the positive which is based on itself and positively grounded in itself. . . , Feuerbach interprets negation of the negation as philosophy in contradiction with itself, as philosophy affirming theology (surpassing, etc.) after having denied it, and hence affirming it in opposition to itself. The positing or self-affirmation and self-confirmation which resides in the negation of negation (for Feuerbach) becomes a positing which is not yet sure of itself, which is preoccupied with its opposite, which doubts itself and requires a demonstration, which therefore does not prove itself through its being-there, and which is not admitted. It is therefore directly and immediately counterposed to that positing which is sensuously ascertained and grounded in itself." (*MEGA*, pp. 152-153; *EPM*, pp. 381-382)

This [is] where positivism is tempted [to move] against negativity. Therefore it is the temptation of a non-dialectical philosophy. But Marx pursues this further;

"Since Hegel understood the negation of the negation, from the aspect of the positive relation contained within it as the only true positivity and from the aspect of the negative relation contained within it as the only true act and self-confirming act of all being (*Selbstbestätigung alles Seins*), he simply discovered the abstract, logical, speculative formula for the movement of history. This movement of history is not yet the real history of man as a presupposed subject, but the act of his creation, the history of man's emergence." (*Ibid.*)

Feuerbach with his positivism, or his humanist and immediate philosophy, does not account for history, or man as making himself across history. In so doing, he creates himself as subject and becomes "self-consciousness."

Yes, Hegel was wrong in extracting nature or man (or religion, art, law) from thought. This is no reason to simply overthrow Hegel—just because he makes nature or man the subject and consciousness the predicate. (One could equally well make law or religion the subject and Spirit the predicate, the positive the subject and the negative the attribute.) This would be to misunderstand the problem. —The problem is to have a conception of the negative that does not transform nature, man, and history into abstractions, a

114. L. Feuerbach, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy" (1842) in *The Fiery Brook*, p. 154.

115. György Lukacs, *Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft* (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1967), p. 684. *The Young Hegel* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), pp. 559-60.

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conception of the negative which is in their very fabric, and particularly in that of history. Marx would argue that when Feuerbach affirms matter, he is not a historian. When he recognizes history, he is not a materialist. For Marx, a historical materialism is a concrete conception of negativity and of the negation of a negation. It is a correct formula, but an algebraic one with respect to the *movement* of history.

In this spirit, Marx tries, in the *1844 Manuscripts*, to elaborate his philosophy and his dialectic. He tries to redefine the concepts of nature, man, and history, to "realize" the Hegelian "surpassing" and negation. —It is a dialectic that will no longer be a history of consciousness, not even a history of man(Feuerbach), but "a history of being."

Sketch of a Marxist "History of Being:"

We no longer start from "thought" or pure 'knowledge," i.e. the equivocal relation consciousness (*Bewusstsein*)-object, becoming finally self-consciousness and absolute self.

Where, then, do we start? From nature or from man? We no longer start from pure nature, [which] by itself is not man. And man taken positively will not be a valuable philosophical principle. Man himself is not two natures, but a double nature: "Both the material of work and man as subject are the result as well as the starting point for the historical movement." (*MEGA*, pp. 115-116; *EPM*, p. 349)

Marx's sketch of philosophy is essentially dialectical, i.e. nature, man, and history are all understood, not as substances definable by a principal attribute, but as movements without a locatable discontinuity, where the other is always involved. —There is no cleavage between matter and idea, object and subject, nature and man, in-itself and for-itself, but a single Being where negativity works. —Therefore, nature will not be defined as a pure object, externality, but as the "sensuous," carnal, nature in the way we see it. Natural beings have an internal relation where the relation between some of them and others is predetermined. Man will be defined neither as a pure subject nor as a fragment of nature, but by a sort of coupling of "subject-object" with two sides; a relation to an object, or an active object, and also a relation essentially to another man, a generic being (*Gattungswesen*), "society." This latter relation is a transformation and a continuation of the natural relation of living beings with external being. History in this sense is the very flesh of man.

"Man is immediately a natural being (*Naturwesen*). As a natural being and a living natural being, he is, to an extent, equipped with natural powers and vital forces. He is an active natural being. To an extent, it is as a natural, corporal, sensuous, objective (*gegenständliches*) being, a suffering (*leidendes*) being, conditioned and limited like animals and plants. In other words, the objects of his drives exist outside man as objects independent of him... That man is a living, real (*wirklich*), sensuous, objective being with natural powers means that he has real, sensuous objects as the *object of his being* (*Wesens*) and of his vital expression (*Lebansaüsserung*)... To be objective, natural,

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and sensuous and to have one's object, nature, and sense (*Sinn*) outside oneself,[116] or even to be oneself object, nature, and sense for a third (being)[117] is one and the same thing (*ist identisch*). Hunger is a natural need. It therefore requires a nature and an object that is outside itself. . . The sun is an object for the plant, and indispensible object, which maintains (*bestätigend*) his life, just as the plant is an object of the sun, an externalization (*Aüsserung*) of its life-awakening power and its objective essential power. A being which does not have its nature outside of itself is not a natural being. . . A non-objective (*ungegenständliches*) being will be a non-being (*Unwesen*).

"Imagine a being which is neither an object itself nor has an object. In the first place, such a being would be the only being (*das einzige Wesen*); no other being would exist outside it. . . *For as soon as there are objects outside of me*, as soon as I am not alone, *I am another*, a reality other than the object outside of me. For this third object, I am therefore a reality other than it, in other words, its object."[118] (*MEGA*, pp. 160-161; *EPM*, p. 389-390)

Man is therefore a suffering being (*leidend*) and because he feels his suffering, he is a passionate being (*leidenschaftliches Wesen*).

"But man is not only a being of nature. He is a being of human nature, that is, a being which is for himself (*für sich selbst seiendes Wesen*) and therefore a generic being (*Gattungswesen*). . .[119] Therefore human objects are not natural objects such that they offer themselves immediately. The human sense (*der menschliche Sinn*) as it is immediately, objectively, is not human sensibility. . . Neither objective nature, nor subjective nature is immediately and adequately present to the human being. Just as everything that is natural must be born, man too has his act of birth (*Entstehungsakt*): history. But history is an act of birth that is known (*bewusste*). Consequently, it is an act of birth that consciously surpasses itself as an act of birth (*als Enstehungsakt mit Bewusstsein sich aufhebender Entstehungsakt ist*). History is the true natural history of man." (*MEGA*, p. 162; *EPM*, p. 391)

Nature is transformed into history by sensuous-practical man. Nature, which comes to be for itself, and therefore realizes itself in destroying itself, maintains itself while surpassing itself. And carnal, "material," history serves as its clutch to connect up with natural forces and as a continually "objective" movement that is its "steering wheel."

116. [marginal note:] Man has his sense, his being outside himself. The relation subject-object is born out of a pre-conscious relation with the outside. It is not a "pure activity," but an "objective" heavy one. Cf. *MEGA*, p. 160; *EPM*, p. 389. (M-P)

117. [marginal note:] And, at the same time, because he has this instinctual relation with things, he is "other" for another man. —Intercorporality. —Chiasm: nature—sociality. Man produces and reproduces society. He is produced and reproduced by it, just as he produces objects and is produced by them.

118. [marginal note:] "*Society* is the prefected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature." (*MEGA*, pp. 115-116; *EPM*, pp. 349-350). (M-P)

119. [marginal note:] Everything that precedes was only a natural [peculiarity?] but because man is for himself, he is a generality, that is, he interiorizes his relations with the world and with the other, or he projects himself into them. He is the others and they are he. (M-P)

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This is quite Feuerbachian, but with the added dimension of history as that which produces man and is produced by him. Here then Hegel with his negativity descends into the flesh of the world.

But the philosophical problem was, then, the exact status of this negativity, which is no longer the absolute Self, and which floats above nature.

If one holds oneself [to that negativity],* after all it comes from Hegel, it is an act of birth which "surpasses itself" as an act of birth, because it is "for itself." Is this not the access to the *known*, to "knowledge?"

But in introducing the concept of nature, Marx denies himself the possibility of letting negativity float into the air. He maintains, against Feuerbach, the negation of Hegelian negation as an abstract formulation of history before the birth of man. But this negation of the negation is the installation of man's positive Being or of a second nature. This is why Marx praised Feuerbach for having taken the positive resting in itself as a principle. Marx only reproached him for not envisioning the mediations that precede him. Marx himself envisions the "surpassing" of history by itself: the "self-surpassing" as a blossoming of man's "true essence:" "If I know religion as alienated human self-consciousness, this does not mean that religion is already self-consciousness, but that it is an alienated self-consciousness. Thus I know that the self-consciousness which belongs to the essence of my own self is realized in an annihilated, surpassed, religion, but not in religion itself. In Hegel, therefore, the negation of the negation is not the realization (*Bestätigung*) of the true essence by a negation of an apparent essence. It is the realization of a pseudo-essence or a self-estranged essence. The alienation occurs across its negation or the negation of this essence appearing to be objective, residing outside man, and independent of him and its transformation into the subject. (*MEGA*, p. 164; *EPM*, p. 393)

The relation with the external is a problem in that this relation can no longer be the passing from the negative to the positive, as in Hegel, where there is an alienation of the negative in the positive. This means that the two terms are relativized, that, therefore, the negation of the negation is a denial of alienation [*désalienation*], establishing a relation devoid of contradiction with the positive. In relation to the problem of "surpassing," this means that a man who has "appropriated" his essence for himself receives grounding and produces a new state of man in equilibrium with himself.

Therefore, we have the Hegelian negation of negation taken in its positive sense: "In grasping the positive sense of the negation which has reference to itself, even if once again in estranged from, Hegel grasps man's self-estrangement, alienation of being, loss of objectivity and loss of reality as self-discovery, manifestation of being, self-objectification and self-realization. In short, he sees labor—within abstraction—as man's act of self-creation." (*MEGA*, p. 167; *EPM*, p. 395)

"The positive moments of the Hegelian dialectic. . .(a) 'surpassing' as an objective movement, which re-absorbs alienation into itself. That is the insight, expressed within alienation, into the appropriation of objective being

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by surpassing its alienation. It is an alienated intuition of the real objectification of man..." (*MEGA*, p. 166; *EPM*, p. 395)

Whence negativity (and notably the negation of the negation) is only the contrary of man's "true essence" which has never been, but which will be. Positive simple nature is not only at the origin but also at the end: "...atheism as the surpassing of God is the emergence of a theoretical humanism. Communism as the surpassing of private property reclaims true human life as man's property, the emergence of practical humanism. In other words, atheism is the humanism mediated with itself by surpassing religion; communism is humanism mediated with itself by surpassing private property. Only by surpassing this mediation (a surpassing of a surpassing)—which is nevertheless presupposed to be human—will positive humanism, which originates in itself be born." (*MEGA*, p. 167; *EPM*, p. 395)

More precisely, the description of a future to man's true self-possession (assumed by the concept of nature) supports the previous phase of a negative negation of the negation. "When the essentiality of man and nature has become "practically-sensuously" visible...the inquiry into a foreign being above nature and man becomes practically impossible. Atheism as the negation of this inessential no longer makes any sense...Socialism *qua* socialism no longer needs such mediation. It begins with the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and nature as essential beings (*als des Wesens*). It is man's positive self-consciousness, which is no longer mediated by surpassing religion, just as real life is man's positive reality, which is no longer mediated by surpassing private property or communism. Communism is the act of positing, negation of the negation, and therefore the real phase, necessary for the next (*nächste*) historical development in the emancipation and recovery of mankind. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the nearest (*nächste*) future. But communism is not as such the goal of human development—the form of human society." (*MEGA*, p. 125; *EPM*, pp. 357-358) This is the face which communism turns toward a "beyond" (its side where negation of the negation is positive): the "positive surpassing" of property, the genuine appropriation of the human being—"the genuine dissolution of the opposition between man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the opposition between existence and essence, between objectification and self-realization (*Selbstbestätigung*), between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the problem of history resolving and knowing itself as such" (*er ist das aufgelöste Rätsel der Geschichte und weiss sich als diese Lösung*). (*MEGA*, p. 114; *EPM*, p. 348)

Thus Marx [is different from] Feuerbach, [different from] immediate positivity. But the domain of negativity is enclosed on both sides by Nature and Equality with itself. This is the resolution of the historical enigma (or prehistorical enigma—which is where Marx's reservation lies).

It is also true, as Lukács has said, that even if this "direct thought" is rejected in the distant future, it colors the whole dialectic which depends on

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it. "Direct thought" gives its state to "surpassing" and to work as the possibility of *whatever appears*, as the absolute recreation of the world and man. Is it not also the elimination of dialectic along with Hegelian idealism?[120] "It would be dangerous to understand Engels' sentence as it standing again on materialist feet in Hegel's philosophy involved only a reversal of philosophical signs."[121]

Hippolyte comments in *Logique et Existence*:

"Marx adds this historical dimension to Feuerbach. He therefore rediscovers more or less the Hegelian dialectic in the concrete conflicts of history, but he refuses to reduce the positive to the negation of the negation. . . Man's objectification is not an alienation for him, since the object determined is not negation; it comes first. History, then, has created conflicts and will put an end to them."[122] "The first positivity of nature must be substituted for the negation of the negation. Man must be understood subjectively out of this positivity."[123] "Human nature will then manifest itself after the resolution of historical conflicts. Positivity comes first, positivity will be last, and this positivity must not have any cracks in it—it must not have anything negative."[124]

Since then, *praxis* has ceased to be an openness, an action which does everything, because it is not particular and because it is animated by the class which is its own self-surpassing. *Praxis* becomes the technique of this class power. —It implies a return to the positive by the Party and the dictatorship. This is certainly efficacity, but is it a realization of negativity?

Ironically, in a sense, positivism produces the same result as absolute negation or Hegel's absolute negative, i.e. a hidden sense of history, a combat of gods—Stalinism and Hegelianism. One could even say that Hegel maintains more of the sense of negativity and tension.

Is there a coming to consciousness [*prise de conscience*] in existence today? Non-antagonist oppositions are recognized in Soviet society, oppositions which are no longer presented as steps toward nature.

Philosophy and non-philosophy: a detached philosophy always reappears in disguise. What is needed is a negation of the negation which we do not fix either in negativism or positivism.

(Texts from *Capital* and from the introduction to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.) —The renunciation of philosophy must be a consciousness of these difficulties in the nature-history opposition.

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120. Lukâcs, *Der junge Hegel*, p. 684; trans. pp. 559-60. (M-P)
121. Lukâcs, *Der junge Hegel*, p. 662; trans. p. 542. (M-P)
122. Jean Hippolyte, *Logique et existence: Essai sur la logique de Hegel* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952), p. 238. (M-P)
123. *Ibid.*, p. 238. (M-P)
124. *Ibid.*, p. 239. (M-P)

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RE-READING MERLEAU-PONTY[1]

by Hugh J. Silverman

In *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel*, Merleau-Ponty reassesses the European philosophical tradition which highlights the names of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. His problematic is the status of philosophy in relation to its non-philosophical sources and goals. I shall propose that *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel*, Merleau-Ponty's last course, elaborates a thematic which is both critical to his earlier philosophical activity and transitional to the increasingly significant "structuralist" perspectives—even to their current "post-structuralist" phases. The central role that Merleau-Ponty's thought plays is decentered into its actual expression just as much as his positions demand particularized formulations in order to be understood. Thus Merleau-Ponty's influence cannot be revealed only through explicit references to his name and to his writings. Rather what concerns us is the conceptual dissemination: his collaboration and "quarrels" with Sartre, his characterization of behaviorism, freudianism, and gestalt psychology, his response to the 1937 Stalin purge trials, his existentialized conception of Husserlian phenomenology, and his rethinking of philosophy in its history. These elements of a philosopher in the making—*se faisant* as he said of Bergson—are reconstituted in the light of Saussurian linguistics (which Merleau-Ponty taught at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1948-49), Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology (the subject of an essay entitled "From Mauss to Claude Lévi-Strauss" which was first published in 1959), Lacan's neofreudianism (referred to in *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language* of 1949-50), Althusser's break with the young Marx (signalled in the *Adventures of the Dialectic* of 1955 and especially in *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel* taught in 1960-61), and the revived return to an archeological Hegel in the forms Foucault offers (developed out of Hippolyte's commentaries and essays). As for the post-Merleau-Ponteans (Derrida, Lyotard, and Deleuze), invoking philosophy to become non-philosophy by inscribing itself in our own lives is echoed throughout grammatological traces, libidinal economies, and rhyzomal dispersions. This Merleau-Pontean context, as transformed into a multiplicity of texts, continues to announce its presence as ambiguous radicalism (and radical ambiguity) within considerations of language, anthropology, psychoanalysis, political theory, and history. By entering these various disciplines, by passing through their domains of expertise, by thinking their content, and by bringing understanding out of them, philosophy can reach its fullest achievement as non-philosophy. Non-philosophy is philosophy rendered experiential. What must be shown is how philosophy *qua* conceptualization can become absolute in the various realms of our practical life.

1. This paper was presented at the inaugural meeting of the "Merleau-Ponty Circle," which was held at the University of Akron, September 3-4. In the preparation of the text, I have benefitted from discussions with Dick Howard and from editorial remarks by James Schmidt.

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I. Philosophy Becoming Experience

Merleau-Ponty's sudden death in 1961 has been described, on various occasions, as the termination of a thought in the act of becoming. To substantiate the point, we were first presented with *The Visible and the Invisible* (1964), that monument to the survival of ontology in an age when the whole domain was about to be relegated to an archive somewhere. Then for those of us who did not hear him at the Collège de France, summaries of his courses from 1952 to 1960 were published as *Themes from the Lectures* (1968). Finally, *The Prose of the World* arrived in 1969 with a philosophy of language, developed in the early 1950s, but announced previously only in essays now found in *Signs* (1960) and in some early courses, such as *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language* (1949-50).

Could we have expected that there was more to come? The answer is given in the form of a response to those who might have wondered what Merleau-Ponty would have entered in the Collège de France Bulletin at the end of 1961 – *Themes from the Lectures* ends with 1960. The content of the answer is now given in terms of working lecture notes entitled *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel* and published by Claude Lefort.[2] The character of Merleau-Ponty's work in the year of his death established not only themes and concerns that occupied him many years earlier, but also new directions of thought. In both cases, however, the pervading interest was for philosophy to accomplish what he took to be its ultimate task: becoming experience.

Of the two posthumous books *The Visible and the Invisible* and *The Prose of the World*, the latter was written earlier, specifically in the year or so prior to his inaugural lecture, delivered in January 1953 at the Collège de France.[3] In one sense, then, *The Prose of the World* cannot be regarded as chronologically representative of Merleau-Ponty's final philosophical position. In another sense, the formulations of the early fifties are also expressions of a position taken a decade later. The problematic of *In Praise of Philosophy* (his inaugural Collège de France lecture) focuses on the dialectic of history and philosophy (Hegel and Marx; Marx and Hegel) resolving itself into an ambi-

2. Two series of lectures were offered during 1960-61, for only in the years 1957-59 did Merleau-Ponty consolidate his two courses into one. Thus for 1960-61, there exists another set of inquiries announced as *Cartesian Ontology and Modern Ontology* and not included in *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel*. In this other course, Merleau-Ponty explored the visible with Cézanne, out of the invisible in things, through Leonardo's perspectival projection, and at the oscillating center in the chiasm of visual perception and kinesthetic apperception. Alexandre Métraux summarizes these materials in "Vision and Being in the Last Lectures of Maurice Merleau-Ponty" in *Life-World and Consciousness*, ed. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 332-336. The course parallels specific elements in *Eye and Mind*, trans. Carleton Dallery in *The Primacy of Perception and other Essays*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), which was the last work to have been published by Merleau-Ponty during his lifetime. It develops certain aesthetic theories that remained nascent since *Sense and Non-Sense* (1948), trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia A. Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964)—including particularly the transformation of Cézanne's Gestaltism into the painter's thinking in space as visibility.

3. Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, trans. John Wild and James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

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guity of philosophy and absolute being. From the Hegel who identifies philosophy and history "by making philosophy the understanding of historical experience, and history the becoming of philosophy,"[4] to the young Marx, who said that "one 'destroys' philosophy as a detached mode of knowing, only to 'realize' it in actual history,"[5] we find the basis for the recovery of meaning that takes possession of itself, through philosophy, in the "fecund moments" of experience.[6] We are told that the philosopher takes a distance (the Heideggerian interpretation of the Husserlian *epoché* as "stepping back") in order to see a meaning; it "comes to itself only by ceasing to coincide with what is expressed."[7] But if philosophy remains at a distance, this *pensée de survol* (overview thinking) cannot accomplish the task that is the philosopher's vocation. Philosophy cannot maintain itself outside history and common experience. Hence "in order to experience more fully the ties of truth which bind him to the world and history, the philosopher finds neither the depth of himself nor absolute knowledge but a renewed image of himself placed within it among others."[8] This earlier formulation of philosophy becoming non-philosophy is itself parallel in structure to the incarnate phenomenology of his first major work, the *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945).[9] There the non-philosophical experience of spatiality, motility, and even freedom are an elaboration of a lived, pre-objective philosophy.

Merleau-Ponty's task in *The Prose of the World* was to move from Hegel's claim that the Roman state was the prose of the world to an introduction to the prose of the world in which "the category of Prose [will go] beyond the confines of literature to give it a sociological meaning."[10] With the publication of this work by Claude Lefort in 1969, the theme of the transition from philosophy to non-philosophy is given expression through various types of language, from the most formal, as in the algorithm, to the most indirect, as in painting and gesture. Here again, meaning enters into the presence of the world through language and the various forms of prose. As he had indicated in the "Preface" to *Phenomenology of Perception*, "we are condemned to meaning."[11] In *The Prose of the World*, not only is meaning expressed through prose, but also prose is extended throughout the inter-world (*l'entre-monde*). Philosophical meaning then becomes the lived expressive world, a *Lebenswelt*, without fulfilling Husserl's transcendental reduction (which requires that existence be placed in suspension). In this sense, philosophy can become what Merleau-Ponty characterizes in 1961 as non-philosophy.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
9. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).
10. Merleau-Ponty, "An Unpublished Text" trans. Arleen B. Dallery in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James M Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 9.
11. *Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit.*, p. xix.

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The seeds of this non-philosophy were already germinating in *The Prose of the World*. Just as he often opposes a "bad ambiguity" to a "good ambiguity,"[12] Merleau-Ponty considers (and rejects) the possibility of a non-philosophy that will be the complete annihilation and denial of philosophy. He writes: ". . . no philosophy of history has ever carried over all the reality of the present into the future or *destroyed* the self to make room for the future. Such a neurotic approach to the future would really be non-philosophy, the deliberate refusal to know *that in which one believes*."[13] Hegel certainly does not introduce history as a brute necessity which obliterates judgment and suppresses the self; on the contrary, history is their true fulfillment. Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty espouses a philosophy of presence. Just as Heidegger's Presence (*Anwesenheit*) has, as its ontic correlates, the present (*Gegenwart*) of presence (*Präsenz*), similarly Merleau-Ponty cannot envision philosophy finding a home solely in the future. Such a utopian outlook would deny philosophy its lived aspect. For philosophy to become non-philosophy, non-philosophy must be on-going experience, and such experience cannot be in the future. The movement of intention and expression must appear now in order to fulfill the philosophical, i.e., phenomenological, enterprise. Since philosophies have dealt either with "mediating transcendences" or with "how the self makes itself world or culture which in turn must be animated by the self," true history must be lived and expressed in the present. Thus of the two types of non-philosophy, the one, which translates as a future in which the self is destroyed, is unacceptable. The other, described in 1961, is to be investigated within a signifying perceptual field and within a language of experience which *means*, but does not *propose*.

Unlike *The Prose of the World*, Merleau-Ponty did not table (or abandon) *The Visible and the Invisible*.[15] Doubtless, it was the focus of his attention even in the final year, since the last entry of the "Working Notes" is dated March 1961.[16] The book was to be entitled *The Origin of Truth*, for the return to origins (the *arché* and *genesis* of knowledge) would uncover the source of truth. The notes begin with the truth of being and the being of truth, which are the ontological conditions for "our state of non-philosophy."[17] But what, in effect, can non-philosophy be? Merleau-Ponty proposes a dialectic between two alternative solutions (dialectics): "either the 'bad dialectic' that identifies the opposites, which is non-philosophy—or the 'embalmed' dialectic, which is no longer dialectical.

12. See footnote 81 in "Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel" included in this issue of *Telos*.

13. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 84.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

15. Note Lefort's doubts that the work was fully abandoned and that were there time it could have been revived out of the tissue of *The Visible and the Invisible*. *The Prose of the World, op. cit.*, p. xx.

16. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*. trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1960), p. 165-275.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

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End of philosophy or rebirth."[18] Either the dialectic selects discrete entities (facts) and hence cannot escape disparate multiplicity or it becomes solidified and devoid of movement. The very dialectic between the two alternatives: the end of philosophy (which Heidegger has proposed)[19] and the renaissance of philosophy (which philosophers wish for) is inherent in the problematic itself. Is non-philosophy then a termination point and conclusion to philosophy or is it the basis for a revival? Only the former was suggested in *The Prose of the World*. In this 1959 note, the dichotomy is present: non-philosophy could also be the basis for a bridge between complete positivity and complete negativity. In fact, philosophy itself may serve as that very bridge between those two forms of non-philosophy.

The only other explicit reference to non-philosophy in the "Working Notes" reiterates its duality: "...philosophy is not immediately non-philosophy—it rejects the positivism in non-philosophy, a militant non-philosophy—which would reduce history to the visible, would deprive it precisely of its depth under the pretext of adhering to it better: irrationalism, *Lebensphilosophie*, fascism and communism, which do indeed have philosophical meaning, but hidden from themselves."[20] Philosophy looks within itself in order to fulfill itself, in order to become lived experience. As philosophy becomes non-philosophy, its self-givenness may appear in a harmonious functional form in which non-philosophy—living—is precisely what was sought by philosophy. The risk, however, is that non-philosophy may be the destruction (without possibility of renewal) of philosophy. If history is reduced to the visible, or the produced, the vital dialectic of visible and invisible cannot be realized. Since history is in production (in the making), its invisibility is as present as the specifically visible. The heart of philosophy is its *chiasm* (or intertwining) of taking and being taken, seeing and being seen, touching and being touched, perceiving and being perceived, enveloping and being enveloped. Within this mutual coincidence (*Ineinander*),[21] this "identity difference of difference,"[22] this "interrogative ensemble,"[23] "the becoming-man of nature"[24] leaves no space for a metaphor to occur in between.[25]

Though some may wish to argue that the position is a new direction in Merleau-Ponty's thought—and it is true that the langauge has changed from the formulations of the early forties—the basic structure of the position is the same. What is now non-philosophy as the fulfillment of philosophy was then an "intentional arc"[26] and a circuit of existence delineating a phenomenal

18. *Ibid.*
19. See Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). This is selected from Vol. II of *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961).
20. *The Visible and the Invisible, op. cit.*, p. 266.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 221. The inherent critique of Heidegger's notion of the *Zwischen* will be discussed later in this essay.
26. *Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit.*, p. 136.

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field, experienced as already there. Or even earlier in *The Structure of Behavior* (1942), Merleau-Ponty indicated the necessity of recognizing the originality of the dialectical pair "perceived situation-work" as much as the irreducibility of "vital situation-instinctive reaction" to the pair "stimulus-reflex."[27] Each subordinated dialectic is fulfilled as it is surpassed in another pair. Nature, life, and mind are the successive moments in a series of visible-invisible relationships. They are also the expression of philosophy becoming non-philosophy in a meaningful fashion.

The dialectic of philosophy and non-philosophy is another form of the ambiguous life which permeates Merleau-Ponty's various perspectives. In each case, the rethinking of this ambiguous domain has been central to his formulation of the dialectic. This was particularly the case in *Humanism and Terror:* "The dialectic of the subjective and the objective is not a simple contradiction which leaves the terms it plays on disjointed; it is rather a testimony to our rootedness in the truth."[28] As he was to develop in *The Visible and the Invisible,* the subjective-objective dialectic is the locus of meaning, visibility, ambiguity, truth. The revealing of truth (as in Heidegger's *Unverborgenheit*) is the bi-directionality of philosophy coming out of individual knowledge and entering into the common domain. In connection with Bukharin and the ambiguity of history, bi-directionality is expressed as the opposition between the Commissar and the Yogi: "the true nature of tragedy appears once *the same man* has understood both that he cannot disavow the objective pattern of his actions, that he is what he is for others in the context of history, and yet that the motive of his actions constitutes a man's worth as he himself experiences it. In this case we no longer have a series of alternations between the inward and the external, subjectivity and objectivity, or judgment and its means, but a dialectical relation, that is to say, a contradiction founded in truth, in which the same man tries to realize himself on the two levels."[29] For the same person to express both philosophy and non-philosophy is not a simple task. Yet it is the banner under which Merleau-Ponty operates both in 1947 and 1961.

To indicate, in another area, this repetition of the same, we find the concluding passage to the essay on "Trotsky's Rationalism" delineating the Scylla and Charybdis of philosophy's move to non-philosophy. On the one hand, we find a utopianism, on the other, a dogmatic philosophy of history: "Marxism does not offer us a utopia, a future known ahead of time, nor any philosophy of history. However, it deciphers events, discovers in them a common meaning and thereby grasps a leading thread which, without dispensing us from fresh analysis at every stage, allows us to orient ourselves toward events."[30] This final self-orientation toward events—similar to the

27. Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior,* trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon, 1963) p. 162.
28. Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror,* trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 96.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-3.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

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"tending toward expression" by which Merleau-Ponty characterizes the child's imitative behavior—is the ultimate realization of philosophy. Philosophy cannot satisfy itself with analysis, nor even with description. For Merleau-Ponty, it must initiate a movement in the direction of actual lived experience (*Erlebnisse*). This can be accomplished through Marxist *praxis* only if one carefully interprets social phenomena. The traditional Heraclitean metaphor of life as a flowing river is here transformed into a *curriculum vitae*—a course of life—which the philosopher thinks and writes about in order for it to enter into the texture of the world. Each person must, however, enact his own course of understanding—as Merleau-Ponty did from *Humanism and Terror* to *The Prose of the World* to *The Visible and the Invisible*.

The initial phases of the basic themes, later developed in *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since Hegel* were begun at the time of *The Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955),[31] or, more precisely, in 1956, when Merleau-Ponty offered his Thursday course on "Dialectical Philosophy."[32] Although a continuation of the recently published book, the lectures also explored new ground. After moving from the "fecundity of contradiction" and "the labor of the negative" in Hegel to the "subjective reflection" of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty then turned to a "circular dialectic" in which "the *experience* of thought" undergoes a journey to learn "what was already there, 'in itself,' before reflection." This itinerary, which takes him through Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre establishes an uneasy equilibrium between the negative and the positive, the one and the many, the subjective and the objective, the null and the total. These different dialectics might be said to return eternally—as Nietzsche claims of life in general—to the same: philosophy and non-philosophy.

Each equilibrium reintroduces the question of the status of non-philosophy in its relation to philosophy. In order to clarify the question, Merleau-Ponty takes up the role of nature. His studies on nature are not to return to a physicalism. Nor is this nature precisely the *physis* of the ancients—though it does accompany a *logos* that seeks to know it. In Aristotle's *logos* of *physis*, the structure of the natural world is known by living in it and observing one's surroundings. However, for Merleau-Ponty, what counts is not the distance between *logos* and *physis*, but the immediacy of the former in the latter.

The interrogation of nature is philosophy's move toward nature. In contrast to classical metaphysics which establishes the distance between philosophy and nature, Merleau-Ponty's metaphysics is an ontology *of* nature, i.e., a natural ontology. In "The Possibility of Philosophy" (1959), philosophy interrogates its foundations. When it becomes evident that nature is foundational, the question arises as to whether philosophy occupies a place apart from nature? With Hegel the answer is negative—"something comes to

31. Merleau-Ponty, *The Adventures of the Dialectic*, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

32. Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures*, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 51-61.

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an end,"[33] and philosophy is denied a special status. In the process, a philosophical void is created by the denial. The filling that Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche offer is itself a destruction of philosophy. The end of philosophy begins where philosophy becomes nature.

With the naturalization of philosophy, "we enter an age of non-philosophy. But perhaps such a destruction of philosophy constitutes its very realization. Perhaps it preserves the essence of philosophy, and it may be, as Husserl wrote, that philosophy is reborn from its ashes."[34] The problem is not whether philosophy is such a phoenix, but rather how it is reborn from its ashes. The preoccupations, obscurities, equivocations, and interpretations of these post-Hegelian thinkers do not solve the problem any more than the numerous commentaries on their writings. What is philosophical in non-philosophy is not a series of recommendations for our own time. Thought can no longer provide guidelines, evaluations for present and future action. Whatever we discover in Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, it is not a picture of how they understood their era. On the contrary, we find in them the very condition of our own time: "They live on in us rather than our having a clear perspective on them and we involve them in our own problems rather than solving theirs with ours."[35]

Their philosophy of non-philosophy is to become our non-philosophical philosophy. The history of non-philosophy is a continual restatement of a negated metaphysics. At each moment that a philosopher refuses to accept the standard metaphysical assertions in favor of a renewed understanding of life, then non-philosophy is at work. Non-philosophy is not anti-philosophy, for the former is philosophy put to work, while the latter runs counter to the enterprise of understanding itself. By interrogating the meaning and possibility of non-philosophy, philosophy is reborn in nature and in experience. Philosophy inserts itself into everyday life such that the interrogation is a realization of our own activity. Along the path of its history, Heidegger, following Husserl, moves to interrogation—not of the *Lebenswelt* as such, but rather of the ontological conditions of existence. Merleau-Ponty's identification of Heidegger as embarking on the path of non-philosophy signals a certain change in orientation. Throughout Merleau-Ponty's work, we find explicit reference to Husserl, while the insertion of Heidegger into his corpus only a year prior to *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel* suggests that he has made the very ontological turn which determines the direction of *The Visible and the Invisible*.

Following Heidegger, some, such as Sartre, spoke of man as negated being and the being which negates. Merleau-Ponty is aware that the early translations (by Henri Corbin) of *Da-sein* as *la realité humaine* (human reality) lead directly to the substitution of humanism for metaphysics. The end of philosophy was understood as the end of metaphysics. However

33. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

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humanism, in the sense of a philosophy of man, would triumph. For Merleau-Ponty that was a misinterpretation. Certainly man is implicated in the experience of the world—but man need not be glorified. Heidegger sought "through *Dasein*, to get at Being, to analyze certain human attitudes only because man *is* the interrogation of Being."[36] Man enters into the interrogation and is interrogated along with Being. But he does not appear as an isolated entity. Man participates in "pre-objective Being" just as much as any other essent or being. For philosophy to enter into such participation through understanding is for philosophy to become non-philosophy. By expressing and describing our living through pre-objective Being, i.e. nature, philosophy can return to what is fundamental, and hence to what is not philosophical.

If the fundamental is not philosophical, which is Merleau-Ponty's position in his 1959 course, a clarification of what is fundamental comes in the next year. *Eye and Mind*, his last publication, explores vision. Given the name visibility in his working manuscript, vision is nature at work. Philosophy surrenders to vision as is exemplified in the activity of a painter such as Cézanne who interprets how we see by making us see. Unlike thought with its Cartesian supports through construction and transformation, vision goes to the things of the world in order to uncover their sense. This necessarily corporeal vision delineates the zone of Merleau-Ponty's post-Hegelian philosophy.

Space is "reckoned starting from me as the zero point or degree zero of spatiality. I do not see it according to its exterior envelope, I live in it from the inside; I am immersed in it. After all, the world is all around me, not in front of me. Light is viewed once more as action at a distance. It is no longer reduced to the action of contact or, in other words, conceived as it might be by those who do not see in it. Vision reassumes its fundamental power of showing forth more than itself."[37] Vision enters into spatiality and participates in more than it reveals. The task of philosophy is to take thought to the spatiality of vision. Once there, philosophy must divest itself of its pretensions. Philosophy learns that the study of painting can teach us how to understand the world as non-philosophy. "The painter's vision is not a view upon the *outside*, a merely 'physical-optical' relation with the world. The world no longer stands before him through representation; rather it is the painter to whom the things of the world give birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible."[38] The painter reveals nature as the emergent meaning of the visible. As Being arises, the painter enters into the painting. On this basis, he can return to himself in order to complete his vision, his understanding. "Vision alone makes us learn that beings that are different, 'exterior,' foreign to one another, are yet absolutely *together*, are

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110. Translation altered.
37. Merleau-Ponty, *Eye and Mind*, trans. Carleton Dallery in *The Primacy of Perception*, p. 178.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

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'simultaneity'."[39] The unity of beings is the unity that philosophy seeks to know, but which it can know only by experiencing them in their spatiality and visibility.

Merleau-Ponty finds an unmediated expression of Being in literature which is similar to the "meaning of the visible" in painting, for they both activate an "intentional arc." From among his writings in 1961, Merleau-Ponty left five notes on the novelist Claude Simon.[40] The three principal themes of these notes, (1) vision, (2) *Vorhaben*, and (3) the felt, are reformulations of the same experience. One asserts: "To see is to allow us to avoid thinking a thing, *since we see it*."[41] Cartesianism requires that whatever is thought be included in the *cogito*. The *cogito* cannot itself allow us to enter the world of things in order to see them. We must in fact suspend our thoughtful judgement in order to perceive what is there. Vision is itself a grasping of what is already there (*vorhaben*). To speak of the *Vorhabe* as pre-objective experience is to include what is imaginary as well as perceptual. In both cases, the task of the novelist is to describe what is felt. Without the work (*le travail*) of the novelist, "feeling, living, and sensorial experience are not worth anything. Work does not involve simply the conversion of the lived into words, but rather *making what is felt speak*."[42] The philosopher is also engaged in making what is felt speak but not in sensorial language. The philosopher must return to experience in order to develop the language of experience. But that language is an elaboration of whatever achieves meaning in our daily lives.

II. Philosophy and Non-Philosophy

Merleau-Ponty's 1960-61 course explores the relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy in two distinct parts. In the first portion, after some introductory remarks concerning the appearance of the absolute, he identifies the absolute with the phenomenon, establishes the relationship between knowledge and experience, proposes a phenomenological dialectic, develops the place of self-consciousness, and indicates Hegel's failure to link philosophy and non-philosophy. The second part focuses on stages in Marx, immediate philosophy, Marx's critique of Hegel, the possibilities of praxis, Marx as philosopher, and the relationships between thought, man, and nature. Although Merleau-Ponty is moving toward a unified thematic, the cryptic form of the work makes this difficult to perceive readily. The directions that he had developed prior to 1961 all point to the possibility of philosophy becoming non-philosophy. First Hegel, then Marx, serve as the means of articulating this movement.

In exploring Hegel's "Introduction" to the *Phenomenology of Mind*, the

39. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

40. These notes were published posthumously in *Méditations*, 4, 1961-62, pp. 5-9. They are reprinted in *Entretiens: Claude Simon*, ed. Marcel Séguier (1972), pp. 41-46. Dates of these notes extend between October 1960 and March 1961. Therefore they cover the same period as *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel.*

41. *Entretiens: Claude Simon, op. cit.*, p. 42.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

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absolute appears in such a way that the phenomenon is the whole truth. Since the phenomenon must appear, its manner of appearance encompasses all that is, i.e. the absolute. This means that philosophy cannot present itself in any way other than as non-philosophy. Philosophy must be engaged in questioning. Heidegger's understanding of the question of Being and Sartre's discovery of the origin of negation in the interrogative attitude establish characteristic modes of philosophical questioning. In Nietzsche's claim that the Greeks knew how to live, the stress on appearance as life manifesting itself places them at the level of the phenomenon, at the level of non-philosophy. Philosophy, through its questioning, interprets and thereby transfigures what is lived.

In order to interpret experience, philosophy sets itself apart from experience. When Nietzsche proposes the absolute of appearance, he sets the stage for Hiedegger to claim that the absolute is "a-philosophy" and for the Sartre of *Critique de la raison dialectique* to assert that Marxist *praxis* offers the best example of an unsurpassed philosophy. Accordingly philosophy for Heidegger and Sartre becomes non-philosophy, experience, life.

Philosophy has no access to the absolute through understanding (*Erkennen*). Understanding, which seeks to know the absolute, requires some instrument or medium by which it can approach the absolute *qua* appearance. In mediating between the philosopher and the absolute, understanding serves as an indicator of appearance. However, it reveals only an empty space or a pure directionality. Because of this mediating function, understanding cannot succeed in bringing out the appearance in its absolute form. As a substitute for understanding *qua* mediating function, we would have to become understanding itself. This could be accomplished in history if life were to make itself into a type of knowledge and knowledge were to make itself into life. In that way, the relationship between the absolute and our acquaintance with it would be realized in our own experience.

To accomplish this task, a recognition of the identity of the phenomenon with the absolute is required. Philosophy is not understanding because philosophy demands that understanding perform a mediating function. If understanding mediates, then acquaintance-knowledge (Bertrand Russell's formula for *Erkennen*) of the absolute will differ from the appearance of the absolute. For the absolute to be true, it must be known in its truth and it must appear in its truth. Furthermore, understanding must be the manner of revealing the truth of the absolute. Thus revealing the phenomenon is presence of the absolute.

In the appearance of the absolute, natural consciousness seeks to be the real accomplishment of knowledge. However, since there is also a *natural* unconscious, which Merleau-Ponty attributes to Marx as well as to Freud, knowledge cannot grasp the totality of the phenomenon. The structure of consciousness is such that the phenomenon is not fully revealed. Because the phenomenon is both in relation to itself and in relation to the external world, a chiasm is formed. By this chiasm, consciousness interweaves the

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phenomenon within its natural context. "Nature," which was the theme for Merleau-Ponty's lectures in 1957-59, provides an environment whereby consciousness can be its own concept, but not its own self-realization. Consciousness must also become nature in order for it to realize itself in addition to manifesting its identity.

Such a consciousness is engaged in negation. What is negated is not the for-itself, as in Sartre. According to Sartre, the for-itself negates itself so as to give itself a being which it is not and to project beyond that being. But its projects define itself as another in-itself. The operations of consciousness force the in-itself into transcendent objectification. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness negates in order to affirm its own movement to a new form of being and expression. In this way, the intertwining of the relation to self with the relation to the external world is a dynamic orientation toward an unfulfilled self-realization and not a denial of true identity as in Sartre. Its *telos* is to be unified with itself and nature. But since that unification is not possible, consciousness must be unhappy. As long as it remains unhappy, divided within itself, and alienated, it cannot become the absolute unification that it seeks.

What appears out of this impossibility for consciousness to achieve unification is the intentionality of consciousness. Intentionality is itself experience (*Erfahrung*)—but it is a restless experience. It is never content in that it continues to delineate the chiasm (the intertwining). As long as the chiasm exists, a polarity will be found within natural consciousness. The measure of experience, then, will be the identification of what is measured and that by which it is measured. This binary opposition between *mésurant* and *mésuré* parallels that of the *signifiant* and *signifié* in a semiological formulation. Since the standard of measurement cannot be what is measured, the measurement *qua* experience or knowledge cannot be the appearance of the absolute. The absolute must remain unachieved.

To measure consciousness is to make it a mediated intuition. But if it were a mediated intuition, how could consciousness learn anything? On the one hand, consciousness is the standard of measurement and the external world is measured in order to establish what consciousness knows. In the first case, consciousness is philosophical, in the second, consciousness is natural. Since, however, these two types of consciousness can exchange their roles, they can each be subject or object for the other. They are the same for each other—even though together they cannot be absolute, for measurement is the denial of the absolute.

For the attainment of the absolute, knowledge must be experience. But in order for this to be true, knowledge must undergo a transformation. Knowledge, that is knowledge of the object, is insufficient. After the dichotomy between subject and object, and between the standard of measurement and what is measured, what remains is "a pure act of vision." Though Merleau-Ponty finds this formulation in Hegel, it is repeated in his own work: the surpassing of these dichotomies is visibility, or, to put it

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otherwise, ambiguity. Both visibility and ambiguity are restatements of intentionality, the dual process which unifies the opposition within it. The bi-directionality of standard of measurement to what is measured and vice versa establishes the relation as pure unmediated experience.

The exchange between standard of measurement and what is measured is dialectical. The dialectic arises out of the tension between the relation to self and the relation to a transcendent object. This dual relation characterizes the function of consciousness, which accomplishes its tasks through experience. Such experience is ambiguous (*zweideutig*) in that its many meanings are unified in a synthetic activity.

If we examine the role of ambiguity in this connection, we find that it is at once phenomenological and dialectical. It is phenomenological in that consciousness comprehends itself in a moment. That moment is the full revelation of the phenomenon as neither object nor subject but as "the co-givenness of both" (*für dasselbe*). Consciousness stands out as meaning: the signification of the relation as the appearing of appearances. Since nothing can enter phenomenology from the outside, it is unmediated. As a description of experience, phenomenology brings out the various dimensions and aspects of that experience as it takes place.

Ambiguity is also dialectical in that it moves in two directions, integrating whatever enters its path and surpassing itself by preserving its own integrity. As dialectic, ambiguity is the operation of knowledge (*Wissen*) upon the object and the object delimiting the extent of knowledge. The dialectical relation is surpassed in experience itself. What remains is the ambiguous totality that is no longer differentiated. In its totality, the dialectic forms the absolute. Merleau-Ponty illustrates this notion of the absolute by mentioning the historical conditions underlying the purge trials of 1937, which he had discussed at length in *Humanism and Terror*. Here experience has brought out the ambiguous alternatives and resolved them into the nakedness of events, i.e., the absolute of appearance.[43]

A consciousness that is truly self-conscious, Merleau-Ponty claims, is empty. The case in point is Hegel's assumption that his own self-consciousness (which would be analogous to the bourgeois state) is identical with consciousness in general (which would be similar to the state). But the bourgeois state cannot fulfill itself (become fully aware of itself) if it assumes that it is the state. The state must be conscious (i.e. appear in consciousness). Since consciousness permeates what appears through experience, it must permeate the state. The state cannot be limited to its determination of itself as the bourgeois state would do. Therefore, the bourgeois state is not fully self-conscious.

Because experience operates within a total situation, *praxis* must *be* the

43. For a discussion of the meaning of these events and related issues in Merleau-Ponty's political theory, see Dick Howard "Ambiguous Radicalism: Merleau-Ponty's Interrogation of Political Thought" in G. Gillan, *Horizons of the Flesh* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1973), pp. 143-159 and his essay included in this issue.

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absolute (full consciousness in self-consciousness). To become itself, consciousness must tear itself away from itself so that it may participate in the absolute. Although consciousness "designates" absolute knowledge, it can only become that absolute by entering into it experientially, by practicing it in action.

Though Hegel sets up the move to the absolute through consciousness, he does not link philosophy and non-philosophy. Both the relation to the self and the relation to the external world are preserved. Consciousness remains ambiguous without the necessary experiential unification. The absolute here is absolute negation or absolute affirmation. It cannot be both at the same time. Yet for philosophy to become non-philosophy, experience of the world as an appearance, it cannot maintain the disjunction between affirmation and negation. That disjunction signals the continuance of philosophy and the refusal of non-philosophy. For the possibility of non-philosophy, pure *praxis* must take place. Here neither affirmative nor negative judgement can play a part—only experience in its fullness is necessary. Since Hegel is still involved in negation and positive surpassing, one must look beyond him for the requisite move to the absolute.

The early Marx is Hegelian in orientation, attempting to reform philosophy by dissociating himself from Feuerbach. Merleau-Ponty refers to this point in Marx's development as the "philosophical" or "pre-Marxist" period and argues that it is followed by a break with philosophy as a form of alienation.[44] Two problems characterize this change. First, in the early period, views which are reminiscent of Feuerbach are mixed with those which are non-Feuerbachian. For example, we find the claim that the destruction of philosophy must be its realization and its realization must destroy philosophy. The latter formulation cannot be simply a return to speculative philosophy. It must mean that philosophy is itself transformed—a position which Feuerbach did not take. Thus inherent in the early Marx are signs of a move to non-philosophy.

The second problem concerns the role of a Hegelian dialectic in the case where socialism is to be scientific. If philosophy has become socialism in its rigorous and non-utopian form, has Hegel's method also been excluded? If so, can the move to non-philosophy maintain its signification and importance, or is philosophy reified and excluded (as a positivism), rather than reintegrated in another form? Merleau-Ponty would wish to support the dialectical reintegration. Thus to those who charge Marx with not having written a *Logic*, the answer that *Capital* is its substitute can indeed provide a basis for understanding Marx's later project. In the orientation toward appearance by means of essence, we find a reconstruction of experience. The structure of that movement is fully Hegelian. Hence the scientific socialism proposed

44. Louis Althusser in his "Introduction" to *For Marx* (Paris, 1965) dubs this break, the *coupure épistémologique*, following Gaston Bachelard's description on the philosophy of science. Since it announces a shift from an earlier position, the transition that it signals is the move to science and a "scientific socialism."

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through *Capital* is actually philosophy following out the movements of experience. The later Marx is therefore both the refusal and the reintegration of his earlier philosophy.

Merleau-Ponty attempts to understand this reunification by asking whether it is a question of logic (*Sache der Logik*) or a logic of the thing in question (*Logik der Sache*). If it is a question of logic, then it has little importance for the material conditions at work in society. If, however, it is a logic of the thing in question, where what is in question is historical materialism, then the project for philosophy is to become that logic which brings out the very thing in question. In reformulating the lived ambiguity, what is to be surpassed here is the distinction between idea and thing. In history, the difference becomes the identity of the thing in question with its intrinsic logic.

Such an identity of the thing in question with its logic goes by the name of immediate philosophy. Here philosophy is unavailable for mediation. When Hegel understands and conceptualizes experience, the absolute is self-presentational, self-enclosed, and self-defining. It is mediated only by its affirmation of itself as absolute. With this affirmation, the absolute gives itself as true. The movement of truth brings consciousness. Consciousness renders the truth of the absolute evident for itself. But since this movement is pure conceptualization for Hegel, Marx's mandate is to return to immediate philosophy. With Marx, experience no longer becomes philosophy, conceptualization, and self-presentation. Now philosophy becomes experience, pure movement, and immediate philosophy.

At the same time that the Marx of *Capital* believes he has abandoned philosophy by presenting the realities of inter-human economic relations, in effect he has rediscovered philosophy in its experiential form. The negation of philosophy is its revival as non-philosophy. Realizing non-philosophy is the fulfillment of philosophy becoming world and the recognition that it is no longer necessary for the world to become philosophy. What was self-consciousness is now *praxis*, for *praxis* is philosophy in its immediacy. Where Narcissus required the river in order to see himself, self-consciousness is mediated by its conceptualization of itself. In *praxis*, Narcissus no longer looks at himelf in order to know himself. Now he goes for a swim. Conception becomes action within concrete conditions.

Such a reversal involves an implicit critique of Hegel. However, Marx also engages in an explicit critique. His writings in 1843 and 1844 revise Hegel in favor of embodied man and non-philosophy. The movement toward the realization of incarnate reality and the movement from philosophy to non-philosophy represent an identical directionality. Where the Hegelian philosophy was a philosophy of the concept and thought, the Marxian formulation is the presumed denial of philosophy *per se* and the introduction of *praxis* as the inheritor of absolute knowledge. The absolute therefore becomes bodily experience, that is, openness to material need, exchange, and alienation. Since *praxis* is both "the head and heart of the Revolution," Marx views philosophy as a hindrance to the realization of the Revolution.

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However, if philosophy becomes non-philosophy, then *praxis* can operate freely within the historical reality that founds it.

The move from philosophy to non-philosophy is not a pure denial of philosophy as such. Rather it is a reunion of philosophy with non-philosophy, in which a philosophy of the concept will no longer dominate over a philosophy of experience. Philosophy is not therefore annihilated. On the contrary, it achieves life through negation. The negation of philosophy *qua* non-philosophy is both the failure and the realization of philosophy. When the specific relation between philosophy and world has been overturned (*verkehrt*), the world and its problems prevail.

The Marxian critique of Hegel rejects the non-engagement that is characteristic of the Hegelian State. An action which evolves according to the highest principles is an intellectual's *praxis*. Such *praxis* is anti-philosophical (not non-philosophical) and hence it is another form of philosophy. What it requires above all is a realization of its possibilities in the proletariat, not in the conceptual realm. Merleau-Ponty speaks of this realization as the positive possibility of the German emancipation in the proletariat. What he means is that the full freedom of the proletariat in Germany, as envisioned by Marx, is also the fulfillment of philosophy as a meaningful enterprise. With the proletariat as "universal spirit" (*Weltgeist*) comes negativity (reaction against the bourgeoisie) and a dialectical union of philosophy and the proletariat. The proletariat negates its oppressor; philosophy negates its conceptual orientation.

The superstructure needed to carry out the movement of negativity is not a philosophy of consciousness, but a philosophy of man incarnate. Thus we find mirrored in the Marxian critique of Hegel, the Merleau-Pontean response to Husserl. Just as Hegel integrates phenomenology into knowledge as soon as he sees that he is part of that knowledge (what appears is known for the self), Marx returns to his early essays in order for them to become true in *Capital* and in its self-surpassing, i.e. the denial of capitalist production.

In *Capital*, Marx has moved from reality (the actual capitalist conditions of production) to appearance (the proletariat which comes into view as an oppressed class). The task of *Capital* is to give a basis to proletarian philosophy as a movement of things. It also brings about a consciousness of separation between the *de facto* proletariat and the philosophico-historical function which conditions it.

For Marx *qua* philosopher the task is to provide critique, which Merleau-Ponty sees as taking four forms: (1) the critique of philosophical exhaustiveness, i.e. philosophy cannot cover existence in its entirety; (2) a critique of the pretentions of self-consciousness, i.e. by knowing oneself one does not know all of one's historical and material conditions; (3) a critique of the negation of negation, i.e. the success of the proletariat will be an affirmation and not another negation; and (4) the critique of objectivity, i.e. objectivity is an alienation of subjectivity in the object.

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The Marxist philosopher recognizes that his true *Dasein* is in nature. Nature is the locus in which the man's existence is realized as ambiguous. This ambiguity is not the "bad" ambiguity of contradiction and duality in subjectivity and objectivity. This ambiguity indicates a multiplicity of meanings unified through experience in concrete situations. When object-being is alienated, consciousness has ground for action. However when consciousness is experienced as pure object-being, it loses its range of possibilities. Self-affirmation is dependent upon the recognition of one's alienated state. Alienation arises when the self responds to the will of the other, which denies the selfness of the first. This type of negativity, which Hegel called the desire of the other as it occurs in the master-slave relation, is nevertheless the ground for the possibility of self-affirmation in a concrete socio-historical context.

In Hegel, nature and man are extracted from thought (*Denken*). Hence, thinking and pure knowledge are primary. However, if reversed, if nature or man were predicated upon consciousness, the problem would still not be rectified. What is needed is a single being in which negativity can operate. This singularity, repeated in Sartre's "singular universal,"[45] has the character of ambiguity without the divisive aspects of duality and multiplicity. Marx would understand such a being to be concrete reality informed by history with signification.

Nature is transformed in the movement of history by "sensuous-practical man," that is, by a meaning-laden human *praxis* which takes on a carnal, "material" shape. While history is produced by man, it also produced him. Merleau-Ponty quotes Jean Hippolyte as claiming that "human nature will resolve itself after the resolution of historical conflict." Once we recognize that man's self-estrangement and self-consciousness are not reserved for the mind, we see that they are realized only in surpassing (*aufheben*) history. As a self-surpassing and a self-conserving process, man's true being is revealed within nature's movements. The advances and retreats of non-philosophy occur within history and nature in such a way that philosophy surrenders its autonomy in order to live as flesh in the world.

Where philosophy for Hegel was the absolute appearing in experience, that experience remained a phenomenon in thought. The presence of philosophy at work provides a place for Hegelian thinking. Non-philosophy for Hegel can, at most, be another type of negation within thought. With Marx, however, the reversal, by which philosophy becomes historical experience, *praxis*, and the concrete, is a revitalization of philosophy. This revitalization does not occur as philosophy, but rather as non-philosophy, the historical conditions of embodied human beings confronted with the realities of exchange and alienation. However, by rendering these conditions evident, philosophy is revived like a phoenix through and out of non-philosophy.

45. J. -P. Sartre, "The Singular Universal," trans. John Mathews in *Between Existentialism and Marxism* (New York: Pantheon, 1974).

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III. The Dissemination of Centrality

The reconstruction of phenomenology that accompanies Merleau-Ponty's work is based in an understanding of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. We cannot trace the full development of this reconstruction here, though its outlines can be sketched. The presence of a transcendental ego in Husserl as the condition, and source, of all intentional acts give the self and hence all philosophical reflection a well-defined central point of emanation.[46] Heidegger replaces the focus on the transcendental ego with an emphasis on the movement between Being and beings. Interpretation and the ontological difference alter the point of attention from the starting-point to the intentional relation of in-betweenness, where neither subjectivity nor objectivity prevail.[47] The Sartrian appeal to the transcendence of the ego[48] is a response to both the pure subjectivity claim and the intermediary postulate. For Sartre, what might have been called a *center* in the tradition is now regarded phenomenologically as "nothingness." If a self can be identified as such, one must look to each transcendent ego that is taken as the object of a reflective act. Such selves, however, are outside consciousness and, therefore, false versions of the self. It would be bad faith to deny them. Only the unreflected or pre-reflective *cogito* might serve as a place for the truth of the self. Yet a non-place, non-entity cannot be regarded as a center. The philosophizing self finds its identity in its projects and possibilities and in the transcendent forms of its self-expression. The latter remain, in effect, a third alternative to the Husserlian and Heideggerian conceptions.

Merleau-Ponty moves to combine all three alternatives. His reconstruction of the immediate tradition—as well as that of Nietzsche, Marx, and Hegel, whom he discusses explicitly in *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel*—is the basis for his own articulation of the self as ambiguous. Here the self is regarded as the unifying source, the intentional activity, and the worldly transcendent form of the person. Philosophy becomes experience and non-philosophy because it is the enactment of signification in operation delineating the incarnate importance of the individual in an intermundane context. Significations are gathered together as the expressive manifestations of consciousness in the self's relations with others.

This reconstruction is the basis for *praxis* and action. The philosophizing self cannot be isolated, cannot simply be interpretive understanding, and cannot be only a series of reflected beings-in-themselves. The philosophizing self must bring the consciousness of its own activity to action itself and that action must be philosophy in the style and form of non-philosophy.

Although Merleau-Ponty's elaboration of philosophy becoming experience

46. See my "The Self in Husserl's *Crisis*," *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January, 1976), pp. 24-32.

47. In "Man and the Self as Identity of Difference," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer, 1975), pp. 131-136, I develop this particular Heideggerian formulation of selfness as between subjectivity and objectivity (establishing difference), and as inclusive of both (establishing identity).

48. See J.-P. Sartre, *Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday, 1957).

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can be regarded as a useful unification of what is present in his immediate tradition, what, on the other hand, is the place of his writings in the expressions of thought that have followed in the wake of his death? We may regard the post-Merleau-Pontean expression of the movement toward "non-philosophy" as the "decentering of philosophy."

While Merleau-Ponty argues for a multiplicity of significations delineating our human experience, structuralists insist upon signs and structures. That two of Merleau-Ponty's books announce these same notions is not irrelevant. The first work, *The Structure of Behavior* (1942), refers to structures as the basis for a system of human behavior. *Signs* (1960), on the other hand, presents the signs of contemporary life at the linguistic, sociological, literary, and political level.

What is both peculiar and important in the discussion of structures and signs is expressed by the two thinkers most influential for post-Merleau-Pontean expression: Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Even though the former made his principal contribution (*The Course in General Linguistics*[49]) in the first decade of this century and the latter published his principal study (*The Elementary Structures of Kinship*[50]) in 1947, their renown predominates largely in the sixties.

For de Saussure, a sign is the combination of a signifier (word) and a signified (concept). Signification is the act or process of relating signifier to signified in relation to a value system of other signs. Such a system of signs would be a *langue*. When spoken or activated at a particular moment, *parole* is given expression. In combination, the speaking (*parole*) of a particular language (*langue*) gives rise to a system of use-signs, i.e. a *langage*. A *langage* is the manifestation of significatory signs within a system. Such a unity of multiplicity does not, however, establish a center. Any philosophical formulation that is in this way semiological will find itself proliferated throughout the system.

Similarly in structural anthropology, structures are formed by a combination of elements that are repeatable in different times and/or places. That which operates their production, whether in myth, kinship, or ritual, will not be a fixed, locatable subjectivity. Rather, the savage mind as Lévi-Strauss later calls it, will reproduce itself throughout cultural products.

These two approaches within the human sciences cannot be regarded as philosophical expression. In fact, some emphasize that structuralism is a methodology and not a philosophy. If it were to be a philosophy, it could be termed "ideology" or theory. As long as it remains a *praxis* of semiological and structural operations, its status as a decentered philosophy (what Merleau-Ponty calls "non-philosophy") can be maintained.

In the work of Saussure, Lévi-Strauss and their followers, we find a field of

50. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Elementary Structures of Kinship*, trans. James Harle Bell, John Richard von Sturmer, and Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon, 1969). Although first published in 1949, a revised edition appeared in France in 1967.

49. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, (New York, 1959).

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inquiry in common with Merleau-Ponty's interrogations. Sartre's essay on Merleau-Ponty in the special issue of *Les Temps Modernes* (1961) points to this decentered space: "He buried himself in the night of non-knowledge, in search of what he then called 'the fundamental'."[51] Sartre selects a passage from "De Mauss à Lévi-Strauss" in *Signs* to make his point. He writes: "What is of interest to the philosopher (in anthropology) is precisely that it takes man as he is, in his effective situation in life and knowledge. The philosopher interested in anthropology is not one who wants to explain or construct the world, but he who aims at inserting us more deeply into being."[52] In Merleau-Ponty's move to non-philosophy, he finds philosophy appearing in various forms of life, such as those examined by structural anthropology.

The interest in entering deeply into being is not limited to linguistics and anthropology. It also arises notably in literary criticism (Barthes), psychoanalysis (Lacan), political theory (Althusser), and the history of ideas (Foucault).

Roland Barthes distributes philosophical subjectivity throughout the surfaces of literary expression. His championing of Robbe-Grillet and other *nouveau romanciers* illustrates his orientation toward the representation of geometrical relations circumscribing the production of human acts and relations without identifying a localized human subjectivity. *The Voyeur* announces a murder.[53] We follow the expressed elements of a series of relations—an island, cigarette butts, the nape of a woman's neck, etc. Nowhere, however, do we find the establishment of a subjective perspective. Knowledge is dispersed throughout the elements of material, geometrical, geographical, interhuman relations. Events are recounted as an inventory of real consciousness distributed throughout Nature.

Barthes' own criticism also moves away from the interpretational mode. A textual reading is not an individual's personal statement of themes and images. Reading a text involves the elaboration of its semiological components: binary oppositions, myth, and structure. Writing begins and transpires at "degree zero."[54] The authorial mode remains absent. Signification is dispersed throughout the system of signs in the language (*langage*) of the novel, play, fashion, and most recently autobiography.[55] Criticism is thus articulated at the level of non-philosophy.

Sartre, in his essay on Merleau-Ponty, comments: "Savage and opaque, it is the work which retains being within its recesses. This unreason is the undertaking which will subsist in the community as its future *raison d'être*.

51. J.-P. Sartre "Merleau-Ponty" in *Situations*, trans. Benita Eister (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett, 1965), p. 211.

52. *Ibid.*

53. Alain Robbe-Grillet, *The Voyeur*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Grove, 1958).

54. See Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (Boston: Beacon, 1967).

55. For examples, see Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill & Want, 1974); *On Racine*, trans. R. Howard (New york: Hill and Wang, 1964); *Système de la mode* (Paris: Seuil, 1967); and Roland Barthes (Paris: Seghers, 1975).

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And above all, it is language, that 'fundamental,' for the Word is only Being in the heart of man thrown out to exhaust itself within *meaning*. In short, it is man, burst forth in a single spurt, transcending his presence in being, to reach towards his presence in the other, transcending the past to reach towards the future, transcending each thing and his selfness to reach towards the sign. For this reason, Merleau, towards the end of his life, was inclined to give an ever more important place to the unconscious. He must have agreed with Lacan's formula: 'The unconscious is structured like a language'."[56] Merleau-Ponty's language of silence may well be a form of the unconscious. For Lacan, however, the Freudian unconscious is not entirely silent—it is revealed as a chain of signifiers. Freudian "condensation" and "displacement" are forms of metaphor and metonymy. The language of the self is once again dispersed throughout produced forms.

Since the psychoanalyst is limited to what the patient says, the analyst must attend to the letter and word in speech. The unconscious expresses itself in many ways. The signifying chain is dispersed such that meaning *insists* in the chain of the signifier but none of its elements *consists* in the meaning of which it is capable at a particular moment.[57] The self does not dispense meanings conscious or unconscious. Rather it maintains an "ex-centricity" that has no nucleus, only symptoms of other realms of self-expression.

Similarly in political theory, philosophy enters into the lives of human individuals in their concrete situations. Theory does not stand apart from practice. Althusser's term "theoretical practice" will show that philosophy can live, but not as separate, "high altitude" thinking. Philosophy must enter the fray. The practice of theory must itself be non-philosophy, i.e. philosophy that has become experience and action. "Theoretical practice falls within the general definition of practice. It works on a raw material (representations, concepts, facts) which it is given by other practices, whether 'empirical,' 'technical,' or 'ideological.' In its most general form theoretical practice does not only include *scientific* theoretical practice, but also pre-scientific theoretical practice, that is, 'ideological' theoretical practice..."[58] Non-philosophy is not the refusal to think, to write, to uncover the bases of social elements of knowledge. Yet it cannot at the same time ignore concrete human concerns in their "empirical," "technical," and "ideological" forms. Theoretical practice is both the practice of theory and the theory of practice. Is this position not in effect what Sartre attributes to his fellow editor of *Les Temps Modernes*? "Merleau's commentaries on politics are only a political experience in the process of becoming, by itself and in every sense of the word, the *subject* of mediation. If writings are acts, we can say that he acted in order to appropriate his action and to find himself in depth."[59] The self that he

56. Sartre, "Merleau-Ponty," p. 211.
57. See Jacques Lacan, "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious," in *The Structuralists*, ed. Richard and Fernande De George (New York: Anchor, 1972), pp. 287-323.
58. Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 167.
59. Sartre, "Merleau-Ponty," p. 209.

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sought was not a transcendental self, —nor, for that matter, a transcendent ego. His writings were a theoretical practice which also created self-expression.

The fourth area in which Merleau-Ponty's legacy achieves relevance is in the history of ideas, or what Foucault calls the history of systems of thought.[60] Uncovering the *epistemé* of a particular set of structures, forming a system on a synchronic plane, is once again not the building of systems of ideas. Rather it reveals the presence of the absolute within human experience. "Ressemblance" for the Renaissance, "representation" for the classical age, and "man" for the modern *epistemé* are forms of the dispersal of knowledge. Yet they are also evidence of the underlying unity of knowledge, that is, knowledge experienced as a structure.

We do not live at a particular time in relation to the discrete development of some particular idea, concept, or scheme. We live in an inter-contextualized set of contemporaneous relations. Biology, linguistics, and economics, although separate realms of investigation, all carry on their work at the same time. They also affect one another because of the types of knowledge that are produced due to interrelated conditions. The task of philosophy is not to simply explain what is, it must enter into knowledge of life, language, and labor. If it remains aloof, it will fail, if it participates in the experience of the world it will negate itself. But this latter path, though the hardest of the two, is nevertheless the vocation of philosophy. In this respect, philosophy becomes archeology, i.e. both semiology and hermeneutics: the presentation of systems of signs and the interpretation of those signs as they appear in their contexts.

Merleau-Ponty's unspoken presence also permeates post-structuralist activity. Dominant directions, particularly in France, continue in Merleau-Pontean fashion. We cannot even claim that the non-philosopher has been forgotten, —like negative theology, his presence appears everywhere but is identified nowhere.

The blossoming of Jacques Derrida in 1967 announced grammatology as the study of the written unit.[61] Writing elaborates speech by an exteriority. Meaning and signification do not arise out of an act, rather they arise throughout the appearance of writing. Writing is the visibility that Merleau-Ponty appealed to in the speaking spoken and the spoken speech which appears in a painting, in an event, or in the expression of thought. The closing (*clôture*) of the *epistemé* is the insertion of speech and voice within verbal language (*langage*). The *grammé* is throughout a later Heideggerian presence of that which is present (a visibility of the visible). By claiming that the distinction between *difference* and *differance* is available only in

60. See Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, trans. anon. (New York: Vintage, 1970), and *The Archaelogy of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972).

61. In 1967, Jacques Derrida published three books: *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern Univrsity Press, 1973); *L'Ecriture et la différence* (Paris: Seuil, 1967); and *De la Grammatologie* (Paris: Minuit, 1967).

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writing,[62] (in spoken language the "a" is not heard), Derrida points to "traces" of a linguistic experience.

These "traces" are an index of decentered subjectivity. The self *is* only in the *logos* of *grammé*, just as with Merleau-Ponty the speaking subject appears as absolute only in experience—an experience arising contemporaneously with the presence of the phenomenon. As philosophy becomes this experience, its form, as we have seen, is that of non-philosophy. For Derrida, as the absence of a reference to the subject becomes evident, signification operates within the free play of differentiation between signifier and signified.[63] Meaning is disseminated[64] throughout writing—specifically, the presence of writing—the voice of silence and the silence of voice.

For Lyotard, once author of a *Que Sais-je?* volume on phenomenology,[65] the translation of intentionality into libidinal desire plays a Merleau-Pontean refrain. With Lyotard, figural expression is sent out in various directions at the level of discourse. Desire meets the painting or the text at a moment perpendicular to its formalization.[66] The field in which discourse is present indicates the place of human desire, the place in which the libidinal is at work. This unification of Freudian singularity and Marxist collectivity at the point of intersection in art is philosophy-become-text.[67] The textual presence of the unconscious, however, is also theoretical work (*travail*) announcing itself as work (*oeuvre*) of art.

Similarly all magisterial discourse has as its goal the assertion of mastery over an audience.[68] In seeking to gain the confidence of his students, the sophist entered into the art of persuasion. Persuasion became the expression of the master's desire over the language of the student. The student in speaking for himself would in fact be dispensing the desire of the other—the student's language could only be a repetition, extension, and multiplication of a discourse that belongs to his teacher and is therefore not his own. Merleau-Ponty had already noted that with non-philosophy an autonomous subjectivity does not speak. What he found in Hegel and Marx was the

62. See particularly "Differance" in *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 129-160. This essay was originally published in 1968 as vol. LXII of the *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie* after having been read before that society. The significance of its oral exposition is internal to the understanding of the distinction between "differance" and "difference."

63. See Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," *The Structuralist Controversy*, ed. Eugenio Donato and Richard Macksey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970).

64. See Derrida, *La Dissémination* (Paris: Seuil, 1972). The *semé* as unit of meaning is dispersed throughout writing.

65. Jean-François Lyotard, *La Phénomenologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1954).

66. See Lyotard, *Discours, figure*. (Paris: Klineksiech, 1971).

67. See Lyotard, *Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud*. (Paris: Union Générale de l'Edition, 1973) and *Economie libidinale* (Paris: Minuit, 1974).

68. Reference is made here to Lyotard's "magisterial" lecture for the "Schizo-Culture" *Semio-text(e)* Conference held at Columbia University (Fall 1975). The experimentalization of translation methods used in the course of the lecture illustrated not only the proliferation of "desire," but also the repetition of the discourse of the other—in this case, Lyotard's.

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corporeal expression of philosophy no longer identifying itself as such. The study of magisterial discourse is the presence of the very same language. The discourse that seeks to negate that of the master takes the place of the master as in the Freudian desire for paternal replacement. Non-philosophy becomes the child and parent of philosophy.

Difference, repetition, dissemination—these are the indices of Merleau-Ponty's legacy. His unspoken presence permeates these formulations of current thought. Their presence in Deleuze's writing once again signals that the empire of signs is at work delineating the contemporary *epistemé*. Just as Deleuze sees Proust embroiled in the intricate construction of a spider's web, one would be hard put to find the place of an individual subjectivity at the center of French thought. The spider continues to weave—Marcel, the character, becomes, in the end, at the point of recovering lost time, the author of the narrative that sought the fulfillment of its temporal teleology. When the ends meet, one cannot say that a point is established. Rather, like the rhizome, growth extends outward forming a network. The end point is as undiscoverable as the starting place. Yet the web, the network, the text are non-philosophy philosophizing.

Deleuze's books on Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, and Bergson are evidence of a passing-through-philosophy.[69] Yet the return which interrogates Sacher Masoch, Proust, Lewis Carroll, Freud-Marx, and Kafka[70] is the refusal to present philosophy in a hierarchical, geneological, linear fashion. The Merleau-Pontean flesh of the world is, in Deleuze, the transmission of the absolute at the level of textual experience.

The texture of the world becoming an interpretation of human activity and consciousness becoming carnal presence could not avoid articulation in the writing of those who developed along with Merleau-Ponty. We can only mention Ricoeur's hermeneutic, Dufrenne's aesthetic, Lévinas' metaphysic, and, of course, Sartre's dialectic, which extend the tradition that would have continued to speak.

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is not non-philosophy in the sense of a lost philosophy. Its presence is prolonged despite his absence. The absence of a living subjectivity is not the absence of a lived philosophical adventure.

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69. See Gilles Deleuze, *Empirisme et subjectivity* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953); *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression* (Paris: Minuit, 1969); *La Philosophie critique de Kant* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1966).

70. See Deleuze, *Présentation de Sacher-Masoch* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1967); *Logique du sens* (Paris: Minuit, 1969); *L'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrenie*, with Félix Guattari (Paris: Minuit, 1972); and *Kafka*, with Guattari (Paris: Minuit, 1975).

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MARXISM AND TRUTH

by Fred R. Dallmayr

Together with other political frameworks or orientations, Marxism lives today largely at the outskirts of knowledge. In a sense its marginal position can be traced to an excess of efficiency: to its success in unmasking and demolishing political doctrines and blueprints. Leveled into the kaleidoscope of available "ideologies," Marxism (at least in Western eyes) tends to be reduced to the status of a blind impulse or idiosyncratic preference; attachment to its premises, consequently, appears as a manifestation either of ignorance—the operation of hidden motives—or of private whim. The only means in this situation of extricating Marxist thought from the tentacles of hazard and fancy seems to reside in a return to its "scientific" aspirations, to its ambition not only to imagine "alternative futures" but to investigate and present an account of social reality. Unfortunately, given contemporary standards of empirical research, the revival of such aspirations offers at best a precarious refuge. In view of the discrepancies between Marxist forecasts and developments both in "post-industrial" societies and in third world countries, the propagation of Marxism as rigorous science seems to strain its explanatory and predictive capacities and to be equivalent to dogmatism. Moreover, even if feasible and warranted, the identification of Marxism and empirical science would presumably be purchased at the price of political impotence—given the insistence of scientists on the disjunction between research and commitment. Construed either as ideology or empirical analysis, Marxism's condition reflects the present atrophy of "public knowledge," the absence of a fund of shared experience and reflection pertinent to the public domain.[1]

As has been indicated, Marxism is not entirely innocent of its present predicament; in fact marginality has not simply befallen it as a *vis a tergo*. For almost a century, Marxist orthodoxy has presented itself in the garb of positive science—differentiating itself from positivism by an insistence on the "material" character of empirical reality and on the determining impact of economic factors in human history. Trends in this direction were initiated already by the founders of the movement. Due to his division of labor with Engels, Marx during the later period of his life refrained from elaborating in detail on epistemological issues; his sporadic comments as well as Engels' more profuse observations aimed chiefly at repulsing idealist challenges rather than at clarifying the cognitive status of their assertions. Epistemological postures hardened among their followers—owing largely to the triumphant rise of positivism in all disciplines and the resulting need for

1. Compare in this context John M. Ziman, *Public Knowledge: The Social Dimension of Science* (Cambridge, 1968); also Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1962).

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Marxists to buttress their intellectual credibility. With growing intensity, leading spokesmen of the Second and Third International espoused a platform of "materialism" or materialist objectivism according to which reality (interpreted as matter) exists outside and independently of man and knowledge constitutes a reflection or replica of external impressions in the mind. To be sure, the materialist creed was not uniformly embraced in the Marxist camp. Noticing the incongruence between revolutionary aspirations and the passive receptivity enjoined by official epistemology, dissidents from early times sought to invigorate Marxism through infusions of Kantian moralism or Nietzschean activism—infusions which only underscored the common dilemma of positivism and Marxist orthodoxy: the widening rift between knowledge and experience, theory and praxis. Efforts to combat this rift, undertaken by Hegelian Marxists, commonly were marred by idealist overtones and the traditional reluctance of Hegelians to articulate the basis of knowledge claims.[2]

While not blameless regarding its present ills, Marxist thought is by no means devoid of internal remedies or antidotes. As it seems to me, a central antidote or guidepost for reorientation can be found in Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*, written after his break with idealism but before his turn to political economy. "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included," the opening section of the *Theses* asserts, "is that the thing, reality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of an *object* or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity, practice,* not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since of course idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such." After thus delineating a perspective pointing beyond both idealism and conventional materialism, Marx in the second *Thesis* addresses himself to the central criterion of knowledge. "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking," he observes, "is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking."[3] The basic argument of the present paper is that Marxism in the past has largely contented itself with reiterating traditional perspectives (mentioned in the first *Thesis*) and that only recent decades have witnessed attempts to develop the epistemological implications of Marx's statements. In order to illustrate and substantiate this argument, the paper focuses on a number of leading Marxist writers on epistemological questions in our century. While a first portion sketches the heritage of orthodox materialism from Lenin to the present, a second part

2. For an overview of historical developments compare George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (2nd rev. ed., New York, 1965), esp. pp. 203-351; George L. Kline, "Leszek Kolakowski and the Revision of Marxism," in Kline, ed., *European Philosophy Today* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), pp. 113-163, esp. pp. 127-140; and Lucien Goldmann, "Gibt es eine marxistische Soziologie?" in *Dialektische Untersuchungen* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1966), pp. 213-238.

3. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume* (New York, 1968), p. 28.

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reviews the proposals of prominent nonconformists intent on reconstructing Marxism on the cornerstones of intentional activity and conscious design. A concluding section reviews recent endeavors to articulate a concrete dialectics of everyday life and an epistemology of lived experience reminiscent of Marx's concern with "human sensuous activity."

1. *The Legacy of Materialist Objectivism*

That external matter is the source of all knowledge has been repeatedly professed by Marxists, but never more authoritatively than in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Compared with similar statements on the topic. Lenin's treatise has the advantage of being a forthright and more or less unambiguous exposition of official doctrine; moreover, his study has had a profound impact on the Marxist movement, to the point where some of its propositions have assumed the status of common sense opinions no longer consciously tied to Lenin's authorship. The extent to which Lenin relied on conventional epistemological alternatives is evident already from the introduction in which Marxism's struggle with its opponents was compared with the conflict between Berkeleian idealism and traditional materialism. Referring to the *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (of 1710), Lenin noted that Berkeley identified cognition with sensation and with the ideas connected with sensation while rejecting "the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind." According to the Bolshevik leader, this attitude was illustrative of a basic gulf and perennial dividing line in the history of human thought: "The two fundamental lines of philosophical outlook are here depicted with the straightforwardness, clarity and precision that distinguish the classical philosophers from the inventors of 'new' systems in our day. Materialism is the cognition of 'objects in themselves,' or outside the mind; ideas and sensations are copies or images of those objects. The opposite doctrine (idealism) claims that objects do not exist 'without the mind;' objects are 'combinations of sensations'." The same dividing line, in Lenin's view, was recognized in Engels' work on *Ludwig Feuerbach* where the central distinction between the "two great camps" was seen in the fact "that while for the materialists nature is primary and spirit secondary, for the idealists the reverse is the case."[4]

As presented in Lenin's study, the opposition of the two camps seemed clear-cut and irremediable—although at a closer look the dividing line was bound to appear highly elusive and problematical. For, how was it possible to claim knowledge of objects outside the mind and even "outside human knowledge"—without transforming cognition into an act of faith and materialist epistemology into "fideism" (a term frequently used by Lenin as a synonym for idealism)? More specifically, even granting the existence of external objects, what entitled materialists to describe such objects as "matter"—rather than as ideal substances, as traditional realists had

4. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (New York, 1927), pp. 17, 24. As Lenin added, Engels places in between these two camps "the adherents of Hume and Kant, who deny the possibility of knowing the world, or at least of knowing it fully, and calls them *agnostics*."

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customarily done? Was such a description not predicated surreptitiously on human cognitive endowments and, in particular, on the premise that man's sensory apparatus allowed access only to tangible or material entities (rather than spiritual phenomena)? Unperturbed by such quandaries, Lenin in subsequent chapters of his book confronted the "materialist" epistemology of Marxism with the "empirio-criticism" of Mach and Avenarius. While empirio-criticists treated things or bodies as complexes of sensations, "philosophical materialism" endorsed the opposite theory that sensations are "images or reflections of things." To buttress the latter view, Lenin appealed again to the testimony of Engels: "Anybody who reads *Anti-Dühring* and *Ludwig Feuerbach* with the slightest care will find scores of instances when Engels speaks of things and their reflections in the human brain, in our consciousness, thought, etc." The basic question was whether one proceeded "from things to sensation and thought" or rather "from thought and sensation to things." The first approach was the "materialist line" adopted by Engels, while the second was characteristic of idealism and subjectivism: "No evasions, no sophisms (a multitude of which we shall yet encounter) can remove the clear and indisputable fact that Ernst Mach's doctrine of things as complexes of sensations is subjective idealism and a simple rehash of Berkeleianism. If bodies are 'complexes of sensations,' as Mach says, or 'combinations of sensations,' as Berkeley said, it inevitably follows that the whole world is but my idea."

As Lenin tried to show, materialism was vouchsafed not only by Engels' teachings, but also by common sense and by the authority of modern science. Ordinary common sense, he argued, dictated an attitude of "naive realism" and this attitude—embraced by "any healthy person who has not been an inmate of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the idealist philosophers"—implied the view "that things, the environment, the world, exist *independently* of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our *self* and of man in general." The same experience which in everyday encounters demonstrated the existence of other people produced also "the conviction that things, the world, the environment exist independently of us." In a more elaborate or rigorous form this conviction functioned as cornerstone of scientific inquiry; in fact, materialism provided the theory of knowledge "to which the overwhelming majority of contemporary scientists instinctively holds," especially in the domains of physiology and biology. "For every scientist," Lenin wrote, "who has not been led astray by professional philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensation is indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world: it is the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness." Scientific evidence and materialism were thus inextricably linked. With regard to visual perception, for example, natural science "explains the sensations of various colors by the various lengths of light-waves existing outside the human retina, outside man and independently of him. This is materialism: matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation. Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., that is, on matter organized in a definite way." While matter was recog-

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nized as "primary" and as independent of sensation, "sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organized in a particular way."[5]

Apart from stressing the external, material source of knowledge, Lenin's study also contained forceful observations on the issues of objectivity, truth, and the relationship between cognition and human practice. Regarding truth, he referred explicitly to Marx's assertions in the second *Thesis on Feuerbach* that the problem "whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking" is not a theoretical but a practical question and that the "truth" or "this-sidedness" of man's thinking must be proved "in practice"—statements which, at a first glance, seem difficult to reconcile with a passive and purely receptive epistemology. Attacking some Machians who had tried to use the passage for their own purposes, Lenin called it "ignorance" and "infinite slovenliness" to "skip the *very first* phrase of the Thesis and not to realize that the 'objective truth' of thinking *means nothing else* than the *existence* of objects (i.e., 'things-in-themselves') *truly* reflected by thinking." Likewise, it was "sheer illiteracy" to interpret the notion of "this-sidedness" as if Marx ignored the "other-sidedness" of cognition—since only idealists or agnostics limited thought to "this side of phenomena" and denied the reality of "objects-in-themselves." The same canons of materialist epistemology also provided the key to Marx's emphasis on practice or on human "activity" (to use the term of the first *Thesis*). In this respect, Lenin cited with approval the commentary of a French writer who noted that Marx's meaning was "the following: just as to our ideas there correspond real objects outside us, so to our phenomenal activity there corresponds a real activity outside us, an activity of things. In this sense humanity partakes of the absolute, not only through theoretical knowledge but also through practical activity." The expression "humanity partakes of the absolute"—Lenin paraphrased—signified that "human knowledge reflects absolute truth," just as "the practice of humanity, by verifying our ideas, corroborates what in these ideas corresponds to absolute truth."

The dependence of thought on objective reality, according to Lenin, implied a standard of empirical objectivity and absolute truth; but acceptance of this standard did not necessarily preclude experimentation and the slow transformation of partial or relative insights into full knowledge. A "fundamental tenet of materialism," he insisted, was "the existence of the thing reflected independent of the reflector (the independence of the external world from the mind);" thus, "the assertion made by science that the earth existed prior to man is an objective truth." A consistent materialist was bound "to acknowledge objective truth which is revealed to us by our sense-organs" without being "dependent upon man and mankind." Yet, materialism also

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34, 43-44, 48, 63. In another context (p. 38) Lenin elaborates: "Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, thought and sensation as secondary, because in its well-defined form sensation is associated only with the higher forms of matter (organic matter), while 'in the foundation of the structure of matter' one can only surmise the existence of a faculty akin to sensation."

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required recognition of the historical process of approximation; in other words, it was necessary "to put and answer the question of the relation between absolute and relative truth dialectically." This aspect was amply illustrated in the context of scientific research: "Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge." Accordingly, materialist epistemology had to endorse simultaneously the standard of absolute truth and the notion of historical limitations: "From the standpoint of modern materialism, i.e., Marxism, the *limits* of approximation of our knowledge to the objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is *unconditional*, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional." It was within this framework that the concept of "practice" also acquired its proper significance, since it referred basically to scientific experimentation. Contrary to a shallow pragmatism tying truth to individual utility, materialist activity was subject to empirical tests. While "for the materialist the 'success' of human practice proves the correspondence between our ideas and the objective nature of the things we perceive," pragmatic individualism equated success with "everything needed *by me in practice*." To be sure, experimentation—like cognition itself—involved detours and a process of trial and error; but the criteria of practice was "sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless fight on all varieties of idealism and agnosticism. If what our practice confirms is the sole, ultimate and objective truth, then from this must follow the recognition that the only path to this truth is the path of science, which holds the materialist point of view." [6]

Since its publication, the arguments expressed in Lenin's study have played a crucial and ubiquitous role in Marxist epistemological discussions. It would be time-consuming (as well as somewhat tedious) to retrace this entire chapter in the history of ideas; for present purposes I shall concentrate on comparatively recent statements of Marxist thinkers. A good illustration of the Leninist heritage is the writing of the Polish Philosopher Adam Schaff—although it is true that, over the years, his views have undergone subtle modifications (generally in the direction of greater flexibility and of a lessening of doctrinaire intransigence). In a militant fashion, materialist orthodoxy was expounded in an article of 1959, entitled "Studies of the Young Marx." The article was prompted by the growing infatuation of existentialists—including existentialist "revisionists" in Poland—with the presumed "humanism" evident in Marx's early writings, in contradistinction to the analytical outlook of the later works on political economy. The immediate target of the essay was a paper published by Schaff's compatriot, Leszek Kolakowski, on the epistemological tenets of the young Marx. In Schaff's presentation,

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-103, 121, 131, 133-135, 139, 142. "The sole conclusion," Lenin added (p. 142), "to be drawn from the opinion of the Marxists that Marx's theory is an objective truth is that by following the *path* of Marxian theory we shall draw closer and closer to objective truth (without ever exhausting it); but by following *any other path* we shall arrive at nothing but confusion and lies."

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Kolakowski's paper advanced two main theses: first, that the theory of knowledge presumably found in the *Manuscripts* constitutes "Marx's real epistemology;" and secondly, "that Marx's epistemological views are opposed to those of Engels and Lenin." Both theses, in Schaff's opinion, were "utterly false," since Marx's early writings had to be interpreted "in the light of his evolution, which becomes visible from the heights of his maturity," and since, seen in this perspective, Marx's epistemology was never at odds with that of Engels or Lenin. Even if, for the sake of argument, one granted that the youthful Marx embraced the notions ascribed to him by Kolakowski, the mature Marx clearly held different views: "If the 'embryo' of 1844 really were incompatible with mature Marxism, then it would not be the real embryo of Marxist epistemology but a potential embryo, later rejected."

Regarding Marx's actual theory of knowledge, Schaff vigorously defended the "two camps" doctrine. Epistemology, he observed, was above all concerned with the question: "When is our knowledge true and what do we mean by such a statement?" Answers to this question followed "one of two main lines." According to the first, "the truth of knowledge depends on its agreement with a reality existing independently of ourselves. Materialists subscribe to this classical theory of truth." According to the second answer, "true knowledge occurs when it corresponds to certain norms or principles which we accept." Exemplified in "the theory of coherence, theory of evidence, theory of general agreement, theory of utility (first version of pragmatism), and the theory of the economy of thought," this approach was "non-classical" and "accepted by the idealistic schools of philosophy." While in the materialist outlook truth "consists in the agreement of knowledge with objective reality which is reflected by consciousness," subjective idealism equated it with "the agreement of knowledge with rules dictated by consciousness." Epistemological postures, according to Schaff, were equally compact and irreconcilable as class interests: "The position of a philosopher on the problem of truth provides a simple test to ascertain his position in the struggle between materialism and idealism—even if like the neo-positivists he proclaims himself neutral." Marx's mature formulations (and at least incipiently his early opinions) were "expressly based on the materialist theory of reflection, and so on the classical theory of truth," while Kolakowski made an "obviously strained attempt" to push the young Marx into the idealist camp by linking his outlook with pragmatic activism and even with Bergsonian notions of spontaneous creativity.

As Schaff noted, Kolakowski's exegesis—or rather his "crazy construction"—was predicated not only on the *Manuscripts* but also on the *Theses on Feuerbach*, and especially on the epistemological relevance of human "practice." Viewed in the broader context of materialist epistemology, however, the *Theses* gave rise to two distinct but related issues: namely, "whether the object which we know exists objectively, i.e., independently of all consciousness," and "whether and to what extent knowledge which reflects objective reality is connected with man's practical activity." Regarding the former issue, materialists of every persuasion acknowledged "not only the

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objective but also the material existence of the object of which we have cognition." Concerning the second point, Marx "unlike mechanistic materialists and unlike Feuerbach" recognized "the active aspects of human consciousness, and the practical activity of man engaged in transforming nature as a basic category in his theory of knowledge." Yet, this recognition was entirely free of idealistic overtones, since "practice" was meant in a "thoroughly materialistic" vein as a synonym for the experimental or operational approach of human inquiry toward truth. Anyone who, like Kolakowski, injected the term with pragmatist or Bergsonian overtones, "simply does not understand what he has read in the young Marx." The reference, in the *Theses*, to a practical and thus "subjective" element in the process of cognition was not designed to undermine the Marxist attachment to objectivity and external reality: "When we speak of 'absolutely independent' reality or of being 'in itself' we do so in a very definite sense: we are concerned to underline the materialistic thesis that reality is not the creation of consciousness, but exists independently of and outside it. From the assertion that a subjective factor affects our knowledge it does not follow that the object which we know is a subjective creation."[7]

In a more subdued form, materialist objectivism re-emerged in one of Schaff's late writings, entitled *History and Truth*. Although chiefly concerned with questions of historiography, the study contained a chapter devoted to a discussion of general "epistemological premises." Instead of the simple bifurcation between materialism and idealism, Schaff now articulated three basic models of cognition—with each model involving a different linkage between subject and object. The first model was represented by the "mechanistic theory of reflection" according to which the subject or observer is a purely passive receptacle of external stimuli and knowledge consists in the precise rendition or mirroring of objects. The model could be termed "classical," both because of its roots in antiquity and because of its connection with the so-called "classical definition of truth." In the second conception—which could be described as "idealist-activist" model—external reality was almost completely obliterated and the subject installed as inventor or creator of the objects of knowledge. In contrast to the respective predominance of subject or object, the third model emphasized the interrelation and reciprocal influence of the two sides of cognition, accepting both elements as integral parts of reality. According to Schaff, this "activist" version of the theory of reflection was the only epistemology congruent with Marxism—although Marxist statements in the past may on occasion have lacked sophistication and endorsed the "mechanistic" outlook. From a Marxist perspective, the first model coincided with traditional materialism whose contemplative character had been castigated in the first *Thesis on Feuerbach*, while the second alternative illustrated the virtues and defects of conventional idealism. Briefly put,

7. Adam Schaff, "Studies of the Young Marx: A Rejoinder," in Leopold Labedz, ed., *Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas* (New York, 1962), pp. 190-194.

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Marxism diverged from competing postures through its different anthropology—the conception of man not as an isolated individual but as an "ensemble of social relations"—and through its stress on "practice" or human participation in the cognitive process. Both aspects converged in the focus on language and on the role of conceptual arsenals in the search for knowledge. To take the example of photography: the replication of reality was not merely the result of external stimuli but also of the instrumental qualities of the camera.

To some extent, Schaff's new typology reflected the influence (or paralleled the arguments) of logical empiricism and analytical philosophy with their emphasis on conceptual frameworks and heuristic "paradigms" as prerequisites of empirical analysis; yet, the contours of the "two camps" legacy were still readily visible behind the reformulation. Despite the rejection of passive receptivity, Marxist epistemology was at best a variant of traditional materialism, while "practice" conceived as the development of cognitive schemes reinforced the experimental character of inquiry in conformity with postulates of contemporary scientific methods. As Schaff insisted, the Marxist model maintained the basic tenet of an external reality, since for materialists there was "no doubt that the object of cognition which stimulates the sense impressions of the observer has an objective existence outside and independent of the knowing mind." Regardless of differences in detail, the mechanical and the "objective-activist" perspectives could both be interpreted as "mirror" theories of knowledge and Marxism—like mechanical materialism—was firmly committed to the "classical definition of truth" and thus to the formulation not only of conditional or contingent but of unconditionally and absolutely true propositions. The main distinction between the mechanical and Marxist types of materialism concerned the experimental and cumulative character of inquiry: while the former conception regarded cognition as a "finished act," the latter viewed it as an "infinite process." A similar distinction applied to the products of cognition: while "naive realism" conceived these products as copies or mirror images, "critical realism" treated knowledge as a result of a mental reconstruction of reality. Differences of this kind also prompted Marxists to accept the distinction between partial and complete knowledge or truth (a distinction which was by no means synonymous with the dichotomy between absolutism and relativism). "The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding arguments," Schaff noted, "is that cognition and truth itself have the character of a process." This character derived not only from the cognitive enterprise but also from the complexity of the universe; for, "both reality as a whole and its component parts are infinite, as regards the quantity of their correlations and their changes over time." Although a gradual approximation, however, inquiry in the end arrived at unqualified knowledge: "By accumulating partial truths, cognition accumulates knowledge and moves in an infinite process toward the goal of complete exhaustive and absolute truth."[8]

8. Schaff, *Geschichte und Wahrheit* (Vienna, 1970), pp. 59-65, 67-71, 76-81. As it seems to

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To round out the discussion of materialist objectivism I would like to draw attention briefly to two other prominent, albeit divergent, Marxists in our century: Georg Lukács and Louis Althusser. In the case of Lukács, some of the later works betray an epistemological outlook which in many respects resembles Schaff's third model. To be sure, Lukács' thinking is far too rich and multifaceted to permit easy summary. His early essays, collected in *History and Class Consciousness*, signalled a dramatic attempt to reconcile Marxism with Hegelian dialectics—although the effort was marred by a tendency to leap into ready-made and purely speculative syntheses. Following a phase of materialist orthodoxy which coincided largely with his stay in the Soviet Union, Lukacs moved progressively toward a position of "critical realism"—a position submerging Hegel's legacy in concrete experience while stripping it of the pretensions of a finished history and a finished logical system. Blended with other ingredients, this perspective is clearly evident in his pothumously published *Ontology of Social Life*. After discussing contemporary philosophical predicaments in the domains of epistemology and ontology, the study delineates the contours of a realist (or non-idealist) dialectics, by focusing on the basic intent of Hegel's thought underneath his elaborate conceptual edifice. According to Lukács, Hegel's crucial insight consisted in his grasp of the "process character" of reality and in his stress of dynamic "totality" as a motor of historical development, in contrast to the traditional concern with static substances. Moving beyond Kantian antinomies, he perceived the universe as a "total ensemble composed of relative-total wholes" and located the core of dialectical change in the "real genesis, unfolding, interrelation and synthesis of such wholes." Contrary to Hegel's idealist formulations, however, dialectical process has to be seen not as a conceptual category but as a concrete event—since far from being a mental construction, the universe is the basis of thought and mind, a reflection or reality. In the modern age, only materialism has upheld the "mimetic" quality of thought—though construing reflection in a narrow "mechanical" vein. The epistemological task of contemporary Marxism, against this background, is to articulate and develop the notion of a "dialectical mimesis" recognizing the priority of ontology over thought—a notion adumbrated in embryonic form not only in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* but also in Aristotle's philosophical realism.[9]

In Althusser's approach, the focus on dynamic totality is replaced by the logically and scientifically more ambitious (but historically more opaque) conception of "structure." Like other structuralists and in agreement with Schaff, Althusser emphasizes the mediating role of models and conceptual

me, Schaff's perspective has a close affinity with the position championed by Karl R. Popper and his followers, as illustrated in Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York, 1959), or his *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford, 1972).

9. Georg Lukács, *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1971), pp. 75-82, 89-90. (This book is a chapter out of the larger *Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins* whose publication is pending.)

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frameworks; the function of such models, however, is not to provide an idealist or ideological camouflage, but rather to serve as gateways for the steadily more rigorous analysis and explanation of reality. In *For Marx*, cognition or the acquisition of knowledge is presented as the progressive movement from common sense opinions or ideological preconceptions toward scientifically tested and valid propositions. Scientific inquiry, according to Althusser, never involves the direct inspection of empirical data; rather science "always works on existing concepts" or *Vorstellungen*, commonly of an ideological nature. These concepts, called "Generality I," constitute the basic raw material which scientific research—performed in accordance with the prevailing theoretical paradigm or "Generality II"—transforms into "specified concepts" or into "that other 'concrete' generality" which is real knowledge ("Generality III"). The process of transformation, and especially the scientific research enterprise, is described by Althusser as "theoretical practice"—a notion which, in his view, captures the thrust of the second *Thesis on Feuerbach*. Although tied to conceptual categories, scientific inquiry ultimately seeks to reflect the real world outside mental constructions, but it can do so only through its indirect procedures and operations. The pursuit of knowledge, he notes, proceeds "wholly in the theoretical practice" and while it does refer to concrete reality, "this concrete real 'survives in its independence after as before, outside thought' (Marx), without it ever being possible to confuse it with that other 'concrete' which is the knowledge of it." Despite the need for conceptual mediation, however, the nexus between thought and reality persists and is challenged only by agnostic ideologies, while scientific practice proceeds on the basis of the "non-problematicity" of the relation between knowledge and its objects.[10]

2. *Knowledge as Intentional Design*

Orthodox epistemology, with its stress on the reflection of external reality, has never enjoyed uncontested sway in Marxist ranks. After the flurry of Kantian and Nietzschean insurrections (noted earlier), the counter-offensive in recent decades has been fomented chiefly by existentialism and phenomenology—and especially by spokesmen extolling human imagination and initiative over the constraints of an external determinism. As a philosophical and political doctrine, materialism has never been more rigorously challenged and battered than in Sartre's postwar essay on "Materialism and Revolution," written at the time of his gradual turn toward Marxism. That the doctrine would prove a stumbling block was hardly surprising, given Sartre's philosophical background. Under the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, his early writings had accorded a central or foundational role to consciousness both in the fields of theory and of human action. Radicalizing Husserl's insights and blending them with elements of Hegelian dialectics, *Being and Nothingness* presented conscious awareness as a completely transparent and self-propelled force able to negate or transcend all empirical

10. Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 1970), pp. 167, 182-186.

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impulses and restrictions. When, under the impact of wartime experiences, social and political issues began to compete with and partially replace pure phenomenological inspection, serious philosophical quandaries were bound to arise; the reorientation was additionally complicated by the doctrinaire and intransigent character of the French political context. A bulwark of Stalinism for some time, the communist movement in France tended to be a staunch guardian of orthodox beliefs and official pronouncements. In the field of epistemology, communist intellectuals were eloquent in championing the materialist theory of reflection and in denouncing ideological deviations and nonconformist views. [11]

The essay "Materialism and Revolution" opened with a frontal attack on the "two camps" legacy. Commenting on the plight of the postwar generation which—though attracted to Marxism—found the notion of materialism baffling or repulsive, Sartre argued that "it is not their fault if the very people who at present invoke the dialectic wish to force them to choose between two opposites and reject, with the contemptuous name of 'Third Party,' the synthesis which embraces them." In order to ease this plight and to remove the obstacles to revolutionary commitment, Sartre proceeded to debunk official ideology as a myth or metaphysical tenet. Since materialism, in successive steps, denied "the existence of God and transcendent finality," reduced "the action of mind to that of matter," and finally eliminated "subjectivity by reducing the world, and man in it, to a system of objects linked together by universal relationships," he concluded "in all good faith that is a metaphyusical doctrine and that materialists are metaphysicians." The espoused mythology, moreover, was badly confused and self-contradictory. In focusing upon matter, materialism seemingly joined the positivist camp with its restriction of knowledge to empirically verifiable propositions; but positivists regularly disclaimed insight into the nature of the world. By proclaiming matter as the core of the universe and by treating mind or thought as a material product or effect, official ideology obviously took "an *a priori* stand on a problem which infinitely transcends our experience." Like idealism, materialist orthodoxy thus grounded itself on first principles and its assurance could come "only from intuition or *a priori* reasoning." In Sartre's view, materialism was "a metaphysics hiding behind positivism;" moreover, it was "a self-destructive metaphysics, for by undermining metaphysics out of principle, it deprives its own statements of any foundation."

The same conflict or contradiction was evident in the vaunted objectivity and epistemological realism of the materialist faith. By rejecting idealist speculation and subjectivism, the materialist claims that he has exorcised subjectivity itself; but the manoeuver is deceptive and easy to unmask: "In *order* to eliminate subjectivity, the materialist declares that he is an *object*, that is, the subject matter of science. But once he has eliminated subjectivity in favor of the object, instead of seeing himself as a thing among other things, buffeted about by the physical universe, he makes of himself an *objective*

11. Compare, e.g., Roger Garaudy, *Théorie matérialiste de la connaissance* (Paris, 1953).

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beholder and claims to contemplate nature as it is, in the absolute." The interchange of subjectivity and objectivity jeopardized the consistency and even the scientific "rationality" of the materialist position; in fact, "by a dialectical reversal which might have been foreseen, materialist rationalism 'passes' into irrationalism and destroys itself." For, if thought is a byproduct of matter and completely conditioned by a given physical state of the world, it was possible to see how the human mind could "express the universe as an effect can express its cause," but not how it could make sense of, and formulate a theory about, its object: "How could a captive reason, governed from without and manoeuvred by a series of blind causes, still be reason?" If one were to maintain the validity of thought and of scientific propositions, the criteria would have to be found outside the simple cause-effect nexus—and thus in a domain which materialism proclaims to be purely subjective and unreliable: "When materialism dogmatically asserts that the universe produces thought, it immediately passes into idealist scepticism. It lays down the inalienable rights of Reason with one hand and takes them away with the other." After first undermining positivism by means of a speculative dogma and after destroying both through "the metaphysical affirmation that man is a material object," orthodoxy proceeded to destroy this affirmation in turn "by the radical negation of all metaphysics." In the end, "all that remains is ruins."[12]

In lieu of the dismantled materialism, Sartre's essay attempted to delineate an epistemological and philosophical perspective more readily compatible with Marxist aspirations. The thrust of Marxist epistemology, according to Sartre, was to identify knowledge not with the reflection of eternal objects but rather with human action and more particularly with work construed as struggle with, and transformation of, objects. As a purely contemplative outlook, the theory of reflection was suitable only to the ruling class—in our time to the bourgeoisie. Aiming "not at changing the world but at maintaining it," the ruling class always claimed "to *contemplate* the world as it *is*," that is, "from the viewpoint of pure knowledge, without admitting to itself that this attitude tends to perpetuate the present state of the universe by implying that the universe can be known rather than changed." From a proletarian vantage, this notion of the "primacy of knowledge" exerted a "negative and inhibiting influence by conferring a pure and static essence upon the object." Committed to change, Marxism thus could not be satisfied with passive contemplation, "but ought, itself, to be an action;" moreover, Marxist philosophy could not simply "tack itself on to the revolutionary effort," but had to be seen as "indistinguishable from this effort." The "superiority" of revolutionary thought consisted "in its first proclaiming its

12. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Materialism and Revolution" (1949), in William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, eds., *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1962), vol. 2, pp. 388-391. Despite his attack on materialism Sartre recognized the "pragmatic" value of the doctrine and its quality to act as "a mobilizing, transforming and organizing force" in society, an aspect due to the fact that "there is a deep relationship between the *situation* of an oppressed class and the materialist *expression* of this situation. But we cannot conclude from this that materialism is a philosophy, and still less that it is *the* truth" (pp. 402-403, 405).

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active nature." Such a proclamation, to be sure, did not remove the need for validation; since the revolutionary needed "to distinguish between the true and the false, this indissoluble unity of thought and action calls for a new and systematic theory of truth." For these purposes, a merely "pragmatic conception of truth" was insufficient, as it coincided with "subjectivist idealism"; the "materialist myth" was invented to bridge the gap, but Marxism could not be content with mythology. If it were to be validated, the truth of Marxist revolutionary thought had to be found in the coincidence between the essence of reality and human practice: "What is needed is, in a word, a philosophical theory which shows that human reality is action and that action upon the universe is identical with the understanding of that universe as it is, or, in other words, that action is the unmasking of reality and, *at the same time*, a modification of that reality."[13]

If action or practical work was the key to reality, then the proletariat in our age had a privileged access to truth. As a victim of bourgeois exploitation, Sartre noted, the proletarian cannot be satisfied with being assimilated into the prevailing society; rather, he is bound to be a revolutionary who is "defined by his *going beyond* the situation in which he is placed" and who, in moving beyond it "toward a radically new situation," is able to "grasp it in its synthetic wholeness" or as a "totality." As a worker, the proletarian revolutionary was amply prepared for the task of social change. Within the limits imposed by the bourgeois structure, the worker gains "mastery over things" in his labor and discovers himself "as a possibility of infinitely varying the form of the material object by acting upon it in conformity to certain universal rules." These rules (such as the relation between cause and effect) are themselves not encountered in passive submission "but in the very act which transcends the material state towards a certain end which illuminates and defines this state from within the future." The experience of active transformation could be expanded from work to society at large. The revolutionary worker was capable of surmounting his social condition "because he wishes to change it" and because he regards it "from the point of view of this will to change." Revolutionary change was basically a collective act of transcendence and revolutionary thought thus had to be a "philosophy of transcendence" and also a philosophy of freedom. "This possibility of *rising above* a situation in order to get a perspective on it," the essay stated, "is precisely that which we call freedom. No materialism of any kind can ever explain it." Revolutionary man was neither a speculative dreamer nor a conditioned object; rather, he was "a contingent being, unjustifiable but free, wholly punged into a society which oppresses him, but capable of transcending that society through his efforts to change it." The effort to change and transcend the world, moreover, provided the criterion of truth to the revolutionary undertaking; for, "it is in changing the world that we can come to know it."[14]

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 408-409. "This," a footnote elaborated (p. 409, n. 13), "is what Marx, in his *Theses on Feuerbach* calls 'practical materialism.' But why 'materialism'?"

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 407, 411, 414-415, 419, 427. As Sartre added: "Neither the detached

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As can be seen, Sartre's argument did not involve a complete departure from his earlier phenomenological concerns. At a closer look, his "philosophy of revolution" disclosed a blending of "transcendental" phenomenology with the imperatives of the class struggle—or rather, a reinterpretation of the constitutive function of consciousness (radically construed) in the direction of revolutionary practice. His posture has encountered criticism from many quarters. The proposed blending has provoked misgivings not only in Marxist ranks, but also among phenomenologists—some of whom regard his views as the outgrowth more of idiosyncratic leanings than of strict phenomenological analysis. Thus, while acknowledging suggestive insights, Enzo Paci—the leading spokesman of phenomenological Marxism in Italy—has noted in Sartre's writings a lack of the "epoché, that is, the return to the concrete subject and his intentionality" and has argued that only phenomenology can offer "a rigorous and consequential foundation to Sartre's position." The satement occurs in Paci's study *The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man* (of 1963), probably the most ambitious philosophical effort in recent decades of reconciling Marx's and Husserl's legacies. Since, in another context, I have reviewed in detail the strengths and weaknesses of the study, I shall limit myself here to a brief recapitulation of some major propositions. Neglecting the complex and multifaceted tapestry of the work, I shall concentrate on passages which underscore and corroborate Sartre's central tenets—especially the interpretation of Marxism as a philosophy of practice and of practice as an intentional project or design.[15]

According to Paci, Western society is in the grip of a profound crisis—a crisis due to the progressive reification of human relations, to the emphatic reduction of scientific knowledge and of man himself to mere "factuality." The crisis can only be met through a sustained effort of reflection and radical reorientation, such as are undertaken by phenomenology and a phenomenologically revised Marxism. The predicament of our age, Paci asserts, is "the expression of the struggle of humanity for its own self-understanding, for its own meaning," and the challenge imposed by this predicament is "a transformation that is as engaging as it is radical: the transformation that man must demand of himself." In our century, phenomenological inquiry has provided crucial guideposts to recovery: "Phenomenology wants to return his 'subjectivity' to man. It wants to return man to himself, freeing him from every fetishism, from the mask behind which humanity has been hidden or 'veiled'." The removal of veils and distorting appearances has been the basic purpose of Husserl's writings which thus acquire a broad practical

consciousness that would soar over the universe without being able to get a standpoint on it, nor the material object which reflects a condition without understanding it can ever 'grasp' the totality of existence in a synthesis, even a purely conceptual one. Only a man situated in the universe and completely crushed by the forces of nature and transcending them completely through his design to master them can do this."

15. See Enzo Paci, *The Fucntion of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*, trans. with an introduction by Paul Piccone and James E. Hansen (Evanston, 1972), pp. 297, 347; also my "Phenomenology and Marxism: A Salute to Enzo Paci," in George Psathas, ed., *Phenomenological Sociology* (New York, 1973), pp. 305-356.

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significance: "Within man there is a latent humanity—and here we interpret Husserl in a radical sense—a humanity which has not yet been born but which can be born if man so desires, if man assumes the responsibility for becoming what he can become." Regarding the distinction between essence and appearances, Husserl's approach in Paci's view is more rigorous and uncompromising than most preceding philosophies, mainly due to his elaboration of the phenomenological "epoché" or "reduction," a procedure designed to uncover "authentic intentional life" beneath surface phenomena or experiences. "Phenomenology," the study notes, "wants to lead man to self-consciousness, to self-foundation, to self-constitution, to transcendental foundation." The task is possible only if the "mundane" is bracketed—where the "mundane" refers to "the barely factual, the 'positive' of positivism, that is, meaning reduced to the factuality of discourse, the subject reduced to an object." Once it is seen that "objectivism and factuality are masks behind which man is hidden and fetishized," it follows that "the transcendental foundation requires the transcendental reduction to pure subjectivity, that is, to transcendental subjectivity."

In developing his conception of phenomenology, Paci (to a greater extent than Sartre) relies on Husserl's notion of the "life-world" defined as a pre-theoretical or "precategorical" context of awareness; but he refrains from segregating this context neatly from transcendental reflection. Such a segregation, he observes, had sometimes been suggested by Husserl but cannot strictly be maintained. Phenomenological "epoché" is always simultaneously "a reduction to transcendental subjectivity and to the *Lebenswelt*;" actually, one can show that "the transcendental reduction includes all others and leads to a subjectivity which is not mythological." Whether construed as a concrete human being "in flesh and blood" or as a transcendental foundation, subjectivity in Paci's view is the source of intentional meaning in the universe, a meaning implicit in the life-world and awaiting conscious implementation. Phenomenology teaches, he notes "that *the world has being insofar as it has meaning*, to the extent that the truth inhering in it is discovered and becomes the aim and intentional meaning of human life." Since reality is tied to intentionality, "the being of the world is constituted in subjectivity;" in fact, "subjectivity is the *entire world* to the extent that it is subjective, intentional activity." Seen in this light, human practice has a far-reaching task: the task of rescuing meaning and thus reality from reification and oblivion: "Transcendental consciousness (subjectivity), as the being of the world that is constituted in consciousness, is not the acceptance of a pregiven being (which is not true being). Rather it is the active constitution of meaning: forming subjectivity." Proceeding in this vein, Paci occasionally attributes radical or revolutionary connotations to intentionality. Instead of accepting the life-world as "already done and accomplished," transcendental reflection "implies taking a dialectical, revolutionary position on the intentional level." Consequently, the "transcendental epoché is a *total* transformation."

Viewed from this vantage point, phenomenology offers many points of contact with revolutionary Marxism. Once basic economic needs are

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perceived as integral components of the life-world or core layer of experience, the two orientations seem complementary and even congruent. Paci is not unaware, of course, that the reconciliation is impeded by doctrinaire obstacles, such as the equation of Marxism with traditional materialism; but he quickly surmounts such barriers. Matter and the natural universe, in his view, are only on a superficial level opposed to intentional awareness. Although "given to me as a matter in its impenetrability, opacity, passivity, and resistance," he writes, the material world "can be reduced to a lived modality" or to the experience "of passivity of the hardness of 'things';" by focusing on the context of the life-world "we become aware of the fact that even external and material nature is internal to the extent that it is life experienced by transcendental subjectivity." In another context, "inert matter" is described as "*subjective* in its own way" and materialism contrasted to "a substantialism extraneous to the subject: I am the world, the whole world." Given this notion of materialism, it becomes apparent that Marxism signifies basically a critique of bourgeois reification and an attempt to revive intentional practice. "By returning to the subject and his operations," the study elaborates, "I can discover that appearances are abstractions that have become real and have transformed workers into abstractions, while actually the worker is the concrete man. This is precisely what Marx clarifies in *Capital* by rediscovering men behind the phenomenal forms that have been turned into a false reality by exchange, wage-labor, and capital. Therefore, the original concreteness from which Marx in fact departs, is the subjects." Marx's outlook was shared by Engels, despite his occasionally naturalistic terminology: "In terms of phenomenological analysis, dialectical modalities such as those presented as laws by Engels must necessarily begin with subjectivity, both as a point of departure and as a living and operating presence." The nucleus of dialectical materialism, in any case, resides in "the insertion of the dialectic into subjectivity and the penetration of subjectivity as a causal element into every dialectical modality."

Cognition—on the premises of a phenomenological Marxism—involves a search for authentic life under the veil of appearances. As Paci observes, "phenomenology is the disoccluding of what is 'veiled' " and the recovery of "a truth that man originally carries within himself and that he loses in the 'mundane'." Once man is able to remove his masks, "he discovers his own truth. He sees his proper, authentic nature, where what appears is what really is." From a transcendental perspective, subjectivity contains its own criterion of truth in the form of intuitive evidence. Although always limited and finite, evidence according to Paci is "the pledge and the proof that man can bring to light what is latent within himself, what he has hidden, what is not yet human, what is not rationally or philosophically grounded." In a phenomenological sense, he adds at another point, "beginning from the subject means beginning from that nucleus of truth which, although minimal, the subject contains precisely because he is a subject who departs from the evidence of what he directly experiences in the first person." In order to be

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truthful, however, personal insight cannot limit itself to a replication of objective or "mundane" appearances, after the manner of traditional realism and its theory of reflection or correspondence; as Husserl's work exemplified, "the philosopher continuously places himself in the attitude whereby the meaning of the truth of being is never pregiven but is continuously produced by intentional subjectivity." Under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, knowledge or science acquires "a *new* meaning. It is no longer the verification of an objectivity in itself. Rather, it is the consciousness of praxis, its intentional direction, the positive meaning of truth, and the effort of actualizing this meaning in the epoché of a truth coinciding with the given."[16]

3. *Toward an Epistemology of Sensuous Experience*

Impressive as an insurrection against the orthodox doctrine the focus on knowledge as intentional practice, evident in the arguments of Sartre and Paci, is fraught with serious hazards and quandaries. The boldness of the vistas opened up in their writings provides only a precarious antidote to objectivism and reification; in a sense, it corroborates and reinforces these ills. Given the complementary character of the notions of subject and object, the stress on subjectivity and intentional consciousness conjures up as counterpart (and is intelligible only against the foil of) an opaque and unconscious nature. Both Sartre and Paci, it is true, try to overcome this polarity, but at the risk of one-dimensionality. Despite their disclaimers of idealist connotations, the boundary line between their postures and subjective idealism is at best hazy and elusive; whether nature is construed a material for human labor or reduced to a lived modality, intentional consciousness seems to be the agency ultimately destined to embrace or subdue the world. It is hard to see, on these assumptions, how their views can escape the strictures against idealist activism voiced in Marx's first *Thesis*. If, as Marx suggested, both traditional materialism and idealism are unsatisfactory and defective, it seems desirable to depart from the confines of these polar conceptions in search of an epistemological perspective attentive to "real, sensuous" practice and experience. As it happens, tentative but significant strides in this direction have been undertaken in recent decades by Marxist thinkers—or thinkers sympathetic to Marxism—both inside and outside the communist orbit. The purpose of the remaining pages is to delineate the main thrust of their endeavors.

In the East European context, an attempt to develop a non-idealist and non-objectivist epistemology has been undertaken by the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, in an essay (of 1958) which was the target of the previously reviewed attack by Schaff. Entitled "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth," the essay outlined the major tenets and shortcomings of both orthodox materialism and "idealist" pragmatism; contrary to Schaff's allegations, Kolakowski did not simply endorse the idealist option but sought to sketch an indigenous Marxist perspective. Whether his effort was entirely

16. Paci, *The Function of the Sciences*, pp. 6-10, 35, 66-69, 132, 161, 175, 282, 290, 415.

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successful, however, can be doubted. At important junctures, the presentation was marred by ambivalence and vacillation; briefly put, the essay offered a strained interpretation of pragmatism and an equally strained differentiation between pragmatism and the Marxist alternative. Labelled "Marxism of a positivst orientation" and identified chiefly with the writings of Engels and Lenin, materialist orthodoxy was characterized by its treatment of truth as a correspondence "between a judgment or an opinion and the reality to which it refers," with both reality and the mentioned correspondence being "independent of man's knowledge." Human practice in this view had merely the secondary or experimental function of serving as test or criterion for verifying empirical propositions. According to Kolakowski, the orthodox approach conformed entirely to the "classical definition of truth" according to which "any statement is in itself true or false on the necessary and sufficient condition that the reality of the thing or process it describes is as it states or not." Established as official doctrine and "universally accepted in Marxist circles" since Engels' time, the approach was "popularized, but also generalized, in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*" which applied the notion of correspondence not only to judgments but also to sense impressions, claiming that they should " 'copy,' 'photography,' or 'reflect' the objects of the external world." Without neglecting the possibility of detours and setbacks, both Engels and Lenin "saw the development of man's conceptual apparatus as an effort to copy ever more faithfully the external world, which was regarded as a pre-existing model."

Contrary to the orthodox relegation of practice to the task of verification, pragmatism as originally formulated by William James relied on practice or practical usefulness as "a factor in the *definition* of truth." Instead of serving as an experimental tool, practice was regarded as the source of knowledge and the truth of a judgment as function "of the usefulness of its acceptance or rejection" in daily life; a statement qualified as true "if as a result of accepting it our needs are better met or our position in life undergoes a positive change." As Kolakowski pointed out, usefulness in classical pragmatism had strong biological overtones. The "classic" pragmatic concept of knowledge, he wrote, was "purely biological" and cognition itself was seen as "a form of biological reaction that permits the best possible adaptation of individual organisms to their environment;" the standard of truth consequently was whether "a given reaction of an organism to the stimuli of his environment is or is not adequate, is either useful or detrimental to the survival of the organism." Since organic survival and successful adaptation are presumably empirical criteria, practical usefulness in the pragmatic sense would seem to be amenable to empirical test and pragmatic epistemology not far removed from the doctrine of correspondence. Despite his appeal to biology, however, Kolakowski refused to draw this conclusion, insisting that pragmatism was chiefly an individualistic and ultimately an "idealist" conception. Due to the diversity of needs, he stressed, "a statement can turn out to be either true or false depending on the individual and on the sum of

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needs that define his aspirations at a given time." In view of this fact, it was possible to regard the pragmatic approach as "one of the possible formulations of idealism"—if this doctrine was reducible to the thesis that all judgments "are meaningless unless one posits, implicitly or explicitly, a certain consciousness in reference to which this judgment is or is not valid."

Moving beyond the sketched options and invoking the testimony of the *Manuscripts*, Kolakowski postulated a Marxist theory of knowledge in which the role of human practice was central rather than ancillary or arbitrary. "The vision of the world presented in the *Manuscripts,*" he wrote, "arises from an effort to consider man's practical activity as a factor that defines his behavior as a cognitive being." In delineating this vision, Kolakowski employed the terms familiar in large measure from the description of pragmatism. "The basic point of departure for all of Marx's epistemological thought is the conviction," the essay stated, "that the relations between man and his environment are relations between the species and the objects of its need;" as a consequence, cognition had to be seen as a "function of a continuing dialogue between human needs and their objects," a dialogue "called work." Instead of being speculative inventions or replicas of objects, cognitive categories were "created by a spontaneous endeavor to conquer the opposition of things;" it was "this effort to subdue the chaos of reality that defines not only the history of mankind, but also the history of nature as an object of human needs—and we are capable of comprehending it only in this form." Need satisfaction and the struggle with nature was not merely a mental enterprise but rooted in the "biological apparatus" of human life; the appropriation of "the raw material of nature" involved an "assimilation of the external world, which is at first biological, subsequently social and therefore human." Knowledge from a Marxist perspective thus signified not merely the passive reception and reflection of stimuli; rather than revealing "forms or attributes of reality 'in itself'," cognitive propositions were "subjective—or rather, serially subjective—as long as they bear the imprint of the organizational power of man who sees the world in such terms and from such points of view as are necessary for him to adapt to it and to transform it usefully." At the same time, Marxist epistemology was not tied to arbitrary flights of fancy. Knowledge claims arose "as human products, yet not in the idealist sense;" although the object could not "be conceived without the object that constructs it," the term "subject" referred to a "social subject" engaged in the concrete transformation of nature. As a result, Marxism was equally far removed from Bergsonian intuitionism and idealist pragmatism: no "act of pure will" was "raised to the rank of a primal fact of consciousness;" on the contrary, "active contact with the opposition of nature creates at one and the same time conceptive man and nature as his object."[17]

17. Leszek Kolakowski, "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth," in *Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today*, trans. Jane Z. Peel (New York, 1969), pp. 38-44, 46-49, 54, 66. Regarding the distinction from pragmatism, he argued (p. 56) that "pragmatist relativism" was "irreconcilable with Marx's thought for two major reasons. The first is the impossibility of creating *ex nihilo*; the second, the impossibility of conceiving human conscious-

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Kolakowski's approach—blurred in its contours and slanted toward instrumental activity—has not remained an isolated venture; comparable efforts, sometimes of a more sustained and rigorous character, have been undertaken by numerous East European philosophers in recent times. Reference has previously been made to facets of Lukács' complex and broad-gauged study on the *Ontology of Social Life*; actually, it is not impossible to interpret many arguments of the study in a non-orthodox vein. Thus, the notion of "dialectical mimesis" or a "realist dialectics" can be viewed, in some measure, as pointing toward a non-idealist phenomenology—a phenomenology of the life-world absolved from the constraints of subjective consciousness. Some observers have in fact assessed the study in this light; more importantly, some of Lukács' students have developed his suggestions in the direction of a dialectics of "sensuous" everyday experience.[18] Parallel endeavors can be found in the work of the Czech thinker Karel Kosik, especially in his *Dialectic of Concrete Experience*. Starting from the phenomenological distinction between essence and appearance, the study emphasized that the acquisition of knowledge requires a preoccupation with the concrete life-world since "appearance is not radically distinct from essence" and essence only appears through the medium of phenomena. Due to the dialectical relationship between essence and appearance, cognition, according to Kosik, involves a special kind of praxis—a praxis which, in contrast to both positivism and idealism, seeks to reconstruct or recover true reality in the midst of appearances.[19]

Among Western thinkers a central place, in my judgment, must be accorded to Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As it seems to me, all his writings reflect a search for a non-idealist "practical" epistemology; steadily pursued with growing intensity, this search led him to the pre-reflective (and pre-subjective) underpinnings of cognition and thus to the vital parameters of experience within which the search for knowledge and truth can take place.

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ness as a social instrument reducible to the behavior of particular organisms." As he added, somewhat cryptically: "There exists a reality that is common to all people and that remains forever in a state of incipience, a reality in which the phenomenon of creativity certainly occurs but in which a certain constant is retained that corresponds to what we can call 'human nature' or else to that totality of human properties, biological needs, and social relations which can rightfully be termed immutable."

18. Compare, e.g., Agnes Heller, *Marxismus und Alltagswelt* (Frankfurt, 1971). Commenting on the outlook of the later Lukács, Kenneth Megill observes: "The problem of Lukács' ontology is to discover the *Seinsformen* which are revealed in our everyday experience and the forms of human activity which have been produced in the history of man." As he adds: "The ambiguity present in Lukács' writings enables two traditions to claim him—one which accepts his arguments in favor of realism in art and his dialectical materialism as the starting point, and the other which sees his ontology as a method for developing an open and critical Marxism." See "Georg Lukács on Ontologist," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, vol. 9 (1969), pp. 338, 351.

19. "The materialist theory of cognition as mental reproduction of reality," Kosik writes, "involves a dual character of awareness which is foreign both to positivism and to idealism. Human awareness is simultaneously a 'reflection' and a 'project;' it copies and constructs, records and plans, mirrors and anticipates—that is, it has a receptive and an active role at the same time. To gain access to 'the things themselves,' to distort nothing but to let things appear as they are, requires a special kind of praxis." See *Die Dialektik des Konkreten: Eine Studie zur Problematik des Menschen und der Welt* (Frankfurt, 1967), pp. 9-12, 26.

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Apart from the legacies of Hegel and Marx, his thinking was profoundly shaped by the teachings of Husserl and Heidegger—with Heideggerian themes progressively gaining ascendance. A tentative blending of transcendental and existential concerns emerged in his first major study, entitled *The Structure of Behavior*. Written from the vantage point of lived experience (*minde vécu*) and the lived body, the study constituted a frontal attack on conceptions of perception and cognition prevalent in modern psychology and post-Cartesian philosophy, conceptions linked with traditional views of mind-body relations and the subject-object nexus. The central target was behavioral psychology according to which human behavior is the result of external stimuli just as cognition is the product of external impressions on the sensory apparatus and the mind. After the initial formulation of the reflex arc, behaviorism had modified the model of linear causality through the introduction of multi-causal circuits and especially through the notion of conditioned reflexes. According to Merleau-Ponty, however, none of these modifications were able to remedy the initial defects of the approach: given their dispersal over time and place, no amount of empirical stimuli could account for the emergence of a coherent image or a coherent knowledge of an object; equally, no amount of circuits could render intelligible the transformation of extenral data into mental replicas. The relationship between object and perception, he noted, was reducible neither to "the relation of effect to cause" nor to "that of function to corresponding variable. All the difficulties of realism arise precisely from having tried to convert this original relation into a causal action and to integrate perception into nature." As he added, "the experience of a real thing cannot be explained by the action of that thing on my mind: the only way for a thing to act on a mind is to offer it a meaning, to manifest itself to it, to *constitute* itself vis-à-vis the mind in its intelligible articulations." [20]

These considerations gave at least initial credence to transcendental reflection or a perspective stressing the constitutive role of consciousness. Since the time of Descartes, modern philosophy, and ultimately much of modern science, have relied on the distinction between extended matter and thought, elevating mind to the status of a transcendental observer able to know the world objectively in accordance with clear and distinct concepts or ideas. Instead of being an empirical event, Merleau-Ponty wrote, cognition in this view is "a taking-possession of events, even internal ones, which is not mingled with them," an internal "re-creation" or, in Kantian and Platonic terms, a "recognizance" or "recognition." While improving on the causal model, however, transcendental idealism was itself basically deficient: preoccupied with absolute conceptual knowledge, it left no room for concrete experience and the actual encounter of perception with reality, reducing cognition to a series of predicative judgments: "There is an existential index which distinguishes the perceived or imaginary object from the idea and

20. Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, trans. by Alden P. Fisher (Boston, 1963), pp. 193, 199.

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which manifests 'something' in them 'which differs from my mind,' whatever this 'other' may be in other respects." On the level of concrete perception, an object always presents itself in a partial or "perspectival" manner—an object aspect which is due to temporal and spatial constraints and to the insertion of the observer in his own "lived body." Partiality of this kind, however, is not necessarily a "subjective" distortion and does not reduce the object to a subjective idea or intention—since every perception points beyond itself to a real world not exhausted by subjective awareness. "Far from introducing a coefficient of subjectivity into pereption," the study affirmed, the perspectival character of knowledge "provides it on the contrary with the assurance of communicating with a world which is richer than what we know of it, that is, of communicating with a real world." The focus on embodied perception thus offered a new avenue to cognition and a crucial means for overcoming the traditional subject-object and materialism-idealism dichotomies: "The perceived is grasped in an indivisible manner as 'in-itself' (*en soi*), that is, as gifted with an interior which *I will never have finished exploring*; and as 'for-me' (*pour moi*), that is, as given 'in person' through its momentary aspects." [21] Despite this stress on the existential dimensions of cognition, one should note that the study did not completely abandon transcendental reflection, but differentiated carefully between lived experience and objective (or intersubjective) knowledge and truth—although in the end, transcendental consciousness was exposed to the challenge of pre-reflective "structures." [22]

While *The Structure of Behavior* was mainly a critical review of traditional doctrines, Merleau-Ponty's second work delineated in greater detail his own approach and especially his notion of the "primacy" of perception. Phenomenological inquiry, Merleau-Ponty noted in paraphrasing the thrust of his study, "has finally revealed that the perceived world is not a sum of objects (in the sense in which the sciences use this word), that our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of thought, and finally that the unity of the perceived thing, as perceived by several consciousnesses, is not comparable to

21. While critical idealism, Merleau-Ponty added, had "pushed the problems of the relations of the soul asnd body back step by step by showing that we never deal with a body in-itself (*en soi*) but with a body for-a-consciousness and that thus we never have to put consciousness in contact with an opaque and foreign reality, for us consciousness experiences its inherence in an organisms at each moment; for it is not a question of an inherence in material apparatuses, which as a matter of fact can be only *objects* for consciousness, but of a presence to consciousness of proper history and of the dialectical stages which it has traversed. Therefore, we could not accept any of the materialistic models to represent the relations of the soul and body—but neither could we accept the mentalistic models, for example, the Cartesian metaphor of the artisan and his tool." See *ibid.*, pp. 186, 196, 198-199, 208.

22. "The zone of individual perspectives and that of intersubjective significations," Merleau-Ponty stated, "must be distinguished in my knowledge." What was involved was not the antinomy between sensibility and intelligence nor that between matter and form: "The distinction which we are introducing is rather that of the lived and the known. The problem of the relations of the soul and body is thus transformed instead of disappearing: now it will be the problem of the relations of consciousness as flux of individual events, of concrete and resistant structures, and that of consciousness as tissue of ideal significations." *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215. Regarding the confrontation of consciousness and pre-reflective structures see *ibid.*, pp. 220-224.

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the unity of a proposition." On the basis of phenomenological perception, cognition of an object could never be derived from the mere amalgamation of discontinuous external impressions; at the same time, the object was not synonymous with a concept or an abstract definition: "We observe at once that it is impossible, as has often been said, to decompose a perception, to make it into a collection of sensations, because in it the whole is prior to the parts—and this whole is not an ideal whole. The meaning which I ultimately discover is not of a conceptual order." In contrast to idealist philosophy, Merleau-Ponty insisted that the unity of perceived objects and the meaning of perceptual data were not the product of an "intellectual synthesis." The perceived thing, he wrote, "is not an ideal unity in the possession of the intellect, like a geometrical notion, for example; it is rather a totality open to a horizon of an indefinite number of perspectival views which blend with one another according to a given style, which defines the object in question." The perceptual grasp of an object, therefore, had to be seen as a result of a concrete praxis or "practical synthesis"—although praxis in this context involved by no means a willful creation or intentional constitution: "The perceptual synthesis thus must be accomplished by the subject which can both delimit certain perspectival aspects in the object, the only ones actually given, and at the same time go beyond them. This subject, which takes a point of view, is my body as the field of perception and action (*pratique*)."[23]

Since, according to Merleau-Ponty, the perceived world was neither an external object nor imprisoned in subjective awareness, perceptual cognition involved a confluence of immanence and transcendence—a confluence incompatible with either realist or idealist premises: "There is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because it always contains something more than what is actually given." Similarly, since it signified the acquisition of knowledge, perception was neither a private (or subjective) nor a purely objective (or inter-subjective) endeavor. "If I consider my perceptions as simple sensations," Merleau-Ponty commented, "they are private; they are mine alone. If I treat them as acts of the intellect, if perception is an inspection of the mind, and the perceived object an idea, then you and I are talking about the same world, and we have *the right* to communicate among ourselves because the world has become an ideal existence and is the same for all of us." To permit genuine communication, intersubjectivity had to operate not merely on the conceptual level but on that of experience: "The thing imposes itself not as true for every intellect, but as real for every subject who is standing where I am." As in his previous study, Merleau-Ponty acknowledged that perception did not simply coincide with

23. Merleau-Ponty, "The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences," in Alden L. Fisher, ed., *The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty* (New York, 1969), pp. 47-51. The essay was an address given in 1946 shortly after publication of *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. by Colin Smith (New York, 1962). In the "Preface" to this study he observed: "The world is not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I have no doubt I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible." See "What Is Phenomenology?" in Fisher, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 38.

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knowledge or objective truth: "We willingly admit that we cannot rest satisfied with the description of the perceived world as we have sketched it up to now and that it appears as psychological curiosity if we leave aside the idea of the true world, the world as thought by the understanding." However, the emphasis now was clearly on the internal linkage of the two spheres. If perception was contradictory and paradoxical in many ways, this aspect was not irrelevant to reflection once it was seen that "*the acknowledged contradiction appears as the very condition of consciousness.*" Instead of pointing to a mere psychological preamble or to the dark fringes of reason, the relationship between experience and thought involved the genealogy of knowledge itself, the emergence of reflection from its own pre-reflective and pre-rational background: "The perceived happening can never be reabsorbed in the complex of transparent relations which the intellect constructs because of the happening. But if this is the case, philosophy is not only consciousness of these relations; it is also consciousness of the obscure element of the 'non-relational foundation' on which these relations are based."[24]

The exploration of the genealogy of truth and of the relationship between lived experience and knowledge became the consuming preoccupation in Merleau-Ponty's subsequent writings. The last decade of his life found him preparing a complex study to which he gave such working titles as "Being and Meaning," "Genealogy of the True," or "The Origin of Truth." A communication of 1952—a prospectus of past and future endeavors, written at the time of his candidacy for the Collège de France—provides intriguing insights into his evolving thought. "We never cease living in the world of perception," the communication stated, "but we go beyond it in critical thought—almost to the point of forgetting the contribution of perception to our idea of truth." Despite its important role in the task of verification and in "specifying criteria and demanding from our experience its credentials of validity," critical thought was "unaware of our contact with the perceived world which is simply there before us, beneath the level of the verified true and the false. Nor does critical thought even define the positive steps of thinking or its most valued accomplishments." In view of these limitations of traditional conceptions of knowledge, the prospectus delineated a new approach to the "relation between mind and truth," predicated on the experience of perception: "The evidence of the perceived thing lies in its concrete aspect, in the very texture of its qualities, and in the equivalence among all its sensible properties—

24. "The Primacy of Perception," *ibid.*, pp. 51-52, 54-55. Compare also his comments: "Philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being. One may well ask how this creation is *possible*, and if it does not recapture in things a pre-existing Reason. The answer is that the only pre-existent Logos is the world itself, and that the philosophy which brings it into visible existence does not begin by being *possible*; it is actual or real like the world of which it is a part, and no explanatory hypothesis is clearer than the act whereby we take up this unfinished world in an effort to complete and conceive it... True philosophy consists in re-learning to look at the world, and in this sense a historical account can give meaning to the world quite as 'deeply' as philosophical treatise." See "What is Phenomenology?" *ibid.*, p. 42.

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which caused Cézanne to say that one should be able to paint even odors." From the vantage point of our "undivided existence," the world exhibits "a truth which shows through and envelops us rather than being held and circumscribed by our mind." A comparison between the perceived world and "the field of knowledge properly so called" gave rise to such questions as: "Does not the realm of the perceived world take on the form of a simple appearance? Is not pure understanding a new source of knowledge, in comparison with which our perceptual familiarity with the world is only a rough, unformed sketch?" Questions of this kind required the development of a "theory of truth" and a "theory of intersubjectivity" which differentiated between experience and reflection without rupturing their linkage. "It seems to me," Merleau-Ponty noted, "that knowledge and the communication with others which it presupposes not only are original formations with respect to the perceptual life but also they preserve and continue our perceptual life even while transforming it. Knowledge and communication sublimate rather than suppress our incarnation, and the characteristic operation of the mind is in the movement by which we recapture our corporeal existence and use it to symbolize instead of merely to coexist."[25]

The project outlined in the prospectus was not completed; the manuscript devoted to the topic remained a torso—which has recently been published under the title *The Visible and the Invisible*. In its published form, the manuscript offers both a critique of traditional philosophies and tentative steps toward a reorientation. All thinking or reflection, Merleau-Ponty observes at the outset, emanates from a concrete encounter with the world, from the background of a "perceptual faith" which itself is pre-reflective and at least initially obscure: "We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind express a faith common to the natural man and philosopher—the moment he opens his eyes;" but "what is strange about this faith is that if we seek to articulate it into theses and statements, if we ask ourselves what is this *we*, what *seeing* is, and what *thing* or *world* is, we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions." In an effort to overcome obscurity, traditional philosophy has tended to place experience in a procrustean scheme, by dividing it into a subject and object pole and by either levelling the perceiver into the world or the world into the perceiver's mind. The thrust of realist approaches in the past has been to treat perception as an "exterior relation between a world in itself and myself, conceived as a process of the same type as those that unfold within the world—whether one imagines an intrusion of the world in myself, or, on the contrary, some excursion of my look among the things." The paradoxes encountered by these approaches have prompted the formulation of alternative vistas stressing the place of mind or consciousness in the acquisition of knowledge. Important sections of *The Visible and the Invisible* are devoted to a detailed discussion of several versions of mentalism—including the legacy of

25. Merleau-Ponty, "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work," *ibid.*, pp. 367, 371.

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critical reflection (deriving from Descartes and Kant), Sartre's dialectics of radical freedom or negativity, and theories of immediate intuition (espoused chiefly by Husserl and Bergson). Although valuable for undermining the naturalist claim of a self-contained universe, these perspectives in Merleau-Ponty's view are ultimately misleading, by being insufficiently attentive to their own premises and to the experience of perception which they seek to explain. Pure reflection in particular is guilty of neglecting its own origins: "It thinks it can comprehend our natal bond with the world only by *undoing* it in order to *remake* it, only by constituting it, by fabricating it. It thinks it finds clarity through analysis, that is, if not in the most simple elements, at least in the most fundamental conditions implicated in the brute product, in the premises from which it results as a consequence, in a *source of meaning* from which it is derived." Proceeding in this manner, transcendental thought "falls short of its task and of the radicalism that is its law:" it "recuperates everything except itself as an effort of recuperation, it clarifies everything except its role."[26]

Given the predicaments of traditional philosophy, *The Visible and the Invisible* proposes a radical type of inquiry which overcomes the half-hearted character of radical doubt: "If it is true that as soon as philosophy declares itself to be reflection or coincidence it prejudges what it will find, then once again it must recommence everything, reject the instruments reflection and intuition had provided themselves, and install itself in a locus where they have not yet been distinguished, in experiences that have not yet been 'worked over,' that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both 'subject' and 'object,' both existence and essence, and hence give philosophy resources to define them." An inquiry of this kind requires a return to perceptual faith, that is, a faith which "knows itself to be beyond proofs, not necessary, interwoven with incredulity, at each instant menaced by non-faith" and which is the emblem of our original "openness upon being" or upon the world. Once the "experience of brute being" is accepted as the "source of meaning for us," the customary distinction between subject and object emerges as dubious and in need of revision. In the encounter of perception, Merleau-Ponty writes, the perceived or visible world "seems to rest in itself;" yet, "it is not possible that we blend into it, nor that it passes into us, for then the vision would vanish at the moment of formation, by disappearance of the seer or of the visible. What there is then are not things first identical with themselves, which would then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who is first empty and who, afterward, would open himself to them." Similarly, the focus on perceptual experience undermines and unhinges the traditional doctrines of realism and idealism: "We do not have to choose between a philosophy that installs itself in the world itself or in the other and a philosophy that installs itself 'in us,' between a philosophy that takes our experience 'from within' and a philosophy, if such be possible, that would judge it from without, in the name

26. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. by Claude Lefort, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, 1968), pp. 3, 32-33.

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of logical criteria, for example: these alternatives are not imperative, since perhaps the self and the non-self are like the obverse and the reverse and since perhaps our own experience *is* this turning round that installs us far indeed from 'ourselves,' in the other, in the things. Like the natural man, we situate ourselves in ourselves *and* in the things, in ourselves *and* in the other, at the point where, by a sort of *chiasm*, we become the others and we become world."[27]

As will be noted, the relation between observer and object, between the seer and the visible, is not one of a simple identity but rather involves a complex interaction and mutual interrogation—what Merleau-Ponty sometimes calls an "intertwining" or a "reversal." In perception, he observes, "he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he *is of it*, unless, by principle, according to what is required by the articulation of the look with the things, he is one of the visibles, capable by a singular reversal, of seeing them—he is one of them." The connecting linkage as well as the distance between observer and object is provided by embodiment, by man's insertion or participation in the "flesh" of the universe: "We understand then why we see the things themselves, in their places, where they are, according to their being which is indeed more than their being-perceived—and why at the same time we are separated from them by all the thickness of the look and of the body." The reason is that "this distance is not the contrary of this proximity" and that "the thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication." If the human body is able to see and to touch visible things, "this is only because, being of their family, itself visible and tangible, it uses its own being as a means to participate in theirs, because each of the two beings is an archetype for the other, because the body belongs to the order of the things as the world is universal flesh." Reducible neither to matter nor to mind, embodiment in Merleau-Ponty's view constitutes the cornerstone of a pre-reflective (and thus pre-subjective and pre-objectivistic) ontology: "The flesh is not matter, in the sense of corpuscles of being which would add up or continue on one another to form beings;" more generally, "it is not a fact or a sum of facts 'material' or 'spiritual.' Nor is it a representation for a mind: a mind could not be captured by its own representations; it would rebel against this insertion into the visible which is essential to the seer." Escaping the confines of substantive metaphysics, the flesh has to be seen as "a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being" or as an " 'element' of Being."

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-88, 130-131, 159-160. At another point (p. 103) Merleau-Ponty adds: "We do not have a consciousness constitutive of the things, as idealism believes, nor a preordination of the things to the consciousness, as realism believes (they are indiscernible in what interests us here, because they both affirm the adequation of the thing and the mind)—we have with our body, our sense, our look, our power to understand speech and to speak, *measureants* (*mesurants*) for Being, dimensions to which we can refer it, but not a relation of adequation or of immanence."

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The relationship between thought or knowledge and experience, against this background, is no longer that between a transcendental spectator and contingent reality. Once perception serves as "the umbilical cord of our knowledge," reflection has to be more attentive to, and more intimately connected with, the lessons of pre-reflective encounters. "The words most charged with philosophy," the manuscript states, "are not necessarily those that contain what they say, but rather those that most energetically open upon Being, because they more closely convey the life of the whole and make our habitual evidences vibrate until they disjoin. Hence it is a question whether philosophy as reconquest of brute or wild being can be accomplished by the resources of the eloquent language, or whether it would not be necessary for philosophy to use language in a way that takes from it its power of immediate or direct signification in order to equal it with what it wishes all the same to say." Thought or mind, from this perspective, appears not as the antipode of a world of objects, but rather as "a sublimation of the flesh," just as the "idea" is "a second or figurative meaning of vision." Knowledge, Merleau-Ponty comments, is "a relationship with oneself and with the world as well as a relationship with the other;" hence, "it is established in the three dimensions at the same time" and must be "brought to appear directly in the infrastructure of vision." Once, instead of being "the contrary of the sensible," thought is seen as "its lining and its depth," the bond between "the flesh and idea" is equivalent to the nexus between "visible and the interior armature which it manifests and which it conceals." Although not directly accessible to inspection, this armature is "not a *de facto* invisible, like an object hidden behind another, and not an absolute invisible, which would have nothing to do with the visible. Rather it is the invisible *of* of this world, that which inhabits this world, sustains it, and renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of this being." Regarding the notion of a "pure" idea surpassing the "ideality of the horizon" or the ideality implicit in the flesh, the study does not reject its possibility but stresses its roots in indirect vision and articulation: "Let us only say that the pure ideality is itself not without flesh nor freed from horizon structures: it lives of them, though they be another flesh and other horizons. It is as though the visibility that animates the sensible world were to emigrate, not outside of every body, but into another less heavy, more transparent body, as though it were to change flesh, abandoning the flesh of the body for that of language, and thereby would be emancipated but not freed from every condition." [28]

Merleau-Ponty is not the only Western thinker concerned with the epistemology of "sensuous" experience. To some extent, parallel arguments or considerations can be found in publications by contemporary spokesmen of the Frankfurt School, especially in the writings of Jürgen Habermas. The latter's *Knowledge and Human Interests* in particular was an attempt to probe the pre-reflective infrastructure or matrix of cognition. Moving beyond Kolakowski's narrowly instrumental outlook and elaborating on suggestions

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103, 134-135, 137, 139, 145, 149, 151-153, 157.

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provided by Max Scheler and others, the study differentiated between three experiential domains underlying and animating distinct types of cognitive inquiries: the domains of "technical-instrumental," of "practical-communicative," and of "emancipatory" interests. Building upon these foundations Habermas more recently has formulated a "discursive" theory of knowledge according to which truth is assumed to emerge neither from a simple mirroring of reality nor from purely intuitive evidence but from the universal "discourse" of investigators conducted in the context of an "ideal speech situation." While not disavowing a persisting nexus, however, these and similar recent investigations tend to stress and perhaps exaggerate the bifurcation between the genesis and the confirmation of knowledge, between the "apriori of experience" and the "apriori of validation;" despite the acknowledgment of a certain linkage, the relationship between "ideal speech" and actual speech or between ideality and reality remains elusive or obscure.[29] Perhaps some of Merleau-Ponty's insights may serve as a corrective or at least as a reminder at this point. As he writes in *The Visible and the Invisible*, knowledge is not simply an intelligible sphere hovering above experience: "The meaning is not on the phrase like the butter on the bread, like a second layer of 'psychic reality' spread over the sound: it is the totality of what is said, the integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain." In a sense, he adds, "the whole of philosophy, as Husserl says, consists in restoring a power to signify, a birth of meaning, or a wild meaning, an expression of experience by experience, which in particular clarifies the special domain of language. And in a sense, as Valéry said, language is everything, since it is the voice of no one, since it is the very voice of the things, the waves, the forests. And what we have to understand is that there is no dialectical reversal from one of these views to the other; we do not have to reassemble them into a synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility which is the ultimate truth."

29. See Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1971); and "Wahrheitstheorien," in *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz* (Pfullingen, 1973), pp. 211-265. Regarding Habermas' general perspective compare my "Reason and Emancipation: Notes on Habermas," *Man and World*, vol. 5 (1972), pp. 79-109; regarding the discursive theory of truth see Thomas A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3 (1973), pp. 135-156.

30. *The Visible and the Invisible*, p. 155. Compare also his comments in the earlier prospectus: "Language leads us to a thought which is no longer ours alone, to a thought which is presumptively universal, though it is never the universality of a pure concept which would be identical for every mind. It is rather the call which a situated thought addresses to other thoughts, equally situated, and each one responds to the call with its own resources." See "An Unpublished Text," *op.cit.*, pp. 372-373.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

*Notes on Lukacs' Ontology**

by Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller,
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Introduction

I. When we decided to publish the commentaries written for our friend and teacher Georg Lukács after reading the last version of his book, *On the Ontology of Social Reality*, and we reread our "Notes on Lukács *Ontology*," it became immediately clear that for various reasons, we would have to write a collective introduction to the text. First—not necessarily in order of importance—to provide a few sketchy comments concerning the work's genesis, which is frequently discussed but scarcely known in its entirety.[1]

At the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962, i.e., soon after the German manuscript of Volume I of the enormous book, *Die Eigenart der Aesthetischen*, was finished, Georg Lukács began a project he had cherished in his young years—his ethics. (We think it right to speak of the realization of youthful plans in his old age. Although former conceptions were changed when he became a Marxist, every reader of the Heidelberg manuscripts will recognize their continuity with later works. Likewise, everyone familiar with Lukács can see that in this case he was continuing his lectures at the Free School of Human Sciences: the creation of a contemporary radical ethics, although taking into account his "reorientation.") True to his old approach, he mainly consulted primary sources on the subject and took extensive notes. But even during this phase, i.e., in the latter part of 1962, he toyed with the idea of adding a foreword or a lengthy first chapter to his *Ethics* (in conversations he often gave it the tentative title *The Place of Ethics in the System of Human Actions*). In it he would formulate the ontological "basic characteristics" of social existence—all the more so since he was unable to base his ethical conception on "traditional" Marxist accounts. He often unambiguously discussed the need and the reason for this with us and others.

This work, begun so energetically in the spring of 1963, was interrupted by a catastrophe whose effects and inner torment were even greater than Lukács' 1911 existential crisis precipitated by Leo Popper's and Irma Seidler's deaths: the death of his wife, Gertrud Borstieber. He had already dedicated his *Aesthetics* and the already begun *Ethics* to this woman "as a modest attempt to express gratitude for more than forty years of life and thought, work and struggle together." As he confided in intimate conversations, this woman's influence on his life could be compared only with the October Revolution. That was an accurate depiction: it was Gertrud Borstieber's unique personality, a combination of traits of a *grande dame* of the Enlightenment and a plebeian heroine in a Gottfried Keller novella, that taught him to appreciate the "ordinary life" he had formerly despised. With her death he saw himself literally confronted with Hamlet's question. His decision was made after almost half a year of inner turmoil. Lukács returned to his desk, from then on under the stern discipline of an unwavering work-asceticism. As in his younger years, every trace of "life" was banned from the world and he tolerated nothing but work as a personal duty in and

*English translation by David J. Parent.

1. These remarks are very sketchy. All data are reconstructed from memory; later philological studies will have to make an exact reconstruction of the genesis of Lukács' work on the basis of his copious correspondence.

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around himself. The result was that his old dynamic way of thinking got rolling again and Lukács soon realized that what was needed was not an ontological introduction or a first chapter, but an *Ontology*; without this no successful foundation for the ethics would be possible. The final decision was reached in 1964. Lukács began writing without delay.

The following "Notes" were not written under the ridiculous pretense that they might be equally valuable, but only for the sake of information. As soon as Lukács was finished with a chapter (he dictated it into a tape recorder), he usually handed the text over to one of his students. After the entire work was typed, i.e., during 1968, he gave the completed manuscript to the authors of this essay and asked for extensive critical comments. He wanted to use these for correcting the proofs or for eventual revisions. Such conversations, five in all, took place in the winter of 1968-1969; in each case, one chapter or a group of chapters was discussed. The debates always extended late into the night and, in view of the theoretical inflexibility on both sides, were often very sharp, though our side was always muted owing to our friendship, love, and respect for Lukács' person. The following "Notes" were written for Lukács' personal use: they summarized the *main* points of discussion in order to simplify debate. They originated as follows: after we had read individual chapters, we met with Lukács before the proposed discussions and handed our written remarks to Vajda, who edited the papers and blended the common views into a unified formulation. He then gave this written report to Lukács. Unifying the criticism caused no great problem: the fundamental evaluation of the work was the same on all essential questions—especially at the stage of the second reading.

In the discussions with Lukács, essential theoretical differences arose on some questions between us and him; both parties, of course, expected this. As a result of Lukács' "work-centered" nature, theory was the main line of communication between him and other human beings anyway, but during the last eight years of his work-asceticism, it became practically the only link. Thus, in our contacts with him, regular theoretical discussions, already substantial, played an ever greater role. Every disputed question had already been discussed while the work was being written. In the debates during the winter of 1968-1969, Lukács agreed with several of our objections; others he wanted to answer in the final text, which was essentially a revision of the "first text." Since our objections seemed to require a revision and confirmed his uneasiness that the work had grown beyond the originally intended size, he decided to abridge the book. At first he thought of substituting for the first three chapters on the history of "ontological thought" a short introduction clearly summarizing the basic ideas. But this attempt also grew longer than originally planned. Therefore, before he had even corrected the proofs, he decided to finish this work, which had grown into an independent book, and to title it *Prolegomena to the Ontology of Social Reality*. He wanted to postpone his decision on the eventual revision and publication of the five theoretical chapters of his *Ontology*.[2]

The writing proceeded very slowly. Furthermore, the last phase was overshadowed by the *awareness* that he was afflicted by an incurable illness which he bore with exemplary stoicism. The last part, and even we cannot determine whether it is the actual end of the project, was finished in the early fall of 1970. He was no longer able

2. These five theoretical chapters resulted from the omission of the chapters on the ontological views of neo-positivism and religion, and on Hegel and Hartmann. Despite the title, the chapter on Marx is systematic rather than historical and is closely connected with the chapters on Work, Reproduction, Ideology, and Alienation.

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to read the text, which was deciphered and typed by several persons in his last months, since in the last seven or eight months he was already unable to work. According to the merciless verdict of 1963, he wanted to await death at his desk, but only a grotesque caricature of a life spent in strict, hard work was granted to him: he was transported to the hospital from his empty desk, now a skeleton of a life devoted to unceasing activity. An expression he often used when rejecting help and typical of his unpathetic nature—he used it when someone wanted to unburden him of some of the technical tasks connected with his work—was: "I have to clean my own dirty laundry." But he was no longer able to do this.

II. What moral and objective motive can there be for publishing a manuscript written at Lukács' behest for his own use, which furthermore can make no claim to the roundedness of a systematic essay or critical review?

First, the *Ontology*—Lukács' last ambitious work, written while his health was still intact—is now being published in Hungarian, in German, and soon also in Italian. Undoubtedly, it is a decisive document for an appraisal of his last period and for an understanding of the problems he dealt with and therefore—in view of the constitution of his personality, equally representative in success or in failure—also for an insight into the entire Marxist philosophical problematic during the last decade. On the other hand, there is the brute fact that he did not regard the manuscript he left us as the final version. Today it would be scientifically irresponsible to "reconstruct" the revision he planned on the authority of conversations and fragments of discussions. But so much can safely be stated: he generally accepted the existence of a contradiction between the "two ontologies" mentioned in the following "Notes," and he found it necessary to eliminate it, although he did not or only partly agreed with some of our suggestions for its elimination. In view of the fact that the work was unfinished and that he wanted to revise the last version (at least in the direction of eliminating the contradiction we had pointed out), we can state that the "Notes" are part of the genesis of the work and may provide a better understanding of it.

Secondly, after Lukács' death—partly but not primarily in connection with the publication of his *Ontology*—we were often asked to clarify our own relation to his last creative period, especially since disagreements about the *Ontology* had also appeared in print (in *Der Spiegel*, June 14, 1971). Since our relation to Lukács as students, which we both always admitted and stressed, has become problematic today, we have decided to publish these critical "Notes" as a document. Thus, we are publishing the text unchanged. Only slight abridgements were made (insignificant recommendations on wording or short deletions).

But precisely because we are publishing an unchanged text, it seemed absolutely necessary to add an explanatory introduction to these "Notes." That seemed necessary for two reasons. First, because the text does not provide a *complete* picture of our views on ontology. It would have been completely superfluous for us to point out to Lukács the fundamental points of our agreement with him: those ideas that we accepted were taken for granted among us. In addition, these "Notes" elaborate those points that we felt had to be made to warrant revision. Consequently, they concentrate on main problems without touching on the whole gamut of general methodological questions. We were not writing critical reviews; Lukács had asked us for recommendations for the revision of an already finished text. Although he was incredibly open to counterarguments and debates, if we had not kept to the pre-set framework but chose to present once again in writing our own doubts (which were already well

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known to him), our friend and teacher would have rightly seen this as impudence.

Moreover, even with the above reservations, the unprejudiced reader will immediately notice that the "Notes" are extraordinarily *critical* of the work. But this is only the *final result* of a very long process and it took shape only during our rereading of the completed work. When we knew only the general intentions and individual chapters, our evaluation of the project was much milder. This contradictory relation can be explained as our scientific and moral duty because even before our debates with Lukács we often referred to the work in progress in unmistakably positive terms in the Hungarian philosophical and cultural press.

III. In discussing our relation to the *Ontology* retrospectively, more than a decade after the beginning of the work, we should mention the incredibly intense liberating effect that this intellectual enterprise and the setting of its objectives had on all of us. Readers unfamiliar with our intellectual situation at that time will hardly understand this. Although we remain unshaken in our demand to transcend the bourgeois state of the world and convinced that this transcendence can and should be achieved with Marx as a starting point, since the middle 1950s, i.e., the time when we began to regard ourselves as philosophically independent, thinking human beings, we had increasingly more and deeper doubts, problems, and questions concerning the "traditional" Marxist philosophical framework. Following Kolakowski, we labelled the "traditional" framework the "extensional tendency."[3]

Since our philosophical childhood, we had sought a "philosophy of practice." Here it is unnecessary to describe in detail the close connection between this striving and the fact that we were students of the author of *History and Class Consciousness*, whose radical rejection of his masterpiece we never shared. (Of course, that was also connected to our reception of Gramsci.) Also attributable to Lukács' influence is that in the course of this process of clarification, we held firmly to Marxist philosophy's claim to universality in principle—at least contrary to a few related efforts that appeared internationally. Initially, it was unclear to what extent Marxist philosophy, postulated as "universal," was distinguishable from the science of the "most general laws." This is why, to the extent that we were still at the beginnings of our methodological reflection, in the spirit of the philosophy of *praxis*, we chose in "self-defense" the solution of dealing with the "extensional standpoint" in the framework of *sectoral disciplines*. The first important documents of this search were Heller's essay on ethics, written in 1957-58 as lectures and published eleven years later under the title *How Free Is Man?* and Markus' 1958 study on *The Epistemological Views of the Young Marx*—to mention just two specialized disciplines. This, naturally, brought about an unresolved philosophical compromise, which grew ever more intolerable as we developed. This compromise was not primarily imposed from outside, but dictated by our common feeling that the huge task of "reviewing the whole" far exceeded our own strength. Given these reservations, doubts, partial attempts to move ahead, and uncertainties, it is understandable why Lukács' decision to write *The Ontology of Social Reality* had such a liberating effect on us. This experience determined our "view" for several years as we read the various parts as they were completed, although some skepticism appeared with the very first chapters. Lukacs' decision at that time did not have

3. This systematization is "extensional" because it determines the object and task of Marxist philosophy by defining Marxist philosophy—in contrast to the *particularity* of the phenomena studied by the specialized sciences—as the contemplation of the *most general structures and laws* of nature, society and thought.

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merely a liberating effect on us: it was also a guarantee of success. We can be accused of overestimating Lukács' general results in the reform of 'traditional Marxism,' of not sufficiently clarifying the state of the question (especially methodologically), and of having in the 1960s approached our teacher with the partiality of students. This last statement is certainly accurate as a psychological fact of our development. Yet, even those who see the crystallization points of renewal in Althusser, in the Frankfurt School, or in Sartre must recognize Lukács' always *representative position* in the last phase of development of Marxist philosophy, which lasted for almost fifty years. Thus, our partiality was perhaps more than subjective preferences, and our expectation could probably lay claim to the rank of *hope* as conceived by Bloch.

This "hope" was reinforced by the most recent philosophical developments. Lukács' great work, *The Specificity of Aesthetics*, which had been published in the meantime, showed us the outline of such a general philosophical approach. Here we do not wish to deal with the aesthetic content of the work, especially his often challenged position on modern art, which some of us initially shared and dogmatically defended, while others never accepted it—but which, at any rate, all of us have abandoned in the last five years. The philosophical *novum* for us was the *theory of objectification* underlying the entire work. This theory provided a real answer to at least some of the unanswered questions formulated in Marx's philosophy. Since it was philosophically elaborated and seminal, it embodied Lukács' *true* self-critique of *History and Class Consciousness*: the metacritique of the apodictic judgment of the masterpiece of his youth since the generic character [*Gattungsmässigkeit*] in *The Specificity* was no longer a conceptual mythology. The book was also a grandiose attempt to develop the great generic spheres of objectifications (at least mental ones) from everyday practice and everyday thinking, within the framework of a unified conception. At the same time the work laid the foundations for a future *Methodenstreit* by linking the concept of certain great generic spheres of objectification and the values created by them as socio-representative answers to historically delimited concrete situations *with* their general generic validity. However onesided and disputable, this provided an answer to the old dilemma of the superstructural character of *historical value products* and their universally valid form: in short, to Marx's Homeric paradox.

This explains our expectations of the *Ontology* and at the same time clarifies what we agreed with: we expected a work that would carry out a synthesis between historicism and analysis on the universal generic level, between practice-centeredness and philosophical universality. Like every determination, this was also a negation of numerous trends within Marxism, co-existing or appearing at that time. It was, above all, a rejection of the above-mentioned "extensional conception": the projected synthesis absolutely ruled out the essentially positivistic conception of the "universal laws" of the "extensional conception" which homogenized nature and society and therefore eliminated any real human activity. At the same time, it also ruled out those famous reform attempts that sought to go beyond the irresoluble philosophical dilemmas caused by the traditional conception either by means of axiological reforms based on the eternal, hypostasized "human nature" or by the view that sees society as a complex consisting of the structure of structures. This synthesis also opposed those trends that—whether from the viewpoint of sociological relativism or epistemological decisionism—identify the philosophy of practice with mere ideology and culture critique. Thus we formulated our expectations of the *Ontology* rather sketchily, but also more concretely than a mere longing for a "great work."

Here, another personal element is theoretically important for understanding the

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later differences of opinion. Looking at the title of the work in progress, we accented "social reality" rather than the naturalistic implications of the "extensional conception," which we regarded as completely obsolete and methodologically untenable. At that time *Ontology* meant to us nothing more than these demands for a synthesis: the transcending of purely historicizing tendencies without becoming entangled in the net of "universal laws." Lukács himself, however, did not clarify his methodological position. After he rejected *History and Class Consciousness,* he ignored the fact that the book had created a "philosophical situation" (the "situation" of a Marxist historicism elaborated at so high a level of generalization, which paradoxically excluded generalizing systems as "reified"). This philosophical situation had to be dealt with in a methodological way which he himself wanted to overcome. While he wanted to build a "theoretical system," he still distrusted great philosophical *systems*—a distrust which he had once raised to a theoretical level in the critique of rationalism in *History and Class Consciousness* (and had further articulated in his review of Bukharin's work). Although, in his "Extorted Reconciliation," Adorno one-sidedly exaggerates the hostility toward ontology of *Against Misunderstood Realism* (which is extremely ambiguous and, to a certain extent, suggests merely a rejection of the ontology of an eternal *condition humaine*), those familiar with Lukács know that toward the end of the 1950s he used the expression "ontology" as an invective rather than as a constructive model. Even later, this term for him did not mean much more than an emphatic rejection of the dominant *epistemological approximation,* and was primarily motivated by a polemical attitude toward neo-positivism. We were perfectly in agreement in regard to this last intention. But as for the details of the critique we had serious reservations from the very beginning.

It was with these expectations that we read and interpreted the first chapters of the *Ontology* as they were finished and given to us. The work provided an *incentive* for us to seek to work out the central problems of Marxist philosophy—but without, of course, claiming the systematic universality of Lukács' book. In the 1960s, then, we undertook a series of studies to clarify and develop the same problems that were undertaken in the *Ontology.*[4] Purely from the viewpoint of the notes written on the *Ontology,* the effect of these studies on us was that, while Lukács wrote the book, we developed a common perspective both concerning the problems it tackled as well as the methodological problems it implicitly raised (of course, this did not eliminate mutual violent discussions among ourselves over the details—which still persist today). This common perspective also clarified for us the numerous differences that there were between Lukács' solutions and ours.

To forestall misunderstandings, two things should be pointed out. First, as usual, the writings on this subject were read by Lukács while they were still in manuscript form. He discussed their major thrust with us, and he always agreed with them—as he stated verbally and in writing. Since our introduction is no psychological study of Lukács, we do not want to analyze those elements of agreement which in some sense were related to our free interpretation of the *Ontology* as it was emerging. Since our discussions with Lukács were intellectual confrontations completely free and unre-

4. These were: György Markus, *Marxism and "Anthropology"* (1965); Agnes Heller, *Value and History* (1965); *Everyday Life* (1968); *Towards a Marxist Theory of Value* (1969), published as a special issue of *Kinesis,* III:1 (Spring, 1971); Mihaly Vajda, *Objective View of Nature and Social Practice* (1966); *To the Boundary of Myth and Reason* (1967); and Ferenc Fehér, "Is the Novel Problematic: A Contribution to the Theory of the Novel," *Telos,* 15 (Spring, 1973), pp. 47-74. Other philosophers and sociologists in Hungary at that time also held views close to our own. But here we only speak for ourselves.

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strained, and since we had absolute confidence in his attitude which was always unrestrained by diplomacy, theoretically unyielding, and absolutely candid, we tried to provide a *theoretical* and not a psychological answer to the question: how could he emphatically agree with such work whose conclusions he rejected? The theoretical solution was simple: he saw in them the continuation and elaboration of *his own last philosophical intentions*.

This agreement on philosophical intentions concealed a perhaps deeper, more essential unity: the evaluation and interpretation of our common ideological situation and task, which Lukács designated as "The Renaissance of Marxism." Since a no-man's-land of scholasticism extended between the great traditions of Marxism and the present, a return to Marx, and the conviction that, though no answer can be directly read out of Marx for present problems, they can be theoretically and practically solved only through a rediscovery of his theory's original meaning free of the distortions of "traditional" solutions. A common perspective on a whole series of issues dealt with in the *Ontology* developed on this common basic ground. They were: the natural precondition of the practical-social orientation of Marxist philosophy, the recognition of the central role of the category of "labor," the treatment of ideology as an actual force (not merely as a "superstructural reflex"), and the careful treatment of the central categories of alienation, which for decades had been unjustifiably relegated to the background despite the fact that they give a basis to real historical interpretation, etc.

Secondly, in order to reconcile our always emphatic and sincere feeling of solidarity and the paradox of our disappointment with the solutions proposed in the finished manuscript, we must stress the continuing genetic nature of the experience that culminated in the fall of 1968 with the rereading of the manuscript. Naturally, our initial enthusiasm had in the meantime changed into skepticism concerning even decisive key points. We could no longer claim a distinct experience of liberation in conversations and intellectual meetings. The most important of these conversations took place between Agnes Heller and Jürgen Habermas in May, 1966, on the occasion of a lecture in Frankfurt. Habermas showed considerable interest in Lukács' work: at that time the *Ontology* was already a topic of philosophical 'gossip' in West Germany, but completely unknown both in terms of content as well as text. When Heller summarized the content of the finished chapters and further plans, Habermas rejected the plan itself. To him, an effort of this sort seemed to contradict in principle the Marxist view of history in seeking to reintroduce the great systems of rationalism which belonged to the "historical past." Although carried out in a spirit of friendship and mutual respect, the discussion was heated: even then we did not *exclusively* accept the Frankfurt attempt at a positive solution – i.e., that every category can be investigated only in its concrete historical manifestation (one of the best examples of this is precisely Habermas' *Die Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit*, and its approach is not too different from ours, as can be seen from Heller's book, *Renaissance Man*). But when we went over the discussion among ourselves, it had a different effect; it aroused *methodological doubts* concerning the *Ontology* in two senses. First, it suddenly cast light on a fact that we had only vaguely felt, i.e., that the project's basic methodological principles had not been fully thought through; secondly, it raised once again the century-old dilemma of *Marxism as philosophy*: how historicity (history as the only science, to cite Marx) can be reconciled with systematic universality.

At this point we can only outline the *most essential* problems of discussion that united us in the fall of 1968 in relation to the completed text of the *Ontology*. Since it

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involves major philosophical problems, the following list can be replaced only by extensive studies or multi-volume monographs.

1. *The denial of the possibility of the dialectic of nature* and doubt that the creation of a comprehensive picture of nature is the task of philosophy. Although *History and Class Consciousness* never constituted "orthodoxy" for us, we accepted this idea without reserve. Thus, we were especially disappointed by a few negative apodictic judgments in the *Ontology* concerning certain stages of development of natural science. We felt that they were drawn by analogy from Lukács' annoyance with "modernistic" phenomena as a result of his concept of *decadence*, rather than based on competent judgments. All this did not, of course, mean the denial of the objectivity of self-existent nature, but only that nature as a philosophical theme obtains in the active material and spiritual relation of nature and society, i.e., as a decisive social problem.

2. *The rejection of the reflection theory* in epistemology (even within the framework of a realistically oriented epistemological effort). As can be seen From Feher's and Heller's numerous works written during the 1960s on Lukács' *Aesthetics* and on concrete aesthetic questions, for a long time we tried to expand and transform the concept. Thus, for example, in aesthetics we tried to replace it with the concept of mimesis (Lukacs' work actually offers indications along these lines) until we discovered that the category is useless. In Markus' and Vajda's writings on Wittgenstein, Husserl, perception, etc., as well as in parts of *Everyday Life* dealing with epistemological aspects, it became evident that we were unable to accept the *Ontology's* outspoken hostility to epistemology in the form of the alternative of *either* ontology *or* epistemology.

3. The emphasis on the idea of historical progress is an indispensable principle of socialism and of the practice aiming toward socialism—a principle that gives order and "meaning" to the past in terms of *today's historical situation*. If the selection and arrangement is right, this principle must have a "basis" in past history, and therefore is not arbitrarily selected but it is not one that can lay claim to any inevitable historical sequence. Accordingly, we rejected the naturalistic "conception of growth" even in economics.

4. In this connection we interpreted *historical determinism* only in the sense that for human beings born into ready-made conditions, there is a range of movement limited only by these conditions—a narrow or broad circle of possibilities of development and alternatives, whose realization depends only on the totality of consciously or unconsciously integrating human activities. We rejected "socio-historical laws" "independent" of human activities and their utility within a non-naturalistic conception.

5. *The central role of the concept of value within our perspective.* At this point we can formulate our relation toward the *Ontology* less polemically because, as readers of these "notes" can see, we found no truly consistent conception of value in Lukács. Basically, he was undecided whether to regard value as *only an economic category* or also as a "moral" one. In his youth—as can be seen from the Heidelberg manuscripts which came to light after his death—this category was crucial. After he became a Marxist, however, he came to regard the whole question as "ideological mystification." But on this point the *Ontology* vacillated between the two poles, neither of which (nor both together) we shared with him, as was most clearly formulated by Heller after certain debates and in agreement with all of us: value is a very general category belonging to the origin and essence of society. The discussion that ensued concerning

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this category concretized both the divergent interpretation of *ideal objectifications* in Lukács' *Ontology* and in our common view.

Since objections about content always involve *methodological* divergences of opinion, it is not surprising that our conversations were summed up in a "definition" of philosophy that did not coincide at all with the "practice" of the *Ontology*. The formulation is contained in Markus' 1968 article on "Debates and Tendencies in Marxist Philosophy" which, paradoxically enough, characterized our common perspective as "socio-ontological." This article was so much the result of our conversations and debates that all of us could literally call its conclusions our own: "The task of philosophy consists in shaping the alternatives of the *present* into conscious questions (and answers) by investigating today's underlying conflicts within the *total development* of mankind, by discovering the relation of alternatives to historically created values and thereby explaining their significance, their 'meaning,' from the viewpoint of all of human development. In this sense, philosophy is really nothing more than a constantly renewed 'summary of the general results...that can be abstracted from the observation of man's historical development' (Marx)—a summary that always originates in the present, and is the real ontology of social existence understood as history from the viewpoint of the development of 'human beings'." We are, of course, aware that this formulation is not yet an answer but at best the outline of an answer, not to the question: "What is 'the right' structure?" but to: "How do we visualize a possible Marxist philosophical 'structure' on the given level of the world situation of human thought, in the context of lessons drawn from many bitter fiascos, but at the same time from ever renewed reform efforts?" We cannot deal extensively with this here, but only indicate where it contradicts the real, though not internally resolved, aspirations of the *Ontology* and how our conception of the nature and structure of philosophy, i.e., *its methodological principle*, tried to answer the previous problems of content.

If the question were asked whether in the debates with Lukács on the *Ontology* all objections were formulated in this coherent form, our answer would be negative. As already mentioned, Lukács knew where our views deviated from his on all topics. A previously mentioned circumstance prevented us from putting forth a summary thesis-like formulation of our views. Lukács had asked for our collaboration to help him correct *his own work*. Personal gratitude and respect for him along with customary collegial spirit required that we regard the given manuscript (and not our own divergent opinion) as the point of departure. So a remarkable situation arose, especially after the series of conversations on the *Ontology*. Our point of view on ideal objectifications received a strange confirmation which was also unpleasant for us: once again, it turned out that even if what has already been expressed disposes over no "material body," it is present and influences thinking, as well as action. In the given case, it influenced philosophical action. For another year and a half, until Lukács' illness worsened, the discussions attracted wider and wider circles. By then it had become clear that there were *coherent divergences* and consequently, the discussions became more and more heated and laden with unusual personal animosity. The man who later would stare death in the face with Spartan equanimity, often referred in his last years to Goethe's Aristotelean experience and said repeatedly: "The developed entelechy really has a right to immortality." In this "really" we understood the touching flirtation with the idea of physical immortality hidden behind the cloak of impersonal professionalism. We understood the personal message of trust, so unusual for him; we were happy because this message showed us that his will lived on. But we

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could not console ourselves with the idea that developed entelechies were *in fact* immortal. In view of the increasingly sharper theoretical debates and the ever more personal atmosphere towards the end of his life, overcast by the painful shadow of extreme old age, another question is justified: why didn't we bring our differences of opinion before the public? Aside from circumstances we do not wish to elaborate on now and which could be considered secondary factors in our decision, we agreed not to formulate *during his lifetime* as a public polemic against him the things we had repeatedly said to him in private.[5] He was informed of our decision and agreed fully with it. Did this create some kind of unprincipled unity? To what extent this unity was principled or unprincipled is not for us to judge. About our own motives, with which Lukács was in full accord, we can only say that it was and remains our conviction that there can and ought to be intellectual differences—even essential ones—between philosophers who are in fundamental agreement. Within the same "school" or the same theoretical circle the existence of marked oppositions under the sign of theoretical divergences and quests for solutions is perfectly normal. What is required is only that they be made clear: one must neither dissolve them away nor give up the fundamental ideological unity and solidarity because of them.

"I am a friend of Plato, but truth is a better friend still"—for millennia this proverb has stood as the sign post of every philosophical crossroads. And since the "Notes" incontestably signal a parting of philosophical ways—within a more comprehensive final and unbroken unity—it would be natural for us to quote this as the conclusion to this "Introduction." We will not do so, for reasons which were transformed into moral imperatives by personal experiences and memories affecting our whole lives. In socialism, we chose a goal that guides our activity and in which there is no absolute split between truth as an objectification hovering above human circumstances and human relations as ephemeral entities bearing little or no value content and regardable from the viewpoint of philosophy as negligible quantities. The great thinker was our friend, and he best proved this in discussions about the work intended as his masterpiece. Those who showed him the inner contradictions of the work he had written as the crown and legacy of his philosophy were the same persons whom he had introduced to the mother-tongue of philosophy and who had learned to think within his intellectual aura. Therefore, his attitude in responding became an unforgettable message and obligation for us. His cool discipline did not reveal a trace of the great burden of his destiny, in many respects tragic, that loomed ahead. He had to begin his work of summing up at an age when Hobbes could do nothing more than play tennis. Here his marginal comments, which expressed his agreement or showed his intention to consider ideas are our witnesses, since for the first time in his life he was contemplating, on the basis of remarks by students, whether or not to correct or revise the work he had thought to be finished. His Socratic joviality which he had adopted in old age from his favorite sage, and his inexhaustible energy of argumentation, which

5. Something should be said about "secondary factors." In the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 11 (1969), R. Beyer published, under the title "Marxist Ontology—An Idealistic Fashion Creation," a critique of the conversational, introductory summary of the *Ontology* that appeared in the book *Conversations with Georg Lukács* and in the lecture "The Ontological Foundations of Human Thought and Action" written in 1970 for the Philosophical World Congress in Vienna, which briefly summarized the entire work. Although Beyer's critique, written in a decidedly libellous tone, did give some of the problematic of ontology as method and could have spurred on a philosophical discussion, Ferenc Fehér's reply on behalf of all of us in *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle*, 1 (1970), rejected the possibility of philosophical discussion with such a partner, who transformed a theoretical question into a thoroughly unfounded and malicious ideological and political denunciation.

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seemed to belie his years even in his physical gestures, together with such understanding of the opposing viewpoint, with such respect for polemical philosophical intentions, gave those evenings an unforgettable atmosphere.

Georg Lukács firmly believed in the truth of his standpoint and yet when we claimed the truth for our side and outlined our views which were opposed to his in decisive respects, he accepted them as justified *though* contestable. The basic intellectual attitude we shared, summed up in the term of "revolutionary tolerance," uncompromisingly rejects every perspective that does not seek a liberated human race or that regards this "regulative idea" as an obsolete illusion of this century and feels no duty towards it. Our basic intellectual attitude supports a theoretical collaboration based on critical understanding with all efforts that, as witnessed by their words and deeds, aim at the realization of these goals. This "revolutionary tolerance" had long lived in us as an intention, but now it was crystallized into a concrete principle in the course of these conversations. This was the *philosophical message* of the long debate that transformed our unfading memory of our teacher and friend into a didactic model of thought.

Budapest, January 1975

Notes on the First Part of the Ontology

I. In our judgment, the first part contains two ontologies, contradictory in many essential points. The first regards the process that begins with the humanization of man through labor as "necessary in reality" (incidentally, we do *not* understand how the "real necessity" of any process is distinguished from logical necessity), as a process in the economic sphere which, understood as the "essential sphere," is *always completely realized* through human mediations and, on the phenomenal level, with numerous variations, even through accidents.

The second conception: with the humanization of man through labor, there arose the *possibility* of the development of the three fundamental factors.[6] In "prehistory" these tendencies develop independently of human will, but by no means necessarily. Since the continuity of human history is assured by the objectifications of needs, abilities, activities, etc., the field of operation of human action is determined by the objectifications that have already been made. This field of operation therefore determines alternative possibilities, whose solution, undertaken in this or that manner, decides the course of development for longer historical periods. We can speak of necessity only with regard to the inner movement of some formations, but not in relation to historical transitions.

The most important factors pointing to the first conception of the Ontology: we drew them first from the chapter on Marx, for although most statements of the previous chapters point in this direction, the co-existence of the two ontological conceptions is nowhere as clearly perceptible as there.

1. You state for the first time on pp. 295-96[7] (but repeat it frequently later on; in fact, the whole second part of the Marx chapter is expressly built on it), that the

6. The first factor is the tendency for the amount of work necessary for the physical reproduction of man to constantly decrease. The second factor is that the naturally given [*naturwüchsig*] is originally dominant in work. In later development work becomes more and more socialized with the division of labor that sprang from work and everything based on it. Social categories form, so to speak, a more and more cohesive stratum that rises above the psychologically given existence of man and modifies him. The third factor is the progressively more developed integration of societies that belong together. (This and all other footnotes were written in 1975 to help the reader.)

7. Pages are given for the original typed manuscript.

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economic sphere is the *essence* of the process of reproduction (it is at the same time also the terrain of necessity), but everything else belongs to the *phenomenal* sphere (and accordingly constitutes the terrain of contingency). Consequently, capitalism and socialism differ only in the phenomenal sphere (which, incidentally, most drastically contradicts the paper on democratization).[8]

2. The sharp distinction between social existence and social consciousness. —This is a problem extending through the entire work, which is given many completely different solutions in all the chapters (often the various solutions are intermixed even in a single chapter). Already in the first chapter the relationship of reality (*Wirklichkeit*), being (*Sein*), and reflection remains unclarified. On page 4: "If this [the central position of the dialectical reflection of objective reality] is neglected, then there necessarily results a constant intermingling of objective reality and its—ontologically always directly subjective reflection." In the chapter on Marx, page 306: "Marx everywhere sharply separates the two components: social reality, which exists independently of whether it is more or less correctly known, and the method of its most adequate understanding possible." Already here we would like to point out that in the chapter on labor, consciousness becomes a specific form of *non-being* (p. 481) and *non-reality* (p. 476). From the above-mentioned distinction between being and consciousness (or reality and consciousness!) it follows that in several places Marx's statement: "they don't know it, but they do it," is understood not only as a typical phenomenon of prehistory but as a *universal socio-ontological fact*. In our opinion, all this is incongruous with statements pointing in the direction of the second conception of ontology, claiming that human consciousness does not have epiphenomenal character but has a decisive socio-ontological relevance, as it turns out later in the chapter on ideology.

3. The course of history is constituted in the laws determining its entirety and whose negation leads to irrationalism (p. 401). Most noticeably in the passage on page 376: "the sequence and separation of economic formations, the kinds of class struggle possible in them, are in their great underlying tendencies strictly determined by the general laws of the economy." The consequence is the complete qualitative identification of natural laws and social laws in statements to the effect that nature and society differ only in their complexity, in the quantitative divergence of their effective factors. The application of physical analogies in the treatment of social phenomena (e.g., statistical laws) points in the same direction.

4. The first three chapters point in their entirety in this direction (with the exception of the analyses of Wittgenstein and Heidegger and the passage on religious needs), by raising it to a basic question whether philosophy *occupies itself* with epistemology or with ontology, and not whether its point of departure is the isolated (necessarily exclusively knowing) individual, or social totality. That a philosophical standpoint based on ontology can be just as negative and amenable to manipulation as one based on epistemology is not even considered (with the only exception of an ontology that starts from the conception of transcendence). The denial of all possible forms of ideal objectifications seems especially important from this viewpoint (cf. the chapter on Hartmann), since Comrade Lukács evaluates even the mere *existence* of Hartmann's natural ontology as a positive thing, while at the same time proving that this natural ontology *can* provide *no* basis for a materialistic socio-ontology.

8. This is a reference to a manuscript on questions of socialist democratization written by Lukács in the second half of 1968. To this day, only a short section of it has appeared in print, under the title "Lenin and the Question of the Transition Period," in *Lenin* (Budapest, 1970).

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The factors pointing to the second conception of ontology appear first when Comrade Lukács criticizes traditional Marxism 1) Cf. the ontological relevance of consciousness (p. 411); 2) On the "Homer-problem":[9] social continuity cannot be reduced to economic development (pp. 436ff); 3) Traditional Marxism replaced the alternatives by a mechanical conception of necessity; 4) The false dualism of being and consciousness in traditional Marxism (p. 425).

II. The first three chapters bring up problems that are not specifically socio-ontological, but general-ontological, and occasionally natural-ontological. But with respect to natural ontology these attempts at a solution contain several contradictions: 1) A few passages give the appearance that philosophy, in reference to the natural sciences, has the task of criticizing them. But in that case it is unclear whence could this critique proceed. It often seems as if the basis of this critique were the standpoint of common sense; 2) Elsewhere the argument gives the impression that philosophy itself is called on to solve certain problems of transition between various spheres of nature; 3) Sometimes a conception seems to glimmer through that the task of natural ontology is the synthesis of the facts and laws discovered by the various natural sciences, the construction of a total image of nature; 4) In many cases, however, a conception appears to the effect that philosophy must not meddle at all in problems of the knowledge of nature.

Consequently, it remains unclear whether a natural philosophy is needed or whether philosophy can be satisfied with adopting the world image presented by natural science (presupposing, at any rate, the existence of nature). But if we assume the standpoint that a separate natural ontology is indispensable, then we must decide how it is to be conceived. In this respect, there are again two different standpoints: 1) Natural ontology formulates the most general laws of nature (i.e., such as apply to nature's great spheres of being), namely that laws undergo only a change of form in the transition from one sphere to the other; 2) Natural ontology is clearly historical, i.e., it describes the particular categorical structures of the respective spheres of being.

In regard to natural ontology, two factors appear with which we can in no way agree: a) the positing of a universal evolution of nature. (This inescapably implies teleology!) b) A concept of being (*Sein*) so general that it presupposes only a quantitative difference in regard to the reality of nature and social reality, to contrast the concept of consciousness with this being. (Being and reflection: the sharp distinction of reality and reflection without considering that reflection is an element of the social sphere of being itself.)

III. A few important partial remarks: The critique of Einstein (from p. 46, and later, pp. 103ff)—which deals with no questions affecting the basic conception of the book—should be omitted. This would be all the more advisable since Einstein's statements on the relation of physics and geometry are not suited for the critique of neo-positivism. For neo-positivists assume a diametrically opposite position on the question. According to them, mathematics (including geometry) consists of analytical sentences in contrast to the synthetic-empirical character of physics. Classical neo-positivism is characterized precisely by its sharp contrasting of geometry and physics, and not at all by the claim that geometry is part of physics. Among positive remarks made in the course of the critique, there are also some that are not exact: e.g., "First,

9. "But the difficulty lies not in understanding that the Greek arts and epic are bound up with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still afford us artistic pleasure and in a certain respect they count as a valid norm and as an unattainable model." Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London, 1973), p. 111.

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geometrical statements are not at all logically proven... Secondly, such sentences need no substantiation in physical reality."

On page 133, there is another unwarranted statement in the critique of Einstein. We have in mind here the space-time continuum. Einstein repeatedly emphasized that the four-dimensional space-time continuum constitutes a "homogeneous," undifferentiated coordinate system only in mathematical formalism (which would correspond with the comments on mathematics as a homogeneous system), but in physics the four coordinates are not equivalent in their interpretation; the coordinates of time and space are not interchangeable there, for the simple reason that time is irreversible. 5) In the chapter on Hegel, it is not clear what you mean by Hegel's two conceptions of ontology. 6) That the philosophy of nature was described on p. 205 as the high point of Hegel's system completely retracts the basic idea of the book *The Young Hegel.*

The Chapter on Labor

I. In our view the greatest defect of this chapter is that the problem of objectification remains unsolved—indeed, is not even posed, which is the same reproach Comrade Lukács levelled against his own *History and Class Consciousness.* This has severe structural consequences for the whole conception. Labor appears exclusively as the positing and the realization of the goal. Not a word is said to the effect that labor is an act that creates social objectivity, and so the side of labor that—according to Marx's view—brings about the historicity of social being, is neglected. As a result, the problem of the genesis of individual goal positing practically does not appear. It follows that the individual workers' goal is either a reflection of biological needs—transformed into consciousness—(this assumption excludes the development of needs, and implies that human needs cannot at all emerge), or if this goal is the autonomous product of consciousness, then it is consciousness that creates and carries sociability.

Our proposal is that Comrade Lukács insert a new section analyzing the problems of the objectification of the labor process, the sociability of the goals posited in the labor process, and the historical genesis of needs.

II. Neglecting the problem of objectification[10] causes difficult problems in the treatment of the alternative character of the labor process. Since the social goals objectified in the tools or means of labor and their genesis are excluded from the scope of analysis, the goal of the labor process always appears as something pregiven and the alternatives of the working individual are restricted to a choice of means and methods for achieving the pre-established goal. On p. 488, Comrade Lukács even states that only the means have an alternative character. This narrows down the whole field of alternatives: alternatives exist only for the individual. No social alternatives can exist within this conception. Of course, if we interpret alternatives always as an act of consciousness (p. 484), always as a recognized alternative possibility (p. 488), then we must necessarily differentiate the social alternatives from the objective social possibilities. But the reduction of the problem of alternatives to the mere aspect of means leaves no room, on the social level, either for conscious alternatives or for objective possibilities. This narrowing down of the alternative-problem would be eliminated by the insertion of the recommended new section: it would become evident that the sphere of possible goals is determined by the objectifications which previous gener-

10. *Editors' note*: The authors use *targyiasulas* (objectification) here in relation to work and *objektvasio* (objectivation) in relation to the whole complex of the externalizations of various dimensions of human subjectivity.

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ations produced in history, but within this sphere working individuals in the labor process can themselves choose not only the means for realizing the goals, but also the goals which they want to achieve.

III. That the various fundamental categories of social ontology came about in labor does not mean that labor can serve as the model for all heterogeneous forms of activity: the categorical structures of various forms of activity are obviously fundamentally different, as is clearly shown later in the analysis of reproduction.

IV. The considerations on the relation of theory and practice (pp. 513-16) should be omitted since they are not at all clear. Anyway, the whole problem is analyzed where Lukács deals with ideology. Here—if we consider the viewpoint of the *Aesthetics*—the question is completely out of place. In the everyday forms of activity, theory and practice form an inseparable unity.

V. Likewise we recommend that the analysis of the category of value be moved to the chapter on reproduction. Here it fully suffices if you reiterate the following (p. 516ff): moments of the normative, of the *ought* (*Sollen*) appear already in labor. To us, this proposal seems justified because there are many contradictions in the analysis of value, both within this chapter and among the different chapters. Only a few examples: you claim on p. 526 that value is nothing but the principle of evaluation of the manufactured product; at the same time it turns out, on p. 546, that value does not necessarily contain a conscious factor. Or: you claim several times that value (all sorts of value, value in general) is reducible to utility and success (incidentally, in our opinion, utility is only an everyday concept: philosophy can find no use for it), but later, with the appearance of moral value, you claim that this cannot be derived from utility. In the chapter on reproduction, you even go so far as to regard economic development as neutral (p. 636). —The problem of value conflicts remains unresolved. We find it, moreover, highly problematic that you divide values into only two groups, economic or moral.

We will return to the problem of value in reference to the chapter on reproduction but at this point we wish to recommend Heller's work on value and history,[11] which tries, on the basis of Markus' "Anthropology,"[12] to outline a conception of value.

VI. We have very serious doubts about the proposed solution to the problem of freedom. First, we consider the critique of Engels (pp. 571ff.) to be petty. It does not catch the main point of the view of freedom depicted by Engels. It should be emphasized that here only the freedom actualized in labor was taken into consideration, i.e., man's freedom in regard to nature (social freedom has another meaning even ontologically), and not the problem of freedom in general. Still, we find the solution, even within the framework of these limited objectives, completely onesided: man's freedom toward his own instincts is also a factor in this respect. (In the later chapters it becomes clear that one cannot speak at all about freedom in general; one can only speak of freedoms.)

VII. We wish to call your attention to the most important parts in which the "ontology of necessity" is introduced even in the chapter on labor: a) consciousness as

11. Agnes Heller, "Value and History," in *Alltag und Geschichte* (Luchterhand, 1970), and "Towards a Marxist Theory of Value," *op.cit.*

12. György Markus, *Marxism and "Anthropology."*

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non-existent (p. 481); b) the positings of consciousness are as such non-existent acts (p. 482); c) the natural necessity of social events (p. 582); d) essence—appearance (p. 542); e) *dynamis*, as non-being, non-reality (pp. 485ff: the plan of a factory)—that something really is, is not determined by its objectivity and its form, but by the function it plays in society; f) we cannot agree at all with the reduction of consciousness to the reflection of reality: if consciousness were really just this reflection, how would we understand that the realization of that which is formed in consciousness produces something new? g) the juxtaposition of manipulation and science (p. 574). Practice based on the sciences can also be manipulated!

VII. A few other problems: a) We consider it an unfortunate formulation (p. 63) that the object of the ontological positing is either rightly understood or one can speak of no positing. False consciousness! b) The conception of the *Aesthetics* that science grows directly out of the labor experience is sharply contradicted on pp. 468-70. The immediate experiences of labor can also be built into myths.

The Chapter on Reproduction

I. Theoretical Problems and Objections.

1. Freedom and alternatives. On p. 623 you write: "as regards the general ontology of society, the problem of freedom means only that the individual's situation is increasingly determined by accidents once general economic laws come to the foreground." But on p. 624 you claim that it is only the *appearance* of freedom. Consequently, no ontological relevance can be ascribed to freedom. We cannot accept this at all. The increasing role of chance in individual decisions would, of course, actually create only the appearance of freedom. But the problem of *social freedom* cannot be treated in relation to the categories "necessity-chance."

As a result of the use of labor as a direct model, the alternative character of all individual decisions and the problem of individual *autonomy* are not differentiated. The idea of autonomy (whereby one could later return to the real problems of freedom) does not appear at all in this chapter. In fact, the passage on p. 740 gives the appearance that Comrade Lukács denies the autonomy of individual men. From the fact that questions are always already objectively posed (here, too, it is not irrelevant what mediations are used to answer them), it does not follow that man reacts to these questions unmoved by his own inner impulses!

We already indicated in connection with the chapter on labor that the lack of a separate discussion of social objectifications raises difficult theoretical problems. One is that *the role of consciousness remains unclarified*. While up to this point one of our most important objections was that Comrade Lukács contrasts objective evolution with its merely subjective reflection (consciousness), we can find here exactly the opposite extreme: *consciousness appears as the bearer of the continuity of social being*. Statements on pp. 647-650 allow two interpretations: a) Social being-in-itself is also an objective and necessary process, independent of consciousness, and is merely modified by human consciousness: "Thus, the process' objective laws are by no means abolished, but at times they are modified, even decisively." The statement on p. 647 also points to the same idea, whereby the meaning of the claim "without consciousness no sociability" is as follows: sociability rises to the level of being-for-itself only by attaining consciousness. b) In social evolution in general (i.e., from the moment when man ceases to be a dumb genus which can, in our opinion, mean only this: he ceases to be a brute animal) consciousness unambiguously takes on the directing, leading role.

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Page 647: The continuity of the social process is guided and steered by the forms and contents of consciousness; consciousness is the organ of continuity. Page 648: The specific trait of social being, in contrast with all other forms of being, is consciousness as the medium of continuity. Page 743 also speaks of the leading role of consciousness.

In our opinion, this vacillation between two extremes stems from the neglecting of the objectifications (on pp. 652 and 665 the role of the bearer of continuity is assumed by language!)

3. The categorical confusion in the treatment of genericness (*Gattungsmässigkeit*) is another consequence resulting from the neglect of objectifications (pp. 635-38, and pp. 645-61). The categories of *dumb* (*stumme*) *genericness, genericness in itself* (*an sich*) and *genericness for itself* (*für sich*) are not clearly differentiated. Actually the category of dumb genericness is identified (although not unambiguously) with genericness in itself on the one hand, that of no-longer-dumb genericness with genericness for itself, on the other. The result is statements such as: the transcendence above the state of dumb genus has its source in the world market (p. 636); no-longer-dumb genericness still appears in dumb form (p. 645), etc. At the same time, we find formulations such as the following: man's genericness-for-himself really originates with labor (p. 646).

Besides the fact that the general line of thought is completely confused by this, our basic objection is that the essential idea expressed here, that genericness-for-itself can only be a category applicable to all mankind, contradicts the basic conception of the *Aesthetics*. If science and art are for themselves generic objectifications, then it would follow from the above remarks that they could not have come about before the existence of the world market.

The identification of dumb genericness with genericness-in-itself also leads to the identification of ontological reproduction with biological reproduction, and the identification of the last two with the economic sphere (p. 706), which we cannot accept.

4. Our basic objections are that Comrade Lukács—leaving the specific terrain of social ontology undetermined—excludes several fundamental questions of reproduction from ontology. On page 620 you state that politics is not a part of social ontology (although you analyze it extensively in the chapter on ideology); in numerous passages (and increasingly more in the following chapters) you refer many questions—basic ones from the viewpoint of social evolution—to ethics, etc. In our view, social ontology should comprehend society as a whole, and if detailed studies of a few parts belong to special disciplines, this cannot mean that any parts of the whole transcend ontology.

This chapter too clearly shows that the problem of value remains completely unresolved. On page 630, value grows with existential necessity from labor; while on page 636, value is ontologically secondary; the economy (and production in general) is neutral; on page 638 value appears as being-in-itself; and on page 756 all values are transferred to ethics: they lie outside ontology. A few statements clearly exclude the problem of value from ontology: on page 726 the separation of ontology and value is set at the foundation of Marx's materialist view of social being. Here you claim that all normative statements are arbitrary.

6. We do not agree with you in understanding the social totality as a complex—composed of complexes—within which only one of the complexes (the economic one) is dynamic, and it is so powerful that it determines the movements of all other complexes (pp. 700-701).

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II. Theoretical Objections on a Few Partial Problems.

1. The treatment of the division of labor is inadequate. It contains several statements that contradict Marx's ideas: e.g., you identify the origin of the division of labor with the origin of handicrafts; on page 613 you say that the technical division of labor (what is that?) originated in primitive times. On page 614, then, Marx's idea is explicated to the effect that the division of labor came about with the separation of mental and physical labor.

On the division of labor, we make two recommendations: a) Use Marx's distinction between natural and social divisions of labor, or rather natural and naturally-given (*naturwüchsig*) divisions of labor, as your point of departure. b) Do not interrupt the analysis of the problem of the division of labor by interjecting the treatment of needs, food, sexuality and education. These parts should be removed and dealt with before the study of the division of labor.

2. Our problems with respect to the analysis of language are as follows: a) We disagree that language supposedly evolves further: we do not understand at all what this is supposed to mean. For what you state on page 593—that language is becoming capable of naming ever more objects—does not bear scrutiny. It follows from that nature of language that every object ought to be nameable. b) The relation of thought and language remains unclarified. Consequently, on page 665, language turns out to be reflection. What does it reflect? c) On page 653, animal language and conventional human signs cannot be identified! Humans have agreed on conventional signs *by means of language*.

3. Antiquity cannot be called a slave society: especially its essence should not be seen in slave holding (pp. 621, 711, and throughout the whole chapter). On the last point, where you deal with the development of social formations on the basis of Marx, you also characterize it in a completely different manner.

4. We have problems with the analysis of law. Our main objection is that your judgment of its role is completely negative. You never mention that the origin of positive law was a great progress. You also do not take into consideration that persistence in legal forms, even in the contemporary historical period, plays a far more positive role than a negative one. One cannot look down at law from the heights of communism. A few unacceptable details are also linked with this basic view (p. 688). The concept of justice is said to arise as a reaction to the formal character of law (you disregard that there is not only a moral, but also a legal justice, and that the two are not identical). Law appears purely as a means of class oppression. You do not consider law as the offspring of Greek democracy. You brand every effort at a rational regulation of law as reactionary positivism, without considering how significant the French revolution's return to Roman law has been, etc.

Other remarks on the question of law: a) An analysis of the relation of law and property is missing. b) It is not true that law and ethics were identical in antiquity (p. 676)! c) What does it mean to say that law is a reflection (pp. 683-84)? And what about the other statement, that it reflects the economy (p. 686)? d) It is not true that morality arose as a reaction to the formal character of law (p. 688).

II. A few of the already listed objections are also connected with the problem of necessity. Other such passages include: on p. 591: The stagnation of the productive forces is a mere appearance. The development of the productive forces always takes place necessarily, and undeterredly. (But from p. 599 on, the line of thought is reversed and you condemn the point you just made as positivism.) Secondly, although the sequence of social formations is not preordained, it is necessary.

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The Chapter on Ideology

1. We recommend that Comrade Lukács omit the first two points of the chapter—except for passages discussed below which should be treated elsewhere. The abridgement of the book—which we have already agreed with—would, in any case, be desirable, and the two points mentioned add hardly anything new to what was depicted in the preceding chapters. The first point (the ideal [*das Ideelle*] in the economy) is almost entirely repeated from the chapter on labor, but is at the same time less clearly organized. The second point (on the ontology of the ideal moment) likewise reiterates earlier points without providing the analysis of the ideal moments. The content of the categories dealt with should be more precisely circumscribed. In the text, objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*) refers to the process of objectifying human abilities in general, and also (in objective and non-objective form) objectified human abilities themselves, etc. A distinction must absolutely be made between these, otherwise the reader cannot find his way in the text. The category of externalization (*Entäusserung*) also has two meanings: it means the development of the subject's abilities in history through his objective activities, but also the *way and manner* the subject is expressed in his objective activity. Moreover, the reader ought also to be reminded that here Comrade Lukács does not use the term "externalization" in Hegel's and Marx's sense of the word—as a synonym for alienation (*Entfremdung*)—as he did in *The Young Hegel* (there alienation is called "*Entäusserung*" even in the chapter title).

2. On pp. 873-75, you deal with the problem of the historicity of needs. The point ought to be transposed to the chapter on labor; we expressly suggested in that context that this problem should be dealt with there.

II. Here we summarize our remarks on the use of the pair of categories essence-appearance. Our main points have already been made in connection with the previous chapter. The altogether too ambiguous use of this pair of categories extends through the entire work. Now we list the most frequently occurring interpretations, with the help of examples: a) Essence is surplus value, whose appearance is profit; b) Essence is capitalism, whose appearances are its concrete forms that differ depending on time and place (French, English, etc); c) Essence consists of three underlying tendencies of human history—among their appearances is everything that is determined by these factors or constructed upon them; d) Essence is the fact of nature that the earth turns on its axis, while its appearance is the sun rising and setting; e) The development of essential human forces has the emptying of the individual as an appearance.

Since Comrade Lukács uses the pair of categories in such different contexts, its content is completely blurred. In our view, it deals with ever different things. A more precise contentual differentiation would be all the more necessary since the grouping of unrelated problems should not be done for merely semantic reasons. One of the most striking examples of this occurs when Comrade Lukács deals with Goethe's question of duration and change immediately after the analysis of the relation between surplus value and profit. But the latter bears no relation to the former: what does it mean to say that surplus value is duration in the change of profit? What is more important is that this ambiguous use of the category pair results in the confusion of principles.

1. The use of these categories as in example a) above (Marx also used the two categories in this sense as coherent and systematically applied technical terms) uncovers a social ontological problem of fundamental importance: namely, that as

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long as the teleological positings move in the phenomenal sphere, the given formation cannot be transcended. (For Marx, bourgeois political economy is the reflection of the phenomenal world.) Once this interpretation of the *essence-appearance* category pair is terminologically confused with other problems (e.g., the relation between content and form), then Marx's entire conception loses its sharpness.

2. The problem of essence and existence plays a fundamental role in Marx (the *Ontology* also points to this in precisely the same terminology—in the analysis of Engels' critique of Feuerbach). But, again to preserve Marx's distinct contributions, this problem should be sharply distinguished from the problem referred to in point 1 above.

III. The whole chapter is now dominated by the second ontology, but here too some formulations tend to contradict this conception: on page 980, the development of essence is independent of teleological positings. The statement that the total historical process reveals a non-teleological character does not mean that anything could happen in society which is not the result of teleological positings. Page 1000: Human decisions only speed up or slow down the developmental process of necessity-essence. *Wesen* is determined independently of these. By whom or by what? Again on page 1000: Objective social determination and human activity are mutually factors of development. Page 1013: Economic development is essentially necessary. (This clearly contradicts the thesis that it is a question of tendencies.) Page 1023: The development of essence is independent of human activity. Page 1025: The area of necessity and essence. The area of freedom and appearance. Page 1027: The area of necessity is, even in communism, independent of conscious positings (cf. the essay on democratization).

IV Other Problems.

1. The concept of ideology depicted on pp. 951-52 is too general: if ideology means only that every appearance is determined by the circumstances of its origin, then ideology is identical with sociability or with reality itself.

2. On page 955, the statement is made that ideology exists only in societies with opposing interest groups. This does not fit the facts: e.g., magic is also ideology. On the other hand, Comrade Lukács also holds the view that there will be ideologies even in communism.

3. Page 967: The functional interpretation of ideology should not lead to regard the relation of ideology and truth as completely irrelevant. The problem should absolutely be dealt with.

4. Page 989: We simply do not understand the statement that law is epistemologically false.

5. Why does politics belong to the phenomenal sphere (p. 994)? In addition, we have several other problems about the ideas on politics: Politics is not clearly differentiated from political ideology. Problems of power and of the state are missing from the treatment of politics. The problem of the content of political objectives is not even raised. So politics is equated with tactics, for the positing of a right politics becomes identical with a successful political positing.

6. We cannot accept that reification (*Verdinglichung*) is nothing but the congealing of processes. The problem is not an epistemological one. What was said in *History and Class Consciousness* is still valid today in this regard (p. 1052).

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The Chapter on Alienation

1. We disagree with the *basic conception* of this chapter: according to it, alienation (or more precisely, alienations) is a category that applies only to individuals, i.e., it is a theoretical category of personality, but not an historical one. (What you stated in the last chapter of *The Young Hegel* and in the monograph on Marx contradicts this.) In this chapter of *The Ontology*, alienation is a phenomenon in all societies only to the extent that in them the majority of individuals live a generally alienated life. The statements in *The German Ideology* on alienation contradicting such an individual-oriented interpretation are not even mentioned in this chapter. From *The German Ideology* it is clear that in Marx, alienation is not a collective term for various negative phenomena, but the main factor of prior history: "This congealing of social activity, this consolidation of our own product into an objective power over ourselves, that grows beyond our control, frustrates our expectations, voids our calculations, is one of the main factors in previous historical development..."[13]

The following is also clearly formulated for the first time in *The German Ideology*: that the social division of labor and alienation constitute (even in the mature Marx) inseparable factors of prior history. The chapter, however, does not analyze the problem of the division of labor at all. We would like to remind you that in your monograph on Marx you did not discuss alienation in reference to the individual despite the fact that there you studied Marx's development only up to the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, where Marx regards alienation, if not in reference to the individual, at least from the standpoint of the individual.

Of course, one of the problems stressed in the chapter—the discrepancy between the development of human abilities and the development of human personality (a phenomenon produced by alienation)—is the way alienation is mediated. In Marx, however, it is not a question of a discrepancy between the ability and personality of the same man, but of a discrepancy between the development of objectified *abilities* of the human *genus*, and the impoverishment of the individual's personality (and ability).

As a result of the basic conception in Comrade Lukács, the struggle against alienation and the struggle against subjective projections of alienation are identified, which turns out to be equal to--and likewise we cannot agree with this—the struggle of the individual against his own alienation. We also regard—within the world of alienation—the struggle against the crippling of personalities and other effects of alienation, as important factors. But this is not the struggle against my own alienation. Comrade Lukács goes so far—especially on the first point—as to state: the individual is capable of abolishing his own alienations even independently of his concrete social situation. But this can only mean the transcendence of alienation in consciousness.

II. In regard to two categories, we sense underlying conceptual unclarities:

1. *Genericness*. Neither the category of genericness-in-itself nor that of genericness-for-itself is clearly explained. The use of the two categories gives the appearance of being applicable to the human genus, indeed, even to the historical process, but at the same time also to single human individuals. As to the social process, genericness-in-itself seems to mean irresistible economic development (p. 1132), in contrast to genericness-for-itself, which means the consciousness built upon the genericness-in-itself, the known objectifications, while in reference to the individual genericness-in-itself would mean particularly in contrast to the non-particular individual dedicated

13. K. Marx, *Werke*, 18 (Dietz edition), p. 33.

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to a cause, to genericness-for-itself. In one place you speak (p. 1130) of the genericness-in-itself and genericness-for-itself of the artist as a human individual.

2. *Reification*. Again it is not clear what this means. It seems—exactly as in the ideology chapter—to be a stepping out of the process, the rigidification of process, but at the same time it is also identical with false consciousness, with commodity fetishism, etc.

III. We do not agree with you regarding the transcendence of alienation as a "by-product" of socialist revolution. Your work on Marx, your essay on democratization, etc., are built on the correct (in our opinion) conception that the transcendence of alienation is a fundamental moment of communism, as communism is a society without alienation—i.e., unalienated, genuine history. However, in many places of your political analysis, the insight breaks through that the revolutionary movements of our day are directed expressly against alienation.

*Utopian Consciousness and False Consciousness**

by Joseph Gabel

The concept of false consciousness occupies a unique place in Marxist theory. It is still rarely used by Marxists and, unlike the theory of alienation, is just beginning to penetrate non-Marxist intellectual life. Only quite recently has it entered the university, having previously been suspended in a kind of no-man's-land between an orthodox Marxism that had rejected it and the so-called "bourgeois" thought which did not accept it. Following Lukács, Lucien Goldmann was very interested in the problem of false consciousness, though he did not make it the central theme of his works.[1] While to my mind he had a debatable interpretation of the question, he did have the merit of posing an important problem. Goldmann essentially saw the phenomenon of false consciousness as a collection of errors—inadequate theories—conditioned by the given sociological situation. From this perspective the theory of false consciousness would be situated in the trajectory of the sociology of knowledge and of epistemology.

For me, on the contrary, false consciousness indeed appears to be a form of inadequacy, but one which goes beyond the notion of error. It is a type of *insane* (*délirant*)—more precisely, *schizophrenic*—inadequacy. Consequently its study should be situated as an extension of the theory of alienation and of psychopathology and only indirectly concern epistemology and the sociology of knowledge. The following simple example illustrates the difference between ordinary and pathological error. Imagine two neighbors, a foreign military attaché and a peaceful tradesman. Their telephone lines are connected to the same cable which is not functioning properly. They hear

*An edited and slightly condensed version of a lecture given at the colloquium on "Utopian Discourse," Cerisy-la-Salle, summer 1975. Translated from the French by Lynn Layton and Russell Berman.

1. Lucien Goldmann, "Conscience réelle et conscience possible: conscience adéquate et fausse conscience" (1959), now collected in *Marxisme et sciences humaines* (Paris, 1970), pp. 121-129.

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interference and both come to the same conclusion: tapped lines. Thus materially they are making the *same* mistake, and yet, in another sense, *it is not the same*. For the normal mode of "being-in-the-world" for the military attaché implies the possibility, even the probability, of having his line tapped. His error is thus only banal, simply an inadequate choice between two possibilities of comparable legitimacy. The materially identical error of his neighbor is by contrast symptomatic of a profound disturbance in the coordinates of his existence (in the sense of a deterioration of the dialectical quality of the insertion of the Self into the World) and could be preliminary manifestation of a paranoid sequence. It is in this latter sense that I have previously tried to speak of the schizophrenic character ("morbid rationality") of false consciousness. It is this "existential" interpretation—as opposed to Goldmann's cognitive-Manichean version—which I will attempt to apply to the problem of utopian consciousness.[2]

Is utopian consciousness false consciousness? Mannheim thought so and his formulation is unequivocal: "The common and ultimately crucial characteristic of ideological and utopian thinking is that one experiences with both the possibility of false consciousness."[3] But Mannheim asserts this without proving it, and furthermore, it occurs in the context of a general theory of utopia which most authors do not accept. For Mannheim, as for Ernst Bloch, utopia is a positive historical phenomenon, a factor of social change, of liberating revolutionary ferment. Elsewhere Mannheim predicts—with no enthusiasm whatever—a kind of decay in the utopian element in our civilization.[4] Yet if the eventual disappearance of the utopian element from our political space would leave such a vacuum, with what right could we speak with Mannheim of a *false* utopian consciousness? Here we are confronted with one of the major inconsistencies of Mannheim's work, and it forces us to rethink our concepts, especially that of utopia.

The concept of utopia has been characterized by its ambiguity; people have spoken of both its positive and negative role. Such terminology conveys disturbing Manichean overtones. In one of my early studies, I suggested a distinction between two types of psychopathological impairment: the *surrealist*, characterized by an overly dialectical, and therefore insufficiently reified perception of reality, and the *subrealist* presenting a diametrically opposite structure.[5] This distinction has interesting sociological applications in the study of utopian consciousness. The surrealist concept of utopia sees it essentially as a factor in socio-historical change, as a revolutionary instrument which "shatters" being (*fair éclater l'être*). On the contrary, the subrealist concept refers to unrealizable projects which are elaborated by marginal people and have no relation to historical reality. Far from having a "historical-generative" (*"historiogène"*) quality, the subrealist version serves as a pretext for *escaping from* history.

As an example of the ambiguity of the concept of "utopia," consider the traditional designation of Thomas More. He is generally considered, as the creator of the term, the model utopian, whereas Marx is taken as a "futurologist" before the fact.[6] But

2. Thus I am attempting to apply a personal conception of false consciousness to the problem of utopia. In contrast to Goldmann, my central category is *de-dialecticization* rather than *inadequacy*. See above all my *False Consciousness*, trans. Margaret A. Thompson (Oxford, 1975).

3. Cf. Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie*, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 53.

4. *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. L. Wirth and E. Shils (New York, 1936), pp. 262-263.

5. In the *Actas Luso-Expanolas de Neurologia y Psyquiatria* (Madrid, November, 1946). These concepts are of course understood as ideal types; actual utopians and utopias present mixed features.

6. While futurology is a new discipline whose status still remains imprecise, from now on it is

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when one recalls that More anticipated a kind of social imperialism or colonialism, the utilization of fifth columns, and slave labor, while Engels had "envisioned" the withering away of the state, one can wonder who is the utopian and who the futurologist. With good reason true utopians have often been reproached for failing to recognize the coherence of historical situations, i.e., for ignoring the historical validity of the dialectical principle of totality. Yet More's sense of this coherence is astonishing. He understood perfectly that the socialist organization of society has a permanent and necessary corollary the existence of a strong state—a fact which an Engels could never comprehend. Strange as it may seem, the creator of the word "utopia" must be excluded from the circle of traditional utopians even though he undoubtedly thought of himself as one. In fact, without knowing it More discovered one of the great historical laws of the founding of collectivist systems. This process has nothing to do with either the "withering away" of the state or the leap from the "reign of necessity" to that of "freedom" as expounded by those "utopians," Marx and Engels.

The category of false consciousness does not enter into the surrealist conception of utopia which sustains the writings of Bloch and Mannheim. In this context, a precise example is provided by the question of a Zionist "utopia."[7] In the terms of Bloch and Mannheim, Zionism is entirely utopian: an instrument which shatters Jewish "being"—the long reification and extra-historicization of the exile (*galuth*). If Zionism thus seems to be a typical utopia,[8] can one still speak of a Zionist false consciousness? Personally, I do not think so. The Zionist idea may have crystallized a political error and it may have brought forth injustice, but one would have difficulty in speaking of it in terms of false consciousness as I have characterized it. False consciousness is a corollary of alienation and reification. Racism is an "alienating ideology," not because it perceives ethnic differences, but because it reifies in biologizing them, and then legitimates this reification with terms drawn from the natural sciences. In contrast, Zionism constitutes a socio-historical functionalization or relativization of such differences. It is by no means certain that the "Zionist man" represents for mankind (*a l'échelle humaine*) a higher value than the pre-Zionist Jew. His progress in dignity and "civic" virtues may be compensated and overcompensated by a regression in intellectual penetration and sense of universalistic vocation. I fully understand the nostalgia for the Jew of yesterday representative of this "*sens de la souffrance*" (Scheler) and at the same time bearer of universal messages; in this sense we may say—and Nietzsche would not disagree—that no Jew was more Jewish than Christ. But from another viewpoint it nevertheless seems true that the prodigious human mutation provoked in such a short time by Zionism constitutes an ultimate refutation of racism; in that meaning, Zionism is a disalienating factor. It killed the stereotype of the

possible and necessary to distinguish it from utopianism. In René Dumont's recent *L'Utopie ou la Mort*, surrealist utopian and futurological tendencies are combined. Orwell's *1984* combines, on the other hand, anti-utopian and futurological characteristics. In fact, the anti-utopian genre may be viewed as a forerunner of futurology.

7. Cf. the chapter on "Zionist Utopia" in Ernst Bloch, *Freiheit und Ordnung: Abriss der Sozial-Utopien* (New York: Aurora Verlag, 1946), pp. 160-174.

8. To support this interpretation I would like to cite three facts: 1) according to Bloch, utopia is a "principle of hope" and in fact the Zionist anthem is entitled "Hope" (*Hatikvah*); 2) the temporality of the surrealist variant of utopia—reminiscent of Bergsonian "duration"—is a living temporality, dialectical as well as value-creating rather than, as in the case of subrealist utopia, corrupt, spatialized, non-eventful. One of Theodor Herzl's works is thus entitled *Altneuland* (the "old-new country") which clearly reflects the dialectical structure of historical temporality of the unity of opposites; 3) finally, recall the subtitle of Herzl's work: "If you will it, it is not a fable."

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masochistic, coward Jew. But it is impossible to kill a stereotype without shattering all other stereotypes such as the "lazy Negro" or "inefficient Arab" without shattering stereotypical thinking as a general phenomenon. So Zionism offers a "principle of hope" not only for Jews but for all oppressed or under-valued minorities in the world. The time will perhaps come when an objective historian will explain what the contemporary Arab renaissance owes to the fascination with the Zionist pattern; there was certainly a phenomenon of "identification with the aggressor" in Anna Freud's terminology. Indeed, in turning back on this model, black Africa makes a dangerous concession to racism. Hence, the Zionist example proves that Bloch's surrealist utopia is not necessarily a corollary of alienation or of false consciousness.

Following Laplantine's formulation, I understand the "subrealist" conception of utopia as the "mathematical, logical and rigorous construction of a perfect city subject to the imperatives of an *absolute plan* which has foreseen everything and tolerates neither the least fault nor the least questioning: a *synonym for totalitarianism*. The ethno-psychiatric diagnosis which can be applied to utopia is that of a devitalizing nationalism, a morbid inclination for stereotypes and abstraction, and political schizophrenia."[9] This judgment is severe, but not in the least unwarranted; only the assimilation of utopia to totalitarianism gives rise to reservations. The term "political schizophrenia" unequivocally poses the problem of utopian false consciousness. My principal reference on this question will be Ruyer's classic *Utopie et les Utopies*[10] which delineates the most important features of this utopian consciousness, namely: a) fixism; "Utopia is essentially anti-historical," or according to Döblin, it is "a human plan to interrupt history, to jump out of history and reach a stable perfection;"[11] b) the feeling of omnipotence,[12] frequent in the type of schizophrenic psychosis defined by Roheim as a "magic psychosis;" c) the intellectualism of utopian constructions; individuals seem to completely lack an unconscious, as well as human warmth (which recalls Minkowski's characterization of "morbid rationalism" or Binswanger's analysis of the temporality of love; d) its comic aspect which is essentially the consequence of dissociation;[13] e) its anti-dialectical character. This last point is a key one, for in the universe of utopian construction quantity is never transformed into quality. "Utopia...is at the antipode...of a dialectical conception of things..."[14]

As a consequence, the dialectical category of totality is alien to that utopian mentality which proceeds willingly by the mechanical juxtaposition of incompatible givens whose sole common denominator is their positive valuation. An unexpected analogy emerges between the structure of the utopian universe and that political demagoguery which also blithely juxtaposes things without concern for compatibility or coherence, but generally with a rather negative assessment. According to Aron, "one chooses, in history, between wholes (*ensembles*). The worst form of utopian thought leads to a failure to recognize the interdependencies between some goods and evils or the incompatibility between some equally precious goods."[15] Here is one of the reasons why Marx should not be classified with the utopians; his historical vision is in

9. *Les trois voix de l'imaginaire* (Paris, 1974), pp. 255-256.
10. Paris, 1951. My observations of political schizophrenia were published as early as 1952 and now appear as "Rêveries sutopiques chez un schizophrène," in *Ideologies* (Paris, 1974), pp. 313-324.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
15. *L'Age des empires et l'avenir de la France* (Paris, 1946), p. 15.

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fact *very totalizing*. He "chooses between wholes," knowing perfectly well that in politics, at least, every rose has thorns.[16]

The schizophrenic structure of utopian consciousness is particularly clear in that peculiar genre called anti-utopian or dystopian.[17] In reality, nothing unites the utopian and the dystopian aside from the fact of describing an imaginary society based on Reason. Otherwise they are opposed in every way. And even if the term is recent, the genre of dystopian literature already has a long history behind it. Perhaps Aristophanes' *Women* is the earliest and not the least significant example. Certain chapters of *Gulliver's Travels* are authentically dystopian, especially the journey to Laputa-Balnibarbi which offers a caricature of a society integrally founded on reason and also constitutes a coherent description—perhaps the first in literature—of the "morbid rationalist" variety of schizophrenia.

The master of the genre, however, is Orwell. His novel *1984* is certainly one of the key works of our epoch. Based upon an ingenious extrapolation of the lessons of the Moscow Trials, it provides a description of a totalitarian society which has successfully utilized scientific progress to establish a *total* control of private life. The dominant traits of this world are: a) a suppression of history by way of a constant re-evaluation of the past based on the exigencies of the present; b) dissociation of thought ("doublethink"), a consequence of extreme subordination; c) repression of sexuality; d) anti-humanism and a generalized depersonalization; and finally, e) the development of a new artificial language ("newspeak") designed to create intellectual uniformity.

Some claim to find certain traits of the People's Republic of China in Orwell's satire; I leave to them the responsibility for such a comparison. As for myself, I find a curious analogy with the development of one of the most important currents of contemporary Marxism: Althusser's school. This analogy pivots on two important and corollary points: anti-historicism, which is symptomatic of a hidden rejection of the dialectic,[18] and anti-humanism. Furthermore, it is an *ideology*, i.e., the theoretical expression of a form of false consciousness.[19] To be sure, the blossoming of the Althusserian School is contemporary with the profound crisis of conscience of the European Left. We have entered a historical period in which egalitarian demands are increasing in the West—May 1968 was essentially a "levelling" movement—while crashing head-on into a hierarchic orientation in those countries which officially claim to be Marxist. The consciousness of the Left is thus a dissociated or split consciousness. Perhaps here we have a sociological explanation of the general direction of this Marxist school which, while introducing the fundamental structures of subrealist utopian discourse—a-dialecticism, anti-historicism, anti-humanism—and faced with increasingly clear evidence of the utopian character of egalitarian demands, practices a sort of flight forwards. In short, the contradiction between an egalitarian ideal and a

16. In *politics*, because one can try to create it in botany. Hence one might ask if a certain "botany of roses without thorns" (Lysenko) is related to a utopian dimension in Russian Marxism.

17. This dichotomy is to be distinguished from that of Laplantine who identifies "utopia" and "totalitarianism" and then uses the term "counter-utopia" (*"contre-utopie"*) to refer to projects founded on liberty, such as that of L'Abbaye de Thélème.

18. After L. Althusser's defense at Amiens, one of the members of the jury (M. D'Hondt) observed that the German term *Verschiedenheit* (difference) had been translated as "opposition." This is more important than M. D'Hondt understood, since a *dialectical* notion, the role of which was so important in the thought of H. Lefebvre, was rendered as a *Manichean* and *reified* expression.

19. Cf. *L'Homme et la Société*, 35-36 (1975), pp. 57ff.

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hierarchic reality reappears in the consciousness of the European Left, either as a structural assimilation into reified utopian discourse (Althusser) or by an ideological-utopian (surrealist) affirmation, i.e., without relation to the concrete historical possibilities of the egalitarian ideal (the student movement).

At this point a simplistic but unavoidable conclusion emerges: the necessity of working with well-defined concepts. The human sciences would hasten their departure from their interminable prehistory if some consensus existed on their main research concepts. It would be particularly desirable to find the appropriate vocabulary for the concept of utopia; the demonstration of this urgency is perhaps the principal result of our examination of the relations between utopian and false consciousness.[20] Mannheim recognized the existence of a possible relationship between the two and searched for a common denominator. Working with a barely differentiated conceptual apparatus, however, he was led to a search for a common denominator in the notion of the "transcendence of being." This approach leads to an impasse since to want to "transcend being" has nothing to do with an alienating attitude. I have tried to show that this common denominator exists, but that it must be found elsewhere and that this search must begin with a preliminary effort at conceptual clarification.

To conclude, I would like to risk a hypothesis concerning the anthropological function of utopian consciousness. Why does man create utopias? For Lapassade utopia gives an "illusion of completion" (*achèvement*), designed to compensate for the feelings of incompleteness which man owes to the particularities of his evolution.[21] This sense of incompleteness is a challenge to which history, dialectics, the universe of values, i.e., culture, respond. Utopia, however, can be a pretext to avoid this challenge. This entails a rather surprising conclusion: the anthropological significance of utopianism in its "subrealist" form is not so distant from that of racism. The universe of racism and of subrealist utopia are two forms of ahistoricism and two variations of the illusion of completion.

Hence, an explicative hypothesis surfaces from these arguments which leads into psychology; again I can only sketch it briefly here. Man has a sort of fascination for identity which greatly transcends the epistemological realm. It expresses itself in phenomena as different as sexual fetishism, morbid rationalism (and schizophrenia generally), taste for the uniform (both in dress and thought), and in a general way with what Bouthoul calls "heterophobia." One can even wonder if the death instinct (or better: drive) of the psychoanalyst does not relate to it in the last instance. Clearly the "subrealist" utopia primarily flows from this tendency. "What is remarkable in all these constructions which ruthlessly exorcise the collective memory of the group is the deliberate will to reduce the exuberance, the richness and *diversity* of a village or city worthy of the name—i.e., infused with a mythical density only realized slowly, generation after generation—to the monolithic coherence of identity."[22] Once again in the study of utopian consciousness we find the analogy with clinical schizophrenia, but at the same time we reach the limits of the competence of the sociologist who must here make way for the psychoanalyst.

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20. During the colloquy, the terms "dionysian" and "apollonian" were suggested. The former would refer to the "surrealist," the latter to the "subrealist." The concept "energetic" has also been discussed. It is essential to underscore the ambiguity of the concept of utopia.
21. Cf. G. Lapassade, *L'Entrée dans la vie* (Paris, 1962).
22. Laplantine, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

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*Critiques of Reason from Max Weber to Ernst Bloch**

by Michael Landmann

1. *Max Weber.* Two opposing camps met at a congress of national economists in 1909.[1] One one side the socialist group around Schmoller, Wagner and Knapp argued for the unity of theory and practice, science and politics. On the other, Weber, Sombart and Eulenburg demanded the separation of these two areas, maintaining that value judgments can never be made with an objective claim to truth. As the example of the natural sciences showed, science must limit itself to factual judgments. Only as an *empirical* science could sociology become a science at all.

Along with the empirical postulate, Weber gave the famous descriptions of calculating, goal-oriented, rational behavior (as contrasted with traditional and emotional motivations), which led to both capitalist enterprise and bureaucratic officialdom, paralleling the rise of scientism. Reason seemed limited to finding increasingly more effective means for given objectives. The political function of modern sociology, so Weber said, could consist only in the selection and provision of means.

In Max Weber, the extrication of the isolated "means" was connected with his studies of Calvinism. The Calvinist limited himself to methodical action, while leaving the end to the unfathomable decrees of an unapproachable God. It was not accident that positivism, with its asceticism concerning the question of the whole and of meaning, could take root best in the Calvinist soil of Anglo-Saxon countries. Conversely, the metaphysical question remained relatively open against the background of either Catholicism, with its natural theology, or Lutheranism with its tender emotional fervor toward God.

Max Weber, however, considered the relative emancipation of the means to be a great motive force even beyond this historical context. In his last major lecture "Science as a Vocation" he posed the exclusion of axiological questions as a precondition for science. "All natural sciences give us an answer to the question: What should we do, *if* we want to master life technically? *Whether*, however, we want to and should master it technically, and whether that really and truly makes sense, is never examined or simply assumed." The scientist who does not restrict himself to determining facts, but also wishes to ask about value and right action should be told that "the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the podium of a classroom."

"Purposive rationality" is a method-and-means rationality for achieving ends, but it is not responsible for the rationality of these ends themselves. Values are felt or posited, not known. Weber's position arose from both the fascination of his time with the precision and reliability of the natural sciences, as well as from his study of the history of religion. He knew the prophets and the false prophets. He knew that the questionableness of their convictions was matched only by the pathos with which they proclaimed them. He distrusted surreptitious value judgments and politics flowing from the "romanticism of revolutionary hope." He had seen Treitschke in his youth.

The negative side of this position is that it surrenders to subjectivity and power all

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*From *Entfremdende Vernunft* (Ernst Klett: Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 128-153. Translated by David J. Parent.

1. Cf. Christian von Ferber, "Der Werturteilsstreit 1909-1959," in *Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, ed. Ernst Topitsch, 3rd ed. (Cologne, 1966).

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the areas that cannot be mastered with the help of empirical science. Therefore, first von Krockow ranked Weber among the decisionists. At the Heidelberg Sociological Congress of 1965, a faction under the leadership of Herbert Marcuse (for whom the task of sociology consists in changing society) raised the objection against Weber that he, like all mere empiricists, strengthened the *status quo* as a sociologist—not as the politician that he also was.

Weber saw rationalization as the law of science and consequently he approved of it, while simultaneously remaining aware of its limitations and dangers. He followed the "shifting battle" between goal-oriented and charismatic action, between rigidity and originality in intellectual and political life.. He often complained of the "disenchantment" resulting from rationalization. He also spoke of the drastic change whereby the economic and technical means, originally devised for the end of human emancipation, became ends in themselves and froze into a "steel-hard hull" of 'submission." After the Russian revolution of 1905 he himself hoped that this economic and technical prison might be smashed, and he asked "whether a mighty re-birth. . .or mechanized petrifaction" loomed in the future.

2. *Georg Lukács.* In his essay on "reification" (the objective basis for the subjectively-felt "alienation"), Lukács uses Marx as his point of departure. According to Lukács, the alienation described by Marx results from the variously applied but always identical principle of the artificial fragmentation of original wholes (a motif that can be traced back to Rousseau, Humboldt and Schiller, who however hoped to regain the totality lost in reality only indirectly, through education and art). As economic rationalization, according to Marx, sees in things no longer their utility but only their value as commodities, it also reduces the worker simply to a function of his measurable labor power which is also bought and sold as a commodity. It ignores his individual qualitative characteristics unless they disturb the pre-calculated course of the work process. no longer the complete man living from his own center, he is now the bearer of the work-process, fitted as a component into an alien system, which he finds pre-existing and finished, without his participation, and demanding his submission to its mechanical laws. He produces only a part of the product and so does not objectify his personality in it; the end-product does not belong to him for his use, nor does he recieve compensation equivalent to his share of his input. Thus rationalization by no means frees man, but on the contrary reifies him. It also reifies the relations of men among themselves, as well as those of the individual to himself. This reification, however, is a necessary consequence of fragmentation, the separation of the parts from a living whole.

According to Lukács, while rationalization subjects every partial field of social life to necessity and order, chance prevails in the relation of the relatively independent partial systems among one another. Total calculation in matters of detail therefore coexists with the incoherence and irrationality of the total process, since rationalization, as we saw, divides the organically unified work-process into artificially isolated partial functions, each carried out more effectively and with maximum time-saving by a specialist. Consequently, partial functions, tend to become independent and further develop, each in its own way, unrelated to the others, following only the logic of their own specialty.

Here the objective whole of civilization no longer has any inner unity, which is absent as well on the cognitive level. Every science—the more highly developed, the more so—shuts itself off in its own field. It even loses sight of the whole of its field. It restricts itself to specialized sub-laws of its field, but not to its concrete substratum of

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reality. Scientific understanding itself becomes reified. Thus, as Marx saw, use value lies beyond the field of observation of political economy.

By departing from the material substratum of the formation of their concepts, the individual sciences consciously reject the knowledge of the whole context of their field. Even philosophy does not see through the reification underlying the formalism of the individual sciences. Science, in fact, gains precision and credibility precisely by leaving its substratum in unexplored irrationality. When philosophy is based on the conceptualizations of the individual sciences, the connecting whole of the fields remains unknown.

A multiplicity of individual sciences, separate from one another in object and method, move in rational partial systems. Within them reason can operate unimpeded, with unproblematic categories, but it thereby loses the "true category of reality," totality. It can thus neither conceptually reproduce society, nor lead it. It could do both again only by consideration of the totality, unscientific as that may seem.[2]

Because the sciences give close, detailed views, a view of the whole gained at a greater distance is needed in addition to them as Lukács' teacher Georg Simmel had already pointed out in his critique of positivism. Lukács' achievement consists in "de-academicizing" Simmel's theorem by demanding not only a metaphysics of all being, but a comprehension of the whole society, and concommitently that real society again become truly whole. The impulse given by Lukács lives on in Sartre's "dialectical totalization" of the historical process (critique of dialectical reason), but even more so in the Frankfurt School. No element can "be understood even in its functioning without insight into the whole." "Every opinion about society as a whole necessarily transcends its scattered facts," resulting in a concept "in which the disparate data are organized" (Adorno). At the same time, the "totality" is not only a structural principle, but also the [axiomatic] principle of society. It contains a norm for the critique of existing reality and a goal for history. This two-pronged attack against empirical social research proceeds by showing the latter to be inadequate because it deals with incoherent details, and is value-free.

3. *Adorno.* Following Lukács, Horkheimer and Adorno claim in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that we are witnesses to the enlightenment's self-destruction. The enlightenment has become retrogressive and must therefore reflect on its own regression. Abdicating reflection on the destructiveness of progress to its enemies would mean its own fate.

This retrogression is based on two sources. Scientism, which limited science to determining facts and to mathematization replaces the concept by the formula, the cause by the rule and probability. It translates qualities into functions and the positivist censor rejects as fiction, illusion, or meaninglessness everything that goes beyond the ritual of these formalizations. The other cause is the uncritical instrumentalization of science, dependent in part on the aforementioned formalization. Science, as analytical method, can no longer reflect upon meaning and value, or upon anything "incommensurable," because these things cannot be broken down into mathematical formulae. In part the instrumentalization is conditioned by

2. Cf. also Lukács' pupil Lucien Goldmann, "Reification," in *Dialektische Untersuchungen* (Neuwied, 1966). Society is seen as a "structured totality," in which no single factor dominates. The economic sector predominates only because capitalism separates it off as an autonomous reality. Thus, religion, morality and art also become independent. Reification rules in all these arbitrarily isolated realities. The leap to freedom is the return to a totality in which the sectors are mutually interdependent.

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the fact that in this context science is concerned only with power and so only a reified form of thought can result. The goal is not the truth of an appropriated content, but method, operation, the effective approach, technology and organization. Enlightenment consequently degrades even awareness and revolution to mere means.

In its roots and idea, enlightenment, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, is anti-authoritarian: reason is a means of criticizing all domination. It seeks not only to perceive, classify and calculate what is, but also to negate by seeing through the surface of social constraint, and by measuring the present against an idea of better reality and fearless happiness. As bourgeois enlightenment however it loses itself to its positivist factor—not only in Comte, but as early as Turgot and d'Alembert—and thereby renounces its own fulfillment. The factual remains unchallenged, repeated by cognitive reason, merely perpetuated by pragmatic reason. In science, the enlightenment's critique of the existent becomes indifferent toward the prevalent value-system. Indeed science consents to it as a means for self-preservation and accomodation. Scientific enlightenment no longer serves freedom, but only the self-preservation of the apparatus, which by better providing for our maintenance, at the same time subordinates and equalizes us. "By putting everything individual under its discipline, it lets the uncomprehended wholes of freedom, of domination over things strike back at man's existence and awareness." The whole itself becomes a positive fact, whose unchangeable givenness must be subdued and subordinated, together with the constraint it exercises upon things and men. "Under the title of the brute facts, the social injustice from which they stem is sanctified as eternally removed from any remedy."

So enlightenment reverts to mythology: the two hopelessly mirror only existing domination and elevate the existing reality to the level of an eternal norm. "The curse of incessant progress is incessant regression." Anti-revolutionary rationalism establishes new domination. Reason, which freed man from nature's violence now justifies man's violence. Society dominates by means of the same reason which broke nature's domination over man; one domination has merely been exchanged for another. Furthermore, man himself is counted as part of nature to be dominated. Reason does not grasp this, or at least draws no lesson from it. It continues to betray and subjugate us and to adapt us to a civilization which is inseparable from inhumanity and horrors. Reason, by shutting itself off from its own theoretical imaginativeness, surrenders the field to charlatanism, superstition, and political madness. The masses, educated only technically, are ready for despotism. That is not the work of the opponents of reason, but of the Enlightenment itself.

In late works such as *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno's negativism toward reason becomes even more acute. Emile Durkheim's sociologism already drew a parallel between the super- and subordination of concepts on the one side and the power of the tribe over the individual on the other; logical hierarchy reflects the social one. Classification is related to classes. The isolation of concepts from one another is an expression of the division of labor. In this sense, Adorno choses a *tertium* between the sociological and the logical realms, namely "domination," which embodies the essence of the enemy as such. Adorno seems to have adopted the Talmudic saying: "The difference between the present and the Messianic age is only that then the repression by the rulers will cease." For Adorno no such thing as legitimate or liberating domination exists. In a radio talk broadcast in 1965 Adorno opposed Arnold Gehlen's claim that the subject develops only in the framework and in the service of institutions. Adorno bemoaned the authoritarian and repressive essence of institutions, which

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violate and strangle the individual self. The relation between man's domination of nature and man's domination of man recurs, according to Adorno, structurally in the relation of the general concept to the non-conceptual particular being. When the general concept identifies particular being with its own conceptual content and so homogenizes it and disregards everything in the thing that could contradict this identity, it subjects the thing to itself. The particular is subsumed in the general and is completely determined by the general's tending to domination.

The parallelism between technico-social domination over nature and man and cognitive domination of the concept over the known it not merely formal. Rather, the cognitive domination also constitutes, for Adorno, the basic cause of the technico-social one. Thus, reason is by no means the humane authority to which we can appeal when faced with inhumane domination. Instead, reason itself is to blame for this inhumanity, because it too derives from the will to dominate. Indeed, for Adorno, this intimate affinity with domination characterizes not only instrumental, technological, scientific reason, but all reason, even when it apparently—and therefore never successfully—resists the former, as does intuitive or dialectical reason.

Like reason, our entire awareness and the structure of our self are stamped by domination. Human qualities and capacities no longer seem to belong to a living unity but rather appear split off as if one "owned" them. The instrumental attitude toward external nature avenges itself when it is redirected toward our own inner nature. The subjugation of the non-self implies that the self too be fashioned in the image of the "identical, purpose-oriented masculine character." The objectification of solid things in the world around him leads retroactively to "self-reification." Bergson's warning, echoed by Heidegger and Jaspers, is thus linked with the theme of reification.

The perversion of the self by models of domination and of reality has, however, still not permeated the "mimetic" strata in us, which formerly were predominant and have survived to our day. This distortion did not begin at any particular point in history, but has grown increasingly serious. It is in fact located in a natural propensity of our mind and this is in part, even necessary. Consequently, it would be an illusion to believe that the self could, by its own enlightening power, abolish the alienating conditions to which it is subject.

While reason promises to free man as a subject from domination by nature, it really enslaves him as an object of its own domination. This reversal of the subject into an object, already described by Marx, cannot be grasped by reason precisely because it always operates from a subject and because external liberation appears to be successful. Thus reason lives habitually under the spell of a self-induced blindness.

Still Adorno does try to break free of the logic of domination by means of "unregulated experience," by grasping the individual from the core of its individuality, and not from previously fixed conceptual schema. New Philosophy aims for the non-identity of the liberated multiplicity. "The reconciled state does not annex other reality by philosophical imperialism, but would allow other reality to remain remote and different, though in permitted proximity." The other thing should, as John Duns Scotus said, never be a mere "example of" something; it should, as in Rickert, be respected in its ungeneralized historical uniqueness. This is not merely true of knowledge: even in action one should live and defend the particular against universalistic reason.[3]

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3. Cf. Kurt H. Wolff, "Surrender and the Body," in *Cultural Hermeneutics II* (Dordrecht and Boston, 1974): we abandon "Received notions" only in the experience of "surrender."

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In addition to an attitude in which man subjugates nature, Adorno recognizes another attitude which he calls mimetic; in it the magical early age in turn submits to nature in order to save itself from this superior power. Only civilization represses this mimetic basic attitude. However, for Adorno as for the romantics, prehistorical properties of man survive in art and reappear even today. In an instrumentalized, purposive, nature-exploiting world, art is the last asylum of mimesis. It indirectly offers a guarantee of the possibility of a different existence and access to the world. It represents this other world, in which the repressive identity-constraint of the self would again be loosened. Art remembers and promises. It is memory's refuge in a world that keeps us from our destiny. It could disappear as soon as we are allowed to fulfill our destiny.

However, the logical relation is not a relation of domination, for the simple reason that it is not a relation in reality. While domination is exercised from the outside, the concept only selects isolated factors that already existed in the thing itself. The concept is not related to the thing as the stronger to the weaker, but as the general to the particular. It does not abuse it, does not despise it, does not subject it to serfdom, does not deprive it of its surplus value, but tries to understand it and to give it a place in the coordinate-system of an intellectual order. If subsumption by itself were a crime of brutal, elitist occupiers, then mankind would have to give up speech along with reason; for words too are subsumptions.

Conceptual knowledge does tend to regard the subsumed concrete object as already totally known. Therefore the later 18th century rebelled against the autocracy of conceptual knowledge, as Meinecke showed in his book on historism. Now one wants to observe things not only in their development but also in the unmistakable specificity of their being-more-than-a-specimen, which they share with no other being. Yet, this represents no alternative to conceptual knowledge. The concept already grasps certain traits of the thing and so prepares the way for deeper penetration into its individuality, which then reveals the pallor of the concept and, in extreme cases, its inappropriateness. The opposition is old, but it was left to Adorno to use it to denounce generalizing reason in its entirety as a realm of Satan.

Simply because the classified can be better mastered, used, managed, exploited, and made profitable, Adorno ascribes to classification as such an *interest* in domination and use. As Bergson showed, mechanism stresses the quantitative aspect because it looks at nature from the standpoint of applicability. Only the decline of this prespective permits non-quantitative, non-applicable aspects to come to the fore; predominance of classificatory-subsumption can be explained by interest. However, while its predominance is thus explained, the ability to classify as such is not. This ability to classify and to quantify are both genuine intellectual achievements. What they show us of the world may be one-sided but not false, since both apprehend realities. What Adorno could attack would thus be only that certain interests lead to a too exclusive use of subsumptive reasoning even where it should not be applied. Interest is on the part of those who use instrumental reason perhaps even falsely due precisely to interest. The problem does not lie in reason itself, which provides as such a neutral basis of its application (though genetically it perhaps originated for such application).

If reason, as reason, exercises a domination, then it is not so much over things or other men as over non-rational forces within consciousness, or given a narrow understanding of the concept of reason, over its rational competitors. There is also a sociology of the soul: in it victors and oppressed face each other. Romanticism in the

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psychological realm parallels revolution in the political! It rehabilitates previously repressed elements and their achievement. Yet, while the liberation of the downtrodden social strata seeks to have them disappear as such, on the contrary, the liberation of the repressed psychic strata reactivates them precisely in their separate existence.[4] The repression of a social class is accompanied by a parallel repression of a psychic and rational layer among the oppressed. The rulers want to lull revolutionary ideas among them, while at the same time power robs the rulers themselves of their alertness.

4. *Max Horkheimer.* In his treatise *Critique of Instrumental Reason*, Max Horkheimer completes his friend's philosophy by arguing that reason evidently comes to its senses when it denies its own absoluteness. For antiquity and for Leibniz, reason was not only a faculty of a subject but was also an objective order of reality. Subjective reason grasped this order as the true nature of things. Thus, human goals were rational not only due to their utility, but also because they appeared in harmony with the comprehensive rationality of the world. The antireligious and antimetaphysical enlightenment destroyed precisely this context in the name of reason. Formerly ethics commanded us to obey eternal ideas that contained intrinsic value, but in Hobbes only rules for a smooth functioning of society remain. This self-abolition and instrumentalization of reason apparently is, to a certain degree, a necessary part of its nature.

Thus a substantive and a functional rationality—the latter already stressed by Max Weber—stand in opposition: one perceiving ideas, the other merely finding means for purposes, which may themselves be extra-rational. The latter is at the same time more subjective and formalized. The dangers of objective reason are Romanticism and ideology, while the dangers of subjective reason are materialism and nihilism. The task of philosophy consists in uniting the two wings of reason intellectually to prepare their unification in reality. As Kant interweaves empiricism and rationalism into the transcendental method, Horkeimer attempts to link instrumental and substantive reason.

The formalization of reason has, in part, great merits, although pragmatism and positivism have followed too much in its wake. If concepts are only nominalistic abbreviations, work-saving devices in a thought-process reduced to the level of an industrial process, then not only are such concepts as mind, consciousness and self lost as themes of reflection, but so are others, such as justice and tolerance. They are still in the lawbooks, but they have been cut off from their intellectual source. Reason no longer sanctions them, for it is no longer capable of determining the goals of life. That justice and freedom are better than injustice and oppression can not be verified positivistically. The neutralization of reason robs it of every relation to ideas and the power to judge and discover them. It registers facts, forgetting that they could be the product of alienation, and therefore stops prematurely without connecting them to the social process; positivistic intelligence becomes the servant of the existing production-apparatus. Thus, the greatest task of reason is to denounce what is now called reason.

Reason, which performs a service in the given social whole, is confronted by Critical Theory. It is opposed to a reason which recommends subordination to strong force, if that is useful to the subject, a reason which, in its struggle for survival, will make an object of the other person and deny him his freedom. Critical Theory restores

4. Landmann, *Die absolute Dichtung* (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 32ff, 119ff, 189ff.

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an idealistic concept of reason which is, as such, connected with "interest in the abolition of social injustice."

5. *Herbert Marcuse.* In *One Dimensional Man,* Marcuse follows the last reformulation of the idea of reason to the effect that instrumental, value-free reason or technical reason, as he calls it, i.e., essentially a partial rationality, is all that remains in advanced industrial society. Despite rising rational capacities in parts of the system, the whole of the political system is consequently, irrational. The rational functioning of industrial civilization appears to conceal this deep irrationality, while it essentially reverses even its internal rationality in the partial areas into their opposite. For romanticism, progressive reason kills organic growth; for Marcuse, insufficiently perfected reason kills itself.

The irrationality of the rational leads to increased productivity accompanied by increased destructiveness. This irrationality appears in the welfare state's military adventures. Because the killing is calculated, the madness is accepted. Similarly manipulated needs are inculcated into men by the power of suggestion through the mass-media in order to keep production stable or to increase it. Needs no longer arise in the individual but in the autonomous technical and economic process. The vicious circle of irrational needs and instrumental reason produces these needs and then in turn is supported by them because only it can satisfy them. Satisfaction of these apparent needs increases work but not happiness. Thus, Marcuse turns into an accusation what Galbraith and Brzezinski had observed to be a law: a system always programs men, it satisfies *their* needs as they adapt to *its* needs.

By stabilizing existing power-relations, mere technological rationality becomes irrational. Apparently "only" technical, it also has political implications just as it historically sprang from a class interest. It raises and secures the standard of living and the comfort of the individual, but not autonomy and freedom from coercion. Its rationality becomes suspect. The rational apparatus frustrates its original purpose of bringing about a humane existence in which all functions are freely developed. Its striving is now to perfect technological rationality only within the framework of existing institutions while maintaining the given conditions of domination. Its goal is only self-reproduction and not rational change, which is limited to a corrective within the given system. The enslavement of man is considered inevitable when unfreedom is rationalized.

A society so structured tends toward the totalitarian, toward the elimination of opposing individuals, even if it is (still) not politically terroristic. Instrumental reason increasingly dominates human life. The same scientific method that succeeded in subjugating nature now subjugates man, for it is as such neutral. While domination was criticized and abolished by Enlightenment-reason, it is legitimated by technological reason. It produces "a rationally totalitarian society." Its triumph, however, is to so restructure the actual subjugation that it becomes unnoticeable. Heteronomy, whereby we must adapt and restrict ourselves, appears in the mask of autonomy. Technology becomes ideology, because coercion appears as submission to a reason that has arranged everything optimally. By fulfilling our material wishes better than ever, it lulls the desire for liberation so skillfully that men accept repression without protest, build it into their own self-conception, and are happy in their consciousness. They find their soul in their commodities.

While formerly the dominated stood separate from their masters on the upper end of the hierarchy, today domination is no longer exercised by human subjects, but by the anonymous and almighty system itself. Of course, there are groups that have

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greater managerial power, that profit more, and that therefore are all the more interested in preserving the system, but they too are only servants of the expanding apparatus. They become "more and more dependent on the machinery which they organize and operate." They cannot declare as false any of the needs whose satisfaction the machinery promotes and stop its satisfaction. The system is really dominated by the anonymous, inherent tendency to create ever new needs and to produce ever new means to satisfy these needs.

The same quantifying reason which separates *what is* from *what should be* and therefore presents itself as value-free is also the one that does not understand contemporary reality. Operationalism in the natural sciences and behaviorism in the social sciences no longer transcend the *status quo*. Empirical sociology investigates, in false isolation, a single factory, but not the socio-historical context in which it stands. Its measurements thereby obscure more than they clarify. Their exactness is a mystification, since the social context is what determines the fact. Without that context, which constitutes a higher order of reality, the fact cannot be understood. Of course, the social context cannot in turn be measured. Rather, a *theory* of society is needed. Modern society exercises domination but makes it invisible and intangible. Thus, it has created a corresponding sociology incapable of recognizing domination. Science no longer transcends the given form of society, but performs only a therapeutic function and thus helps conserve it: it promotes quietism.

Rationality is not an absolute, unchanging factor, but relative to the respective historical moment. Historical development and changing reality expose rationality to be still irrational: reason becomes nonsense. Contemporary rationality is also disavowed by the fact that it wants to perpetuate the *status quo*. It calls theories that contradict the existing universe irrational, while they are the rational ones precisely because they refuse to cooperate with madness. It is always a function of philosophy to recognize the irrational in existing reality and to design the "concrete negation" to it. According to Marcuse, this function today is allotted to so-called post-technical rationality. It can propose an alternative only if it does not shy back from passing a value judgment on the existing system and critically transcending it. Yet, this has become a most dificult task since the system has so increased its efficiency and raised its standards of living and it is so skilled at obscuring its inner contradictions that the quest for an alternative soon comes to be seen as unreasonable.

Strengthening any of the partial rationalities of the present system can only contribute further to the irrationality of the whole. It would be an intensification of repression and destruction, which are the work of this false rationality. Therefore, mere reforms, improvements in detail, are of no help, but, on the contrary, serve the bad whole. What is necessary is a revolutionary change of the system itself, a "reversal of the trend." But that means a "break with the prevalent technological rationality."

The domination of nature and the production-apparatus will remain in existence. Marcuse is not advocating a rejection of technology, but only a different one which would bring its now unguided, arbitrary and unendingly expanding process under control. In the future, an authority would be needed to first decide on the worthiness of satisfying needs and to establish priorities among them. The domination of the means over the end must be reversed; the independence of technical forces, by which they imposed themselves as a criterion for men must be ended. They must reappear as services for a meaning in life that they do not produce. The achievement-principle, by which men are evaluated only by efficiency and utility, must be displaced by the pleasure-principle.

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A consciousness rejecting a work-ethic that subjects things and itself to practical economic ends will develop a "new sensitivity: an emancipation of the senses." While the supposed autonomy of bourgeois knowledge still serves an interest, only a future society will give us the astonishing fascination of a utility-free perception. But can the social continuum be at all broken by rational critique? Does the truly rational, the idea of how life could be better, have a place today—so Marcuse deliberates in closing—only in fantasy and literature?

It has often been observed that two forms of criticism of the modern world run side by side in Marcuse, a "conservative" one and a "marxist" one.[5] If he originally underemphasized the bourgeois values of "interiority" because in their apparent independence they left the *status quo* untouched, later, after technological rationality has become the main enemy, these same values become allies in the struggle against the "administrative pre-emption of culture by civilization." This formerly rejected aporia is now re-accepted (analogously to "community" and "society"). Likewise, Marcuse's "great refusal" does not want to be conservative, but it seems to be so, since it is not a "determinate negation" and thus represents an existentially anarchistic attitude rather than a political, society-changing force.[6]

6. *Jürgen Habermas.* According to Habermas, experimental science does not function in society as an enlightenment fostering emancipation, but it merely broadens our power over objective processes. It perfects administration. All efforts to comprehend the living context as a whole, as well as all positions based on value (and thus also the sensitivity to repression and the feeling of attachment for individual freedom) seem dogmatic to it. These elements of enlightenment are dismissed by the binding interest of a disinfected reason. Its monopolization of the claim to shape human behavior rationally implies the rejection of all other possibilities. Thus Habermas too, like all the members of the Frankfurt School, contrasts two forms of reason: a higher one interested in essence, context and value, and a lower, more superficial one.

On the other hand, the value-orientation of our behavior remains unchanged as before, but since the priority of one value over the other cannot be established by empirical reason, the choice is left to unsupported subjective decision. The progress of mere technical rationalization is bought with a proportional increase of irrationality. Without becoming aware of its dependence, empirical theory depends on the interest of domination over natural and social reality and the interest in maintaining existing domination.

5. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, in *Antworten an Herbert Marcuse* (1968), pp. 12ff and in the same anthology, Hans Heinz Holz, "Utopie und Anarchismus," pp. 15 and 55ff. Cf. also Martin Puder in *Neue Deutsche Hefte* 16:3 (1969).

6. How widely Marcuse's allegations against modern science are accepted today can be seen in a book from a completely different movement (theological and Heideggerian), which deals with the same weaknesses. Cf. Georg Picht, *Der Gott der Philosophen und die Wissenschaft der Neuzeit*; Karel Kosik's *Dialectic of the Concrete* might also be mentioned. According to Kosik, that progressive rationalization excludes reason (for which he also refers to C. Wright Mills) can be traced to the fact that modern reason since Descartes is only that of the isolated individual. Thus, independent reason becomes dependent on its products which in their entirety are irrational. Its original mistake was to consider the individual and consequently itself to be immediate as just a positing subject and not as something also posited. It neglected to include its own preconditions and did not understand itself historically. Therefore, the whole, as well as values and goals, remained outside it. Man's world is now fragmented into the area of the rational, the means, efficiency and the area of inwardness and subjective freedom. Here positivism, there irrational currents. Dialectical reason has the mission of not only complementing one side by the other, but of uniting the two.

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In contrast, Habermas considers our chances of clarifying value problems and attaining rational agreement on them limited, but greater than positivism believes. Contrary to a "false consciousness" that shuts off reflection at the limits of verifiable science and so gains a disguised normative function, he postulates a "Critical Theory" that keeps reason's interest in freedom, autonomy, and liberation from dogmatism intact.

According to Habermas (in "Technology and Science as Ideology" and elsewhere) it is necessary to make a distinction between work and "interaction" or "communicative behavior." The sphere of work is that of instrumental, goal-oriented reason, the type of reason that deals with the choice of strategies and the use of techniques under fixed goals and in given situations, but does not reflect on the context of interests within society as a whole. In the sphere of interaction, on the other hand, reason seeks an understanding of the suitability and desirability of the intersubjective norms. In the former case, under "work," rationalization means: increase of skills and productive forces, extension of technical disposable power; in the second case, rationalization means: the progress of emancipation, the liberation of humanity, individualization, domination-free communication, abolition of repressiveness and rigidity. Here, the intention of rationalization is not a better functioning of the economic-industrial apparatus, but what Plato and Aristotle called the "good life" and with it a change of the institutional framework. Thus, technical progress is a potential for liberation only when it is imbedded within such a change.

Today, discussion centers on "what we want in order to live" and not on "how we would like to live." Technical questions are solved, while practical goals are assumed as given. Technology becomes a technocratic ideology. There is no authority to determine the goal of technical progress, rather progress takes its goal immanently from within itself and claims that it is therefore acquired rationally. Yielding to "technical requirements," the depoliticized society becomes, as it were, a self-regulating system. It does not act according to norms, since its behavior is conditioned and adaptive. This conceals the difference between goal-oriented rationality and "interaction," and represses the emancipatory interest. The system reproduces itself without reflecting on whether the results corresponds to our ideas of ourselves. However, social science ought to recognize that scientific and technical progress by itself remains questionable as long as it is not mediated by an externally determined direction.

Weber criticized the prophets who wanted to introduce values into science. Critical Theory again takes up this discussion and seeks a middle ground retaining the validity of each pole: valuations are necessary but science itself, a different science, will make them. Habermas sums up the nature of this science with Jasper's term, the "communicative": i.e., values are to be discovered and viewpoints brought closer in undistorted discussion. But this disregards two factors. First, viewpoints can, despite all discussion, remain unreconciled, when each claims to have reason on its side. The new science could turn out to be "aporetic," involving iressoluble contradictions. The discussion actually takes place not only between divergent views and interests but also between different forms of reason. That is one of its justifying motives, but it is also the source of its danger to fail. This already implies the second factor. The alternative between a form of reason that finds means to fulfill goals and a form of reason that finds the goals in communication is considered only from the viewpoint of science. However, goals are not found only--if at all--scientifically or philosophically, nor are they only postulated by "prophets." They are dictated by wielders of power (who then also appropriate science and change it into a pseudo-science).

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7. *Ernst Bloch* occupies a special place among the modern critics of reason. He confronts fact-determining reason with utopian reason. Utopia applies norms to existing reality. These norms are not demonstrable by the given facts. The world of facts gives them no letter of recommendation. Natural law cannot be verified by the prevalent law, but for that very reason utopian models are not refutable by the force of existing reality. The opposite is true: they judge facticity. Natural law decides what is right. Utopias, in their absoluteness, to which no empirical experience corresponds, provide a criterion for the inhumanity of the empirical.

For Bloch, man not only anticipates better conditions, but present-day reality itself is not yet complete. Possibility and process ferment in it; things are "abbreviated forms of themselves." They want to "end apocalyptically" (*The Spirit of Utopia*) in order to be perfected. So nature already comes to meet man, who is desirous of change. It wants "to return home through man." By creating and realizing utopias, man releases his own tendency out of its latent state. As in Schelling, the human mind continues what in nature was already pressing toward the same goal.

Thus, utopia does not merely posit a postulate alongside reality, as initially seemed to be the case, but it also contains a truth, indeed a truth higher than that of mere factual statements. It thinks not only of the accomplished fact, but also of the possible tendency in progress; it speaks in the name of what is not yet, of the future. It is a "trying out," a "forming of models" of not yet existent true being; it is related to a history-minded world "that is still verifying itself." By bringing to light the utopian essence and thus the essential truth of a thing, it helps this truth to bring through in reality too. By promoting utopian truth in things through practical change, it confirms its own truth.

For Bloch, utopia is not merely juxtaposed alongside the knowledge of the given reality. For him, there are not two reasons, one factual and the other utopian. Rather, only a truth that incorporates both is "adequate to the object." Every system must be an open one, leaving room for the incomplete, the unfinished, the imminent. In the quest for what is undermining the untrue "context" and thus warrants a different, coming reality, Ernst Bloch is related to Walter Benjamin. Often—as in Freud where the little things in dreams are revealing—this undermining tendency shows only in insignificant things, which are therefore more precious than what is generally noticed.

Utopian thought is opposed to positivism, which clings to supposedly untranscendable facts. Positivism is a derivation of the Greek belief in an immutable innerworldly order of being, while true enlightenment and utopia are derived from the Biblical hope in a promised completely different new order: an order of salvation. In Blochian montage: "The Messianic is the red, burning secret of every revolutionary, of every undiminished enlightenment." According to him, a new science will discover other qualities in nature than presently known (Paracelsus, Boehme, Romantic natural philosophy—Schelling, Baader--also had tried to grasp these qualities, though in an inadequate way). Our science has been ruined by its fusion with a striving for power and domination. It is not innocent and it has fallen into sin, but if it were to break off from this amalgamation with power, then a new technology could develop based on a different science in partnership with nature.

This new technology, however, would be possible not only because our science changes but also because nature itself undergoes a change. Like Fourier, Bloch prefigures a cosmic version of the Marxist transition from pre-history to real history. Man himself may again set free the "constructive energies of a frozen nature," and that in a "broader physics" an "alliance" is formed with the unknown "nature-subject" (a revival of the neo-Platonic *natura naturans*).

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REVIEWS:

Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*. Foreword by Paul Sweezy. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1974. xiii plus 465 pages.

One of the paradoxes of North American Marxism is that its generally impoverished history has yielded a body of literature—perhaps even a 'school'—which is equal to any, and is read and studied throughout the world: the writings associated with *Monthly Review*. In part this is no mystery. Paul Baran was European-born and educated, and the conduit for Paul Sweezy's Marxism was Schumpeter. In any case, Sweezy's *The Theory of Capitalist Development*, Baran's *The Political Economy of Growth*, and their *Monopoly Capital*, to name only the major works, have constituted a series of texts which have introduced a generation to a serious and nondogmatic Marxism. Harry Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capital* is an able and articulate addition to this 'school.'

Sweezy is, in fact, a bit too cavalier in slipping *Labor and Monopoly Capital* into the Monthly Review corpus. In a forward to the book, he deems it as simply making good the neglect of the labor process in *Monopoly Capital*; as such it was anticipated and is theoretically derivative. Sweezy states, "In terms of theory, as he [Braverman] would be the first to say, there is very little that is new in this book" (xi). Whether Braverman would be the first or last to say this can be left aside; in any case he would be wrong. There is much more here than a rounding out of *Monopoly Capital* or—to follow the subtitle—a documentation of the degradation of the labor process.

Braverman's object is to restore the critique of the capitalist mode of production. In recent decades this critique has suffered eclipse—including *Monopoly Capital*. The theoretical task signals a political orientation that requires comment, especially insofar as it affects the structure and atmosphere of the book. In brief, between *Monopoly Capital* (published in 1966) and *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, there is not only a theoretical but a political shift. *Monopoly Capital* can loosely be categorized as a third world-new left perspective. The de-emphasis or omission of labor in *Monopoly Capital* was not simply the tabling of a vital matter, but was loyal to the analysis of the book. "The answer of traditional Marxian orthodoxy—that the industrial proletariat must eventually rise in revolution against its capitalist oppressors—no longer carries conviction. Industrial workers are a diminishing minority of the American working class and their organized cores in the basic industries have to a large extent been integrated into the system of consumers and ideologically conditioned members of the society."[1] So Baran and Sweezy in 1966 in a statement exuding new leftism.

Braverman's book is less the filling out of this perspective, than its refutation. In nearly direct response to the statement of Baran and Sweezy, Braverman writes "It has now become a commonplace to assert that Marxism was adequate only for the definition of the 'industrial proletariat' and that with the relative shrinkage of that proletariat in size and social weight, Marxism, at least in this respect, has become 'outmoded' " (13). Braverman directly opposes this commonplace; he seeks to demonstrate the viability of Marx's concepts and, accordingly, the existence and expansion of the proletariat.

The contrasting theoretical axes of *Monopoly Capital* and *Labor and Monopoly Capital* express a contrasting politics; and these politics, in turn, follow the development of the left. The interest in culture, consciousness, students and blacks of the

1. P.A. Baran, P.M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 363.

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1960s has given ground to class analysis and class organizing; or student, black power and third world politics have made way for the working class and party building. The new left spawned traditional Marxism. Braverman's return to labor within Marxism parallels and participates in the recent history of the left. All of this lends an air of orthodoxy to *Labor and Monopoly Capital* which *Monopoly Capital* did not or could not obtain. As if to confirm this orthodoxy Braverman states that he specifically is not concerned with class consciousness. "No attempt will be made to deal with the modern working class on the level of its consciousness, organization or activities. This is a book about the working class as a class *in itself*, not as a class *for itself*" (26-27).

It is not fortuitous, finally, that Braverman parts from Baran and Sweezy in their most 'revisionist' concept—their concept of surplus. Baran and Sweezy sought to redefine surplus value into a critical and moral concept, or at least, add another dimension to a political economic concept. To this end, the social purpose of commodities became relevant. Surplus to Baran and Sweezy was not measured simply by surplus value extracted; this measurement does not suffice once the entire commodity is—in a different sense—surplus or irrational and wasteful, e.g., military commodities. Braverman returns to the traditional meaning of surplus, openly differing with Baran and Sweezy. "The surplus we seek . . . is somewhat different from the surplus Baran and Sweezy sought to trace . . . The fact that labor is used in the making of useless or harmful products does not for the moment concern us" (255).

The book, then, like the left today, smacks of orthodoxy and doctrine, a return—or a retreat—to a traditional Marxism. Undoubtedly this is how *Labor and Monopoly Capital* is being received by many parts of the left. Yet this reading would be a misreading, even if it is the one that Braverman prefers or implies. Rather, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* explodes its own limits and concepts; its orthodoxy is a promise or a threat, but not a reality. The very marrow of the book violates the static concepts of 'class in itself' and 'class for itself,' which Braverman himself defends. Braverman shows not explicitly, but implicitly how these two categories can no longer be cleanly severed. He undermines a technological and retrograde Marxism. The book is no simple return or retreat to orthodoxy; it is a chunk of critical Marxism.

The cutting edge of the book slices through mystifications about the division of labor in capitalism, which Marxists themselves have often accepted and even promoted. A venerable Marxist tradition has been more than delighted at the progress and efficiency of capitalist manufacturing. In keeping with this, the usual Marxist critique has tended to skirt the actual labor process and divisions in favor of questions about exploitation, safety, labor intensity, and so on. These latter categories are derived from the imperatives of surplus value. The divisions of labor themselves are treated as a technical relation. Or, the oppressiveness of capitalism is traced to the context of the division of labor, not to the divisions themselves. The schema assumed in this traditional critique is the use and abuse of a technical apparatus. Capitalism misuses its technology; the socialist society will inherit lock, stock and barrel this technological structure, and once stripped of the compulsion of surplus value, it will usher in a new society.

The great value of Braverman's book is in its refutation of this schema, and its inspiration, a technological Marxism. Braverman examines the extent to which the division of labor itself is capitalist, and not simply its utilization. He uncovers the ingression of capitalism into the very mechanics of the labor process. The specifically capitalist form of the division of labor disassociates knowledge and activity; the intention is not to produce more efficiently, but to subordinate and mesmerize the

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laborer. The technical apparatus is shot through with layers of capitalism. Domination does not begin just outside the technical apparatus—in its abuse—but in its existence. The separation of intelligence and activity, in particular, is not a technical requirement of modern production; it is an element of the domination of labor. Management strips intelligence from muscle and co-ops it up in the office so as to better dominate both—labor and intelligence.

Braverman's argument hits at the underbelly of positivist Marxism; he demystifies the labor process. Consciousness has been systematically excised from the labor process; this both partially explains the passivity of a working class and debunks the positivist dream that a socialist society simply inherits the achievements of the capitalist order. The clean and sharp separation of substructure and superstructure, forces and means of production, social relations and technology is put into question; these are inextricably intertwined. Socialism is not simply electricity plus soviet power. Technology itself incarnates bourgeois ideology, and to this degree, it must be retooled.

To be sure, this is an interpretation of Braverman, a drawing-out of his argument. In tune with the orthodoxy of the book, Braverman is quite reserved about the political implications of his analysis. He does not say that a positivist Marxism is under scrutiny; or that his analysis of the suppression of intelligence in the labor process undercuts the concepts of class 'in itself' and 'for itself.' Only on the last pages of the book does the orthodox container spring a small leak, and it is not by accident that this does not happen in the text proper. In a long footnote Braverman criticizes the notion of workers' control and participation. His objection is not the usual one, that such a program ignores state power, and so on, but that it is conservative in its acceptance of the existing labor process and divisions. "The demands for 'worker's participation' and 'worker's control'...far fall short of the Marxist vision. The conception of a democracy in the workplace based simply upon the imposition of formal structure of parliamentarism...upon the existing organization of production is delusory. Without the return of the requisite technical knowledge to the mass of workers and reshaping of the organization of labor...balloting within factories and offices does not alter the fact that the workers remain as dependent as before upon 'experts'... Thus genuine worker's control has its prerequisite the demystifying of technology and the reorganization of the mode of production" (445). This note illuminates the subversiveness of Braverman's project for traditional Marxism.

As with so much of critical Marxism, Braverman's contribution is not simply an addition to Marx but a rediscovery and restoration. A (re)reading of Marx shows that the formation of the division of labor was as central to him as its misuse by capitalism. Marx on occasion very carefully bisects the labor process into a rational form of cooperative labor and a capitalist form of domination. "All combined labor on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious working of the individual activities... A single violin player is his own conductor; an orchestra requires a separate one." The rational form of divisions of authority and labor slides into a capitalist one, directed at extracting surplus value. "The control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function, due to the nature of the social labor process, and peculiar to that process, but it is, at the same time, a function of the exploitation of a social labor-process." "The control of the capitalist is in substance two-fold by reason of the two-fold nature of the process of production itself..."[2] The

2. K. Marx, *Capital I* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961), p. 330-31.

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composite nature of the labor process, a welding together of rational and capitalist forms of domination, reflects its dual function of producing use and surplus value.

Recently there has been the beginnings of a literature documenting that the labor process has been an amalgam of technical efficiency and capitalist domination.[3] Of course to a tradition of labor historians, including Marx, this is hardly news. For example, Norman Ware's *The Industrial Worker* (1924) has chapters "The degradation of the worker," "The degradation of the operative" that parallel Braverman.[4] In fact, however, it is enormously difficult and not always urgent to sort out the unfreedom incorporated in the labor process from that which is imposed from without. Yet the tendency has always been to exempt the labor process itself, as a technical advance, from the indictment of capitalism. The source of the evil was located externally to the division of labor. It was assumed that socialism would inherit intact the labor process while revamping relations outside of it.

This tendency was abetted by what started as a positivist note in Marx and ended as the song and dance of reformism. This note was the positive, if not enthusiastic, appreciation for the achievements of bourgeois society—its productivity, technology, inventiveness, etc.[5] One aspect of this expressed itself in the translation of Marxism into social planning. This program preserved the economic and productive apparatus as a unit while altering the legal and commercial relations. Textual support for this translation could be found in Marx, but it missed the substance.

Braverman, in fact, discusses—though for a different purpose—one of the very quotations that lent itself to the planning interpretation. This is where Marx stated that the division of labor within the workshop and within society differed in kind; the former was rational, and the latter anarchistic. Subsequently this notion was attractive to reformers because it implied that the irrationality of capitalism was restricted to the market place and found its limits at the factory gate; it meant that the cure was state planning. Furthermore, this notion was in accord with a common sense that could confirm the anarchy of the market but was mute before the (apparent) rationality of production within the factory. Such a program and analysis capitulated to the mystique of technology; it reduced revolution to sacking the bosses and rationalizing relations between factories, while leaving sacrosanct the divisions and authority within the workshop.

In the critique of capitalist technology and division of labor Braverman converges with a major effort of critical theory: the demystification of capitalist science and technology. Of course exactly here begins one of the central debates: what are the limits and parameters to this critique? Does the critique encompass the structure of technology and rationality or simply its use and abuse? Within critical theory Marcuse and Habermas have generally represented two poles.[6] Braverman, as well as the history of

3. For example, A. Gorz, "The Tyranny of the Factory," *Telos*, 16 (Summer, 1973); A. Gorz, "Technical Intelligence and the Capitalist Division of Labor," *Telos*, 12 (Summer, 1972); S.A. Marglin, "What Do Bosses Do?" *URPE*, VI:2 (Summer, 1974); K. Stone, "The Origins of the Job Structures in the Stee. Industry," in *Root and Branch* (Fawcett, 1975); M. Davis, "The Stop Watch and the Wooden Shoe," *Radical America*, IX:1 (Jan.-Feb., 1975).

4. N. Ware, *The Industrial Worker* (1924) (New York, 1974), Chapter VI and Chapter VII.

5. Braverman, p. 72ff. Cf. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1963), p. 135ff.

6. For one chapter in this debate, see R. D'Amico's review of W. Leiss's *The Domination of Nature, Telos*, 15 (Spring, 1973) and the response, W. Leiss, "Ideology and Science," *Social Studies of Science*, V:2 (May, 1975).

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Taylorism and management, would seem to lend support to Marcuse; the very technology embodies an ideology designed to subordinate and atomize. Of course, such a position is rife with difficulties; where and how a social dynamic enters the natural sciences and technology is not a matter for general theorizing. It is probably a different story for each science. In any case the difficulties involved are no reason to mystify science. The retreat from the critique of science opens the way fo the humbug and scientism of Althusser and technological Marxism.[7]

Though his most forceful and important contribution, the critique of capitalist specialization and rationality hardly exhausts Braverman's book. Two other topics deserving some discussion are his analysis of the structure of the working class and its homogenization. In both these subjects, Braverman's approach, writing and analysis are fresh and spirited. Braverman is a pleasure to read. Yet here the orthodoxy exacts a heavier toll than in his critique of the division of labor; it suppresses or hides the heresy of the material that Braverman is presenting. Braverman too hastily slips the material into traditional Marxist categories; this he does deftly and finely—and not without reason, but all the same too rapidly. Attention is finally diverted from rethinking these categories to acclaiming their soundness. This is no 'either or' situation, but insofar as Braverman only accentuates the adequacy of the concepts, and not simultaneously their fraility, he helps prop up an orthodoxy he is otherwise undermining.

A pivotal chapter, "The Structure of the Working Class," interprets the composition of the working class in terms of Marx's general law of accumulation and its impact on the laboring and reserve populations. Marx's own discussion in *Capital* is rich and suggestive; it is in no way monochromatic. Marx's analysis follows, however, a basic contour: surplus laborers and population are a function of changes in the organic composition of capital. Within a fluctuating cycle, the central movement of the organic composition is increasing; or, relatively less labor and variable capital are needed by modern industry, and proportionately, more labor is being "released" to various forms of un- and under-employment. As Braverman cites Marx: "The whole form of the movement of modern industry depends, therefore, upon the constant transformation of a part of the laboring population into unemployed or half-employed hands."[8]

Given the cycles of capitalism, the release of labor takes numerous expressions. As Marx states, "The relative surplus population exists in every possible form."[9] Much of Braverman's discussion of the present working class and surplus population seems to be a loyal and accurate application of Marx; but his major argument seems to violate the essential drift of Marx's concepts. In brief, Braverman presents the facts of the bifurcation of the working class—not his word—as an expression of the laws of accumulation and the reserve armies. Industries suitable for mechanization have released labor to those that are not, essentially service and sales industries; the former are capital intensive, the latter are labor intensive. Braverman stresses several related facts. The working class of the mechanized sector is relatively highly paid and static in numbers, while the sales service sector is rapidly growing and poorly paid—and this has been true for several decades.

Braverman is not alone in registering this phenomenon of the polarization of the working class into two sectors; but there is less precedent for interpreting it in terms of reserve armies and surplus population. Again Braverman has done this subtly; but

7. See the provocative essay by S. and H. Rose, "The Radicalization of Science," *The Socialist Register 1972* (London: Merlin Press, 1972).
8. Marx, *Capital*, p. 633.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 640.

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Marx's discussion for all its openness does not anticipate a situation in which there is a bifurcation of the working class as a long term trend, or as Braverman puts it, a "polarization of income among job holders." (393) This seems to transgress the limits of the various forms of reserve armies and suggest other kinds of processes at work, e.g. state capitalism, imperialism, etc. O'Connor, for example, states there are "two major and distinct labor markets." One of these is characterized by big corperations, high wages, unionization and the other by low wages, low unionization, and expanding work force.[10]

Marx's analysis of accumulation and reserve armies does not anticipate this development of two distinct labor forces. The 'release' of labor that formed the reserve armies was not a release for an entire new set of expanding industries Of course there are other concepts which could be adopted here, e.g. the 'aristocracy' of the working class. The power and attractiveness of Braverman's analysis is that he does not seek to reviatlize this jaded concept; but the weakness is that he does not confront what at least the aristocracy of labor concept was responding to--a segmented labor force.[11]

At issue here are the related concepts of class and class consciousness. It would be unfair to burden this book with the task of working out a theory of class; and it would be unjust to burden it with a task specifically excluded, the question of class consciousness. To cite Braverman again: "No attempt will be made to deal with modern working class on the level of its consciousness, organization or activities. This is a book about the working class as a class *in itself*, not as a class *for itself*" (26-27). Yet the theoretical costs of such a procedure should not be ignored; at a certain point it affects the internal coherence of either concept. The clean separation of class and class consciousness has been the approach of Marxists and non-Marxists for many decades. It has yielded a mass of data about the objective situation of the working class, on the one hand, and about its subjective perceptions on the other.[12] The relationship between the two has remained obscure.

Simply for the sake of handling the amount of material, it may be necessary to separate out class and class consciousness. Yet the question mark that stands between class and class consciousness may not be removed if the two are explored separately. To establish there is an increasing and homogeneous working class, as Braverman does, and put off for another day the analysis of working class activity and consciousness paralyzes dialectic thought. The failure of the class 'for itself' as well as the success, must also have objective roots. To chalk up to secondary and minor factors the eclipse of class consciousness, after a certain period of time, becomes non-Marxist and ideological. Investigations into the 'objective' class situation which ignore this problem turn, willy-nilly, abstract and subjective.

There is no need to mince words here; within the boundaries of class 'in itself' Braverman shines; he is a model of clarity and lucidity. He debunks with ease and sureness the standard claim about a new, educated, skilled working or middle class. The 'new' working class, especially clerical workers, are deskilled, dehumanized, poorly paid, routinized, and so on. "The problem of the so-called employee or white-collar workers. . . has thus been unambiguously clarified by the polarization of office employment and the growth at one pole of an immense mass of *wage-workers*.

10. J. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (NY:St. Martin's, 1973), p. 26-7.

11. For a historical defense of the aristocracy of labor concept see E. Hobsbaum, "The Labor Aristocracy in 19th Century Britain," in his *Laboring Men* (Garden City, NY:Anchor, 1967).

12. For a survey of the concept of class in American sociology, see C.H. Page, *Class and American Sociology* (NY:Schocken Books, 1969) especially the "Introduction Thirty Years Later."

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The apparent trend to a large non-proletarian 'middle class' has resolved itself into the creation of a large proletariat in a new form" (255).

Traditionally Marxist contributions to this problem have followed two directions. A 'right' position has perceived a 'new' middle class or the embourgeoisement of the working class. Conversely, a 'left' position has argued for the proletarianization of the middle class. Bernstein and Kautsky were already debating the point. Kautsky adopted the position that was genial to the orthodox till the present. "As much as they cling to bourgeois appearances, the time will come for every one of the proletarized strata of the white collar groups at which they discover their proletarian heart."[13]

Systematic and detailed studies of the 'new' middle or working class—salaried, government, clerical workers—date from the early years of this century, such as Lederer's *Die Privatangestellten* (1912). Braverman infers, somewhat unfairly, that Lederer was an exponent of the 'new' middle class theory. Rather Lederer situated the salaried worker *between* classes, and partaking of both; its politics were conservative and bourgeois while its living standards and conditions were approaching the proletariat's. And Lederer left open the ultimate development of the salaried worker. "In which direction the dominant tendencies of the salaried point—whether towards the working class movement, or more towards the conservative direction of middle class politics—will depend above all on the further development of the conditions in which the salaried work."[14] Later Lederer, as many others, would emphasize the convergence of this sector and the proletariat. "The salaried are now a part of the proletariat," he stated in 1928.[15] Corey's *The Crisis of the Middle Class* (1935) declared that the 'new' middle class and salaried workers are "economically and functionally a part of the working class: a 'new' proletariat."[16]

Braverman's and the left Marxist analysis are appealing; and they are fully in accord with the renewed effort to establish that the proletariat is alive and well and expanding. This is relatively easily shown. If one adopts a criteria such as self-employment,[17] it is not difficult to demonstrate that their number—read: bourgeoisie—are diminishing, and that those who work for others—read: proletariat—are increasing. The problem with this kind of class analysis, which is not Braverman's, is that it barely captures the essence of late capitalism. The 'critique' that emerges from this analysis—capitalism as fewer and fewer rich parasitically living off an expanding and increasingly impoverished proletariat—"is not so much inaccurate—it is not—as it is utterly fragmentary and hardly abreast of the system as a whole."[18]

In brief, the concept of class, like any other, is not immune to reification. Severed from the social relations, it is drained of blood and content. Max Adler reminds that the concept of class "is not a mere concept of classification, but one of relations. That

13. Cited in P. Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism* (NY: Collier Books, 1962), p. 212.

14. E. Lederer, *Die Privatangestellen in der modernen Wirtschaftsentwicklung* (1912) (NY: Arno Press, 1975), p. 293.

15. E. Lederer, "Die Umschichtung des Proletariats," in A. Thomas, et al, *Angestellte und Arbeiter* (Berlin: Freier Volksverlag, 1928), p. 53.

16. L. Corey, *The Crisis of the Middle Class* (NY: Corici-Freide, 1935), p. 259. For a survey of some of the earlier theories of the salaried worker, see H. Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern Society," (1934) reprinted in his *Social Order and the Risks of War* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969).

17. See A. Szymanski, "Trends in the American Class Structure," *Socialist Revolution*, 10 (July-August, 1972).

18. P. Breines, "From Guru to Spectre," in *Critical Interruptions*, ed. P. Breines (NY: Herder & Herder, 1970), p. 17.

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is, the concept of class does not signify a mere external ordering or grouping, similar to the concept of class in zoology or botany... Rather class is a socialized phenomenon, and as such always a link in a larger context."[19]

The almost insurmountable difficulty is to remain loyal to an objective concept of class without sacrificing its social, subjective, and historical configurations. One does not have to be an ideologue to observe that in monopoly capital the appearance of class and class consciousness has changed. "In the market economy the untruth of the class concept was latent; under monopoly, it has become as visible as its truth—the survival of classes—has become invisible."[20]

To insist on the existence of classes without confronting the fragility of class consciousness is un-Marxist; this very fragility must have objective grounds. Class and class consciousness are internally connected; and for this to become more than blind faith, studies cannot simply decompartmentalize them. Of late, increasing numbers of studies have stressed the conditions outside of the labor process in determining class consciousness.[21] These conditions must be considered in rethinking the concept of class.[22] It should be recalled that such attention would hardly be new to Marxism, as Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in 1844* already included much about city life, living conditions, and so on.[23]

Braverman at one point, in passing, makes a statement that illuminates the entire problem. "The variety of determinate forms of labor may affect the consciousness, cohesiveness, or economic and political activity of the working class, but they do not affect its existence as a class" (410). Here Braverman has confessed more than he might grant; for the project of proving the homogenization of proletarian labor, the unity of the working class, is here thrown into question. If the determinate forms of labor decisively affect proletarian consciousness and activity, then the meaning of an objective concept of class which ignores these forms is deprived of substance. The class here erodes into a classifying concept lacking political significance. The logic of the investigation, then, has preserved or even revitalized the class concept but only at the cost of killing it; it no longer penetrates the social phenomenon. Again Braverman is clear enough that he is dealing only with class 'in itself' not 'for itself.' But agian the more and longer these diverge—as Braverman is candid enough to state they do—the more problematic the study of either becomes in isolation.

None of these remarks are meant to detract from *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. No one book can do everything, and this one does much more than most. Braverman's book is an important and provocative work; it is simply written, but hardly simple. It stands squarely and honorably within a great tradition of Marxist theoretical works. Like *Monopoly Capital* it reflects the development of the left itself, the 'return' from third world politics and a critique of life under capitalism to the proletariat. And like

19. Max Adler, *Die solidarische Gesellschaft* (Wien: Europa Verlag, 1964), p. 36.

20. T.W. Adorno, "Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie," *Gesammelte Schriften*, VIII (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), p. 379.

21. For example, H. Kern, M. Schumann, "Zum politischen Verhaltenspotential der Arbeiterklasse," in *Gesellschaftsstrukturen*, hrsg. K. Meschkat, O. Negt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973); J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer, J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P, 1969).

22. For an excellent discussion, see J. Alt, "Work, Culture and Crisis," *Telos*, 23 (Spring, 1975). Cf. J. Cohen, "False Promises," *Telos*, 24 (Summer, 1975) and the reply by M.E. Batiuk, P. Fleming, P. Murray in the same issue.

23. See S. Marcus, *Engels, Manchester and the Working Class* (NY: Vintage, 1975), p. 145ff.

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the left today it is haunted by an orthodoxy that threatens to suppress its originality. Its greatest weakness which aids this suppression is its theoretical modesty. Braverman does not spell out his own subversiveness, most notably the full significance of the critique of the division of labor and a positivist Marxism. Unfortunately his very modesty abets his integration into an orthodoxy which in many ways he is sharply challenging. We should not let this book slip away to the doctrinaires.

Russell Jacoby

Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture*. McGraw-Hill, 1976. 261 pages.

Tibor Scitovsky, *The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction*. Oxford University Press, 1976. 310 pages.

Socialist orators all eventually face the hostile questioner who expects to shatter their faith by posing the following dilemma: How do you expect to find willing garbage collectors in the classless utopia? Actually there are a good many easy answers, including Fourier's (let children do it, since they like to play in the stuff anyway—or something like that). If such questioners had looked at much utopian literature from More to Morris, they might have spotted a more serious issue: how terribly *perfect* everyone is expected to be and how terribly *dull* it looks. With the best of intentions Thomas More had designed a social lobotomy for his utopian citizens, long before Zamyatin and Huxley suggested how useful modern technology could be in exorcising the prurient interests of mankind.

Socialist theory and practice have always been more at ease when dealing with the sphere of work and production than in confronting problems of "culture." Twentieth-century revolutionary regimes, faced with shattered economies and the armed might of industrial capitalism, have—for very good reasons—formulated a production ethic which mirrors Ben Franklin's. Meanwhile, the advanced capitalist societies had reached a new stage of development in which the cultural sphere was undergoing a radical transformation. Unfortunately many socialist partisans in these societies, their thoughts fixed firmly on external models, failed to notice what was happening in their immediate surroundings. For them the ideal form of socialist man, factory-forged, awaiting the conjuncture of objective and subjective "forces," stood ready to emerge beneath the ideological trappings of bourgeois society, which were to be hosed off along with the grime of capitalist industry.

In western Marxism the work of Gramsci, Korsch, the early Reich, and the Frankfurt School challenged this outlook (presented above with some rhetorical exaggeration). The emphasis on empirical social psychology—informed by a critical perspective—in Horkheimer's research program for the Institute for Social Research was meant to provide an organized focus for studying in detail the reproduction of social life. The questionnaire prepared for *Authority and the Family*, together with the elaborate theoretical perspective which placed the empirical research in its historical context, is a fascinating example of a comprehensive approach which was disrupted by the Institute's flight from Germany. This combination of empirical and theoretical approaches was revived for *The Authoritarian Personality*, which has received a measure of respect from conventional social science.

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Unfortunately, the return of critical theory in the 1960s, in part a reaction against the conformist tendencies of empiricist social science, was incomplete. The motifs of "grand theory" and philosophical generalities overawed the earlier interplay of linked theoretical and empirical concerns. The Frankfurt School's own analysis of "mass culture," especially in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, was chiefly responsible for the shift in emphasis. This analysis is in my view not only wrong but downright perverse. Measuring popular culture by exalted standards of aesthetic refinement, the theory found the former to be an unrelieved wasteland. The decisive change in North American popular music from the 1950s to the 1960s, for example, simply could not be glimpsed from the altitude where the pantheon of high culture floated. Thus the break between the culture of the "New Left" and the older generation of Frankfurt School theorists, which was especially sharp in Germany, was inevitable. The blending of social critique and musical creativity by the Beatles, Jefferson Airplane, the Rolling Stones (dear me!) among many others, was just so much dreadful noise to the devotees of Schoenberg. The "promise of liberation" should not be contaminated by contact with such scruffy types.[1]

With its strong puritanical bent, Marxism has barely managed an embarrassed glance at the sphere of consumption in advanced capitalist societies. The more devout are content to mumble a few condemnatory words about "commodity fetishism," either stating or implying that commodities would magically lose their fetish-character under socialist planning. The Frankfurt School theorists went a bit further, referring to the "manipulation" of needs and distinguishing between "true" and "false" (autonomous and heteronomous) needs. Again, unfortunately, the theory did not stoop to particulars and specify which needs were true and which were false. In its less rigorous moments the theory was never far from ill-concealed snobbery. During the 1960s it was not uncommon for younger radical theorists to compete in accumulating vast private libraries (by legal or usually other means) while sneering at others' susceptibility to peer-group influences in their consumption patterns.

The notion of "true" needs, suggesting an ideal of autonomous individual rationality that should remain impervious to marketplace influences, mimics to some extent that elegant fiction of conventional economics, the model of consumer rationality. Generations of first-year economics students have learned that their wants are insatiable, that scarcity is an inescapable part of the human condition, and that the market is an instrument of almost godlike perfection for allocating resources "efficiently." With its delightfully modest assumption that wants are generated autonomously by individuals, the pure theory of consumer behavior has about as much genuine heuristic value as *Grimm's Fairy Tales*.[2] Conventional economics returned with interest the intellectual dishonesty it claimed to find in the attacks of its enfeebled radical opponents, when for example it stated that the function of advertising was to provide "information" to assist consumer choices.

Meanwhile, what was happening out there?

Stuart Ewen's book recounts part of the history of a decisive turn in the course of capitalist development: the realization that "ordinary" men and women could do a

1. Needless to say, I am not suggesting that these are unambiguous expressions of a "liberating" cultural development, but only that they have certain liberating aspects (judged according to both aesthetic and social criteria) as a form of popular culture which are superior to what preceded them and which have a certain enduring value.

2. See Robin Marris, *The Economic Theory of 'Managerial' Capitalism* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 135-6.

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double duty for the economy, first by toiling (that much was known and appreciated) and second by consuming. Consumers are not among nature's evolutionary stunts; they must be created. The industrial work-force had been assembled by the brutal disruption of long-established ways of life, and had been kept at their appointed tasks mainly by police terror. To the extent that any training in popular ideology had been found to be desirable for them, an ascetic production ethic was supplied, for example by Henry Ford. There is much irony in the fact that the mass-production techniques implemented by Ford and others signalled the obsolescence of this ethic and the necessity for its replacement.

The ideology of consumerism took shape in the 1920s. Led by business spokesmen such as Boston's Edward Filene, from whose remarkably frank speeches Ewen draws numerous quotations, its champions detailed the ways in which the "masses" (their term) would be permitted to enjoy a share of what they had produced. Some time would pass before this reorientation of business thinking would take hold widely, and in any case the Depression and Second World War delayed its implementation until after 1945.

But the fabrication of a consumer ideology was underway. As described by Ewen, the following themes were explicitly presented in trade journals, speeches, and books of that period: (1) increasing access to consumer goods should weaken demands for workers' control in industry (i.e., "bolshevism"); (2) as a corollary to the first, "participation" was redefined as the exercise of consumer choice, which was to be the new and appropriate form of "democracy;" (3) non-English ethnic minorities would be "Americanized" and a uniform national "taste" created through advertising messages; (4) the spheres of production and consumption would be kept separate—for example, workplace scenes would not be used in advertising (a practice that is still quite noticeable in advertisements today); (5) the family would be opened up increasingly to social pressures, for example by new consumption models learned in public school "home economics" courses and brought home by the kiddies; (6) male and female roles would be manipulated, with chief attention being given to presenting women as sexual objects; (7) the realm of personal consumption skills would be transformed: individuals (especially women) would be pressured into buying manufactured items (e.g., food and clothing) rather than making them at home.

Ewen's study is a most useful contribution to the archaeology of the so called "consumer society." For one thing the crudeness of the ideological formulations in this period are striking; reading them helps us to appreciate how refined and subtle the advertisers' manipulation of imagery has become. The chapter on the "new woman" in the final part is especially good. The style leaves much to be desired, however, and there is a lesson for many of us here. Ewen has placed his historical research in some conceptual baggage which will inspire readers of this journal, but which also is likely to deprive him of a wider audience. Terms such as objectification and a brief foray into Barthes and Lukacs, for example, will make the book hard going for the uninitiated; I believe they hinder rather than assist the author's objectives. Unless we wish to continue writing primarily for each other in this cozy circle, we ought at least to explain ourselves more clearly when we find it too risky to venture into print without our distinctive teminological armour.

The basic orientation of this book is in line with the "manipulation of needs" thesis mentioned above: "The creation of 'fancied need' was crucial to the modern advertiser. The transcendence of consumer markets and buying habits required people to buy, not to satisfy their own fundamental needs, but rather to satisfy the

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real, historic needs of capitalist productive machinery." It would be nice if someone were to specify for once just what these "fundamental" needs are—preferably without the litany, "food, chothing, and shelter," so that one could avoid the necessity of inquiring: What kinds of foods? How much variety? Needs change, as Marx emphasized; there is no such thing as "fundamental needs."[3]

Critical social theory postulates a layer of "true" or "objective" needs subsisting below the manipulated desires of the capitalist marketplace. Is it too much to ask that someone finally state just what are these true needs? (One hopes that the list will include needs for Havana cigars, French wines, and first-class European hotels; if not, others besides the decadent *Haute bourgeoisie* are going to be disappointed.) Rudimentary conceptions such as this have inhibited us from looking carefully at the actual processes of social transformation that are occurring around us. Unless we carry our critical apparatus beyond the abstract rhetoric of "false consciousness" to the grubby details of social life, and seek to carefully understand the stages of development of behavior patterns, we might as well see whether inspecting entrails would improve our predictive powers.

Tibor Scitovsky's *The Joyless Economy* is the first full-scale critique of the consumer rationality model by a well-respected contemporary economist. It is also a pleasure to read. Scitovsky disserts the crude psychological assumptions of the prevailing model and displays some of the internal tensions in the prevailing patterns of consumer behavior. His conclusions will undoubtedly appear too modest to many readers, but it would be unwise to ignore his clear and torough analysis on that account.

Of the economists' "cosumer sovereignty" notion, Scitovsky says: "Harmony, therefore, between consumer preferences and the pattern of production may simply indicate the adaptation of man's tastes to the rigid requirements of the productive system, and that would hardly be a cause for self-congratulation." Radical theorists will find nothing new in the claim that an increasing supply of consumer goods does not automatically signal an increase in human welfare. But the novelty and force of Scitovsky's undertaking consists in his attempt to show *how* and *why* personal dissatisfaction might result in this process. Partly this arises from the contradictory impulses for comfort and stimulation. I cannot present fully his use of recent behavioral psychology which provides the basis for his critique; the main point is that increased comfort is like addiction in that it gives no lasting pleasure, for pleasure is soon replaced by the habituated striving to avoid the discomfort that withdrawal would bring. The bias in fovor of comfort that Scitovsky finds in North American consumption patterns drives the apparently endless search for higher levels of consumption.

A number of other points are interesting: the reminder of the sources of satisfaction which lie outside the sphere of market exchanges and which are not tabulated in the national accounts; the argument that some ways of striving for individual satisfaction produce social benefits by a "spinoff" effect, whereas others do not; the significance of our inability to register qualitative changes in the pursuit of the satisfaction of needs; and a brilliant chapter entitled "Our puritan Ghost."

The basic theme running throughout all of these is the inherent irony of the consumer society: the lifestyle which is promoted through the ever-enlarging pile of consumer goods is an *austere* one. Our culture skews our consumption pattern "in

3. Strictly speaking, for example, we do not need food for survival, but rather proper nutrition. Would we be content to say that our need for food were satisfied if we were all provided daily with an ample supply of intravenous solution and a needle?

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favor of comfrot and against stimulus enjoyment," and in this structured bias against novely and stimulation Scitovsky locates the primary sources of our continued dissatisfaction with the enormous output of the productive system.

The value in this book is that it provides a well-reasoned hypotehsis which seeks to explain why this dissatisfaction occurs. Even if we wish to regard it only as an illustration of the manipulation of needs (and I think this would be a narrow-minded conclusion), at least we have a hypothesis about *how* it takes place. Scitovsky's distinction between production and consumption skills, and especialy his conception of the latter, seems to me more problematical. Production skills encompass techniques of work, whereas consumption skills are the educated enjoyment of life derived from culture; the puritanical streak in North American culture denigrates the latter and renders us incapable of deriving adequate satisfaction from consumption. Scitovsky argues that Europeans are better consumers in this respect and that consumers can "match wits" with sellers "if they bring discernment, intelligence, and determination to their shopping."

This is a disappointing conclusion to an otherwise original argument.[4] I find it amusing to contemplate matching wits with Exxon Corporation. In a more serious vein, with reference to Scitovsky's image of the more skilled European consumer, I would venture to product that North American consumption patterns will continue their present penetration of European markets and tend to eliminate any significant differences.

I do think that the concept of skilled consumption makes sense, albeit not as represented by the image of the determined shopper. This concept only makes sense in the context of overcoming the methodical separation of the spheres of production and consumption. The "sphere of production" is not, however, the same as the sphere of wage-labor, and this alternative approach should not be interpreted as another recrudescence of puritanism. I am referring to the necessity for increasing the share of personal activity in the production of things for our use, as opposed to relying upon market purchases for everything. For only when we actively engage in producing some of these things, such as cooking a meal rather than throwing a TV dinner into an oven, can we realy become skilled consumers, able to appreciate the qualitatvie differences and subtle nuances in the composition of things. Obviously an industrial economy and the division of labor set certain limits to these possibilities; it is not a matter of leaping backwards toward a paradisiacal illusion, but of reversing a tendency that has become irrational and indeed detrimental to personal well-being. Constraints on resource and energy supplies will eventually be felt particularly in the "convenience" and "comfort" aspects of the present consumption patterns. Perhaps these constraints will encourage us to rediscover the considerable sources of satisfaction in personal activities that are now buried under the immense outpouring of "goods."

William Leiss

4. In his preface Scitovsky relates how he was refused any research support for his work on this book by government agencies and private foundations—despite the fact that he had previously published six books and innumerable articles. This treatment of so modest a critical study proposed by so eminent a scholar tells us much about the nervous state of thought-control apparatus administered by the professional associations, at least in the United States.

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Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family*. New York: Basic Books, 1975. 369 pages.

The family is one of those topics normally placed on a list that includes education, art, religion and the media. Beyond the claim that the family is an important aspect of ideology, there is little about it that radical social theory has told us recently. Matched against this silence, academic historians have been making a lot of noise about the family for the past ten years. But it has remained little more than noise. Historians have researched numerous topics without much sense of what the important questions are and without any generally accepted overview of family history. Edward Shorter proposes to change all that, offering us the first comprehensive history of the family.

In some respects Shorter's work deserves credit. As the first serious general history of the family in Europe, it brings together just about all the best research so that, if nothing else, it serves as a good summary of *l'état des études*. Reading Shorter's book one gets a good sense of what peasant women did in their daily lives, how marriage customs have changed since traditional European society, how household composition has varied in the past two centuries, and a good deal of fascinating sketches of the customs surrounding the family especially in rural Europe of the 18th and 19th centuries. Beyond this, however, *The Making of the Modern Family* will be appreciated as the making of a fiasco of modernization theory.

Influenced deeply by the Parsonian theory of Weinstein and Platt, especially their *The Wish to Be Free*, Shorter argues that the nuclear family emerged as a nest of domesticity, as a private world withdrawn from society, when the capitalist economy *liberated* individuals from community constraints. The capitalist market eroded the collective authority of the village and other corporate bodies over the intimate affairs of the individual that had characterized early modern European society. Shorter claims that love and sex based on spontaneous and empathic emotions replaced relations based on calculation and interest; in Parsons' words, the expressive function replacing the instrumental function. Once capitalism gave individuals the opportunity to escape from parental restrictions and to choose mates freely, nothing could hold back what Shorter calls "the surge of sentiment." The nuclear family was established, he continues, when couples paired on the basis of romantic love and regarded the intrusions of the community as unwarranted interference with their privacy. Sexual liberation, domesticity, romantic love and maternal love, all built around privacy and isolation, are the cornerstones of the nuclear family to Shorter.

The basic problem with Shorter's presentation is that he regards these features of the modern family as *natural* impulses which arose inevitably once individuals had any say in the matter, once, as he says, capitalism fulfilled the "wish to be free." Shorter's presentation contains numerous confusions and does much violence to the history of the family. First, he omits completely the aristocratic family on the grounds that he is doing history from the bottom up. This bow to fashion conceals that his heroes are the members of another elite, the bourgeoisie, who, he finds, always initiate the liberating trends. But by leaving out the aristocracy Shorter is able to sneak in some pretty outrageous generalizations about family history. Leaving out the whole history of courtly love, he can say the bourgeoisie invented spontaneous amorous expression. And leaving out the notoriously ribald sexual practices of the aristocracy, he can assert that libertine mores arise only in the bourgeois period. He says this in the face of so much evidence that, with the *possible* exception of the monks, the bourgeoisie was the most sexually repressed class in human history.

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The bias and blindness increase when Shorter claims that, while bourgeois marriage was based only on romantic love (which he defines as a "vehicle for self-exploration and self-development," p. 15), peasant marriage was, he urges, "totally affectionless" (p. 55). Now even if Shorter presented adequate evidence to bolster his position, which he does not, it would be most difficult to lend a shed of credence to what he says. First, he admits that romantic love among the bourgeoisie, when it occurred at all, never lasted very long after marriage. So, how could it be the basis for "self-exploration?" Also, romantic love according to Freud, whom Shorter never mentions, is a narcissistic illusion, projecting the self onto the other, hardly the basis for an odyssey of internal discovery. But even worse, Shorter maligns the peasantry in his effort to show up the wonders of bourgeois civilization. The emotional relations of peasants were in all likelihood quite different from our own, but this is no reason to say that they had no feelings, as Shorter contends. It is also probable that the peasant emotional life was geared more to the village community than to the immediate family and Shorter, always looking for signs of bourgeois feelings, finds only cool calculation.

I want to put aside these historical inaccuracies in Shorter's position and concentrate on the theoretical problem of defining the bourgeois or nuclear family. If one views this family structure as the spontaneous consequence of "freedom" which wells up from deep within each individual rather than as arising within a definite historical conjuncture, one is essentially presenting it as natural to mankind. Therefore one is presenting it as the total fulfillment of human needs, as a perfect social arrangement.

This is of course completely ideological, justifying a given social structure on the basis of a metaphysics of human nature. For Shorter, our society has attained a family structure which allows human beings the freedom to experiment with their personal lives, which guarantees them a free quest for individual development, and which supports their basic needs for spontaneous, intimate relations. But Shorter recognizes the crisis of the bourgeois family, this utopian institution, in the past few decades, although he has no adequate explanation for why perfection should be flawed. Speaking of the loss of communal sociability, of the rise in divorce rates, of the communication gap between parents and children which all beset the nuclear family he can state only this: "It's just like my mother said: nothing comes free in this world" (p. 154, repeated on p. 168). I would not reiterate this inane remark which accepts social irrationality as a product of fate, except that it marks the collapse of Shorter's whole position: there can be no historical view of the bourgeois family structure in his account, no critical assessment of its limits and its changing features, no prescription of its oppressions and needed transformations.

In addition to the ideological weakness of Shorter's argument, which is based on modernization theory, another difficulty stems from his lack of a psychological theory even though he sees the history of the family as a history of feelings and of sexuality. Without a psychological theory of family structure the relative autonomy of the family is lost and the intelligibility of family history disappears. Shorter cannot present the nuclear family as a structure in its own right and indicate properly just where the economy determines it and where it influences politics.

Confusions abound when he claims that the capitalist market requires an "egoistical economic mentality" to "spread into various noneconomic domains of life" (p. 259). The market *forced* individuals, he claims, to look out first for number one and this individualism extended to the family in the form of romantic love and maternal care.

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There are three errors here: (1) How was it possible for the economic system to rely on individualism when there was no psychic or emotional preparation for it, no emotional structure of the family that would internalize values so deeply within the individual that he would appear to be an autonomous agent? (2) Individualism was not supported by the economic realities of the working class because there was no chance of upward social mobility for them, no chance for them to pinch pennies and accumulate capital. Yet Shorter sees the working class of the first stages of industrialization as the vanguard of sexual liberation. (3) Shorter confuses a determinist explanation based on market forces and an individualist explanation based on personal "wishes to be free." If the market is forcing people to be individualists, then they are not "free" to do so. But this is the basic problem in all liberal theory, an irresolvable antinomy between determinism and freedom. At the level of family history, it means that Shorter relies repeatedly on a view of large-scale social actions undertaken by individuals in multiple, accidental, separate decisions: women all over Europe, he says, suddenly decided to give tender loving care to their infants, rather than swaddle them or send them out to be nursed; boys all over Europe suddenly decided to resist their parents' wishes and marry the girl of their dreams. But the whole question of social history, and the whole advance of historical materialism, is to avoid a reliance on presenting chance as the private decisions of millions of people. Instead its task is to depict the conjuncture, to analyze the social structures leading in one direction or another, to present the choices of individuals not as *arbitrary coincidences* on a massive scale but as happening in a situation.

To understand basic changes in family structure, a combination of explanatory methods are needed, including not only the economy and class struggle but also the psychic structure and struggles of sex and age groups. We need to know what features of the nuclear family enabled parents to reproduce in their children not only the nuclear family itself but the cognitive and emotional requirements of the economic system. This Shorter has totally failed to do. At the economic level as well, Shorter, a Parsonian apologist for capitalism, sees only those forces which promote the rise of all the good things afforded by the nuclear family. On the bourgeois side, he does not see that women were excluded from production relations, but only than an enriched bourgeoisie could afford to keep its wives at home. The oppression of women in this situation goes unrecognized in favor of Shorter's smart-aleck opinion that modern women, sequestered in the home, pass the "sacrifice test" since they put the welfare of their children above their own. On the workers' side, he does not see that workers did not adopt and could not adopt the nuclear family during the early stages of commercial capitalism, to say nothing of industrial capitalism, because everyone in the family was compelled to work. Hence the process through which the bourgeoisie imposed the ideals of the nuclear family on the working class in a great propaganda campaign about the proper place of women also escapes Shorter's sexist vision. Family history needs a theory and a model of the bourgeois family which can deal effectively with these difficulties if it is to avoid the simple-minded and mystifying celebration of the dominant family structure. Shorter's book is valuable in that it teaches family historians the important lesson that Parsonian theory will not help in this task.

Mark Poster

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Wlodzimierz Brus, *The Economics and Politics of Socialism: Collected Essays.* Foreword by Maurice Dobb. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. .ges.

Wlodzimierz Brus, *Socialist Ownership and Political Systems.* Translated by R.A. Clarke. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

The Polish encounter with democratization in the workplace from 1956 to the present remains the least known of all Eastern European experiments with workers' councils and self-management.[1] Hence, a good deal of insight can be gathered from these two works by Wlodzimierz Brus.[2] Since the middle fifties when he began his studies,[3] Brus has established himself as an outspoken critic of the autarkic regimes of

1. The range of previous studies and commentary includes: Zygmunt Bauman, "Social Structure of the Party Organization in Industrial Works," in *Studies in Polish Political System*, ed. Jerzy Wiatr and Jacek Tarkowski (Wroclaw, 1967); Jiri Kolaja, *A Polish Factory: A Case Study of Workers' Participation in Decision-Making* (New York, 1960); Georg Kolankiewicz, "The Polish Industrial Manual Working Class," in *Social Groups in Polish Society*, ed. by David Lane and George Kolankiewicz (New York, 1973); Paul Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York, 1956); D. Dabrowski, "Organizacja zaradzania," in *Studia nad zaloga huty aluminium w Skawinie*, ed. K. Dobrowolski and A. Stojak (Wroclaw, 1969); Jolanta Kulpinska, *Spoleczna aktywnosc pracownikow prezedsiebiorstwa przemyslowego* (Wroclaw, 1969); A. Ostrowski, *Rola zwiazkow zawodowych w polskim systemie politycznym* (Warsaw, 1970); J. Waclawek, "W sprawie koncepji role partii w zakladach pracy," in *Nowe Drogi* (February, 1959); A. Werblan, "O socjalistyczny kierunek dzialalnosci kulturalnej," in his *Szkice i polemiki* (Warsaw, 1970).

2. For many readers, an important question is: who is Wlodzimierz Brus? By training and profession, he is a political economist who has achieved a good deal of recognition both as an academic and as an advisor to several Polish government agencies. Prior to World War II, Brus studied economics at the Free University of Warsaw and, after the war's outbreak, continued his academic work in the Soviet Union. During the early fifties, he held the chair of political economy at the Institute of Social Science connected with the Polish Workers' Party Central Committee. By 1956, he was serving as a professor of economics at Warsaw University in addition to heading the department for economic research with the Planning Commission. Brus also worked, during the hopeful heydays of worker self-management from 1956 to 1962, as Vice-Chairman of the State Economic Council. Indeed, while at these posts, Brus closely associated with the late Professors Oskar Lange and Michael Kalecki. It was Brus and Kalecki who composed the initial statements of the widely-touted Polish Economic Reforms of 1956-1957 which, unfortunately, were never actually set into action. Brus, in 1968, joined the Institute of Housing Economy as a researcher and, in the early seventies, he travelled to the University of Glasgow as a visiting professor. Taking advantage of the relative intellectual "freedom" of Poland, Brus has drawn throughout his career upon the resources of both Eastern and Western social science and his writings have appeared in such Western publications as *Critica Marxista, Rinascita, Co-existence,* and *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts und Gesellschaftspolitik.*

3. In *The Market in a Socialist Economy*, which was first published in 1964 and translated into English in 1972, Brus outlines his case in a more technical fashion for implementing market mechanisms in a socialist economic system. Unfortunately, this work, and it is this particular book by which is is best known, presents an overly economistic and technocratic image as is seen in Antonio Carlo's attack on him in *Telos*, 21 (Fall 1971), for doing "the most organic work" in the field of revisionist economic theory. Yet, this sort of perspective does not do full justice to a thinker who in addition to being a devotee of "market socialism" remains, at the same time, genuinely interested in questions of greater socialization, politicization, and democratization for Eastern European socialist societies. In fact, even in this first book, Brus asserts that, "It [a system of workers' councils] constitutes an attempt, if not to eliminate, at least to lessen the distinction between those who give instructions and those who execute them" (*The Market,* p. 156). Brus, to be sure, differs *substantially* from theorists such as Ota Sik in Czechoslovakia who in questioning socialist economics did not openly question the statist socialist politics which underpinned a

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Bierut's, Golmulka's and Gierdek's Poland. Like the Czech reform economists who emerged prior to the Prague Spring, Brus has been predisposed to advocate technocratic economics and liberal politics as a cure for the doldrums of bureaucratic socialism.[4] In *The Economics and Politics of Socialism* and in *Socialist Ownership and Political Systems* these critical views push beyond the usual technocratic economic revisionism of Lieberman in stressing the revitalization of *meaningful popular politics* within the highly *de-politicized* Eastern European bureaucratic socialist states. In these two books, Brus tries to articulate those aspirations of the Polish workers that have challenged the Party to loosen its hegemonic grip on Polish society. I will not focus on Brus' arguments for "market socialism" for this ground has already been covered.[5] Instead, I will concentrate on his critique of Eastern European socialism and on his call for a new policy of pluralistic democratization within the context of the workers' councils.

It must be emphasized, however, that Brus comes out of the mainstream of orthodox Soviet political economics. Thus, he writes in a dry, turgid, economistic style concerned with, e.g., discovering immutable "laws" of social evolution. This is why he asks whether "there exist *economic* laws postulating the real socialization of the means of production and thus defining the plane of further evolution of socialism" (*Socialist Ownership*, pp. 3-4; hereafter *SO*). Fortunately, this does not totally obscure Brus' vision of the more fully socialized society. Like the Yugoslav *Praxis* school, Brus attempts to affirm what is "best" in human nature while defending human beings from the degradations of bureaucratic oppression. To be sure, he only resorts to the standard economistic argument to legitimate a new leap to higher forms of socialization. Thus, the progressive development and socialization of the productive forces under socialism must be accompanied "by the gradual improvement of man as creator of material and spiritual goods" (*SO*, p. 21). To attain this, Brus favors a *dynamic socialization* of the means of production (*SO*, pp. 62-63). Here socialization means "democratization" rather than "nationalization" which simply constitutes a single government decree and subsequent "public" control of the productive forces by a vanguard party-state (*SO*, pp. 30, 40-41). In contradistinction to the familiar mode of *static socialization*, Brus argues for a participatory process which dispenses with the mediation of a bureaucratic party in order to turn the productive forces and their social product over to the direct control of the associated workers.

From a Western Marxist perspective, Brus' theories are a curious mix of insight and

decentralized economic system. Indeed, in *Socialist Ownership* and *The Economics and Politics*, Brus reiterates his familiar plea for instituting some form of "market socialism." Yet, in doing so, "market socialism" seems to assume two meanings. On the one hand, market socialism means the adoption of certain market practices into the planning frameworks of a centralized economy. On the other hand, however, market socialism becomes a metaphor for increasing pluralism, expanding democratic practices and spreading the socialization of the means of production in the face of a bureaucratic-centralist party. Obviously, it serves as an excellent metaphor inasmuch as a market requires freely-flowing information, greatly extended opportunities for individual choice, and widely-based popular decision-making. Market socialism, for Brus, is not important because it could improve the scope and efficacy of a statist bureaucratic party but is rather a means of smashing that party's tightly controlled political monopoly to give society an even more socialist economy to be run by workers' councils.

4. Karel Kovanda, "Czechoslovak Workers' Councils (1968-1969)," *Telos*, 28 (Summer 1976), pp. 36-38.

5. For this sort of critique of market socialism, the reader can turn to Antonio Carlo, "The Socio-economic Nature of the USSR," *Telos*, 21 (Fall 1974) and to Ivan Svitak, "Illusions of Czech Socialist Democracy," *Telos*, 22 (Winter 1974-75).

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illusion, innovation and anachronism.[6] In fact, Brus draws heavily from the contemporary schools of positive social science, especially the work of Stanislaw Ossowski.[7] Still, granted Brus' own socio-historical situation, even his moderately progressive thoughts sustain radical implications. If his ideas could be translated into meaningful programs or if they could be discussed in Eastern Europe, they would have explosive political consequences. In fact, Brus' treatment of popular politics and their role in socialism reintroduces the *political* dimension in Eastern European intellectual discourse. He readily exposes the apparatus' positivized economics of technical allocation as an effort to conceal socialism's political and economic contradictions: "socialism needs not only a technical theory of economic operation, 'a science of the rational organization of productive forces,' but also a political economy in its strict sense, the adjective *political* being given its full force" (*Economics and Politics*, p. 82; hereafter *EP*). Here politics is understood as the immediate producers' participation as opposed to the authoritative allocation of the social product by an elite party-state.

According to Brus, the institution of a socialist regime "does indeed overcome the contradictions of capitalism and creates a progressive socio-economic base for economic development" (*EP*, p. 81). Yet, at least four contradictions remain: the contradiction between long-term increases and short-term decreases in consumption; between income differentiation and egalitarianism; between increasing consumption through employment or by added productivity; and between individual and social consumption as the aggregate levels of general consumption increase. Like Stojanović, Kardelj and Pasic in Yugoslavia, Brus traces the root of the contradictions back to the hegemony of a statist vanguard party. Having secured the rudiments of a socialist administration, it is in the party-state's interest to enact policies which cut short-term personal consumption, enforce income egalitarianism, stimulate increased productivity and expand public expenditures at the expense of individual consumption. Such policies only benefit the party managers. They do not benefit the citizens nor do they contribute to any real "socialization" of society. Given these contradictions, social relations are far from harmonious and alienation persists as workers remain estranged as producers from the instruments and products of their labor: "A long road separates the nationalization of the means of production from their complete socialization, the creation of what we often call a socialist attitude to work and social ownership" (*EP*, pp. 81-82).

These contradictions and their resolution are not technical problems resolvable

6. In fact, Brus advances the idea of the inseparability of base and superstructure in modern socialist societies as a pathbreaking conceptual innovation because the "superstructure" or the state basically determines the basic policies of control and ownership in the "base" or economy (*Economics and Politics*, pp. 86-89). Although he makes the point to display the inadequacy of current definitions of "social ownership," this "discovery" is hardly innovative.

7. Stanislaw Ossowski, in *The Peculiarities of the Social Sciences* (Warsaw, 1962) presents a classification of social organization that includes a) an order of "collective perceptions" or traditional society; b) polycentric order or a social equilibrium achieved through "naturally legislated" individual actions; c) monocentric order or rationalized central planning; and a fourth category which attempts to fuse the freedoms of polycentrism with the direction of monocentrism. Of course, Brus greatly admires the prospect of creating the fourth kind of social order ". . . for the possibility is opened up of a solution which is supposed to reconcile 'the polycentric character of social life with a rational system of planning' and thus create a plane on which effectiveness and humanistic values are not substitutes but complementary to each other" (*Socialist Ownership*, p. 181). Whereas the polycentric West rejects planning as incompatible with its freedoms and the monocentric post-Stalinist party ignores freedoms as impractical in its planning, Brus would have the fully socialized society blend the two to attain a humane socialist system.

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through socialist "scientific management."[8] Indeed, this "scientific thinking" distorts and mystifies actual political tensions and social contradictions: "A discipline which, instead of laying bare the real contradictions in the developmental process, conceals them in the name of universal harmony, loses all hope of affecting the real world and transforms itself from science into apologetics" (*EP*, p. 85). Yet, "in the past. . . the political economy of socialism has not escaped this fate" (*EP*, p. 85). Brus challenges technocratic apologetics and calls for a political economy that can critically mediate the contradictions involved in the further development of socialism: "Political economy can play its indispensable — active — role in determining the development of a socialist society only if it can show up the socio-economic contradictions which actually appear in the economic process and therefore demonstrate the directions to be taken and the mechanisms to be employed in resolving them" and "this task is all the more momentous now that the European socialist countries are entering a stage in which factors of intensive growth are predominant" (*EP*, pp. 83-85). Socialist economics in the seventies are too complex and too precise for state planning. As long as the socialist state retains the organizational thinking of its mobilization phase, economic progress will slow, individual alienation will grow, and the prospects for full socialization will dim. The bureaucratic party and its technocratic economics no longer represent the workers' interests. Today, the powerful state apparatus must allow workers to participate in social decision-making. Thus, Brus has moved away from his technocratic arguments of the fifties and early sixties against the insensitive administration of the economy and in favor of "command planning" by managerial technocrats making allocative decisions by means of the "market" rather than the "plan." Much like the Czech reformers of the sixties who were also interested in breaking the bureaucratic grip of a conservative party, Brus has opted to support self-management and democratization as a means of overcoming the party's planning mentality.[9] Although wary of unchecked technocrats, Brus still trusts the market and wants to remain largely within the existing framework.[10]

Brus' second major argument challenges another basic apparatchik position and claims that the true socialization of the means of production must be understood as an on-going but still incomplete *process* rather than as an already achieved past *event* coming "by means of a once-and-for-all act" (*SO*, p. 34). The *nationalization* of the productive forces and their public control by a party-organized bureaucracy is, at best, a transitional form. Genuine *socialization* of the means of production, however, "stems from the gradual elimination of this indirectness, from the transition from state ownership to 'more and more direct social ownership under the more and more fully direct disposition of the liberated and associated working people' " (*SO*, p. 64). Here Brus explicitly refers to the Yugoslav precedent in workers' self-management theory

8. Brus considers this "scientific management" as a "neutral" policy tool: "the theory and technique of programming is socially neutral; it is concerned with relationships between means and targets for the two most general points of view: establishing whether a given target is attainable and establishing the conditions for the achievement of a particular target for the smallest possible outlay" (*Economics and Politics*, p. 80). Brus does not object to positive economics *per se* but to their practitioneers' negligence of political questions in their fetishism of the technical (*ibid.*, p. 85).

9. Cf. Kovanda, *op.cit.*, pp. 36-40.

10. The acceptance of politics by the regimes themselves is a precondition for forming an effective political economy: "there is no doubt. . . that the initial condition for the development of the political economy of socialism is the creation of a political climate in which the critical analysis of the real world and the independent search for solutions is treated as meritorious activity, and not as an infraction of the general line" (*Economics and Politics*, p. 86).

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and practice as he retraces many of Kardelj's positions prior to the Yugoslav break with Stalin.[11] Following Gerkovic, Brus juxtaposes the nationalization and management of the means of production by the party-state (the *statist model*) to the ideals of Yugoslavian practice (the *self-management model*) where "the decisive point . . . is the concrete postulate of gradual *limitation of the role* of the state in favor of self-management institutions" (*SO*, p. 67). In the latter case, "social ownership *sensu stricto* is *direct social* ownership, which not only abolishes monopoly of ownership and — which goes with it — monopoly of political and economic power by an individual or a narrow group of private owners, but also by a socialist state" (*SO*, p. 64).

In spite of his polemical apologetics for the post-Stalinist party, Brus argues that the statist nationalization of the means of production fails to bring about Marxian socialization. In fact, sweeping programs of nationalization can be achieved "without simultaneous radical change in socio-political relations" (*SO*, p. 19). Thus, the bureaucracy readily fills the place vacated by the old ruling class. Nationalization does not create a "single macro-economic unit" which can embrace the entire cycle of economic reproduction. Consequently, the statist economy becomes ". . . a kind of monolithic grand corporation" (*SO*, p. 20) that directly competes with individual household economies to their detriment. Last, but not least, nationalization does not lead to free, creative, and non-alienated labor. In fact, the statist regime has proven quite capable of "predatory exploitation in order to extract the maximum profit in the shortest possible time" (*SO*, p. 39). Therefore, the process of socialization can take place only ". . . when public ownership is given certain specific features which make it social ownership" (*SO*, p. 21).

The statist moment may have been necessary for the creation of the initial social capital to sustain socialism. As the party-state clings to its past historical form, however, it becomes bureaucratized, monopolistic and aloof from the masses. Thus, the party's public ownership of the productive forces must meet two new criteria: "1) the means of production must be employed in the interests of society, and 2) society must have effective disposition over the means of production it owns" (*SO*, p. 27). In practice, however, "society" as an agency for social ownership is as ambiguous as the "state." For Brus, the essential criterion for judging the "interests of society" and "society's effective disposition over the means of production" rests in meaningful *democratization* throughout socialist economics and politics (*SO*, p. 30). Workers' councils, consequently, represent both a pragmatic and a political improvement in socialism; they are efficient and creative outlets for labor, and they are democratic, free structures for collective political expression. At the same time workers' councils are the prime indicators of the lessening of the state's role in social ownership, of the diminishing party's bureaucratism, and of the growth in society's disposition over the productive forces.

Brus' third major argument questions bureaucratic perspectives on centralization or de-centralization of decision-making. In the familiar clash between the "Plan" and the "enterprise," Brus sides with the enterprise since the "Plan" has become an excuse for a hegemonic party to limit discussion of political choices, the flow of information and the directions of decisions. In party debates of the late fifties and early sixties, the concept of "de-centralization" often meant nothing more than the "multi-centralization" of the party-state's decision-making. The statist party simply opened many

11. See A. Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

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smaller "branch offices" in a move to improve its information-gathering and daily management. The increase in party differentiation, in turn, resulted in a strengthening of its social control. The "Plan" was not forgotten. On the contrary, it was merely sub-divided and thereby expanded. Brus resists this kind of "de-centralization" which seems to be a regression to bourgeois economics. Yet, given the party-state's stronghold on socialist society these mechanisms are a breath of fresh air.

A centralized economy plans fundamental macro-economic decisions which determine the basic direction of economic development; while a de-centralized system leaves individual decisions concerning household consumption or individual economic behavior to individual discretion. The crucial point, therefore, is who makes sectional or enterprise decisions relating to a single economic sector or enterprise (*EP*, p. 7). These "enterprise" decisions can be centrally planned for the advantage of the central planners (the statist party) or they can be made independently at the enterprise level, for the benefit of the "enterprise" or, more specifically, for the advantage of the associated workers who should control these enterprises. Here Brus stresses that the freedom to make economic, social and political decisions "...rests ultimately with an autonomous subject and differs substantially from taking the decision *for* him" (*EP*, p. 7).

Since for Brus, Eastern European socialist societies have gone beyond "primitive communism" in which the planned economy served a useful role in mobilizing society, the lingering centralized statist system only serves to perpetuate antiquated managerial methods. The economic complexity of today's socialist societies necessitates a level of economic flexibility, social versatility and political creativity that the statist economic system sorely lacks. The required decentralization also bears greater freedom because its capacity for allocation depends on the full informed participation of all agents. Thus, de-centralization "...should contribute to overcoming alienation, to facilitating the drawing of the broad masses into active participation in shaping the development of society, and to facilitating the manifestation of creative abilities of the members of society" (*EP*, p. 15).

What does all of this contribute to critical social theory? Not much beyond spelling out the implications of the rationalization of the Yugoslavian model and of the possible broadening of the debate. His criticisms of the bureaucratic party's hegemony highlight the need to democratize socialist societies by means of workers' councils. This, however, is hardly a pioneering intellectual contribution. For all of his advocacy of workers' councils, Brus never goes beyond suggesting that the Soviet Union's statist model be dropped in favor of the Yugoslav model. That Brus must cautiously advance in 1975 the same notions that Tito openly embraced a generation earlier in his Skupstina address of June 1950 is indicative of the bureaucratic dark ages in Eastern Europe.

Brus improves on Sik's "market socialism" by including strong provisions for meaningful workers' councils. At the same time, however, he never faces the unproductive Czech, Polish and even Yugoslav experiences with self-management. Like most workers' councils theorists, Brus sees them as organs of social pre-figuration to enhance the associated producers' humanity. In practice, however, the councils are usually subverted to the instrumental needs of production and management (as in Poland following the 1958 council reforms) even if they are established spontaneously as in the "Polish October" of 1956. As Kovanda observes, when given the right to elect their own management, the Czech workers' councils quite rationally chose the most able persons, i.e., the technocratic white-collar administrative elite, to manage "social

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property." Yet, as soon as the basic interests of the technocratic bureaucracy were threatened, the public communication and debate on democratization was snuffed out by the bureaucratic party.[12] When these reactions are considered along with the fact that only about one-quarter of Sik's original reform proposals even got past the initial stages of implementation, one must reconsider the utility of theorizing a council movement imposed from above. Furthermore, by virtue of their formulation, these reforms are usually to productionist-oriented and overly enterprize-centered. In other words, the question of socialization rarely strays beyond the problems of production in the single enterprize.

During the working class unrest of 1956, workers' councils were established in many plants throughout Poland. In spite of their spontaneous origins, soon the Polish councils also fell victim to instrumental purposes imposed by the resurgent bureaucracy.[13] The Polish councils seriously divided the ranks of the older trade union organizations as well as the loyalties of the manual workers who belonged to the party. Threatened by an erosion in working class support and by a collapse of the institutionalized trade unions, in 1957, the party bureaucracy reacted by "reviewing" the status of its members in order to expell large numbers of those who were active in the councils. In addition to this purge, the IX Plenum rejected a national reorganization plan which sanctioned self-management organs as alternative institutions threatening older trade union and party structures. Finally, in a move aimed at the total instrumentalization of the workers' councils, the fourth Trade Union Congress in 1958 fabricated the Conference of Workers' Self-Management which returned full control of the workers' councils back to the bureaucratic trade unions thereby reasserting party hegemony. By 1959, the workers' councils had deteriorated to nothing more than managerial tools. Socialization as democratization fell into disrepute because, in the words of the economist Lipinski, "the political maturity of the workers does not predestine them to perform specialized professional functions. The enterprize is not a political creation but a rational, technological and economic one. The rational application of technology, organization and economics requires professional qualifications. . . .management belongs to the experts."[14]

As in Czechoslavakia and Poland, the Yugoslav self-management organizations have been bent to the party's Tayloristic desires for engineering the shop floor's human components into part of an efficient whole. Yet, along with this supremacy of the technocrats, the Yugoslav self-management concept directly stimulates individual self-interest, profit maximization and material incentives. Brus never agonizes over why the "socialized society" has fostered a "developed communism" predicated upon "Marxist personalism, humanistic hedonism and stimulating reward according to work."[15] Here he seems only too willing to follow the Yugoslav from the socialist frying pan to the capitalist fire in order to escape the excesses of the statist party and Russian economic domination. How real an option is this today? In 1949, the Yugoslav break-away brought Stalin and Tito to the brink of a war which has threatened Belgrade up to last summer's East Berlin meetings. In the rest of Eastern Europe Russia's perogative to intervene at will now basks under the dual legitimation of the

12. Kovanda, *op.cit.*, pp. 52-54.
13. See Kolaja's *A Polish Factory, op.cit.*, pp. 134-145 and George Kolankiewicz, "The Working Class," in *Social Groups in Polish Society, op. cit.*, pp. 137-151.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
15. Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito* (Cambridge, 1975), p. 10.

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Breshnev and Sonnenfeldt doctrines. At any rate, the USSR is unlikely to acquiesce to a radical democratization of Polish society which could lead to even greater Western economic penetration.

The greatest problem with Brus' project, however, is his reliance on "democratization" to reconstitute socialization. In an important sense, Brus mystifies the political and democratic potential of "democratization" policies because they are not calculated to give the workers control or ownership of the "social" property. In practice democratization merely gives the associated producers a limited role in bureaucratic and technocratic management. The statist decision-making process and structure are not transcended by democratization. Rather, they are simply broadened to encompass workers. As a result, rather than socializing property and developing communism, democratization only extends the right of participation in the statist model. The Yugoslavs openly admit to this limited view of self-management: "the institution of workers' councils...introduces the process of the de-statization and democratization, but not the liquidation of [state] administrative-operative or planning-operative [economic] management."[16]

Brus' major flaw is a result of his inability or unwillingness to expand the realm of political discourse beyond economistic orthodoxy. Despite his frequent travels in the West, Brus fails to introduce any of the critical perspectives of Western Marxism. Most importantly on this account, he fails to discuss the cultural hegemony of the statist party in all dimensions of the people's democracies everyday existence. Indeed, Brus' analysis lacks a new critical meta-theory and a dialectical notion of social theory. The cultural hegemony of bureaucratic theory and technocratic practice can only be fought by re-examining the meaning of theoretical elaboration as well as by concretizing new practical goals for action from below. Unable to do so, Brus is left to meet the post-Stalinist party's bureaucratized positivism with his own positivist, if only slightly leftist, theories for full "socialization." This inadequacy culminates in profound ramifications for Brus' final prognosis for the workers' council. Because he is unable to connect his political critique with concrete historical experience, he is lead to accept the workers' councils as instrumental agencies which can only expand popular participation in existing technocratic socialism. Yet, Brus advances this formula as a progressive social theory. Like the party's technocratic apologists, Brus can only present findings concerning "economic laws" leading to the "further evolution of socialism." He remains trapped within the same framework as the managerial-statist party. Consequently, he fails to solve the most pressing problem of socialist society: "the evaluation of the chance, form and timing of changes which would fulfill the postulate of real socialization of the means of production" (*SO*, p. 4).

Tim Luke

16. Quoted in Johnson, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

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Joseph Gabel, *False Consciousness*. Translated by M. Thompson (with the assistance of K. Thompson). London: Blackwells, 1975.

Laing's reaction against the psychiatric establishment has catalyzed a long-standing controversy in the field of psychotherapy. But the internal ambiguities and plain contradictions in his work have left us without any clear criteria for defining sanity and pathology.[1] Along with Szasz, Scheff and others,[2] the critique that Laing offered in the 1960s succeeded in politicizing the issues of repression and alienation, in relativizing categories, and in displacing the blame from the victim. But in lieu of the icons we were left with little more than a liberal ideology-critique that romanticized the experience of mental disturbance and saw individuality as opposition to the necessarily *constraining* nature of social life. This critique provided the rules by which we could play the game of switching sacred and profane, and also gave us a hall of mirrors to play it in (what Laing calls the "spiral of reciprocal perspectives").[3] But having dispensed with limitations, the mere expression of good will does not appear to remove us from the confusion. The dissolution of distinctions has turned on itself.

Theodore Lidz has pointed to Laing's lack of historical self-consciousness—a tendency to forget the prior or parallel achievements of his contemporaries, and to give scant mention to the influences on his own thought. As a result, sight is often lost of the origin of Laingian concerns in post-war research such as that of Jackson, Wynne, Bowen and Lidz himself.[4] A similar fate befell Joseph Gabel, who developed the parallel between ideology and psychopathology in the 1940s and 1950s. He is referred to by Laing only briefly in a footnote, even though Gabel's treatment of alienation and its political implications is much more fully developed and documented than Laing's.

For these reasons and others then it is fortunate that Blackwells now gives us the Thompsons' lucid translation of *La Fausse Conscience* (1962). The book's aim is to construct an anti-fanatical hermeneutic of the totalitarian mentality. It is a work of political psychology, somewhat in the spirit of Adorno *et al.'s* study of authoritarian personality.[5] Typical of "Hungarian Marxism,"[6] the point of departure is a critical

1. This issue is examined in R. Boyers, ed., "R.D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry," *Salmagundi*, no. 16 (1971); particularly in papers by Sedgwick, Gordon, and Lidz. See also P. Sedgwick, "Mental Illness *Is* Illness," *Salmagundi*, no. 20 (1972), pp. 196-224; R. Jacoby, *Social Amnesia* (Boston, 1975).

2. T.S. Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness* (New York, 1961); T.J. Scheff, *Being Mentally Ill* (Chicago, 1966).

3. R.D. Laing, H. Phillipson, and A.R. Lee, *Interpersonal Perception* (New York, 1966), chapter 3.

4. D.D. Jackson, ed., *The Aetiology of Schizophrenia* (New York, 1960); G. Bateson, D. Jackson, J. Haley, and J. Weakland, "Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia," *Behavioral Science*, no. 1 (1956), pp. 253-54; and L.C. Wynne *et al.*, "Pseudomutuality in the Family Relations of Schizophrenics," *Psychiatry*, no. 21 (1958), p. 205; M.A. Bowen, "A Family Concept of Schizophrenia," *The Aetiology of Schizophrenia*, *op.cit.*; T. Lidz and S. Fleck, "Schizophrenia, Human Integration and the Role of the Family," *ibid.*

5. T.W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson, N.R. Sanford, *Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950). Gabel's concern with totalitarianism, racism and ideology in general was first apparent in a 1939 study of national-socialism (with L. Martin). Cf. "Les fondements pseudo-scientifiques de la doctrine nationale-socialiste," *Masses*, March 1939. *False Consciousness* is dedicated by Gabel as follows: "To the memory of my mother who disappeared at Auschwitz in 1945, and my father who died unconsoled in New York in 1968."

6. J. Gabel, "Hungarian Marxism," *Telos*, no. 25 (Fall 1975), pp. 185-191. Among this school Gabel numbers Lukács and Mannheim, and more recently Mészaros and even Koestler.

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concern with the processes of *alienation*, and (to a lesser extent) the problems of de-alienation. Again in the tradition of this school, the analysis is after the decreasingly popular fashion of the "historicist and humanist Marxism, more dialectical than materialist." Following Lukács, alienation is defined in terms of reification. It is the anti-dialectical, spatialized and schizophrenic characteristics of reified consciousness and existence *per se* that are brought into the spotlight. By *reification* is meant not just the experience of the "thingification" of self or other (which is "objectification"), but in addition a mode of *existence* which is spatialized (i.e., a-historical). Both false consciousness and ideology are characterized by this second quality in addition to the first (213). Although these aspects of a loss of praxis are acknowledged as functions of the development of technology, and it is also accepted that reification is aggravated in captialism's time of crisis, the treatment of alienation as false consciousness is not strictly in terms of its economic determinants.[7] The nature of the relationship between base and superstructure therefore comes into question, an issue given only fragmentary consideration by the author, who (perhaps wisely) has preferred not to expound in detail the metatheoretical bases or consequences of his *oeuvre*.

Gabel starts out by presupposing that there is a parallel between collective and individual forms of false consciousness (i.e., between ideology and schizophrenia). He then seeks to justify this assumption by showing there is a common structure to disorders of political reason and psychopathology, appealing to sociological and clinical facts. His claim is that reification is two-faced. It is at the center of false consciousness in the collective life, and potentiates itself in the further development of ideologies which are expressions of, and systems of justification for, the reified consciousness. The same reification creates the anti-dialectical consciousness of schizophrenia, and is responsible for its "morbid rationalism" and deranged perception.

The concept of "morbid rationalism" is central to Gabel's argument, since he sees it as essential to a general theory of alienation that expands to encompass the individual form (xx). Part of the significance of the concept is that it links Gabel's thinking with the phenomenological psychiatry of Minkowski (from whom the term is borrowed), and the related existential psychiatry of Binswanger. It was originally used by Minkowski to refer to the de-dialecticized cognitive functioning characteristic of schizophrenia. In Gabel's hands it is extended to characterize the social form of false consciousness also, thus emphasizing false consciousness as *a kind of rationality* in its own right, with its own reified and reificational epistemology, rather than as an epiphenomenon of "class interests," "techniques of persuasion," or "crowd psychology." Morbid rationalism in both its aspects can ultimately be analyzed in terms of the particular spatio-temporal structure of consciousness. The reification and loss of praxis which comprises the morbidity is in effect an egocentric loss of "temporalization" (105, 151). This is the anti-dialectical disappearance of concrete historicity from existence, which results in an alienated experience of a homogeneous "spatialised" world lacking the fourth dimension (and to the extent that it is time-related even the third dimension of "depth"). Spatialization then is a

7. Gabel not only departs from Lukács in further downplaying economic context and class interests, but also in proposing a "total" concept of alienation (in Mannheim's sense), rather than a "partial" one. This allows him to include in his purview such significant phenomena as schizophrenia and utopian consciousness. (Gabel gives a useful summary of Lukács' thought for the beginner on pp. 145-155.)

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nullification of the flux and irreversibility of time.[8] In the socio-political realm "utopian thought" is an example of the reifying spatialization of the future.[9] In the same realm, even though it is true that there is an exceptionally high incidence of schizophrenia in Jews, the anti-semitic attribution of an *innate* schizoid tendency is spatializing in the sense that it mis-reads a consequence of historical factors for a given biological fact, confounding "first nature" with "second nature" (118ff). An additional example here might be the British "sweet-tooth," which is only instinctual as an historical product of sugar rationing following the world wars. Spatialized being therefore corresponds to our everyday tendency to exist as though we were merely ahistorical, without freedom, irrational, and biologically determined.

Deterioration of the subject-object dialectic in reification is invariably characterized not only by a spatialization, but also by a *dissociation of concrete totalities* (21). This involves the formation of illegitimate abstractions, such as the "privileged system" central to ethnocentrism, or the reified symbol divorced from its meaning. The *pars pro toto* fallacy is central to the logic of dissociating thought. A major consequence of this de-totalizing activity is *devaluation* (65ff). Gabel calls into play what he calls Lukács' "axiological-dialectical parallelism." Here the Hungarian Marxist dependence on the dialectical principle of *Totality* comes into play.[10] Rather than deriving axiological (value) concepts from the economic base alone, or from some other "extrinsic" source, values are the intrinsic subjective experience of the dialectical structure of the whole, of the Gestalt "goodness of form." Good forms, as in music, for example, are those that have (in Dupreel's terms) *consistency* (Piaget's self-regulation) and *precariousness* (the removal of a part reverberates throughout the whole de-structuring all its internal and external relations). Beings are valued more than things because they exhibit more consistent and precarious structuring (69). Thus in racist false consciousness, characteristics of the victim are isolated and made into fixed

8. Of course, even treating time as a "dimension" risks spatializing it. On the spatialized experience of social life, cf. G. Debord, *Society of the Spectacle* (Detroit, 1970). On the general issue of temporality, see M. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York, 1962); E. Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (Bloomington, 1964); K.F. Riegel, "The Dialectics of Time," to appear in N. Datan and H. Reese, eds., *Lifespan Developmental Psychology: Dialectical Perspectives on Experimental Research* (to be published 1976 by Academic Press); N. Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance* (Indianapolis, 1966). On the clinical significance of temporality, see L. Binswanger, "Heidegger's Analytic of Existence and its Meaning for Psychiatry," in J. Needleman, *Being-In-The-World* (New York, 1963).

9. In a sense that requires careful examination, this morbid reificational tendency is, in its individual cognitive aspect, the inverse of the temporalizing sequence described by the Piaget school as the normative course by which authentic orientation to reality develops at the expense of ego-centric thought. In this respect, despite their metatheoretical differences, Gabel and Piaget reveal their common indebtedness to Bergson's metaphysics of space and time. Piaget explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Bergson throughout his work. It is particularly clear in J.B. Grize *et al., L'Epistemologie du Temps* (Paris, 1966), and J. Piaget, *The Child's Conception of Time* (London, 1969). Gabel was influenced by Bergson via Meyerson's philosophy of science, but also through the Hungarian tradition. Lukács saw in Bergson a questioning of the role of formal thought in life (*History and Class Consciousness* [Cambridge, 1971], p. 110). Bergson was translated into Hungarian by Fogarasi as early as the 1920s.

10. In Hungarian Marxism, the rejection of the dialectic of the totality (in false consciousness) and of history (in ideology) are not separated, and constitute the double reificatory core of alienation. It should be noted that the notion of "totality," being equally applicable to physiological and psychological realms, can be employed in an effort to subsume psycho-pathology under the same rubric as organic pathology (M. Foucault, *Mental Illness and Psychology* [New York, 1976], pp. 7-10).

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biological essences.[11] This detotalizing reification at the same time, like fetishism, *devalues* its object, both through dissociation and depersonalization. Thus loss of value (axiological alienation) characterizes all ideologization. In a similar way we could allude here to Sartre's description of a flattening of the world, a loss of differentiating valuation, in depressive states.[12] This homogenizing loss of depth is of course also a spatialization, since when parts of a totality are dissociated illegitimately, they lose their place in the irreversible historical sequence as well as their precarious value (72).

For Gabel, false consciousness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ideology; the latter is an expression of the former. The qualitative difference is that it is chiefly the fragmenting of totalities that characterizes the loss of dialectic in false consciousness, while it is more the spatializing dissociation of the present from the past and future that constitutes the loss of dialectic in ideology. While false consciousness is a diffused mental state, ideology is a "theoretical crystallization" legitimizing it (11). Ideologies are delirious systems which fabricate an illusory dialectic to justify false consciousness by building a pseudo-history that shores it up. A criterion for identifying ideology therefore is that it obscures the socio-historical conditions of its own origins.[13] Thus prejudice can exist as false consciousness before it receives an ideological expression. We could introduce as an example here "hardhat" anti-intellectualism, which constitutes false consciousness because it reifies, depersonalizes and devalues the "intellectual" in stereotyped fashion, and has a "sociocentric"[14] quality (displaying the egocentrism of a collectivity which imbues its own thought with epistemic privilege, and so excludes it from entering into reversible relationships, dichotomizing the world in an "us-them" opposition). But it does not yet comprise a full-fledged ideology since the requisite rationalization and institutionalization are lacking. Anti-semitism, on the other hand, is an ideological citadel, defended by a complex illusory history which appeals for example to the various catastrophes supposedly caused by the "evil nature" of Jews (129ff). Astrological speculations also have this ideological quality of systematic rationalization.[15]

Part of Gabel's undertaking is the hermeneutic re-reading of the sense of "ideology," distinguishing this critically from the orthodox meanings it has acquired in its bourgeois forms.[16] One departure from common usage which is clearly acknowledged

11. This process is well exemplified in the "I.Q. Debate" between Jensen, Eysenck, Kamin, Herrnstein, Chomsky and others. See N. Block and G. Dworkin, eds., *The I.Q. Controversy*, (New York, 1976).

12. J.-P. Sartre, *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory* (New York, 1948).

13. Thus it is not true that ideology (or schizophrenia) reflects a simple lack of self-awareness. Cf. M. Foucault, *op.cit.*, pp. 44-50.

14. On sociocentrism, see J. Piaget, "Pensée egocentrique et pensée sociocentrique," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 1951, pp. 34-49. The sociological extension of Piaget's ideas is best represented by E. Oestereicher, "Toward a Sociology of Cognitive Structures," *Social Research* no. 1 (1972), pp. 134-154.

15. T.W. Adorno, "Theses Against Occultism," *Telos*, no. 19 (1974), pp. 7-12; and T.W. Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth," *ibid.*, pp. 13-90.

16. This amounts to a critique of the "ideology of ideology." In order to see the variety of meanings, both critical and pre-critical, that have been attributed to the term "ideology," it is necessary to glance through the recent burgeoning literature surrounding the topic, a selection from which follows: R.A. Sharpe, "Ideology and Ontology," *Phil. Soc. Sci.*, 1974, pp. 55-64; E.V. Sullivan, "A Study of Kohlberg's Structural Theory of Moral Development: A Critique of Liberal Social Science Ideology," paper presented at the 4th Conference on Dialectical Psychology, Craigville, Mass., August 30, 1976; R. Zuniga, "The Experimenting Society and Radical Social Reform: The Role of the Social Scientist in Chile's Unidad Popular Experience,"

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in *False Consciousness* is that ideological representations are not epiphenomena. Often the notion of the superstructural character of ideology has carried a pejorative connotation.[17] Even so, in a return to the dialectic, Engels clearly established that the various components of ideology have objective reference and a causal power in themselves, so that they "react back as an influence upon the whole development of society, even on its economic development."[18] A second, and more important, departure from common usage follows Mannheim's segregation of the "total"concept of ideology from the "partial" concept (22). The latter proposes something much closer to ideology-without-false-consciousness. To use Gabel's example, in ideology-critique the partial concept (a) castigates the opponent on the basis of a part of his-her position instead of interpreting the standpoint as a whole—thus underestimating the possibilities of a justified counter-critique; (b) makes "ideology" an extremely generalized concept, covering all situationally conditioned conceptual frameworks (i.e., all frameworks); (c) "reads" the psychological level of an opposing ideology rather than the theoretical level, leaving the impression that ideology is an act of decision which is more or less conscious; and (d) allies itself with a non-dialectical utopian consciousness, thus absolving *itself* from the constraints of its own historicity.[19] We can also find examples of this partial view in psychological works, for example those of the Browns and the Braginskys, and (to some extent) in Chomsky.[20] Within the partial view, the tendency is to stigmatize the adversary as politically biased, as a manipulator of the facts, as allied to a specific political movement and as an instrument of State brainwashing.[21] Without false consciousness, ideology is reduced to a set of values, with the implication that these are purely subjective and

American Psychologist, no. 30 (1975), pp. 99-115; A.R. Buss, "The Emerging Field of the Sociology of Psychological Knowledge," *American Psychologist*, no. 30 (1975), pp. 988-1002; I.M. Zeitlin, *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, 1970); L.F. Feuer, *Ideology and the Ideologists* (New York, 1975); J.L. Sullivan, "The Development of Politcial Ideology," *Youth and Society*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1975), pp. 148-170); G. Olsson, "The American Ideology," paper presented at the annual meetings of the Association of American Geographers, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 21, 1975; L. Brown, *Ideology* (Harmondsworth, 1973); N. Chomsky, "Psychology and Ideology," *Cognition*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1972), pp. 1-23; P. Sedgwick, "Ideology in Modern Psychology," in D. Armstead, ed., *Reconstructing Social Psychology* (Harmondsworth, 1974); Frankfurt Institute, *Aspects of Sociology* (Boston, 1972); J. McCarney, "Theory of Ideology," *Radical Philosophy*, no. 13 (1976), pp. 28-31; V.N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (New York, 1973).

17. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology* (1846), pp. 39-41.

18. F. Engels, "Letter to Conrad Schmidt (1890)," in *Marx and Engels: Selected Correspondence*, pp. 482-483. Still, at this point we might note that this is a "re-action," presumably logically dependent upon the prior action of the infrastructural economic factors in determining the ideologization in the first place.

19. An example of this is the humanist critique of behaviorism, which negates the latter without rising above its level. This "circulation of elites" is noted in a little known chapter on Utopia and Dystopia in H. Kelman, *A Time to Speak* (San Francisco, 1962). Cf. also R.A. Sharpe, "Man the Ideological Animal," a forthcoming review of L.S. Feuer *Ideology and the Ideologists* in *Phil. Soc. Sci.*; D. Ingleby, "Ideology and the Human Sciences," in T. Pateman, ed., *Counter-Course* (Harmondsworth, 1972); D. Ingleby, "The Job Psychologists Do," in D. Armstead, ed., *Reconstructing Social Psychology, op.cit.*

20. L. Brown, *op.cit.*; P. Brown, *Toward a Marxist Psychology* (New York, 1974); Braginsky and Braginsky, *Mainstream Psychology* (New York, 1974); N. Chomsky, *op.cit.*

21. R.A. Sharpe, "Ideology and Ontology," *op.cit.*, p. 56. Sharpe notes the ease with which criticism of a theoretical position becomes criticism of the personality of the "ideologue," implying devious political intent (p. 64). On this issue, see also R. Jacoby, *op.cit.*, p. 6, where he discusses the liberal illusion that ideology is an "abstract non-empirical logic that issues in violence and terror."

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idiosyncratic. This amounts to an irrationalism, which fails to acknowledge the rationality intrinsic to ideology. The consequent underestimation of the power and coherence of ideology in an ideology-critique tends to exclude the realization of the dialectical tension between opposing views, *both* of which are shaped by the history of social life. Such a view therefore also lacks critical self-consciousness. The "partial" variety of ideology-critique would itself be vulnerable to designation as false consciousenss.

This critique of the "partial" concept is a first thrust against the *embourgeoisement* of Marxist concepts, a theme that Gabel pursues energetically (though in a fragmentary way) throughout the volume, simultaneously using his subject matter as concrete illustration. The partial view of ideology is "popular" Marxism, which is guilty of numerous other sins, especially the debasing of meaning in concepts as crucial as "alienation," the "social," and the "dialectic." Alienation, says Gabel, is popularly equated with "estrangement" or even "deviance," which is an anti-dialectical conception, since it presupposes the status quo of a privileged system of defining the "normal" or unalienated with respect to the "social." "Popular" sociology of knowledge has taken on the forms of pure reductionism, construing the social first of all as an "external" factor, and secondly as a totally relativizing influence (45ff). This is equivalent to reducing all "text" to its "context," an ultimately self-contradictory action, which (in Ricoeur's terms) fails to balance a "hermeneutics of suspicion" with a "hermeneutics of restoration." Such an approach corresponds to the reduction of all science to ideology through appeal to its situational dependence or to the "psychology of interests." This is what Gabel calls "surface sociologism" in criticizing Pavlovism, which threatens to utter no more than the empty and incontestable generality that mental illness is essentially a part of society.[22] This is society viewed "as an afterthought," rather than as *constitutive* of the person as a pole in the individual-social dialectic.[23]

Following the style of Gabel's comments, we might also note the problem that "dialectical" can suffer a parallel debasement to the level of generality. This is a constant threat to nascent critical disciplines such as that of contemporary American "dialectical psychology."[24] Thus "dialectical" may be viewed partially as meaning

22. Laing also drifts into this "cosmetic" view of society, especially in *The Divided Self*, where he discusses schizophrenia as a plane out of formation and then suggests that the formation itself (society) may be going in the wrong direction. The problem with the metaphor of course is the illusion that individuals are separable from the "formation."

23. "Surface sociologism" is an insufficiently precise and differentiated conception of "social determination of consciousness," as Juliet Mitchell has illustrated in *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York, 1974), with regard to Freud's Viennese origins. To maintain any specificity as concepts, alienation and ideology require more than the existence of "social conditioning." There must also be an anti-dialectical component—reification. (Thus false consciousness is not just erroneous, it is insane or schizophrenic.) In addition, social conditions necessarily play a *constitutive* role as well as a *selective* one in the emergence of ideology, as Gabel stipulates (p. 22). Society therefore does not simply come in *post hoc* to effect a "natural selection" from alternatives that have already (mysteriously) appeared. It is part of the process by which those very alternatives are generated. (The natural selection view is well exemplified in Donald Campbell's A.P.A. presidential address, "On the Conflicts between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral Tradition," *American Psychologist*, no. 30 (1975), pp. 1103-1126.

24. K.F. Riegel, ed., *The Development of Dialectical Operations* (Basel, 1975); H. Gadlin and J.M. Broughton, "Review of 4th Conference on Dialectical Psychology," forthcoming in *Human Development*. On dialectics in general, see G.J. Stack, "On the Notion of Dialectics," *Philosophy Today*, vol. 15, no. 4 (1971), pp. 276-291.

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"dialogical" (or interactional), as "changing over time," and "contradictory," or even as "paradoxical" or "ambiguous." At the limit of its misuse, "dialectical" is taken to refer to a liberal idealist's "flexibility" of consciousness (the *telos* in Heinz Werner's developmental theory, for example), or to the relativity of all knowledge and truth—a static relativism like Kuhn's that questions even the inter-translatability of paradigms.[25] This view is self-contradictory in that it reduces all rationality to a rhetoric of rationalization, while doing so by means of rationality. Such a view of the dialectic subverts its own foundations. It also encourages conservatism and political laissez-faire. Such a "dialectic" lacks the interpenetration of opposites, the implication of the whole in each part, and the potential for active *aufhebung* or self-transcendence that are diagnostic of dialectic in the Hegelian sense. It expands "dialectic" towards too great a generality in all directions, so that the particular significance of the dialectical relation as a subject-object relation is lost, as are several important distinctions such as that between existence and consciousness, and that between change and development. This is not just a quibbling over arbitrary definition, since the concept of dialectic in Marx as well as in Hegel is imbedded in and motivated by a broad and well-supported theoretical matrix, and lacks the crude self-contradictions of the "popular" interpretations of the concept.

To return to Gabel, there is a further problem in the "popular" interpretations, in that "dialectical theory" is frequently confounded with "valid theory" (30). A recent Lukácsian critique of Piaget's theory by Buck-Morss, for example, opens itself to this confounding.[26] Buck-Morss argues that Piaget's abstract theoretical formalism merely reflects the commodity structure of industrial Western capitalism, and fails to acknowledge the socio-historical relativity of individual abstract thought. But as Gabel points out, "there are great discoveries which contribute nothing to Marxism and have nothing to do with the dialectic, as for example the discovery of the syphilitic origin of general paralysis" (140n). The theory that general paralysis is a variety of hysteria due to social conditions would be a more dialectical theory, but a false one. Gabel himself makes an assumption later in the book, as we shall see, that favors the validity of non-dialectical organogenetic theories of schizophrenia. Lukács himself distinguishes false consciousness from objective error or false judgment. This means that science retains its potential for objectivity even within the context of a reificational structure. This is well illustrated by Gabel's anecdote: Marx argued that Darwinian theory reflected the historical contingencies of British society of that period, and yet still valued its

25. Static relativism is illustrated in theoretical developmental psychology by Reese and Overton's attempt to contrast "organismic" and "mechanistic" paradigms as discrete, mutually exclusive, and virtually irreconcilable alternatives. H.W. Reese and W.F. Overton, "Models of Development and Theories of Development," in L.R. Goulet and P.B. Baltes, eds., *Lifespan Developmental Psychology: Research and Theory* (New York, 1970). For a more dialectical analysis of the relatedness of the two options, see A. Blasi, "Concept of Development in Personality Theory," in J. Loevinger, *Ego Development* (San Francisco, 1976).

26. S. Buck-Morss, "Socio-economic Bias in Piaget's Theory and its Implications for the Cross-culture Controversy," *Human Development* no. 18 (1975), pp. 35-49. This paper has provoked further appreciation and criticism in A.R. Buss, "Piaget, Marx and Buck-Morss on Cognitive Development: A Critique and Reinterpretation," forthcoming in *Human Development*. The origin-validity distinction is discussed at length in W. Stark, *Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1958), pp. 316ff. There Stark considers Mannheim's position that the very concept of "objectivity" is historically situated, and has to be considered relative to that context. The issue is more complicated than Stark appreciates, however, since from Buck-Morss's position, the anti-dialectical *consequences* of misuses of the theory are also held to compromise its objectivity. In addition, at one more remove, the concrete historical consequences of a particular *concept* of objectivity are also taken to call that conception into question.

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scientific merit sufficiently to ask Darwin if he could dedicate *Capital* to him! Conversely, a dialectical theory may well turn out to be false when examined experimentally. There are no grounds for a dogmatic identification of dialectic and truth. *Any* form of knowledge can attain false consciousness. This is the very reason that Gabel is forced to *test* his speculative dialectical assumption of socio-psychological parallelism against the findings of psychopathologists. In a complementary way, the anti-dialectical presuppositions or misuses of Piaget's theory do not immediately imply a judgment upon its objectivity; the validity of the theory is a practical question, and remains to be examined in the light of the evidence. The relativity of the *theorist* as situated in certain socio-historical conditions needs to be differentiated from the relativity of the *theoretical objects* to which the theory pertains (in this case the "stages" of cognitive development).

Thus we see how "alienation," "society" and "dialectic," among other key concepts, can be misused in ways that are more or less related to the "partial" concept of ideology. The reader feels Gabel constantly straining towards a critical conceptualization of this false consciousness within the intellectual world, this mundane anti-dialectical use of theoretical terms. In this way he pursues one of Heidegger's major preoccupations, the self-understanding of psychiatry as a world-design. Yet, much as Gabel is reluctant to explicitly discuss ontology or therapeutics, there is also a hesitation to become embroiled in the complexities of a conscious metatheoretical hermeneutic that would allow a "reading" of the concealed roots of these anti-dialectical conceptualizations. It is precisely this kind of hermeneutic endeavor that Siemek has prescribed for Marxism as a way of increasing its theoretical self-consciousness.[27] This would capitalize upon the latent hermeneutic already implied in the perspective of historical materialism, in its functioning as both criticism and interpretation, and being concerned with questions of evidence and inference in revealing the "hidden sense" of phenomena. Thus, although to a great extent implicit, *False Consciousness* offers a hermeneutic scheme, one that fulfills and goes beyond Laing and Szasz project of a common grounding for schizophrenia and ideology.

To summarize, we see in *False Consciousness* the elaboration of a broad concept of socio-psychological alienation based on the notion of a reificational way of being-in-the-world, the logical expression of which is non-dialectical thought. What this implies is that ideologization derives from radical structural transformations of social awareness, and of the very mechanisms of political reason, rather than from techniques of persuasion or the mass effect of crowd psychology. This avoids the cynicism regarding the potential of the collectivity implied in the vicious circle "they wouldn't be persuaded if they didn't want to be," heard previously *vis-à-vis* public support of the Vietnam war, and currently *vis-à-vis* Carter's acclaim at the Democratic National Convention. The very openness of political persuasion, or acceptance of mystification, reveals a collapse of the dialectical totality, and with it the value equilibrium between consistency and precariousness. As a result, the individual no longer exercises autonomy in valuing, and engages in a self-deception[28] of homologous origin

27. M.J. Siemek, "Marxism and the Hermeneutic Tradition," *Dialectics and Humanism*, vol. 4 (1975), pp. 87-103. See also H. Gadlin, "Towards a Dialectical Psychology: Theoretical Self-consciousness and Hermeneutic Understanding," forthcoming in A. Harris, *Dialectics: A Paradigm for the Social Sciences*. Siemek remarks that there already is a dialogue between the two traditions, even though historically a rift has been in evidence on account of traditional hermeneutics' theological presuppositions.

28. R.A. Sharpe, "Ideology and Ontology," *op.cit.*, p. 56. Sharpe's argument is that because

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with (and coextensive with) political mystification. What this constitutes then is an outline for a different response than Marx's to the question of *how* the conditions of existence act on the individual through the collective consciousness. The "response" is closer to a socio-psychological parallelism, and to the preservation of a non-epiphenomenal superstructure. It gains in a structural elucidation of reified existence what it sacrifices by not accounting for the historical roots of reification.

The transition from socio-political to clinical alienation is made at first by considering how useful it is to our understanding to characterize ideological thought as schizophrenic, i.e., to suggest, in anti-conformist spirit, that the "social fact" may be unacceptable as such since it has become deranged. The intention is not to point to a likeness, but to *identify* the logic of ideology with morbid rationalism, and to demonstrate this scientifically rather than just drawing an analogy. The task is of course to bring this off, and unlike Laing, Szasz, Cooper, etc., to do this without in the process succumbing to a false consciousness that, for example, exploits the parallel for the purposes of stigmatizing ideology or society at large as "crazy" (and by contrast claiming egocentrically a privileged non-ideological status for one's own views), or by succumbing to the conceptual anarchism of stigmatizing all forms of classification as dehumanizing "labelling." The task also calls for some sophisticated bootstrapping, because "schizophrenia" is widely disputed as a diagnostic unity, and so while characterizing ideological thought as "schizophrenic," the author is pressed in counterpoint to justify that "schizophrenia" exists! However, the rewards at stake are high. To show that alienation in the form of schizophrenic consciousness is determined by a reificational mode of existence and not just by a capitalist economic reification, and in addition to establish the schizophrenic nature of ideological thought, makes credible the proposition that political alienation is also not the direct product of economic reification, but is something to be studied as a mode of existence in its own right.

In the psychopathological realm, Gabel gives us further signs of engaging a hermeneutic gear in his recruitment of the phenomenological psychiatry of Minkowski, who shares with the Budapest School an indebtedness to Bergsonian ideas, and thus indirectly to the heritage of the Eleatic paradoxes of motion.[29] Minkowski

an ideology implies an ontology, philosophical criticism may undermine ideologization. Although ideology is a form of rationality, criticism that is not accompanied by a de-reifying resection of the socio-historical roots of alienation will be limited in impact, we might add. As Merleau-Ponty has said, it is not man's critical faculty that safeguards him from derangement, but the structure of his space. The relation between ideological self-deception and the classical defence mechanisms has yet to be explored in depth. This is partly due to the virtual abolition of the dialectic of sacred and profane in humanistic neo-Freudian ego psychology, at the expense of the profane (see Jacoby, *op.cit.*, and recently H. Stuart Hughes, *The Sea Change* [New York, 1975]). However, as Foucault says (*op.cit.*, pp. 33-38) the activity of defences has an essentially *reiterative* structure, which already reveals a further connection with spatialized ideological thought.

29. What amounted in Bergson's case to a philosophical criticism serving as ideology-critique, here (by virtue of the assumed parallelism) takes on the guise of a "psychopathology-critique." When set over against ideological scientism, Bergson's views on time and space still comprise an effective de-reifying critique, despite his own ahistorical reifications such as the *élan vital*.

In drawing attention to the unconscious determinants of scientific thought, Bergson can be compared fruitfully to the "Lebenswelt" movement in the critique of positivistic science, a critique which is only just beginning to have an impact on the field where one might expect it would receive most acceptance, psychology (A. Giorgi, *Psychology as a Human Science* [New York, 1970]).

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characterized schizophrenia as *geometric* in its mechanistic, measurement-oriented view of space (which thereby loses its "lived" quality as a habitat), and as *morbidly rationalistic* in its loss of a dynamic sense of duration (which amounts to a "loss of praxis," meaning impermeability to experience, self-encapsulation, detachment and defensive over-abstractness). Gabel interprets morbid rationalism as an excess of *identification,* in Meyerson's sense (222).[30] An example of this is the essentializing "I've always been this way" experience in mental illness, in which patients ignore the origins of their disorders in their own concrete personal histories. "A nigger's always a nigger," would be the equivalent over-identification in ideological racism. This conceptualization is intended to be analogous to Meyerson's philosophy of science (itself strongly indebted to Bergson), which views the main goal of scientific thought as the spatializing elimination of non-identities.[31] Thus scientism, ideology and schizophrenia are all held to have in common a distorted spatio-temporal structuring (105).

In the morbid "epistemology" of schizophrenia, the reification of consciousness is exhibited in an egocentric anti-dialectical logic that forms illusory identifications on the basis of predicate identity (e.g., as in Messianic thought: "Christ suffered; I suffer; therefore I am Christ").[32] Such a restructuring of experience is guided by purely subjective factors, and by singular events in the personal history of the schizophrenic, which now erupt into the cognitive sphere. Symbolic objects undergo a corresponding distortion in perception (92, 100).

After expanding our understanding of ideology through an account of its "schizophrenic" structure, Gabel reverses the situation to show how a Marxist theory of alienation could facilitate interpretation in psychopathology, through the development of a general theory of mental illness based on the concept of reification (145). In so doing he is directly challenging the orthodox Marxist alliance with Pavlovism in the sphere of psychiatry, which (while containing dialectical features in the same way that, say, Dewey's concept of the reflex arc does), must be rejected for its "surface sociologism," as well as its failure to register the qualitative difference

30. E. Meyerson, *Identité et Realité*, 1908. *Identity and Reality* (Woking, 1930). Meyerson's topic was turn-of-the-century philosophy of physics, specifically mechanics. It is fair to ask whether it is legitimate to extend his argument to the social sciences. Mechanics is, by Meyerson's admission, the science "furthest removed from reality" (p. 216). It is also the science of reversible dimensions, and so excludes values.

31. Thus the law of causality is, at root, the concept of identity applied to the existence of objects over time, the synthetic equivalent of the analytic identity operation in logic. Objectivity resists *over*-identification in thought much as it does in science. The identity of cause and effect in mechanics implies reversibility, and so denies the irreversible temporal course of Nature. The principles of mechanics eventuate in the elimination of time, moving towards reliance on laws of conservation, on substances, on equations (X equals Y), and on constants (like "force"), all of which imply that *nothing happens* except displacements in space.

Gabel claims that Meyerson's work is an "epistemology," although it is more accurately a philosophy of science. As Dewey, Habermas and others have reminded us, the domain of knowledge is far from exhausted by the systematic and conscious rationality of science. Meyerson tries to draw broader conclusions by suggesting that scientific thought may be propadeutic to all forms of consciousness. This is a heuristic but surely contentious claim, one that would for example exhume the notion of perception as unconscious inference which was interred by critics such as Merleau-Ponty (*The Structure of Behavior* [Boston, 1963]; *Phenomenology of Perception* [London, 1962]).

32. Such identification is false because it a) dissociates two elements from their totalities, b) ignores the residual features of non-identity, and c) effects a spatialization (space lending itself to a reversible substitution). Incidentally, "epistemology" is something of a misnomer, since only ontology and logic are discussed in dealing with pathological consciousness and existence.

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between animal and human life. As a result, Pavlovian psychiatry has failed to capitalize on the potential of Marxism to provide a general theory of psychopathology.

At the point of departure we are asked to accept a pivotal premise; that "a certain degree of reification is normal" (143), an assumption that brings with it the same problems, as we shall see in a minute. The significance of the premise is that it gives rise to a bipolar classification of maladaptations: 1) *surrealist* disorders, which are non-delirious and are characterized by a *lack* of reification (such as the aphasic disability in naming), and 2) a broad category of *sub-realist* pathologies (classic dementias, paranoia, hysteria, manic-depressive psychosis, and alcoholic hallucinosis, all included here under the rubric "schizophrenia"), of which excessive reification is diagnostic. Naturally there is a dearth of processes of identification in the surrealisms, proportional to their excess in the sub-realisms.

Within psychopathological discourse, we can sum up by saying that the significance that Gabel claims his systematization has for the status of schizophrenia is sixfold. 1) It is comprehensive in scope and parsimonious in theory. 2) It challenges the traditional (empiricists') diagnostic division of the psychoses based by Kraepelin and Bleuler on the biological veridicality of perception. This division, for example, had previously separated hysteria and mania from schizophrenia. 3) It theoretically renders "schizophrenia" a pathological unity by uniting the various forms that the illness takes, and its process of development, through a phenomenology of the spatio-temporal structuring of consciousness.[33] Previously, a nosography of this kind had been lacking, and schizophrenia had tended to receive a "syndromic" definition in terms of an empirical pattern of co-occurring symptoms. 4) It gives that pathological unity precision by opposing it dialectically to a symmetric mirror-image (the surrealisms). 5) Since the aetiological basis of the surrealisms has been well substantiated as anatomical-physiological, Gabel's systematization comprises a possible argument in favor of the organogenesis of schizophrenia as well. 6) The systematization reverses Goldstein's traditional description of schizophrenic thought as "over-concrete" (a description which had become orthodoxy), preferring to view schizophrenia in terms of its over-identification and dissociation of totalities, i.e., as illegitimate *abstraction* (298). This accounts for the incidence of hallucinations, which are far from concrete!

In support of what amounts here to very strong claims, Gabel proceeds to attempt a double *tour de force* of phenomenological method, by deducing from his original premise both the symptom constellations of schizophrenia *and* the explanatory theories that have dealt with the phenomenon (220). This acts as a test (in the sense of hermeneutic science) of his speculations, a "checking" of his "foreknowledge," as Radnitzky puts it,[34] which in its empirical reference reminds us of the complementarity of hermeneutic cultural sciences and the natural sciences at a methodological level. The testing involves a thorough and wide-ranging survey of other theorists' ideas, and a very adequate although tedious documentation of case histories and empirical findings, mostly from the field of European existential-phenomenological psychiatry, but also calling on American and British clinicians such as Goldstein, Arieti, Head, and Lewis Carroll. Thus, again according to the canons of hermeneutic science, Gabel's methodology conduces to the co-understanding of investigators, and to their self-understanding.

33. Of course, the corresponding loss is one of differentiation between the various forms of sub-realist disorders.

34. G. Radnitzky, *Contemporary Schools of Metascience*, Vol. 2 (Stockholm, 1968), pp. 23-26.

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The envelope that gives the whole package significance beyond the parochial needs of psychiatry is that schizophrenia is defined as an individual form of ideologization, which places this dialectical conception of psychopathology firmly within a sociological perspective, drawing out of Marxism its latent property of *already being a critical theory of mental derangement* (311). This we might note is a welcome antidote of the psychological "explanations" which have attributed schizophrenic thought disorders to deficits or counter-developmental regressions in purely psychic processes such as categorization, abstraction, or communication skills, "deficits" often created to a large extent by arbitrary criteria of what constitutes "normal" (conforming) psychological process.

Although Gabel's endeavor seems both legitimate and successful, there is a group of caveats that lend a certain precariousness to balance the consistency of argumentation, caveats that reflect the "hermeneutic circle."[35] This group is composed of problems in a) clarifying the metascientific status of Gabel's approach (*vis-à-vis* explanation for example); b) establishing the role that "reification" is actually being asked to play, and querying whether it is not a too demanding one, c) examining the precise meaning of "parallelism" as the relation obtaining between social and clinical alienation; and d) exploring the implications of the equation between "a certain degree of reification" and "normality."

Gabel claims to aim at an *understanding* of the structural transformations of awareness resulting in false consciousness, rather than an explanation of their[36] origin. This comprises a departure from the Laingian tradition, where there is explicit location of the origin of pathology in schizogenic family structure, or political structure. This departure is made clear in Gabel's treatment of schizophrenia, where he attempts to establish that a nosology of psychic derangement is an analysis of the forms the illness takes, and does not commit us to any particular stand on their genesis. This position becomes especially necessary in the light of an interesting opposition revealed in the text. The assumption of a surrealist-subrealist bipolar dimension of pathologies favors an organogenesis of schizophrenia, because the surrealist disorders are already known to be a result of anatomical-physiological disturbances. On the other hand, the assumption of a psycho-sociological parallelism seems to *disfavor* an organic theory, leaning towards work like that of Wynne, Lidz, Bowen or Esterson on the schizogenic characteristics of family interaction.[37] In preferring the latter view on genesis, the author helps himself to sustain an interpretational rather than an explanatory attitude, since he wishes to entertain seriously the notion that the latter is only appropriate in the realm of biological reactions (314). This claim in itself seems debatable, especially in the light of works on psychological explanation in the clinical field.[38] It is followed (314) by another suggestion, that "in psychiatry one explains only individual cases, whilst an overall phenomenon can be

35. *Ibid*; and J. Needleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 32ff.

36. Where Gabel does depart, his stance on reductive explanation is sometimes close to equivocation. Thus on p. 80 we hear that "reification" is a *sociological* concept, but that on the other hand the morbid rationalism of ideologies is a "schizophrenic attack." (It is also noticeable that the interdisciplinary parallel is always called "socio-psychological" rather than "psycho-sociological.")

37. R.D. Laing and A. Esterson, *Sanity, Madness and the Family* (London, 1964); A. Esterson, *The Leaves of Spring* (London, 1970).

38. M. Sherwood, *The Logic of Explanation in Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1969); B. Nelson, "Varieties of Explanation in Developmental Psychology," unpublished manuscript, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1975.

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interpreted." But there clearly is legitimacy to the search for universals in psychopathological explanation. Gabel in fact does offer an explanation, to a degree, and does provide universalizing propositions. What he is opposed to is an extreme reductionism. In forsaking the orthodox Marxist conceptualization of infrastructure-superstructure relations, and playing down the determination of schizophrenic false consciousness by economic reification, he has resisted the tendencies of orthodox dialectical materialism to reduce phenomena of social consciousness to the economic conditions of existence. Meanwhile, his rambling but exhaustive survey of clinical literature and experimental studies provides some protection against accusations of pure idealism.

On the other hand, there is a prevalence of "identification" in the thesis that reification is at the root of the many and diverse manifestations of individual and collective false consciousness. As a result, it is reasonable to ask whether "reification" is serving as an explanatory concept in addition to acting as a focus for a set of interpretational categories. Does the concept of reification *explain* the varieties of spatialization and detotalization? This issue is not clarified by the apparent interchangeability of terms such as "reified," "anti-dialectical," "spatialized," "de-temporalized," "reversible," "de-totalized," "dissociated" and "devalued." To state metaphorically that "reification is a phenomenon with many facets" (86), or that the facets are the same thing viewed from different "perspectives"[39] (82), leads us to ask "what *thing*?" much as critics of the psychophysical double-aspect theory are wont to inquire "double aspects of *what*?" Again, to refer to spatio-temporal destructuring as a mere "common denominator" which "makes it easier to describe the combination of behavior and collective value judgments" has the ring of instrumentalism, and leaves us still puzzled as to the status of the theoretical term so depicted. Perhaps the reader's sense of loss here reflects the fact that Gabel's descriptive task stops short of an account of the *way* in which spatialization invades existence, and the different *degrees* that it may successively attain. In establishing the socio-psychological parallelism itself, he does not extend to considering the possibility that there could be parallels in the *development* of ideology or schizophrenia, or in their recession. Despite repeated reference to Piaget, Gabel does not credit the genetic perspective with a usefulness in his own account, which leans much more towards a synchronics structuralism.

"Spatialization" therefore comes to cover a large range of individual and collective phenomena of false consciousness, with the attendant risk that the denominator might become too common. Needleman has nicely described the tension that must exist between *verstehen* and reductive explanation. In Gabel's case we need to ask whether the reduction of schizophrenia and ideology to the basic reality of reification is balanced by an effort to keep the phenomena intact *as they appear*. How is ideology embodied and experienced in a way that is different from an outbreak of pathology? Until we see the difference, how are we able to comprehend the relationship intended to hold between them?[40] If there is too lenient a criterion for what is to count as data, the tension is lost, assimilation replaces argument, and we are left with an encyclopedia devoid of explanatory potential. The book's lengthy review of the clinical

39. Again, we have in the case of "perspective" another term that carries with it an inherent spatializing influence on our thinking.

40. The very geometric quality of the notion of "parallel" expresses the ambiguity involved here, since we can interpret two two-dimensional lines as separate lines, making contact only at infinity, or as the two boundaries of a strip of solid material, which are in a sense always in contact and possess a continuous identity.

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literature tends toward the encyclopedic. It is further hampered by being second-hand, so that the phenomena used as data are already interpreted, and thus divested somewhat of their phenomenality. They are known rather than perceived.

The last of our caveats bears on the way in which Gabel places subrealist derangements on the same continuous dimension as surrealistic disorders, with normality in the middle.[41] The problems of this continuum approach revolve around the requirement that we accept "a certain degree" of reification as normal. Gabel's justification for this is that while adapting to dialectical Nature, man must also compromise and adapt to a partly reified Society. He then proceeds to argue that a fully dialectical existence and consciousness would prevent the kind of day-to-day identification and dissociation of totalities required by, for example, linguistic communication. However, there are several problems here. First, is Society "partly" reified, or "largely" so? If the latter, then surely a "certain degree" of reification would be insufficient for psychological normality. Secondly, and implicit in this first, is the problem that normality has been put back on a relativistic footing, being defined in terms of the particular contingent facts of social life of the moment. (Reification is, according to Lukács, a transitory historical problem, and not a permanent essence of existence.) Thirdly, the argument that Gabel puts forward appears to equate "fully dialectical" with "over-dialectical," or surreal (321), and surely this presupposes some further ideal criterion by virtue of which one is able to legitimately define fully dialectical existence as non-ideal. Why exactly human dialogue is *necessarily* reified remains to be substantiated. One wonders whether there is not here concealed a naturalistic fallacy, a confusion of "is" and "ought." It is of course illegitimate to extrapolate from the statement "human communication is currently reified" to the proposition that "human communication will always be reified" or to the injunction that "human communication should be reified."

Although Gabel's overall approach is far from relativistic, it is possible to suspect a parallel here to his use of an axiology or theory of "values." Valuing is defined as the "*subjective experience* of the dialectical quality and formal coherence of reality" (21, italics added). Such a homogeneous category rejects the distinction between moral and non-moral values. As a result, justice is placed on the same level as taste, and its peculiar characteristics of objectivity (in the sense of universalizability and prescriptivity)[42] are lost. The notion of "use-value" similarly implies a teleological utilitarian ethics, deriving the moral (along with non-moral value) from the

41. Foucault, *op.cit.*, pp. 11-12, has called into question the use of bi-polar dimensions in psychopathology, especially where those dimensions establish a chiefly quantitative relationship between normality and abnormality as locations on a continuum. He wants to combat the idea (current in western medicine since Selye) that morbid psychological conditions are at root hypertrophies of adapted responses. His argument is that this constitutes a transposition of methods and concepts from the medical domain into the psychiatric one, one that unfortunately encourages assimilation of mental illness to organic illness. Gabel has a partial reply to such queries on pp. 318-216 of *False Consciousness*. Another effect of the "continuum" notion is to isolate reificational and de-reificational syndromes from other disorders, presumably not on the same dimension. Such are the neuroses and character disorders, which receive no attention at all, despite their clinical prevalence, and the fact that they have a clear evolutionary relationship to the more extreme disorders (M. Foucault, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-19).

42. The notions of universalizability and prescriptivity as criteria of the moral (rather than the "useful") are laid out by Kohlberg, and endorsed within a broader context by Habermas: L. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It," in T. Mischel, ed., *Cognitive Development and Genetic Epistemology* (New York, 1971); J. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," *Telos*, no. 24 (1976). Both claim a greater inclusiveness and ethical validity for justice over welfare as the fundamental moral concept.

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characteristics of societal structure rather than on the basis of rational criteria of ethical validity. This accounts for the marked absence from *False Consciousness* of ethical or metaethical considerations. They become absorbed (as they do in Freudian, Gestalt and systems theory approaches), in a general theory of values, whose precepts of homogeneity blur the distinction of "ought" from "is." Thus the "normality" of reification is bolstered by assertions that it may be "*useful* in a period of tension or war" (321), or that "a reified 'schizoid' mind, prone to abstraction and combined with lack of feeling, constitutes less of a vital handicap in a cashier than in a teacher or a spiritual leader" (321).

These are caveats that reflect the problems of the "hermeneutic circle": any hermeneutic exposition presupposes a "foreknowledge" which (*a la Gödel*) cannot justify itself without invoking a further hermeneutic envelope. They should not detract from Gabel's achievement, which is the comprehensive and powerful interpretation of the forms in which false consciousness appears, in terms of a pathology of man's situation in the world.

The existential-hermeneutic approach deviates from a Freudian one in its relative detachment from a natural science view of human beings, and its consequent refusal to immediately divest experiences of their phenomenal quality. While Nietzsche, Freud, and also Marx (perhaps) represent the "school of suspicion,"[43] reducing the patent to the latent, there is within the existential-phenomenological tradition more of a "school of restoration" which sees spirit, reason, and faith filtering *down* from the patent, from consciousness. Thus in Gabel's book schizophrenia and ideology share a "top downwards" rationality, which has philosophical, moral, and aesthetic aspects that are not just sublimations or superstructures derived in a "bottom upwards" fashion from a basically profane level.[44]

This tendency to reinfuse sacredness into the dialectic, at the risk of courting conservatism, is strongly represented in modern developmental psychology. Structural-developmental theories like those of Piaget, Kohlberg, Perry, Loevinger and Fowler,[45] describe normative sequences of qualitatively different levels in the diachronic elaboration of mature consciousness. Despite their apparent naturalism, frequent reification of "stages" of development, and their posturing as explanatory theories, such schemes have a strongly hermeneutic interest, and are derived from attempts to comprehensively interpret verbal interview material. They all propose levels of progressive de-reification. Interestingly, they all converge on the notion that several levels of de-reification are necessary *before* conformist or conventionalist worldviews can be attained. Conformity is an achievement. Then several further qualitative steps are involved in the further task of transcending it.

In terms of Gabel's project, it would appear that the discussion could be extended by attempting a rapprochement which would incorporate into the synchronic view of

43. P. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy* (New Haven, 1970), pp. 32ff.

44. L. Binswanger's *Daseinanalyse* assayed such a reintroduction of spirit, much to Freud's amusement. Freud preferred his own "subterranean basement" to Binswanger's "upper story which houses such distinguished guests as religion, art, etc." (Freud's words). See J. Needleman, *op.cit.*, pp. 1ff.

45. J. Piaget, *The Psychology of Intelligence* (London, 1951); L. Kohlberg, *op.cit.*; W. Perry, *forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years* (New York, 1968); J. Loevinger, *op.cit.*; J. Fowler, "Stages in Faith," in T. Hennessy, *Moral Development and Moral Education* (forthcoming). Although the dialectical quality of judgment is not explicitly examined by any of the above, it is implicitly present! See M. Basseches, "A Study of Dialectical Thought as a Post-Adolescent Development in Cognitive Organization." Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, Harvard University.

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alienation the dynamic understanding of transition imbedded in these developmental accounts. The latter provide a possible model for a hermeneutic of de-alienation. Horizons would be expanded. Spatio-temporal structuring would not be the sole realm of reification and de-reification. In addition the areas of cognition covered would increase. For example, Gabel's brief treatment of reified *consciousness* (as opposed to praxis) confines itself to logic, as in his dealing with *pars-pro-toto* reasoning and Arieti's "illegitimate identification by predicates" mentioned above. The developmental theories would supplement this with extra-logical and supra-logical dimensions of consciousness, such as mundane epistemology. At that point, it would be legitimate to talk about "morbid epistemologies" as well as "morbid logics."

Developmental theories deal with consciousness alone, rather than with existence, and specifically with knowing rather than being. Their Cartesian heritage presents serious problems that any effective integration would have to transcend. One aspect of this is their concentration on the *differentiation* of the individual subject from other subjects, and from the object of cognition. Furthermore it should not be assumed that a developmental system can give rise directly to a theory of pathology or de-differentiation. All that is offered is an outline of a genetically ordered set of cognitive-structural forms, each of which lays down a "potentiality" for mental illness.[46] It is not clear that psychopathology is a reversal of this normal sequence.[47] There are therefore several reasons for maintaining reservations about such a rapprochement. A comprehensive account of the disordered mind also requires an understanding of *individual history* (such as the psychoanalytic one) which shows why a disorder actually occurs, and of *social-institutional history* (such as Foucault's) which defines the meaning that "mental illness" has acquired in the process of civilization.[48] In crossing interdisciplinary borders with a certain panache, Gabel has made a significant move toward encouraging the coordination of these different components.

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46. M. Foucault, *op.cit.*, p. 28. The relation of cognitive-developmental theory to psychopathology has been most interestingly explored at a theoretical and empirical level by Bob Kegan, who interprets pathologies in terms of transitions between levels. R. Kegan, *Piaget and Personality: The Psychology of the Between* (forthcoming), and "Personality and the Piagetian Paradigm: Essays on Equilibration," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1976.

47. B. Inhelder, "Some Pathologic Phenomena analyzed in the Perspective of Developmental Psychology," in B. Inhelder and H.H. Chipman, eds., *Piaget and His School* (New York, 1976); B. Inhelder, "Operatory Thought Procedsses in Psychotic Children," in *ibid*; E. Schmid-Kitsikis, "The Cognitive Mechanisms underlying Problem-solving in Psychotic and Mentally Retarded Children," in *ibid*.

48. M. Foucault, *op.cit.*, pp. 68-88; M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization* (London, 1968).

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Helmut Reinicke, *Revolt im bürgerliche Erbe: Gebrauchswert und Mikrologie*. Giessen-Lollar; Achenbach Verlag, 1975. 223 pages. DM 14.

This study of literary figures of the first half of the 19th century takes its methodological inspiration from Marx' ways of interrelating economic forms and forms of consciousness in his critique of political economy. Reinicke pursues the question of the relation between the possibilities of social knowledge available in the medium of art and the specificity of social forms by investigating the content and literary strategies in the works of Lichtenberg, Jean Paul, and Heine as a revolt against the growing commodification of people and nature.

This period from 1800 to 1850 was one of spreading commodification which took place within a form of production in which the subsumption of labor was "formal" rather than "real." Marx terms the subsumption of labor by capital "formal" when small aritsans and other "free" laborers are organized under the control of capitalist or capitalists without radically altering their techniques of producing, as in manufacture, while under "real" subsumption of labor by capital Marx understands the industrial organization of production around machinery. The "formal" subsumption of labor in the period under investigation can be considered inadequate to the concept of capital because it fails to carry out the logic of surplus value production. That the *commodity* form blossoms in this period while the *capital* form is only budding is important to the argument in this review because the commodity form, as opposed to the capital form, does not contain the *immanent* possibility of oppositional forms of action and thought. This means that insofar as protest and revolt arise against the commodity form they must orient themselves to that which is not yet commodified.

Reinicke is not satisfied with merely indicating that each of the writers examined—or that characters in their works—explicity called for emancipation, and relating that to the general prevailing social 'conditions.' Rather, by means of a critical materialist epistemology, he seeks to uncover the specificity of the *form* of revolt expressed and its connections to the form in which it is conveyed. He discovers that in all three writers, revolt is embedded in sensuality, in the small aspects of everyday life which stand opposed to the abstract universal of the commodity form, rather than in any counter principle of universality. "Use-value surfaces [in their works] as literary micrology: as the phenomenology of the non-identical, the preservation of those small qualities not siezed and levelled by exchange-value. The micrological, the emancipatory compendium of details, becomes the object of reflection for Lichtenberg. For him . . . as for Jean Paul, the humanitarian revolt lies hidden within this form which, with Heine, acquires a new sensual aspect as revolutionary paganism against exploitation and non-freedom" (p. 124).

Reinicke shows how Lichtenberg attempted to indicate protest forms against commodity and merchant capital in the sensual qualities of language, everyday life and the habits of other peoples. In short stories, relfections on everyday life, as well as in the way in which he analyzed literature, Lichtenberg tried to uncover a hidden concrete utopia. At the same time, he had a notion of an emancipatory subjectivity embedded in these details which could be achieved through their reflection. Jean Paul also sought to find the locus of emancipatory radicality in the microcosmic, where moments of hapiness and sensuality were still preserved which had been lost on a more general social elvel. This is, according to Reinicke reflected in his language itself; in its restlessness, richness of display and immanent transmission of the 'small sensual joys' (p. 139). The mode of narration incorporates a process of self-reflection, not only

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as related to the world described, as is the case with Lichtenberg, but which includes the writer as subject in the process. It begins to acquire a dialectical character, whereby the 'Self which is in the process of coming to itself' (*zu-sich-selbst-dommende-Ich*) does not attain that goal, but only has a presentiment of it as an anticipated freedom (p. 143).

Heine, the last of the authors considered, continued the tradition of protest against the destruction of sensual qualities by the commodity and made it more explicit. He tried to express a freer sensuality, in lyrical form, as necessary for the emancipatory revolution. Yet, according to Reinicke, it is precisely with Heine that the historical imits of the form of revolt and its medium of transmission—art—become problematic. Heine himself felt that lyrical subjectivity was no longer adequate to the sorts of struggles which were coming into being, but that its decline, the decline of his art, was historically necessary. He was less aware of the historical limits of the revolt form itself which he propagated: "the plebeian critique [which] still has the money fetish as its object and not the reversal of things and of human beings in production itself which is posited by capital relations" (p. 155). On the basis of his investigation and the Marxian categorial distinction between commodity form and capital form Reinicke judges the aesthetic protest of Lichtenberg, Jean Paul, and Heine to be "plebeian anti-capitalism" because it directs itself against the commodity form, not the capital form. Neither the protest nor the historical reality of these writers was adequate to the concept of capital.

In his analysis of Lichtenberg, Jean Paul and Heine, Reinicke indicates that what is essential to all of them is the positive emphasis placed on the subtleties of everyday life. This, as we have seen, characterizes resistance against the abstract universality that informs commodity exchange. Because universality acquired a different, more negative meaning, its unequivocal affirmation as Humanity by Schiller and Goethe became untenable for the writers here examined. For Reinicke, this practical critique of the Weimar classics, as well as its own historical limits, calls art into question as a means of knowledge of the true within the medium of appearance. His point of departure is that art involves the sensualization of truth and that this becomes problematic when reality no longer lends itself to sensualization. With the increasing commodification of nature and people their particular sensuous qualities—what Marx calls the use-value side of commodities—are reduced to exchange values and subordinated to being mere means to capital's utterly abstract goal of the realization of surplus value. At this point, art can at best negatively polemicize against the existing world. It can no longer fully grasp it. Art therefore becomes incapable of positively specifying the sensualization of conditions of knowledge which are becoming increasingly abstract. As Reinicke states, "value and surplus-value...cannot be revealed by aesthetic (*kunstschönen*) means. The analysis of this social truth is the task of revolutionary critique" (p. 173).

Reinicke's attempt to analyze the historical determinateness of art as a mode of knowledge should not, however, be taken to mean that he is dismissing it. On the one hand he is trying to indicate the historical limits of art as a means of knowledge of totality. It existed as a separate sphere because, although that totality was graspable, it was not socially realizable. Art begins to lose that function when the determinations of social form become so abstract that they can no longer be grasped aesthetically. On the other hand, the contradictions of capital develop in such a way that a future society, where meaning and form can be identical, becomes a possibility. Art, as a separate sphere, has reached its limits; the aspirations of art, however, begin to be

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expressed in those of everyday life. "The forms of art after the end of Art. . . must be presented with reference to the possibilities of a revolutionary practice in everyday life, according to the level of the unfolding of capital, the mode of production and forms of resistance of the proletariat. The emphasis, in any case, would have to be that that appearance (*Schein*) which was once created as the True and the Beautiful, along with its affective exercise, be sedimented in material production and the modes of communication of human beings; that which was the supra-practical moment of free sensuality, becomes the practice of everyday life" (p. 188). Reinicke does not banish art from the future society because it does not represent truth, but rather claims that its truth value, as an independent form, has become historically inadequate. That which art was must become part of everyday life.

This approach still has to be examined with regard to its more immediate political relevance. To do so, a closer examination of 'plebeian anti-capitalism' is in order. During a period when fully developed capital relations and an industrial proletariat were still in the process of coming into being, when the mechanization of industrial production was not yet fully developed, anti-capitalist revolt was most frequently against a *new* form of domination and was strongly informed by a memory of a pre-capitalist past. Not, of course, the past of feudal lords and peasants, guild masters and journeymen, so idyllically recalled by retrograde romantic mythology, but, rather, a past in which each individual could relate to themselves as their own owner. Elements of this past did, in fact, historically exist and it is no coincidence that plebeian anti-capitalism was represented most strongly among artisans. However, with the partial exception of the United States (an exception we return to below), this past, a society composed of independent commodity producers, never existed as an historical totality. If then, it is only *partially* rooted in historical reality, what is the source of this image of this past society as a *totality*?

An anthropological ontology can be avoided only if one argues that the present must be structured in a way conducive to such a nostalgic image. If one examines the course of the unfolding of the categories in Marx's critique of political economy, the movement from commodity to money to capital to the various determinations of capital, does have an historical moment—but only as a moment. As totalities, the categories exist only in capitalist society and do not represent total stages of historical development. On the other hand, each step does not disappear with the emergence of the next, but, rather, all together constitute the totality. That is to say, not only does the sphere of simple commodity circulation only fully exist under capitalism, but it is constantly being reproduced anew. Because, however, it exists as a sphere not *immediately* identical with the sphere of capital-determined production, commodity circulation and the ideas of equality and liberty associated with it, are *thinkable* as a total pre-capitalist social form, one whose appearance is in apparent contradiction with the 'realities' of capitalist society. In other words, the moment of past historical reality appears as a totality because it is mediated as a totality in the present. This brand of anachronism can be found in classical political economy as well as in the early anti-capitalist revolt. Marx, in analyzing Adam Smith, speaks of "the paradise lost of the bourgeoisie, where people did not confront one another as capitalists, wage-labourers, land owners, tenant farmers, userers, and so on, but simply as persons who produced commodities and exchanged them" (*A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p. 59).

In the historical period examined by Reinicke, anti-capitalism could only have

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taken on the form of resisting the present by referring to the past. While commodity production was spreading rapidly, the form of production adequate to the concept of capital—real subsumption of labor—began only towards the end of this period. Expressed in terms of the categories of the Marxian critique: on the logical level of commodities, use-value is merely the material carrier of the social relations embodied in exchange-value. It is a non-identical moment, but one which is of little independent significance. The form of thought implied by the categories on this level—the well-known fetish of commodities—is not only static, but one-sided. The categories of the sphere of commodity circulation fail to provide a mode of thought, oppositional to the *value* framework underlying exchange-value. There is an externalization of the *difference* between use-value and exchange-value in the form of the difference between the commodities as the relative forms and money as the universal equivalent form, but this difference is not yet an opposition, much less a contradiction. In other words, within a society which is still in the process of developing a mode of production adequate to the concept of capital, the possibility of revolt and of opposition is in the not-yet-subsumed, the use-value which is not yet a mere carrier of exchange value.

On the logical level of the concept of capital, with the rise of real subsumption, however, use-value has another, more active determination. The use-value dimension is expressed in the labor process, that is, as the non-identical moment of the process of production which incorporates social relations and possesses a dynamic historical moment. The interaction of the process of production of surplus-value with the labor process, as the two moments of the process of capitalist production, not only defines a historical dynamic in terms of the ever accelerating development of the means of production, but also one in which fetishized forms of consciousness as well as oppositional, non-subsumed forms, are constantly coming into being. As opposed to the category of the commodity, that of capital implies the immanent creation of its own opposition (and not merely on the objective level), the possibility of its *Aufhebung*. However, this possibility itself is historical. The dialectic of use-value and exchange-value on the level of capital does not define a given, static, possibility. Rather, that the forms of fetishized thought, as well as those of possible revolutionary subjectivity, historically change qualitatively. The fact that, with real subsumption, the possibility exists that the proletariat can develop anti-capitalist forms out of the immanence of capital itself and does not have to reach back to a pre-capitalist past, does not mean that those immanent anti-capitalist forms can, at any historical point, be capital-transcending. The question of class consciousness is not simply one of the degree of militant anti-capitalism, but one of the content of that anti-capitalism, and that is an historical question.

As an aside, it should be noted that the economy-critical approach here briefly sketched out has important implications for a critique of a major trend in western Marxism stemming from Lukács. In his attempt to theoretically overcome the dichotomy of objectivism and subjectivism, Lukács was the first to analyze the Marxian categories as simultaneous determinations of social form and form of thought. However, he only considered the commodity form and not the capital form in this manner. In terms of what has been argued above, this made it possible for Lukács to derive revolutionary class consciousness immanently out of his categorial analysis. He could only get as far as proletarian self-awareness of its being an object, i.e., the commodity level. On the capital level, however, the immanent analysis breaks off, and instead Lukács has recourse to crisis and the Party. The question as to why

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Lukács and those who followed him remained on the logical level of commodities cannot be dealt with here. In any case, this tradition is, in one sense, carried further by the Frankfurt School: they, too, only grasp consciousness which immanently arises under capitalism as one-sided reification. The mechanisms of the reification are described brilliantly, but because only the value dimension is considered, the results are totally pessimistic. Spurning the Party as an emancipatory alternative, but retaining Lukács' equation of commodity-determined thought with capital-determined thought in general, they can only positively view that use-value which is not yet subsumed. But this is, historically, a losing proposition. Habermas tries to revive the notion of emancipation, but his point of departure is, implicitly, also the commodity level as totality rather than as moment. This is indirectly expressed in his equation of the Marxian concept of labor with instrumental activity, i.e., with the value-dimension of labor alone, ignoring its use-value dimension. Emancipation can be 'saved' only by breaking apart the synthetic double-sidedness of the Marxian categories and establishing parallel spheres of labor and interaction, each with its own transhistorical immanent logic. Emancipation sadly, but necessarily, falls back to the level of the Enlightenment — an exhortation in the name of an historically unexamined Reason.

Let us return to the question of plebeian anti-capitalism as considered by Reinicke. As we have seen, during the transitional period leading to the rise of industrial capitalism, that form, a looking to the past, was the only one historically available. In that sense it can be considered historically adequate. With the full development of industrial capitalism, that form did not 'automatically' disappear, to be totally replaced by a now-more-adequate proletarian anti-capitalism. It lived on as an important anti-capitalist strain both within and without the workers' movement. It lived on, not simply because memories die hard, but because, as indicated above, it is a form of thought adequate to the sphere of simple commodity circulation which is continually reproduced as a moment of the capital-determined totality. Because of the changed historical determination of the social formation, however, it acquired a different or, better, a dual significance. As Reinicke argues, the remembrance of pre-capitalist times can become a hindrance for the proletariat when those qualities which have been lost are not transformed in a socialist direction with reference to the prevailing conditions of capitalist labor. If this does not occur, then what is left are various theorists of money or time-chits, proponents of artisanal cooperatives, etc. — in other words, a tendency which in terms of a working class politics adequate to the realities of industrial capitalism is petty bourgeois (p. 52). In spite of the vulgarizing misuse of this latter term within the Marxist tradition, it does have a critical epistemological significance. It, of course, has nothing in common with the usual form of sociological reductionism which relate ideas immediately back to the class origins of their proponents. Nor does it necessarily refer to the thinking of the actual petty-bourgeoisie. Rather, it refers to a form of anti-capitalist thought, adequate to the sphere of simple commodity circulation, with a utopian ideal which is ahistorical and totally inadequate to the concept of capital: a society composed, even if in cooperative form, of free and equal commodity producers and exchangers, i.e., a society in which *all* are petty-bourgeois.

Yet, similarly as was the case with art, Reinicke's intention is not simply to write off the tradition emerging out of early 19th century plebeian anti-capitalism by examining how its historical adequacy dissolves. He notes that a positive moment lies in its insistence upon self-realization, that one relate to oneself as an owner in one's

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labor (p. 53). This is the double aspect of the historical non-simultaneity of the form of thought being examined. That it directs itself to a past which never fully was makes its specific goals anachronistic and unrealizable at best. However, the fact that it does "remember" a pre-capitalist past at all means that it maintains the possibility of post-proletarian labor, in however confused a form.

This is of particular contemporary political importance. The ideas of the traditional working class movements, whether Social Democratic or Communist, arose at a time when the non-identical moment emerging out of capitalist society could not, even in its most militantly anti-capitalist form, encompass the idea of the *Aufhebung* of capitalist labor. Questions of ownership of the means of production, of the mode of organization of *existing* labor, and of the distribution of capital and goods, could be placed on the agenda; not however the question of proletarian labor itself. To be sure, these movements turned their backs on a pre-capitalist past, but their vision of a post-capitalist future was still too determined by their capitalist present. Today, when the development of late capitalism is such that questions of self-realization, meaningful labor, and so on are very much on the agenda, the traditional working class movements and ideas have become obsolete. On the other hand, plebeian anti-capitalism in its contemporary variants, whether populist, anarchist, counter-cultural, etc., does grasp this question, but wrapped in a web of pre-capitalist fantasies. The task then is to wed this crucially important "remembrance" of the future with the realities and humane potentialities of the advanced capitalist mode of production.

This is particularly important in America, inasmuch as pre-capitalist anti-capitalism has, as a form of thought, been historically dominant to a degree unknown in other capitalist countries. This is the other side of the coin of the question of the development (or its lack) of working-class consciousness in the United States. Most answers, ignoring the common liberal mystifications, concentrate on ethnicity, relatively high wages, the culture industry, and the availability of land. All of these may be important, but they avoid any typie of categorial analysis of the specificity of the American development. American society, outside of the plantations in the South, came closest to a pre-capitalist form which, as a total historical stage, resembled the logical level of simple commodity circulation. Not only was there no feudal past to speak of, but most Americans actually lived as small independent commodity producers—artisans, small merchants and farmers. (The difference between the American farmer and the European peasant is essential here!) Even with the rapid industrialization of the last third of the 19th century, this did not immediately change. On the contrary, the immediate effect was that, for example, the number of farmers tripled. The huge populist waves at the end of the century mark the end of this development. If, as argued above, the nostalgia for a pre-capitalist society of independent commodity producers is present within capitalism as a constant possibility, because the sphere of simple commodity circulation is a continuing moment of capitalist totality, then how much stronger must that form of thought be in a society where it is reinforced by such specific historical circumstances? This form of thought, it could be argued, was practically hegemonic in America and defined what or who the real American was. This, too, was reinforced by a moment of social reality. The American Dream had less to do with the possibility of becoming a capitalist than the possibility of becoming 'independent'—an independence where one could presume a relationship between hard work and material comfort.

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On the basis of this thesis, it could be argued that the high degree of awareness indicated by young Americans in the last decade on questions of self-realization and meaningful activity is not only a function of the fact that the U.S. is the most highly developed capitalist country in the world, but also a function of that pre-capitalist anti-capitalism discussed above. This helps explain the double-sidedness of the American movement: the strong, capital-surpassing needs which have been expressed, and the capital-inadequate forms with which they've been expressed. It is no accident that most of those forms—land communes, food coops, community auto-repair garages, etc.—exist in the pores of capitalist society and deal with the simple distribution and production of commodities. They are reflections of an old American tradition, one which, in its concrete specificity, represents a totally historically inadequate form of consciousness as well as organization for the overcoming of capitalism. Yet the general needs standing behind these concrete modes of expression can explode the capital-determined social form. This double-sidedness marks our dilemma and defines our task.

Moishe Postone

Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la Prison*. Paris: Gallimard, 1975. 315 pages.

Foucault's aim in *Surveiller et punir* is a correlative history of the modern "soul" and the new *power to punish*: "a genealogy of modern morals. First, he refuses to limit his discussion of punishment to its "repressive," negative effects—excluding, repressing, penalizing. Instead he takes punishment as a complex social function having many *positive* effects—maintaining order, restoring calm, "improving" mankind. Next, he does not view penal methods as answering to legal statutes, but he deals with techniques of power in complicity with other agencies of authority: punishment as a political tactic. Third, he explores whether there is a common matrix for the history of penal law, the development of the human sciences (and humanism), thereby continuing his earlier investigations (especially in *The Order of Things*). In short, the technology of power is seen as the driving element in the "humanization of penality" and the "sciences of man." Finally, he wishes to see if the entry of the soul, the non-corporal elements, into the penal process represents a transformation in the manner in which the body is affected by power relations. How, for example, does the normal-abnormal prescription come to add to the crime as an object for penal intervention? And what specific mode of subjugation gave birth to man as the object of knowledge for a discourse claiming scientific status?

It becomes ever more clear as we read Foucault's book that for him the body is directly immersed in the political field and traversed by a complex interplay of forces. The body is viewed by society as useful only if it is at the same time labor-power and a subjugated body. A cry for a more comprehensive knowledge of the body's conduct masks perhaps a more political call for mastery over its hidden potentials. The political technology of discipline is ripe.

But what does Foucault mean by power? He takes his distance from the currently brandished notions that power is "held" by those who are "in positions of power." Rather than speak of power and authority as a thing that, like a commodity, can be

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owned, Foucault views power as an *exercise* that extends far beyond the mere reaches of privilege or class. Power is not utilized on those who "don't have it;" it invades them, penetrates their bodies and traverses their newly acquired 'souls.' Dominant power relations go to every individual's roots and guard his every step. Finally, Foucault states, power is never acquired once and for all, but is instead the object of a constant battle and open to other forces which threaten its reign. In this sense, we are all part of the "ruling class," since it is the dominant class' power relations and the mechanisms of authority which shape people from all classes. Struggles against the dominant system of power therefore fail miserably if they are not directed at the way power pervades individuals' bodies at home, in schools, in the military, and in the workplace.

Foucault concludes his preface by discarding the academic illusion that knowledge is apolitical. Theory is always linked to a practice of power and power is always based on theory. Power relations are always accompanied by a body of knowledge which validates their exercise. Thus, we must avoid the trap of "anthropologism" whereby every deed has a doer, every effect a cause, every meaning a subject. As Nietzsche pointed out, it is impossible to assign a *subject* to knowledge-power relations: "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything."[1] According to Nietzsche and Foucault, the subject is a fiction born from procedures of surveillance and punishment.

In the ceremonies of torture, the central *personnage* is the crowd who watches. The sovereign demands not only that they know of the ceremony, but that they view it. For they must feel fear as they witness the sovereign's power of punishment. During such ceremonies the sovereign often permitted outbursts of heated passion and violence, reading them as signs of allegiance. But these ceremonies meant to terrify the people could also serve to precipitate a refusal of punitive power and even revolt. If the crowds flock around the scaffold it is not simply in order to be present at the sufferings of the victim or to excite the executioner's hand. It is also to hear that person *who no longer has anything to lose* scream out against the judges, laws, power and the Church. For the people, then, this aspect of the ceremony could always serve as a pretext for revenge. We rarely hear about the popular agitations where the crowd grew enraged at the overly zealous actions of the executioner and turned the tables of justice. Yet, those in high places knew this very well, and they feared the effects of these ambiguous rituals.

The execution rituals sought to force the condemned person to legitimate the torture process through an admission of guilt. There was also a whole body of literature – the "feuilles volantes" – to discredit criminals. Like the rituals themselves, however, this literature often backfired and glorified the criminal. (The same process was at work in the American Old West, for example, where the legends of Jesse James' heinous crimes and the posted billboards offering a large reward for his arrest merely served to make him the greatest gunman in the West.) By the end of the eighteenth century, protests against torture abound and one can hear cries for respect of the criminal's "humanity," regardless of the severity of the crime. Whence did this enigmatic call for penal moderation stem?

In France, the monarch's "over-power" which granted the king absolute authority was challenged by the rise of the bourgeoisie, the development of production, and the

1. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Kaufman Edition (New York, 1969), "First Essay, Section 13."

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growth of wealth. The real objective of nineteenth century reforms, Foucault claims, was a new "economy of the power to punish" to assure a more widespread distribution of this power. Thus, penal reform must be read as a strategy for restructuring the power to punish in order to make it more efficient, better formulated, and cheaper. In short, it was a question of reassigning the power to judge from the discontinuous, contradictory and multiple privileges of the sovereign, to the continuously distributed effects of public strength. Punishment was to become a regular *function*, and not a rare spectacle. It was not a question of punishing less, but of *punishing better*.

Thus, for Foucault, it was not a question of a *new sensitivity*, but of a new politics concerning illegality. The rising bourgeois class fought before and during the French Revolution to defend their *rights*. But with the bourgeoisie's growth of wealth and its huge demographic thrust, the main target for illegal actions shifted from *rights* to *goods*. Theft tended to replace armed struggle. While bourgeois justice might have accepted illegal actions involving personal rights, it strongly reacted to illegal actions against property. Hence the illicit practices of fraud, counterfeiting, etc., were severely controlled and recoded. This division between illegalities concerning rights and goods is parallel to the new class divisions. The bourgeoisie appropriated illegalities regarding rights, and the "popular" classes took over illegal actions against property. Thus, a penal system had to be devised to differentiate among illegal actions along class lines.

Given the new form of social organization, a crime was no longer directed against the sovereign but against society as a whole—against the State. What was respected was not the body of the criminal but those of citizens who, as parties to the social contract, had the right to exercise power against the criminal—*the power to unite*.

According to Foucault, a well-developed system of semio-techniques was joined to the exercise of power, consisting of 'six rules of punishment': 1) A crime is committed because it affords certain advantages. Hence there must be more interest in escaping punishment than in risking a criminal act. 2) The *idea of the inconvenience of punishment* will replace the sensations of suffering. What must be maximized is no longer the bodily reality of the penal process, but the *representations* of penality. 3) The penal measures must have their greatest effect on those *who have not committed any crime*. The guilty person is of least importance; what matters are *the future guilty ones*. 4) A representational association must be clearly established between the advantages one could expect to gain from a crime and a well-defined sentence with a well-calculated measure of inconvenience. *The reason for the sentence must be clear and understandable to everyone*. 5) The proof of the crime must be as clear and absolute as a mathematical equation, beyond question. 6) All infractions must be categorized and qualified hierarchically, and penal measures must be individualized. *This individualization of criminality is the ultimate goal*. Thus, *moderation* is a calculated economy of the power to punish. An interplay of signs and representations circulates in everyone's mind and an entire semio-technique is forged to deter individuals from actions against the State.

The criminal is now represented as everyone's common enemy—public enemy number one—the person everyone has an interest in excluding from the social pact, disqualifying as a citizen, viewing as a monster, a scoundrel, and a madman; i.e., as *abnormal*. Hence the truths of penality will be adjusted according to finer and more precise variables of the power to punish. The reformers' ideology developed as a technology of subtle power, both efficient and economical, in opposition to the

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monarch's lavish expenditures. A *chain of ideas* and a common set of interests now bind more securely than any physical torture. This semio-technique of power, this "ideological power," implies a new power politics with regard to the body.

The art of punishment must now rely on a representational technology through which energies are depicted in constant battle (Good vs. Evil, Public Morality vs. the forces of Immorality, etc.). Representational couples representing opposing values are constituted—the power of binary oppositions: Good-Evil, Sane-Insane, Normal-Abnormal. A complete network of *signs-deterrents* is thus formed, capable of subjugating the movement of forces to power relations. To be effective, however, these signs-deterrents must fulfill several conditions. They must be the least arbitrary possible. The punishment must seem to grow naturally from the crime. This interplay of signs must wear away the machinery of forces in such a way as to *diminish the desire* that makes crime attractive by *augmenting the interest* involved in avoiding punitive measures. The representation of the penal process and its disadvantages thus outweighs the idea of crime and its pleasures. Penal measures now use time to transform the individual, to modify his conduct, to establish signs to guide him along proper channels and locate clear deterrents to crime. Time heals, cures and transforms.

Punishment must thus be viewed as natural and in everyone's best interests. Under monarchy, the condemned man's body was the king's property to dispose of as he wished. In the penal colony this body becomes public property. The use of public labor in camps and prisons is an excellent means for creating a collective economic interest in the penal process. The guilty ones pay twice, through sentences and labor. Finally there is a well thought out economy of publicity. In corporal punishment, terror was held up as the example. Now the example is viewed as a lesson on the public good: the decipherable signs of criminality. It is no longer the terrifying restoration of sovereignty, but the constant *reactivation of the Code*: the mass reinforcement of the link between the idea of crime and that of punishment.

Hence, there is a tireless rewriting of the penal code on the level of bodily behavior. This penetrates the very architecture of prisons in the form of a timetable which distributes inmates' bodies in space according to carefully scheduled segments of time. Continual surveillance turns out to be the most effective punishment. This process of surveillance through a supervision of the inmates' time occurs as a cross between sixteenth century theory of pedagogic individual transformation through continuous exercise and late eighteenth century penal techniques. "Correction" and isolation become the main weapons. The case of Philadelphia's Walnut Street Prison is typical: obligatory work, a body kept constantly busy, all work being productive, uninterrupted surveillance. What was specific about the Walnut Street Prison was that, while criminal's condemnation and the crime's motivations were public knowledge, the execution of the sentence was carried out in silence, behind the prison walls. The certitude that the inmate was doing his stretch sufficed as an example for every citizen. The inmates are observed, studied, and their every gesture or word noted.

In the nineteenth century there were two prison models: the punitive city and the coercive institution. In the punitive city—the penal colony—penal power was distributed throughout the social field. Kafka's "In the Penal Colony" is a perfect depiction of this. The goal there was a permanent recodification of minds. Then there was the coercive institution where a compact functioning of the power to punish was at work: a meticulous take-over of the condemned man's body and time. Here Foucault asks:

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how did the carceral, coercive, corporal, solitary and secret model of the power to punish replace the representative, scenic, signifying, public model? What is at work in this shift is a *new form of power* (disciplinary power) and a new goal (a *docile body*).

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the ideal soldier was someone recognizable from far off: he carried the natural signs of his vigor and courage, the marks of his pride. By the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the soldier had become manufactured. The body's posture was improved and a calculated restraint was instilled in every portion of this body: it was shaped, manipulated, tamed and taught how to respond to orders. The body's operations have been subjected to a process of correction and control. According to Foucault, there was certainly nothing new about the body being manipulated. Bodies were subjected to authority well before the seventeenth century. But what was new was the scope of the control. Rather than a control of bodies carried out on a generalized scale, the functioning of the body was worked and observed in the minutest details. Every gesture, attitude, smile and step was controlled. The object of the control also shifted. Where earlier one could read the submission of a body through its behavior, it now was a matter of controlling the entire economy of the body's internal organization. Internal forces and not the external signs will be observed and treated. Rather than ceremony, there is *exercise*. The form of control is also different: what is at work are methods of uninterrupted coercion of the body through the imposition of a relation of docility-utility, i.e., *discipline*.

A fair number of disciplinary procedures already existed in convents, armies and workshops. But the disciplines became general formulas for domination during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And the human sciences and their disciplines inherit directly from these earlier forms of control. Their aim is not merely outward compliance with authority, but internal restraint and self-control. The more obedient the body, the more useful it becomes. Disciplines dissociate power from the body by means of strict subjection. The "invention" of this "new political anatomy" of the body was not sudden. Rather, it came about as a generalized method synthesizing a multiplicity of often minor processes of surveillance and punishment.

What is important is that within twenty years, discipline became widespread in high schools, elementary schools, hospitals and military organizations. These disciplinary techniques define a certain mode of political invasion of the body: a new *micro-physics of power*. These techniques constantly gain ground and seek to spread their control over the whole social body. The projected goal is for discipline to become the norm of conduct.

As with the true believer or the ideal student, no detail is insignificant for the disciplined man. And as no detail of the body's conduct will go by unnoticed, control becomes total. Almost any movement can trigger the wrath of power and bring punishment down on the body in question. Passivity becomes the only recourse to escape control and the only action allowed is compliance with orders. Docility defines the average citizen's behavior. The individual produced by these disciplinary procedures is the man of modern humanism. And what could be gained from a liberation of *this* man?

The new technology of discipline distributes individuals in space with assigned sexual and social roles. Individuals exist within the confines of specific and interwoven institutional spheres—schools, offices or factories, the military, the asylum—but are also confined through a constant and alert surveillance when outside of these

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institutional spaces. Afraid to make the slightest move which could be misinterpreted, the body is no longer able to dream of movement according to its own rhythm. Dangerous communication between bodies is forbidden—and all communication, sexual, discursive or otherwise, between more than two bodies is viewed as dangerous—individuals can only be brought together in mass for economic production or military protection. Hence a child is admonished for turning around in his seat to speak to his neighbor, even if he does not in fact utter a word and regardless of the nature of the utterance; the pedagogic crime in question is that of occupying an incorrect position. The comfortable body, at ease with itself, is unforgivable. The body in school must be like the desk: rigid, taut, tense and rooted to the spot. The real secret of the disciplines is that they all communicate among themselves. Hence, the family's job is to shape a body's self-image (measurable against the social codes of conduct) and then thrust the body out into the different disciplinary institutions. A body thus moves imperceptibly from kindergarten to high school, from delinquent home to asylum, from the factory to the military. Kozol puts this very well in his rage against the school system: "The soldier at My Lai reports his inability to feel in these words: 'You feel it's not all real. It couldn't possibly be. . .' This man is six months out of public school. He is six months distant from the Glee Club, Flag Pledge, textbook, grammar-exercises, Problems of Democracy. It is essential that we be precise. It is not the U.S. Army that transforms an innocent boy into a non-comprehending automaton in six months. It is not the U.S. Army that permits a man to murder first the sense of ethics, human recognitions, in his own soul: then to be free to turn the power of his devastations outward to the eyes and forehead of another human being. Basic training does not begin in boot camp. It begins in kindergarten. It continues with a vengeance for the subsequent twelve years."[2] The body must learn to conduct itself well in all situations, and this conduct precludes feeling or comprehension of the nature of power and authority. The perfect example is the boy fresh out of a military academy, with a high I.Q., good reflexes, and a definite sense of justice, who in a few months becomes the My Lai soldier described above.

Punishing within the regime of disciplinary power does not aim at repression per se, but at *normalization*. Normalization is the new goal, the norm is the rule. What appears as all powerful is the authority of the norm. In a sense, the power of normalization constrains bodies to homogeneity; but it also individualizes by permitting measurement of distances, divergencies, levels and specialties. In a competitive disciplinary system, differences are useful. Within homogeneity as the rule, disciplinary power introduces a *useful* notion: *individual differences*. Individuality always comes down to the same thing: different bodies to be sure, but all in the service of one and the same power of docility and utility.

Exams are perfect examples of this new power. They combine techniques of hierarchy and sanctions of the norm in the form of a constant surveillance that allows the qualification and classification of an individual—healthy or sick; well-behaved or delinquent; normal or abnormal. We often speak of the ideology of the Human Sciences, but what about their technology? From psychiatry to pedagogy, from the diagnoses of illness to the hiring of help, there is a familiar procedure of examination at work which joins power relations in such a way as to select and construct knowledge. Political invasions can be deciphered in the knowledge qualified as necessary and valid

2. Jonathan Kozol, *The Night is Dark and I am Far From Home* (Boston, 1975), p. 178.

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at a given time. Medical examinations are the perfect example of this perpetual examination of bodies. This examination process links a certain *knowledge formation* to a *specific exercise of power.*

In an examination, the body must be visible at all times, situated within a web of recording processes. A whole dossier follows the body and its history from nursery school to surgeon's table to psychiatrist's couch. In other words, each body becomes a *case history* which implies a new type of power over bodies. According to Foucault, the individual is doubtless the fictional atom of an "ideological" social representation. But it is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power called "the disciplines." We must stop speaking of power in negative terms of exclusion, repression, and censorship, for power produces. It produces our reality. It produces forms of knowledge and disseminates them under strict surveillance. The individual and everything we are permitted to know about it are products of this power production. The human sciences, then, are not forms of individual liberation but essential cogs in the machinery of their mass fabrication, normalization and control.

The perfect architectural model of a disciplinary institution was drafted by Jeremy Bentham—the Panopticon. In this model the institution (which could be a school, a prison, an asylum or a factory) is to be constructed with a tower at the center surrounded by a circular building with a series of individual cells or rooms, one individual to each room. Each room would be equipped with two windows, one that lets light in from the outside—a constant reminder of one's isolation—and the other facing the tower. The tower would house a guard who could be anyone, since Bentham provided for a secret underground tunnel extending from the tower to the outside. Any passerby, any citizen at large would have the right to enter the tower to exert disciplinary rights over individuals in the cells. Isolated and separated from communication with other bodies, the body's behavior could easily be observed since it would be constantly in the view of anyone in the tower. Here, power would be no longer individualized—*it is of little importance who exercises it.* Caught within a perpetual authoritarian gaze, the body would have nowhere to move. According to Foucault, this is an architectural design of subtle coercion for a society yet to come. 1984 is implicit in Bentham's disciplinary structure. And *this is democracy*, where everyone has the right and even the duty to watch over his neighbor's conduct, to keep a close vigil over the child's sexuality, to exercise constant surveillance and recognize the need for punishment when and wherever it might occur.

Our disciplinary society is a result of major economic, juridico-political and scientific-historical processes. The disciplines are techniques to insure the ordering of human collectivities. The exercise of power is made as inexpensive as possible, and its effects are extended as far as possible; docility grows in direct proportion to utility for the penal system. This triple objective responds to a well-known historical conjunction: the enormous demographic thrust of the eighteenth century, the growth of a floating population, the increase of the groups to be controlled. One of the primary objectives of discipline is to *situate* and *relocate*—it is a procedure of *anti-nomadism*, an extensive totalization and unification to break collective social arangements. The ideal of discipline is indefinite discipline—infinite debt as Kafka termed it. "What," Foucault asks, "is so astonishing about the fact that our prisons resemble our factories, schools, military bases and hospitals—all of which in turn resemble prisons?"[3]

3. "Michel Foucault on the role of prisons," a *New York Times* editorial, August 21, 1975.

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Historically, prison "reforms" are almost contemporary with prisons themselves. In a disciplinary society, prison is viewed as a constant individual transformation. Delinquence, the minor shadow of major crimes, is viewed as a kernel of danger—a "low threshold for impulsive violence" as American psychosurgeons put it. In the most somber reaches of the justice machinery, there is a space corresponding to these kernels of potential violence where the power to punish silently organizes a field of objective research and experimentation, where it can function in full light of day as therapeutic and where the sentence is inscribed with the rest of knowledge in human sciences. Delinquence thus becomes a "catch-all" category to deal with all those who escape the strictly penal grasp of the prison.

As early as 1840 there was, curiously, a strong critique of the prisons. Allegedly, prisons do not lead to less but to more crimes; detention provokes recidivism on the part of the "wrongdoers"; they fabricate delinquents owing to the life they force those detained to lead; they facilitate the organization of a milieu of highly organized delinquents; and finally, they indirectly produce more delinquency by often causing the detained person's family to fall into financial ruin and into an atmosphere of total despair. But to this charge that prison fails to reduce crimes, as it ostensibly should—and this is the same charge levied against prisons today—Foucault argues that we should realize that prison has indeed succeeded *in producing just this field of delinquency so necessary to a disciplinary society*. For delinquency is less dangerous than crime. It is a centrally controlled marginal milieu (vice, gambling). The penality of detention still functions today, after a century and a half of dismal failures precisely because it fabricates a closed, separated, and useful space of illegalities, the best example of which is the drug ring and the personage of the petty dealer. Dealing is easy to control, and the target of crackdowns. Delinquency is an area of illegality totally controlled by the dominant powers in order to cover up the latter's own illegalities. Hence the petty dealers take the rap for the major pushers. The network of prostitution satisfies the sexual repression of the dominant men and helps, paradoxically, to keep the family intact. Delinquents, in the form of stool-pigeons, even serve as a sub-police force for disciplinary power. The hustler roams the streets freely, but he is in shackles and bound to the real manipulators, who will do him in at the slightest provocation.

In the ideal carceral institution, all of the coercive technologies of behavior are utilized: the guards in such institutions are "behavior technicians," "engineers of conduct," "orthopedic surgeons of individuality." Their ultimate goal is to make bodies shape up and jump to orders. This modeling of the body—which reaches its pinnacle in the current forms of behavior modification in the United States—provides power with a knowledge of the individual, and specifically with a knowledge of the ability of certain groups of individuals to react to oppressive situations by fighting back. These *desires against power* are the real object of research in prisons, schools, delinquency homes and asylums across the U.S. If these human, behavioral sciences succeed, that individual who is capable of fighting back will be an object of the past well before the year 1984 and even before the clock ticks orange.

A new technique of the modern "carceral archipelago" is that it no longer rejects what is unassimilable or unclassifiable. It merely takes back on the one hand what it rejects on the other by extending the number and varieties of disciplinary institutions. The lyricism of marginality sung by so many on the Left, Foucault warns, those voices that grow so excited by the notion of being outside the law, can often fail to realize

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that many of these marginal categories are produced by the system of power that they attack, and are totally controlled by power. Criminality and delinquency are perfect examples of such controlled populations.

Thanks to the carceral continuum, the agencies that condemn are included among those that control, transform, correct and "improve." In its basic function, the power to punish is thus not fundamentally different from the power to cure or to rehabilitate. The disciplinary system of power develops a way to render the mass accumulation of people docile and useful. Hence, the prison is merely a relay in a more general network of discipline and surveillance. The real problem, Foucault concludes, is not prison or no prison, but the thrust of these deployments of normalization which are most definitely on the upswing.

In analyzing disciplinary power, we see that the mechanisms of discipline are not the sole possession of what the Marxists have termed the State apparatus of power. Rather, discipline is a new strategy and a form of combat. Discipline's strategy has infiltrated our bodies throughout our institutional lives. Thus, a real, useful knowledge of how disciplinary power functions cannot be reduced to generalizations claiming that power is held by the ruling class, etc. Disciplinary power is exercised everywhere, and careful analyses of its function and scope are in order.

Finally, notions of repressive institutions that exclude, oppress, marginalize and reject are unable to describe, at the heart of our own carceral cities, these techniques and these sciences that lead to the mass *fabrication* of the disciplinary and disciplined individual. Within this centralized form of humanity, where the social sciences conduct their studies, we must cease to believe in *liberal education*, and open our ears to the rumbling and the roars of a tactical battle directed not only against all challenging forces, but all possibilities for these forces to develop.

Many critics have hitherto failed to see Foucault's own strategy in *The Order of Things*, for example, reading it as a praise to the human sciences. Where they saw objective discussion of structures one might do well to perceive the first pieces and cogs in a machine against disciplinary power and the human sciences in particular. *Surveiller et punir* leaves no doubt about Foucault's political thrust. If this latest book is compared with *The Order of Things*, we come to what Foucault is uttering over and over again: that the order of knowledge (viewed by liberal educators and students as a calm, reflective sphere), the social sciences, and the rise of new forms of humanism are intricately linked to disciplinary power. It is the logic of disciplinary power that Michel Foucault has constantly been attempting to clarify, as well as all of the ties that bind knowledge to the exercise of power.

One of the fundamental differences between Foucault and people who call for a liberation of Man, of the body, of desire, is that for Foucault the body, its desires and sexual forces are all shaped by the exercise of power that produces individuals. Hence, to "liberate" these forces would be to liberate the most disciplined, corrupted and potentially fascist forces imaginable. For Foucault, the problem is not one of *liberation* just as the nature of power is not that of *repression*. Rather, it is a matter of producing different kinds of body relations against those formed by discplinary power, experimenting with sexuality; *not liberating the body but using it as the site for a struggle against the power that enslaves us.*

Foucault concludes his introductory preface to *Surveiller et punir* stating that it was current history, and especially the history of the prison rebellions of the last several years, which taught him that punishment and prison grew up on the same budding

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ground of a new technology of power. Having entered into an age of penal moderation where power is more diffuse but all the more effective for that very reason, where what Jessica Mitford terms "kind and usual punishment" is the form taken by power, Foucault suggests an area of research and political activity for the politicized individual who holds no illusions about "apolitical knowledge," i.e., research into our penal colony: "the role of this intellectual is to struggle against the forms of power in relation to which he is both the object and the instrument: within the domains of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'consciousness,' and 'discourse'."

In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche made a comment about his own analyses which applies directly to Foucault's radical theoretical work: "Everything that has hitherto been called 'truth' has been recognized as the most harmful, insidious, and subterranean form of lie; the holy pretext of 'improving' mankind, as the ruse for sucking the blood of life itself. Morality as vampirism."

Mark Seem

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4. Deleuze and Foucault, "The Intellectuals and Power," *Telos*, 16 (Summer 1973), pp. 103-109.

5. F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, edited with an Introduction by Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1969), p. 334.

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS:

ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES, No. 4 (July 1975)

54, Blvd. Raspail, Paris. 60F. PIERRE BORDIEU, LUC BOLTANSKI, *"Le fétichisme de la langue et l'illusion du communisme linguistique."* Argues that grammaticality is linguistic's mask for the social conditions of "genuine" language competence. Bordieu criticizes the notions of "linguistic community" and of "langue" as symptomatic of linguistics' "amnesia" of the social conditions of the genesis of language and its capitulation to the official language's domination. He then carefully examines the processes of the unification of the "linguistic market" and the reproduction of the structure of distribution of capitalist culture by "linguistic ideology." YVETTE DELSAUT, *"L'économie du langage populaire."* Aims to render the problems of transcription of the logic, at first glance illogical, of popular speech apparent by interviewing a 61-year-old, semi-literate female factory worker so as to manifest the literary quality of discourse without value on the literary market. The second section of the article correlates the structure and appropriation of domestic space with the organization of language among the working class. JEAN-CLAUDE CHAMBOREDON, *"Marché de la littérature et stratégies intellectuelles dans le champs littéraire."* Criticizes the modern cult of the literary work (semiology) and mechanistic "quantitativisme" (of the production of literature and morphology of the producers) as positivist or elitist sociology of literature. Affirms the study of the mediated relationship between the evolution of economic markets and the activities of writers (their careers and literary techniques) as central to understanding the construction of the literary object. CHRISTOPHE CHARLE, *"L'expansion et la crise de la production littéraire (ée moitié du 19e siècle)."* A well-documented study examining the crisis of overproduction in the French literary market toward the end of the 1880s and throughout the 1890s. Charle interprets late 19th century literary and ideological movements in light of his findings which are particularly revealing for the evolution of literary genres. REMY PONTON, *"Naissance du roman psychologique: Capital culturel, capital social et stratégie littéraire à la fin du 19e siècle."* Studies the psychological novelists' reaction to the naturalists during the 1880s and 1890s. CLAUDE GRIGNON, *"Le paysan inclassable."* Examines how the relations of domination pit the farmer against his labor, his products, his time and himself. JEANNINE VERDES-LEROUX, *"Le patronage philosophique."* Argues that the apolitical character and image of technical competence presented at the congresses of the National Association of Social Workers (ANAS) masks a Catholic ideology which substitutes Love for God and makes social workers its agents. MICHEL VILLETTE, *"L'accès aux positions dominantes dans l'entreprise."* Looks at the "conversion of social capital into competence" in cases of the accession of sons of industrial families to inherited positions.

ARENA, No. 41 (1976)

Box 36, P.O. Greensborough, Victoria 3088, Australia. A16 for 4 issues. *"Editorial: A Beleagurered Ruling Class?"* Some theses on the Australian parliamentary crisis of late 1975. ALAN ROBERTS, *"The Politics of Nuclear Power."* An insightful and critical survey by a physicist of a recent controversy surrounding nuclear power. The historical import of the nuclear power program is seen to derive from the current plight of capitalist consumerism heading inexorably toward the destruction of the environment. Roberts' argument is premised on the view that the orthodox base-superstructure model is blind to the political content of the current form of technical rationality. JOHN DOCKER, *"A Study in Context: And the Dead are Many."* A critique of Frank Hardy's latest novel, *But the Dead are Many*. IAN HENDERSON, *"Changing Science and Society."* An extended review of Brian Easlea's recent (neo-Marcusean) work on the natural sciences. ROSEMARY PRINGLE, ANN GAME, *"Labor in Power: The Feminist Response."* A discussion of the present state of the Australian feminist movement, and an injunction against the real possibility of this important movement lapsing into a reactionary and unthinking sisterhood mysticism. HUMPHREY McQUEEN, *"Poor Fellow My Country."* JEAN CURTHOYS, *"Damned Whores and God's Police."* A critique of a recent work on Australian women which assumes one theory popular in the women's movement, viz., that women constitute a homogeneous structural group by virtue of their common position in the family. NONIE SHARP, *"On the Politics of Ignorance: Notes on the Colonial Mentality."* Argues that reaction to domination is not necessarily expressed in terms which allow those in the dominant culture to gain insight into themselves. In relations between Papua New Guineans and white Australians, the latter would need to cast off the central core of an ideology of instrumental rationality which functions as a blinder.

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DAS ARGUMENT, No. 97

1 Berlin 33, Altensteinstrasse 48a, West Germany. FRIEDRICH TOMBERG, *"Von der 'Kritischen Theorie' zur wissenschaftlichen Weltanschauung."* Another attempt to resurrect the notion of the scientific character of Marxism. Tomberg, one of the editors of *Das Argument*, poses the problem of the deficiencies of Critical Theory within the rigid framework of idealism and so-called dialectical materialism. Using Alfred Schmidt's writings as symptomatic of the criticized tradition, Tomberg insists that the mode of materialist thinking which he finds in Schmidt's work lacks the scientific rigor of the founding fathers and that the poverty of Critical Theory is manifested in its insufficient commitment to the notion of 'the matter being independent of consciousness.' Tomberg's method of discussion consists in a search for statements in which Schmidt, although granting the objective reality its independence, cannot get rid of this critical habit of burdening the immaculate with 'buts' and 'howevers.' Thus, according to Tomberg, the radical, i.e., scientific aspirations of materialism are being compromised. Regardless of the philosophical implications of Tomberg's position it is more than obvious that his real point of departure is not materialist metaphysics but his concern with the relationship of the intellectuals toward the working class. It is due to such a concern that he charges the critical theorists for assuming the attitude of 'bios theoretikos,' which, according to Tomberg, renders Critical Theory incapable of having a radical understanding of objective reality. Knowing nothing but the contradictions of extreme opposites and thereby reducing thought to the level of 'choose or perish,' Tomberg presents us with the alternative of either accepting "the knowledge of the objective laws of nature, of society and of thought or denunciation and protest." The poor quality of the article can also be seen in the literal non-existence of arguments on behalf of the "scientific worldview." By using platitudes from the 'treasures' of Marxism-Leninism, the author does not feel compelled to justify or even to explain them. Unfortunately, a second part of the article, dealing with the writings of W.F. Haug, will follow in the next issue of *Das Argument*. The following articles belong to an ongoing section on "Sexuality and Domination." ERNEST BORNEMAN, *"Geld im Patriarchat."* Through a critique of Horst Kurnitzky's writings, Borneman discusses a range of psychoanalytic concepts and their relevance for the anthropological analysis of the roots of patriarchal domination and its importance for the understanding of money. Borneman postulates that Kurnitzky unjustifiably generalizes the modern relations of sexual domination and employs them regressively to establish an explanatory paradigm for the understanding of the past. Borneman objects to such conclusions because of the disregard for those primitive forms of social interaction that lacked patriarchal domination. KLAUS OTTOMEYER, *"Zur Diskussion um das Patriarchat."* A critique of Borneman's book, *Das Patriarchat. Ueber Ursprung und Ziel unseres Gesellschaftssystems* (1975). The book's importance lies in its attempt to continue where Engels' *On the Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* left off. Ottomeyer's major objections pertain to Borneman's use of simple dichotomies in his treatment of sexual inequality. Having located the main line of demarcation between the types of *Matrismus* and *Patrismus*, Borneman attributes positive and negative values, respectively, to these two typologies and ultimately postulates the necessity of abolishing such phenomena as menstruation and pregnancy. Ottomeyer argues that this implies a technologistic concept of progress coupled with a naive belief in the unlimited plasticity of mankind.

CRITIQUE, No. 4 (Spring 1976)

31 Clevedon Road, Glasgow G12 OPH, Scotland. $4 per year; $2 per copy. MICHAEL LOWY, *"From the Logic of Hegel to the Finland Station in Petrograd."* Adding nothing new to our understanding of the changes in Lenin's thought after his break with the Second International, Lowy continues to insist that Lenin's reading of Hegel's *Logic* enabled Lenin to more deeply understand the subtlety of the 'concrete analysis of a concrete situation.' The author's attempt to relate Lenin's knowledge of Hegel to his performance as a revolutionary is based more on insinuation than the ability to show how thought mediates political action as well as itself. HILLEL TICKTIN, *"The Contradictions of Soviet Society and Professor Bettelheim."* Through a critique of Bettelheim's Stalinist appraisal of the Soviet Union, Ticktin describes the paradoxes inherent in the Soviet *economic* system. He pays special attention to the problematic of mechanization which, in the Soviet context, leads "to disruptions of production, an unmechanized auxiliary sector, underemployment, slack norms, and a consequent difficulty in any mechanization." Given the participatory demands of highly automated production processes coupled with administrative political pressures that result in the atomization of social interaction, the Soviet economy is in a crisis which makes a technologistic vision of progress in the Soviet

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Union obsolete. The article also contains an interesting discussion of key Marxist economic notions such as the law of value, surplus-production or the character of labor power, and their relevance for the analysis of the Soviet system. FRANK S. GALASSI, *"Surviving as a Satirist in the Soviet Union: 'The Master and Margarita' by Mikhail A. Bulgakow."* Short, interesting note where Galassi reveals much insight into the nature of satire especially as it developed in the oppressie setting of the Soviet Union. GEOFFREY KAY, *"The Falling Rate of Profit, Unemployment and Crisis."* Kay objects to conventional interpretations of the theory of the falling rate of profit as lending any justification to the various break-down conceptions of capitalism. He rightly claims that even if the falling rate of profit were to have an impact on capitalist crisis, it would "not be a result of a predetermined logical necessity," pointing out that the same break-down conceptions of capitalism relegate the working class to the status of a passive object. Kay, however, does not mention the possibility that there could be something wrong with so-called objective accounts of class, which indicates that he has not entirely overcome orthodoxy on his part. SCOTT MEIKLE, *"Dialectics and Cognition."* A short critique of Ruben's attempt to positivize Marxist epistemology (*Critique* No. 4). Meikle tries to show that Ruben's problems stems from his inability to free himself from the individualism of empiricist epistemology. Instead Meikle offers the 'genuine' Marxist solution which establishes the problematic of cognition in the processual paradigm of approximation, thereby making obsolete Ruben's demand for the pure datum. Meikle's insistence on the hierarchical relationship between abstract and concrete is, despite all attempts to show these two moments to be engaged in a dialectical interplay, still caught in the systematic framework of rationalism with all of its demands for subordination and consistency. Thus, as is common among the 'true' Marxists, the notion of mediation is rigidly defined as the search for the key to 'the last instance' and not as the possibility of analyzing the multidimensional structure of the world in which the quest for the solidarity of autonomous moments is the essence of emancipation.

GERMAN POLITICAL STUDIES, I (1974)

44 Hatton Garden, London EC1, England. NIKLAS LUHMANN, *"Sociology of Political Systems."* Argues that structural differentiation and growing autonomy of the political system make possible its 'functional specification'; moreover, this process in which power becomes reflexive increases the 'communication capacity' of the state and therewith the possibility of its reproduction at higher levels of social complexity. Systems theory ideology at its best. CLAUS OFFE, *"Structural Problems of the Capitalist State."* A critique of Luhmann and Marxist theories of the late capitalist state is introduced via consideration of a crucial question: How can it be shown that this system of political institutions displays its own class-specific selectivity corresponding to the interests of the accumulation of capital? It is argued that the structural problem of the late capitalist state is that it must simultaneously practice its class character and keep it concealed. DIETER SENGHAAS, *"Towards an Analysis of Threat Policy in International Relations."* JOACHIM HIRSCH, *"Scientific-Technical Progress and the Political System."* Science and technology policy is discussed so as to reveal the change of state functions in late capitalism. The 'partnership' between 'science,' 'state,' and 'business' is no more than an ideological veil for the predominance of administrative-captialist interests, unless it is organized and practiced by the immediate producers in science and the economy themselves. Democratic politics of science in late capitalism signifies a contradiction that can be resolved only by making it conscious and developing it concretely. All 'reform measures' have to be geared toward this goal. ROLF-RICHARD GRAUHAN, *et al.*, *"Policy Analysis Illustrated by the Problem of Urbanization."* A discussion of the conflicts between citizen's groups and local administrative machinery. JUERGEN DITTBERNER, *"The Role of the Party Congress in the Inner Party Process of Policy Making."* OTWIN MASSING, *"The Federal Constitutional Court as an Instrument of Social Control."* Argues that the activities of the constitutional court not only reduce the threshold of conflict and the threat of latent conflicts to a bearable level by making decisions; they also tend to guarantee the 'efficiency' of the state by helping prevent its delegitimation. KLAUS VON BEYME, *"Bibliographical Essay on the State of Research in Political Science in the F.R.G."*

HECATE, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January, 1976)

G.P.O. Box 99, St. Lucia, Queensland 4067, Australia. US $4 per year. *"Editorial."* The editors condemn existing tendencies in women's studies programs—limited as they are to simple amalgamations of traditional disciplines—as subversive and ultimately detrimental to women's

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liberation, no longer representing radical departures from conventional scholarship and pedagogy. CLAIRE WILLIAMS, *"Working Class Women in an Australian Mining Town."* A comparative study of the political consciousness and avenues for political development open to both full-time housewives and women in paid employment; specifically, whether paid employment outside the home leads women to reject their social subordination as a result of financial autonomy, membership in work groups, and the ensuing inevitable demand for spouses to share responsibilities for home and children. Williams concludes that paid employment holds more potential than housework in the development of a consciousness of class and sex oppression, primarily because of the housewife's isolation. SUSAN GARDNER, *"Dora and Nadja: Two Women in the Early Days of Psychoanalysis and Surrealism."* The key roles played by these two women in the works of Freud and Breton are discussed by a feminist critic who sets out to explore and demystify certain notions—such as *femme-enfant* and *amour fou*—which constitute key elements of psychoanalysis and surrealism. LINDA GORDON, *"Race Suicide and the Feminist Response—Part II."* A declining birth rate and a large influx of immigrants at the turn of the century in the U.S. initiated an ideological battle around the notion of "race suicide." Attributed alternately to feminism and economic factors by ideologies of the period, the author argues that both were involved in the falling birth rate and that, moreover, the rise of feminism itself was in part the result of smaller family size, not *vice versa*. plus book reviews, poetry, short stories.

THE MINNESOTA REVIEW, No. 6 (Spring 1976)

Box 211, Bloomington, Indiana 47401. $2 per issue; $3.50 per year (two issues). Special Supplement: "Marxism and Utopia." The ninety-page supplement follows fifty pages of literature containing, among other things, *The Horatian* by Heiner Müller. Prepared by Jameson's Marxist Literary Group at San Diego, the contributions are of uneven quality and only loosely unified by the common theme of utopia. Nevertheless, some of the material is highly rewarding. FREDRIC JAMESON, *"Introduction-Prospectus: To Reconsider the Relationship of Marxism to Utopian Thought."* The one-sided Marxian notion of "false consciousness" embodied in the critique of ideology is shown to be in need of concrete suggestions, viz., the preservation of utopia; hence the focus of this issue. DARKO SUVIN, *"'Utopian' and 'Scientific': Two Attributes for Socialism from Engels."* An examination of the above-named notions in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, informed by Suvin's own structuralist critical method. LOUIS MARIN, *"Theses on Ideology and Utopia."* Three theses and their implications are concisely explicated: utopia is an ideological critique of ideology; utopian *practice* is a preface to a theory of praxis; utopian discourse is peculiar to capitalism. Though strictly Marxist, this article is packed with seminal statements. MARK POSTER, *"Fourier's Concept of the Group."* This affirmation of Fourier's importance to Marx as well as the New Left focuses on Fourier's penetrating critique of bourgeois interpersonal relations, with its emphasis on creative group activity as a basis for the overcoming of reified subjectivity. STEPHEN ERIC BRONNER, *"Revolutionary Anticipation and Tradition: In Honor of Ernst Bloch's 90th Birthday."* Bronner's sympathetic presentation of Bloch's inquiry into utopia emphasizes the constructive nature of his contribution to Marxism. JOST HERMAND, *"Brecht on Utopia."* Despite his pragmatic materialism, Brecht is shown to have implicitly articulated a utopian vision in his work, that of "Great Production" as a joyful, creative human end. Competent textual exegesis, but perhaps a bit forced. JEAN PFAELZER, *"American Utopian Fiction 1886-1896: The Political Origins of Form."* A militant article that sees the flood of American utopian novels in the decade in question as a response to the militant struggles of labor, farmers, and women. Claims that all utopias were written by and for bourgeois intellectuals, and could not bring about social change because they did not address the actual victims of social injustice. PAUL BUHLE, *"Dystopia as Utopia: Howard Phillips Lovecraft and the Unknown Content of American Horror Literature."* In one of the highlights of this collection, Buhle provocatively (if hazardously) legitimates explicit awareness of the "dark side" of the dialectic as necessary to counteract the one-sided optimism of rationalistic Marxism. In literature, horror calls into question the fundamental beliefs of Western civilization; an example is Lovecraft's horror fantasy, which develops a critique of twentieth century scientific progress. SERAFINA BATHRICK, *"The Past as Future: Family and the American home in 'Meet Me in St. Louis'."* Ideology-critique, arguing that the 1944 musical film met the need for unity in war-weary American society by showing how the bourgeois family could restore in the private sphere what was otherwise threatened by the onslaught of capitalist technology.

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NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, No. 8 (Spring 1976)

German Department, Box 413, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201. $6 per year. ROB BURNS, *"West German Intellectuals and Ideology."* The first of three articles on the situation of intellectuals in contemporary West Germany establishes the general framework for the discussion by arguing that a recent change has occurred in the role of the intellectuals, from expressing the interests of the dominant class in an affirmation of social democracy, to a more critical stance. WOLF-DIETER NARR, *"Threats to Constitutional Freedoms in West Germany."* The current situation is seen as authoritarian, anti-liberal and alarming, especially for radical intellectuals. The author sees the answer in a rather flabby "militant liberalism." JUERGEN SEIFERT, *"Defining the Enemy of the State: Political Policies of West Germany."* The situation of 'permanent emergency' described in the previous article is further explored; it is shown that "enemy of the state" is defined according to specific domestic and foreign political factors. MORTON SCHOOLMAN, *"Marcuse's Aesthetics and the Displacement of Critical Theory."* Unenlightening summary of the aesthetic notions from "The Affirmative Character of Culture" to *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, focusing on the way art provides a critical "second dimension" through the portrayal of images of non-repressed Eros. HELEN FEHERVARY, *"Enlightenment or Entanglement: History and Aesthetics in Bertolt Brecht and Heiner Müller."* The first of four items on Müller's drama (see also the summary of *Minnesota Review* above) gives a cursory treatment to Brecht, arguing that his Enlightenment rationalism partakes of an outdated abstract totality. In contrast, Müller's more recent work is said to reflect the revolutionary concerns of the post-war GDR in a dialectical preservation and continuation of Brecht's use of the theater for theoretical inquiry and political practice. Though a bit unfair to Brecht, this thesis is demonstrated quite effectively through a substantial analysis which juxtaposes Müller's main plays to those of Brecht. DAVID BATHRICK, ANDREAS HUYSSEN, *"Producing Revolution: Heiner Müller's 'Mauser' as Learning Play."* This interpretative introduction to Müller's play utilizes the same method as the previous article: the contrast between Brecht's learning play *The Measures Taken* and Müller's *Mauser* shows how Müller continues the tradition of revolutionary and self-critical drama by exploring the problem of instrumental reason in Leninist practice. HEINER MUELLER, *"Mauser."* The play examining the perpetuation of reified ends-means rationality in radical practice is presented with German and English texts on opposite pages. BETTY NANCE WEBER, *"Report: 'Mauser' in Austin, Texas."* A chronicle of the production (by an all-woman cast) and reception of the above play which shows the problems involved in presenting a learning play intended for self-inquiry to a large audience interested in a spooon-fed "message." Book reviews include Rabinbach on Poulantzas, Piccone on Gouldner, and Jones on neo-Marxist aesthetics.

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 97 (May-June, 1976)

7 Carlisle Street, London W1V 6NL, England. $16 per year. ROBIN BLACKBURN, *"Marxism: Theory of Proletarian Revolution."* An unoriginal repetition of the development of Marx's political concerns, claiming that the theory of proletarian revolution, and not philosophy or economics, is the decisive theoeretical contribution of Marxism. JAMES PETRAS, ROBERT RHODES, *"The Reconsolidation of U.S. Hegemony."* Excellent political analysis which argues that the recent apparent downturn in U.S. world influence is not the result of any global challenge to the basic structure of U.S. domination, but rather masks the resurgence of U.S. economic and political power in world affairs. See also *Telos* 28. DAVID WILSON, *"Living in My Time: The General Strike."* This is the first of a series of NLR articles attempting to reconstitute key episodes of twentieth-century radical history through memories of those who took part in them. Here are extracts from Wilson's autobiography, *Living in My Time*, concerning the 1926 national strike and the 1931 backlash. *"Simone de Beauvoir Questions Jean-Paul Sartre."* A short but interesting interview focusing on feminist issues.

POLITICAL STUDIES, No. 24 (March, 1976)

Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, NW10 ODD, England. $10.50 per issue. Special Issue: "Marx and Marx Studies." Some good and not-so-good articles on various questions of interest in Hegelian Marxist interpretation put together by Terrell Carver and Paul Thomas. Especially valuable is the book review section devoted to recent works of Marxology. PAUL THOMAS, *"Marx and Science."* Develops the notion that Marx's revolutionary concept of science is different from what is usually understood by "scientific socialism." HEINZ LUBASZ, *"Marx's Initial Problematic: The Problem of Poverty."* The thesis that Marx's initial starting

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point was philosophical is challenged in an analysis of two articles from the *Rheinische Zeitung* (1842-43) which asserts that the real origin of Marx's thought lies in his concerns with concrete, material poverty. Big deal. JOSEPH O'MALLEY, *"Marx's 'Economics' and Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right': An Essay on Marx's Hegelianism."* A concise exposition of the three dimensions of Marx's original plan for a six-part "Economics": (1) the materialist conception of society and polity; (2) the "scientifically correct" method of theoretical exposition; and (3) the critical counterpart to the treatise on "Ethical Life" in *The Philosophy of Right*. TERRELL CARVER, *"Marx—and Hegel's 'Logic'."* An examination of Marx's use of Hegel's *Logic* in the *Grundrisse*, followed by an interpretation of the "Afterword" to *Capital* which focuses on the dialectic. This article further demonstrates the need to establish concretely the nature of Marx's theoretical relationship to Hegel. GILLIAN ROSE, *"How Is Critical Theory Possible? Theodor W. Adorno and Concept Formation in Sociology."* Another empty, "trendy" article on Adorno. The problem of forming a critical social theory in the face of reified concepts and objects, and the ever-present danger of dependence on a concept of totality is emphasized in an inadequte summary which relies heavily on a handful of Adorno's sociological articles abstracted from their larger philosophical context.

POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1975)

Geron-X, Inc., Box 1108, Los Altos, CA 94022. $9.50 for 4 issues. EHUD SPRINZAK, *"Marx's Historical Conception of Ideology and Science."* Reviewing several contemporary commentators on Marx, this paper demonstrates that Marx did not use the term ideology in only a derogatory sense, and that he did not contrast it with a special conception of science. It is further argued that rather than having an exclusive conception of science, Marx developed an historical approach to the scientific method neither limited to his own teaching nor unacceptable to modern philosophers of science. WALTER GOLDFRANK, *"World System, State Structure, and the Onset of the Mexican Revolution."* In approaching the questions of long-term continuity and revolution in the modernizing world, three discrete and often complementary theoretical tendencies are examined. The effects of capitalism in the countryside, the world system as a whole, and the role of the state and the contention for state power are analyzed in an attempt to clarify the terminological confusion prevalent in most discussions of the regime of Porfirio Diaz. CAROLE PATEMAN, *"Sublimation and Reification: Locke, Wolin and the Liberal Democratic Conception of the Political."* Discussion Sheldon Wolin's *Politics and Vision*, which claims that the development of liberalism saw the loss or sublimation of a distinctive conception of the political as a sphere concerned with what is common to a society, this essay examines two completely opposed arguments—the sublimation and reification theories—about the appropriate characterization of the liberal-democratic conception of the political. Interpreting Locke in a much different way, the author goes on to argue that Locke saw a limited, representative government, that is, an embryonic liberal-democratic state, as the only proper political government. Both Locke's theory and his liberal-democratic successors are understood to have developed a reified conception of the political derived from the "fiction of citizenship." MICHELE J. SHOVER, *"Roles and Images of Women in World War I Propaganda."* Government policy which recognizes innate feminine nature and government policy which manipulates and reinforces sexual roles are examined in light of World War I poster art. This art is considered to be a propaganda medium which was used to generate public support for war policy, specifically as such poster art employed images of women. GRENVILLE WALL, *"The Concept of Interest in Politics."* The connection and ideological significance of the relation between the concepts of interest and choice and the question of the objectivity and universality of interests are analyzed.

RADICAL AMERICA, Vol. 10, No. 3 (May-June, 1976)

P.O. Box BN, Cambridge, MA 02140. $8 for 4 issues. RUSSELL JACOBY, *"Stalinism and China."* Excerpted from a longer essay, "Stalin, Marxism-Leninism and the Left," this article explores some aspects of the relationship of the Chinese to the Russian Revolution, Maoism to Stalinism. The divergence of the Chinese Revolution and Maoism from the Russian model is examined in three areas: (1) the role of peasants; (2) political organization; (3) economic organization and industrialization. Jacoby argues that the defense of Stalin by the Chinese is largely tactical as part of their struggle with the current leaders of the Soviet Union. In fact, successful Chinese policies have been different from those of Stalin. LINDA ALBAND, STEVE REES, DENNI WOODMANSEE, *"The G.I. Movement Today: The Volunteer Armed Forces*

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and Movement in the Ranks." Tracing the origins and growth of the volunteer army and the emergence of a new kind of G.I. movement within the ranks, this essay examines the possibilities for both union organizing and political work within the armed forces today. ANNE BOBROFF, *"The Bolsheviks and Working Women, 1905-1920."* Shows that the women of pre-revolutionary Russia were very militant and created a wide variety of organizations to serve their needs. The Bolsheviks in fact lagged behind these women, rather than led them, and party men attempted to manipulate the women's militancy for pre-determined party aims, while suppressing autonomous women's organizations and their initiative in defining their own goals. Bobroff suggests that these Bolshevik policies reflected not only sexist attitudes but also the overall hierarchical organization of the party.

RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 14 (Summer 1976)

40 Langdon Park Road, London N6 5QG. $7.50 for 3 issues. RICHARD NORMAN, *"On Dialectic."* Traces the Hegelian origins of the dialectic. The concern is to distinguish between the "conceptual" dialectic of Hegel and the "temporal" or "empirical" dialectic which Engels and other Marxists have sought to retain. SEAN SAYERS, *"The Marxist Dialectic."* Relying primarily on the classic presentation of dialectical materialism implicit in Marx's writings and explicitly formulated by Engels, Lenin and Mao, this paper defends the dialectical outlook as a means to express truths of fundamental philosophical importance. JONATHAN REE, *"Philosophy in China: What Can We Learn From It?"* Within the context of the predominant Western discussions of China, this essay raises doubts about how much can be learned from philosophy in China. Beginning with a critique of K.T. Fann's *The Making of the New Human Being in the People's Republic of China*, Ree investigates the use of philosophy in mass campaigns of ideological education, the meaning and use of the canonical texts of Chinese philosophy (i.e., chiefly a few articles by Mao), and philosophy as an academic subject.

RADICAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, No. 4 (1976)

9 Poland Street, London WIV 3DG, England. L1.75 for 3 issues. *"Editorial."* Argues for a radical critique of science and technology within capitalism. In particular, it is time to emphasize links between the practice of science and the lived experience and struggle of the working class. SIMON PICKVANCE, *" 'Life' in a Biology Lab."* Under capitalism science is largely determined by the relations of capitalist production. Here the biologist is viewed as a worker, his product a commodity and the ideological content of biology is preliminarily discussed. LUKE HIDGKIN, *"Politics and Physical Sciences."* Strongly questions the independence of science from social and political relations. Examines and attempts to clarify the relationship of science to ideology, social institutions and relations of production. CHARLES CLUTTERBUCK, *"Death in the Plastics Industry."* Health hazards of vinyl chloride is taken as an indication of management irresponsibility in private industry. Reviews of books by Braverman and Dickson.

THE SECOND WAVE, Vol. 4, No. 3

Box 344, Cambridge A, Cambridge, MA 02139. $4 per year. ADRIENNE RICH, *"Anger and Tenderness."* Motherhood as experience and institution. PEGGY KORNEGGER, *"The Spirituality Ripoff."* A critique of various spiritual cults that espouse traditional patriarchal values (anti-homosexual, anti-feminist, etc.) as a solution to personal *angst* and which have become popular as a result of the prevalent desire for "one final solution," the separation of being from becoming, the split between product and process. The turn to spiritualism is described as simply the other side of the perverse preoccupation with changing the material world first: 'being determines consciousness' is inverted to 'consciousness determines being.' FRAN TAYLOR, *"The Tangled Question of Violence."* The problem is how to fight back without responding abominably to abominable crimes. Delineates the various responses to violence against women, ranging from retaliation, through support of existing institutional repression in order to protect women, to non-violence. Delineates theories of violence ranging from innate male hormonal imbalance to a view of violence as institutional and economic and therefore unrelated to individual men. Justifiably inconclusive. Plus poetry, book reviews, short stories.

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, Vol. 1, No. 2

University of Chicago Press, 11030 Langley Ave., Chicago, IL 60628. $12 per year ($9.60 for students). *"Editorial."* Commits the journal to an admittedly pluralistic stance according to which "energetic diversities" have the highest "intellectual value." GERTRUDE LENZER, *"On*

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Masochism: A Contribution to the History of a Fantasy and Its Theory." The early history of the concepts "masochism" and "sadomasochism"—Sacher-Masoch's literature in particular—manifests fetishisms, a mother fixation, a fear of castration, and contradictory fantasies about women which, Lenzer suggests, were generalized in Germany during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. MARNIE W. MUELLER, *"Economic Determinants of Volunteer Work by Women."* Mueller conducts a regression analysis of data collected during a 1963 survey of women who had done graduate or professional work at Columbia between 1945 and 1951. She concludes that volunteer organizations will continue to provide one of the few channels open to women for job training. HARRIET HAWKINS, *"The Victim's Side: Chaucer's* Clerk's Tale *and Webster's* Duchess of Malfi." Argues that there exist two contradictory interpretations of the texts in question, the allegorical and the sociocritical. Dubious appeal to the "reader's common sense" as opposed to "scholarly prejudices" in order to judge fiction of the past on the basis of personal experience of the present world. SUZANNE E. ESTLER, *"Women as Leaders in Public Education."* A comprehensive overview of the central questions, available data and literature, and explanatory models pertaining to women's roles, salaries, and mobility within the hierarchy of the educational system. WILLIAM J. BREMNER, DAVID M. DE KRETSER, *"Contraceptives for Males."* The authors attempt to explain the discrepancy between the amount of research on female contraception and male contraception. INEZ SMITH REID, *"Science, Politics, and Race."* Criticizes the irresponsibility of scientists, politicians and the media in regard to generalizations about the health and intelligence of blacks. SUSAN HUSSERL-KAPIT, *"An Interview with Marguerite Duras."* Duras comments lucidly on the "inverted world" of males and females in her novels and movies in which it is the men who follow women's voices and acts. She explains the "direct" (i.e., unmediated by analysis or manipulation) essential "power" of females as "organic intelligence." Reviews trends in literary criticism, selected authors, and feminist literary history. While criticizing the tendencies of feminist "ideology" (loosely summarized as "criticism of life" beginning from individual experience and emotion) to overshadow methodology, Showalter herself offers little more. BARBARA SICHERMAN, *"American History."* Reviews literature that attempts to reconstruct women's historical experience. CHRISTINE PIERCE, *"Philosophy."* Review essay touching on work in philosophy and public policy, political philosophy, feminist critiques of the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy, and textbooks. GLORIA FEMAN ORENSTEIN, *"Art History."* Review essay. SUSAN MOSHER STUARD, *"Dame Trot."* On the controversy surrounding Dame Trotula of Salerno, an eleventh-century woman, reputably a physician and professor, who entered popular literature, including Chaucer and Ruteboeuf, as "Dame Trot." VILMA R. HUNT, *"Reproduction and Work."* On the effects of work on women's health and the possible reasons for the lack of available information. DACIA MARAINI, *"Report from Italy."* On the state of women's studies, publications and work in Italy. LINDA GORDON, *"A Socialist View of Women's Studies: A Reply to the Editorial, Volume 1, Number 1."* Clearly defines the function of women's studies, distinct from but yet a product of the women's liberation movement, as "the political critique of the whole structure" of our male-dominated society and culture. ANN ELLIS HANSON, *"Hippocrates: Diseases of Women I."* Commentary and translation.

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1976)

New School for Social Research, 66 West 12th STreet, New York, NY 10011. $12 per year. ALFRED G. MEYER, *"The Aufhebung of Marxism."* Orthodox Marxism is here seen as the last great bourgeois ideology, now preoccupied with such nineteenth-century goals as the accumulation of capital and power. JOEL KOVEL, *"The Marxist View of Man and Psychoanalysis."* A treatment of the (possible) homologies between Marxism and psychoanalysis and the need for a reconstituted Marxism into which would be built some psychoanalytic insights. RICHARD LOWENTHAL, *"Social Transformation and Democratic Legitimacy."* An extended, sometimes misguided, discussion of Habermas' theory of legitimation problems in late capitalism. Habermas is accused of championing the inevitability of crises, while Weber's 'irreducible plurality of values' is once more resurrected. HORST MEWES, *"On the Concept of Politics in the Early Work of Karl Marx."* CARL LANDAUER, *"Recent German Literature on Gemeinwirtschaft."* ANTHONY GIDDENS, *"Functionalism: Après la lutte."* CARL F. GRAUMANN, *"Modification by Migration: Vicissitudes of Cross-National Communication."*

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LES TEMPS MODERNES, No. 356 (March, 1976)

26, rue de Condé, Paris 6e. 14 F per issue. J. CHATELAIN, *"Les Luttes de Classes au Portugal."* Analyzes the political struggles in Portugal from the fall of the fascist regime to the defeat of the mass movement in November 1975. Useful dissection of AFM factions, and a trenchant critique of both the 'established' left parties (the socialists and communists) with their counter-revolutionary politics, and of the sectarian revolutionary left who failed to provide an alternate strategy. Chatelain, however, provides no clue as to the requirements of an adequate strategic perspective. JEAN ROSIO, *"Quelques Reflexions sur le 'Materialism' Althusserien."* Yet another critique of Althusser—this time from a quasi-Hegelian, quasi-Maoist perspective. Rosio pursues two principal lines of attack; first, an assault on the Althusserian notion of the specificity of theoretical practice (behind which he sees lurking a defense of the productive utility of the Academy) as a relapse into the idealist posture for which Marx himself criticized Hegel; and secondly the Althusserian concept of a social formation as a complex-totality of quasi-autonomous 'instances' (theoretico-ideological, politico-juridical, economic) which Rosio argues is designed to justify the CP practice of pursuing a dichotomized economist practice at the point of production and an electoralist practice in the field of politics. CHARLES-ANDRE JULIEN, *"Un épisode de la lutte pour l'indépendence tunisienne."* JULIETTE BESSIS, *"Une Diatribe qui éclaire l'histoire." "Une Interview inedite de Salah Ben Youssef."* A 1956 interview with one of the leaders of the Tunisian independence movement, with background articles. ANNIE MIGNERD, *"Propos élémentaires sur la Prostitution."* The French, English, and American prostitutes' movements are subjected to a withering scrutiny. Prostitution is not seen as a "job like any other" and as such must be abolished rather than legalized. JEAN-CLAUDE MATERAL, *"Peut-on porter de maladie mentale?"* A sympathetic critique of anti-psychiatry for its tendency to reduce the phenomenon of madness to the level of a problem in social communication and for its elimination of the category of "sickness." Based on a Lacanian perspective, Maleral argues that attention should be focused on the question of normality vs. pathology. FRANCOIS ROUSTANG, *"La Visibilité est un piège."* Review of Foucault's *Surveiller et punir.*

LES TEMPS MODERNES, No. 357 (April, 1976)

ANDRE GRANON, *"Les six cents jours de Giscard (I)."* First half of a two-part article ('Gorzian' in tone) assessing the French economic and political situation after two years of Giscard d'Estaing as president. Shows how the current economic crisis in France and the austerity measures introduced by the regime to combat it afford finance capital the opportunity to effect an economic reorganization. Criticizes the socialists' and communists' responses to the crisis as failing to break with the magic of growth or to challenge to existing division of labor. Special Section on Corsica. JEANETTE COLOMBEL, *"A l'écoute de la Corse."* CHARLES SANTONI, *"Les masques du discours politique en Corse."* STEPHANU, *"Des 'Boues rouges' ê Aléria: la décisive poussée des autonomistes corses."* VINCENT STAGNARA, *"Les sens de la Révolution Corse."* JOSE GIL, *"La puissance d'un peuple."* Articles and documents relating to the recent emergence of a radical movement for Corsican self-determination.

THEORY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 3, No. 2

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., Box 330, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. $13.50 per year. JUERGEN HABERMAS, *"Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics."* Begins with a presentation of the distinctive domains of the objectivity of external nature, the normative character of society, the intersubjectivity of language, and the subjectivity of internal nature. The viewpoint of universal pragmatics is adopted to analyze speech acts in order to rationally reconstruct the general structures of speech, thereby exhibiting the communicative competence of the adult speaker. Three general stages of the development of communicative competence are distinguished according to the degree of differentiation between speaking and acting and speaking and knowing. RICHARD H. BROWN, *"Social Theory as Metaphor."* Claims that knowledge, be it in science, art or social theory, is metaphoric. But the three enterprises are not metaphoric in the same sense, and sociologists especially have not understood this. Sociologists have seen scientific theorizing as a choice between scientific rigor and poetic insight or intuition. Though no one metaphor or group of metaphors may claim ultimate priority over others, it is claimed that we do have criteria for judging what constitutes a metaphor that works. ROLAND WULBERT, *"Conventions of Theorizing and Multiple Personality."* A (quasi-?)ethnomethodological discussion of the convention of "required immediacy" in reasoning. This refers to the notion that appraisals initially require an immediate relation between what is up for judgment

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and the criterion for judging. BARRY BARNES, JOHN LAW, *"Whatever Should Be Done with Indexical Expressions?"* Argues for the universality of indexicality by attempting to show that discourse in the natural sciences and formal mathematics is indexical in the same way as everyday discourse. TRACY STRONG, *"Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche's Critique of Epistemology."* Claims that Nietzsche's thoughts on language may in one sense be described as a combination of Sapir-Whorfian anthropological linguistics and ordinary language philosophy or as an anthropologically conceived pre-sage of Wittgenstein. For Nietzsche language serves a double function of being both the means by which we construct the world and the source for providing the tools with which we must deal with the world. This leads Nietzsche to a position of nihilism because "the present structure of human life forces men to continue searching for that which their understanding tells them is not to be found." CORNELIUS DISCO, *"Ludwig Wittgenstein and the End of Wild Conjectures."* An explication of Wittgenstein which leads to the notion that all sciences are embedded in an historical and institution tradition which is ultimately based on everyday language—itself historically situated. For the *Sozialwissenschaften*, in particular, sociology, this involves additional considerations. The sociologist must abandon all quest for absolute objectivity in favor of a more epistemologically suitable "grasping" of human life as a member of that life.

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